New Precedent on Digital Privacy and Defamation: Consent and Accurate Reporting in Social Media Broadcasting

Introduction

In the judgment of Shazia Ilmi v. Rajdeep Sardesai & Ors. delivered by the Delhi High Court on April 4, 2025, the Court examined the intricate balance between the right to privacy and freedom of expression. The case concerns a high-profile political figure who, after participating in a live televised debate, alleged that Defendants—prominent journalists, news anchors, and social media agencies—violated her privacy by recording and publishing video footage without her consent. At the core of the dispute was an 18-second segment of video captured in her private residence, and a subsequent “Impugned Quote Tweet” that commented on her withdrawal from the debate and her conduct.

The parties involved include Shazia Ilmi (the Plaintiff), who is a national spokesperson and former journalist, and multiple Defendants, namely reputed media personalities and news entities. The Plaintiff seeks permanent and interim injunctions to remove the impugned video and defamatory content, asserting that her privacy and dignity have been compromised by unauthorized recording and publication.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court reviewed detailed submissions from both sides and examined video evidence, transcript reports, and prior tweets made by the Plaintiff. It held that while the Plaintiff had consented to being recorded during the live debate, her consent did not extend to the recording of the 18-second footage after she had explicitly withdrawn from the live session in the privacy of her home. This post-withdrawal recording, which showed intimate details of her residence and vulnerable state, was adjudged to be in violation of her privacy. Moreover, specific comments in the impugned Quote Tweet—particularly phrases like "chuck the mike" and "throw him out of your house"—were found to be inaccurate and not protected by the defence of truth.

Accordingly, the interim injunction directing removal of the video and certain defamatory comments was confirmed, while other parts of the Tweet were left intact as they were either unchallenged or supported by the defence of truth. The judgment also noted procedural shortcomings by the Plaintiff for not disclosing relevant tweets that formed part of the conversation thread.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The judgment relies on several seminal precedents:

KS Puttaswamy v. Union of India – Clarifying the subjective nature of the right to privacy and cementing the idea that an individual’s domicile is a sanctuary where one can “be let alone.”
R. Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors. – Emphasizing the delicate balance between freedom of speech and the right to privacy, especially concerning public figures.
Martin v. Senators, Inc. & Meter v. Los Angeles – These cases were cited to discuss the implications of consent in recording and the limits of privacy once consent is granted in one context, but not in another.
Bonnard v. Perryman and Fraser v. Evans – These established principles for granting interim injunctions in defamation cases, highlighting that pre-trial interferences must be approached with caution to protect free speech.

Each of these precedents shaped the Court’s findings by establishing that a consent given for participatory recording (i.e., during a live debate) does not pre-authorize further recording in a private setting once the event concludes.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning unfolded in two main parts:

Privacy Violation: The Court noted that although the Plaintiff consented to be recorded during the live debate, her withdrawal from the debate signified a clear end to that consent. The subsequent 18-second footage captured in her private space (where details like her bedroom, her changed appearance, and her vulnerable state were visible) was published without her consent. The Court applied the principle from Gobind v. State of MP and Kharak Singh v. State of MP, holding that every individual has the right to a private and sanctified space even if they are a public figure.
Defamation through Misrepresentation: Focusing on the text element of the impugned Quote Tweet, the Court analyzed specific phrases. It determined that while remarks such as “abuse our video journalist” could be justified by the video evidence, the phrases “chuck the mike” and “throw him out of your house” were not substantially correct. As the defence of truth requires that the statement be “substantially correct,” those parts of the remark did not meet the requisite standard.

In reaching its decision, the Court carefully weighed the balance between protecting an individual’s right to privacy and upholding the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression. However, it stressed that such a balance does not permit unauthorized recording and sensationalized commentary that may lead to public ridicule or defamation.

Impact of the Judgment

This decision is likely to have wide-ranging implications:

Stricter Consent Norms: Media entities and journalists will now need to exercise greater caution. Consent for recording will be strictly confined to the agreed terms; any attempt to record or broadcast content beyond that scope, particularly in private spaces, may lead to successful defamation or privacy claims.
Enhanced Privacy Protection for Public Figures: Despite their public roles, public figures retain a strong right to privacy in settings where their personal dignity and body integrity are at stake. Future litigations could reference this judgment when addressing unauthorized recordings.
Journalistic Accountability: The ruling underscores strict adherence to the Norms of Journalistic Conduct. Media outlets and individual journalists must verify their actions before publishing contentious content, ensuring that statements regarding another’s behavior are both accurate and supported by clear evidence.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Some of the legal concepts underpinning this judgment may appear complex. Below is a simplified explanation:

Consent and Waiver: Consent given in one situation (e.g., a live debate) does not mean the individual has agreed to be recorded at all subsequent times. When the individual withdraws, the right to privacy automatically resumes.
Defamation and Truth Defence: In defamation cases, a statement must be “substantially correct” to be protected by the truth defence. If the statement—even if partly based on fact—is exaggerated or distorted, it may not be deemed accurate, thereby failing the truth test.
Interim Injunctions: These are temporary court orders used to stop potentially harmful actions (like publishing unauthorized content) until a full trial can be conducted. The Court’s decision here balances potential harm against the rights of free speech.

Conclusion

The Delhi High Court’s decision in Shazia Ilmi v. Rajdeep Sardesai & Ors. sets a significant precedent by delineating the boundaries of consent in digital recording and the limits on defamatory commentary on social media. While acknowledging the importance of freedom of the press, the Court firmly asserts that no one—regardless of their public profile—can waive their right to privacy beyond the scope of the original consent.

Key takeaways include:

Consent during a live public event is limited to that context, and withdrawal from the event terminates such consent.
Defamatory comments must be “substantially correct” to be protected by the truth defence; exaggerations and mischaracterizations will not be accepted.
Media practitioners must adhere to established norms of journalistic conduct and verify their content before publication.

This judgment is poised to influence future cases concerning the intersection of digital media, personal privacy, and defamation, ensuring a more nuanced and balanced approach in judicial interpretations.