Mere Residence Is Not an “Integral Part” of Cause of Action under Article 226 in Anti-Defection Writs: MP High Court (Indore) Applies Forum Conveniens

Case: Umang Singhar v. The State of Madhya Pradesh & Others (2025 MPHC-IND 24519)

Court: High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Bench at Indore

Coram: Hon’ble Shri Justice Pranay Verma

Decision Date: 1 September 2025 (Reserved on 31 July 2025)

Proceeding: Writ Petition No. 38050 of 2024 under Article 226 of the Constitution

Introduction

This matter arises from a challenge brought by Shri Umang Singhar, an MLA from Gandhwani (Constituency No. 197), to the alleged inaction of the Speaker of the Madhya Pradesh Legislative Assembly (respondent no. 2) in adjudicating his disqualification petition filed under Rule 6 of the Madhya Pradesh Vidhansabha Sadasya (Dal Parivartan Ke Adhar Par Nirharta) Niyam, 1986. The petitioner sought the disqualification of respondent no. 4—an MLA elected from Bina (Constituency No. 35, District Sagar) as an Indian National Congress (INC) candidate—on the ground of defection under paragraph 2(1)(a) of the Tenth Schedule, read with Article 191(2) of the Constitution.

The central issue decided by the Indore Bench was not the merits of the alleged defection but a preliminary jurisdictional objection: whether the Indore Bench had territorial jurisdiction under Article 226(2) to entertain the writ petition merely because the petitioner resides in and represents a constituency within its territorial limits. The Court answered this in the negative, dismissing the petition for want of territorial jurisdiction, while expressly preserving the petitioner’s liberty to approach the competent Bench.

Key Issues

Whether the Indore Bench had territorial jurisdiction under Article 226(2) when the petitioner resides within its territorial limits but the impugned inaction and the relevant official acts are located outside, i.e., at Bhopal and Sagar.
Whether a petitioner’s residence can be treated as an “integral part” of the cause of action for purposes of Article 226(2).
Whether the doctrine of forum conveniens applies to decline discretionary writ jurisdiction even if a minimal part of the cause of action is asserted within the forum.

Summary of the Judgment

The High Court (Indore Bench) dismissed the writ petition for lack of territorial jurisdiction. The Court held:

Residence is irrelevant to cause of action: The petitioner’s residence or the location of his constituency (Dhar/Indore Bench jurisdiction) does not, by itself, confer territorial jurisdiction under Article 226(2). Residence is not an “integral part” of the cause of action.
Seat of authority and locus of dispute control: The alleged inaction was by the Speaker whose office is at Bhopal, and the respondent MLA represents Bina in District Sagar. The integral facts giving rise to the grievance—filing and adjudication of the disqualification petition—are anchored in Bhopal and Sagar, both outside the Indore Bench’s territorial domain.
Forum conveniens: Even assuming arguendo that a sliver of cause of action could be said to arise at Indore (by reason of residence), the Court declined to exercise its discretionary writ jurisdiction by applying the doctrine of forum conveniens, referring to Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd.
Petitioner’s authorities distinguished: The decisions cited by the petitioner primarily addressed anti-defection merits or general Article 226 propositions, not the precise territorial jurisdiction objection presented here.

Result: Petition dismissed on maintainability (territorial jurisdiction) with liberty to approach the competent Bench.

Detailed Analysis

1) Precedents and Prior Authorities Cited

(a) ONGC v. Utpal Kumar Basu, (1994) 4 SCC 711

Principle: A High Court’s territorial jurisdiction under Article 226(2) depends on where the cause of action arises—wholly or in part—and not on incidental or tenuous facts. The Supreme Court decried “forum shopping,” holding that mere reading of a tender notice at a place or presence of the petitioner’s office does not furnish cause of action there.

Relevance here: The Court used the Utpal Kumar Basu restraint to reject reliance on petitioner’s residence as a hook for jurisdiction. The material facts were where the Speaker would act (Bhopal) and where the MLA’s constituency lies (Sagar), not the petitioner’s residence in Dhar.

(b) Union of India v. Adani Exports Ltd., (2002) 1 SCC 567

Principle: Facts forming the cause of action must have a nexus with the dispute; extraneous or peripheral facts cannot be invoked to confer jurisdiction.

Relevance: Supports the Court’s conclusion that a litigant’s residence or place of correspondence has no nexus to the Speaker’s inaction and therefore cannot be treated as an “integral” fact.

(c) Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India

Principle: The mere location of the Union or enactment at a place does not automatically furnish cause of action there; more importantly, even where a part of the cause of action arises, a High Court may decline to exercise jurisdiction by invoking the doctrine of forum conveniens.

Relevance: The judgment explicitly invoked Kusum Ingots to hold that, even on the petitioner’s best case, the Indore Bench should refrain from exercising discretionary jurisdiction because the substantially convenient forum lies where the Speaker sits and where the MLA’s constituency is located.

(d) State of Goa v. Summit Online Trade Solutions Pvt. Ltd., (2023) 7 SCC 791

Principle: Reaffirmed the cause-of-action test under Article 226(2), cautioning that mere “consequential effects” or fortuitous facts cannot expand jurisdiction. The place where the decision is taken or where the primary facts occur is determinative.

Relevance: The Court’s reliance aligns with Summit Online’s emphasis on substance over form: the gravamen—adjudication of a disqualification petition—is centered in Bhopal (Speaker’s office), not where the petitioner happens to reside.

(e) MP High Court precedents

Rajendra Singh Bhadoriya v. Union Of India, 2019 SCC OnLine MP 6110: Held that a litigating party’s residence is not an integral part of cause of action; included reliance on Prem Prakash Ambedkar v. UOI (2001) and Jaswant Singh v. UOI (J&K HC, 2017). This was the principal intra-High Court authority applied.
Amit Singh Tomar v. Union Of India (W.P. No. 19795/2024, decided 24.07.2024): A petitioner’s posting at Gwalior did not confer territorial jurisdiction where the impugned dismissal order was passed in Srinagar (J&K).

(f) Petitioner’s authorities

The petitioner cited anti-defection decisions—Keisham Meghachandra Singh v. Speaker, Manipur LA, Rajendra Singh Rana v. Swami Prasad Maurya, and Ravi S. Naik v. Union Of India—which affirm the Speaker’s adjudicatory obligations and the justiciability of delays. The Court held these were not determinative on the territorial jurisdiction question before it. Other citations (e.g., Ambica Industries, Chandrahas, Tirupati Dhar Renewable Power) were distinguished as not directly addressing Article 226(2) territoriality in the circumstances at hand.

2) The Court’s Legal Reasoning

(i) Article 226(2) and the “integral facts” test

Article 226(2) empowers a High Court to issue writs where the “cause of action, wholly or in part, arises.” The Court emphasized that only those facts that are integral to the dispute can constitute the cause of action. Applying this:

Integral locations: The Speaker’s office is in Bhopal and any decision on the disqualification petition would issue from there; the MLA whose disqualification is sought represents Bina, District Sagar.
Non-integral location: The petitioner’s residence/constituency in Dhar (Indore Bench jurisdiction) bears no legal connection to the Speaker’s inaction and thus is not part of the cause of action.

(ii) Residence does not create jurisdiction

Relying on Rajendra Singh Bhadoriya and aligned authorities, the Court reiterated that a person’s residence is a matter of personal choice and does not, by itself, generate a legal nexus with the subject matter of the lis. Consequently, residence cannot be treated as an integral fact to ground jurisdiction.

(iii) Forum conveniens in writs

Even assuming that some minuscule aspect of the cause of action could be said to arise within the Indore Bench’s territory (which the Court did not concede), the Court invoked the doctrine of forum conveniens to decline the exercise of its discretionary writ jurisdiction. The appropriate and convenient forum was where the primary decision-making occurs (Bhopal), and where the MLA’s constituency lies (Sagar). This approach derives directly from Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd.

(iv) Inapplicability of merits-based anti-defection jurisprudence

While Supreme Court cases like Keisham Meghachandra Singh have required timely adjudication by Speakers, such merits-based obligations presuppose a court with jurisdiction. The Indore Bench carefully confined itself to the gatekeeping issue—territorial jurisdiction—leaving merits for the competent Bench.

3) Impact and Prospective Significance

(a) Clear locational anchors for anti-defection writs

This decision provides a practical rule-of-thumb: In state-level anti-defection challenges (including writs seeking mandamus to the Speaker to decide disqualification petitions), the proper territorial forum is generally:

The seat of the Speaker (place of adjudicatory inaction/action), and
The constituency and legislative seat of the member whose disqualification is sought.

By contrast, a petitioner-MLA’s residence or constituency is not determinative.

(b) Curbing forum shopping within multi-bench High Courts

The ruling meaningfully limits intra-court forum shopping. In Madhya Pradesh, where the High Court functions through benches at Jabalpur (principal seat), Indore, and Gwalior, litigants cannot select a bench merely because they reside or hold office in that bench’s territorial expanse when the heart of the dispute lies elsewhere. For anti-defection matters involving the Speaker at Bhopal, the appropriate filing will typically be before the competent Bench exercising territorial jurisdiction over Bhopal (ordinarily, the principal seat at Jabalpur).

(c) Reinforcing forum conveniens in writ jurisdiction

The Court’s explicit resort to forum conveniens underscores that Article 226 is a discretionary remedy. Even if minimal or contrived connections exist, High Courts may channel cases to the most substantially connected forum, promoting judicial efficiency and consistency.

(d) Procedural roadmap for anti-defection litigants

File the disqualification petition under the 1986 Rules before the Speaker.
If alleging delay/inaction, approach the High Court Bench with territorial nexus to the Speaker’s office (Bhopal) and the MLA’s constituency (Sagar), not the petitioner’s residence.
Relief sought will typically be a mandamus to decide within a reasonable period (guided by Keisham Meghachandra Singh), but only the properly seised Bench can consider this on merits.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Article 226(2): “Cause of Action, Wholly or in Part”

Cause of action refers to the bundle of essential facts that a petitioner must prove to obtain relief. Under Article 226(2), a High Court can exercise jurisdiction if those essential facts arise within its territorial reach. Incidental or convenient facts (like residence) do not count unless they are part of the essential bundle.

“Integral Part” of the Cause of Action

An integral fact is one without which the claim would fail. For a challenge to the Speaker’s inaction, the “where” is the Speaker’s seat (Bhopal), not the petitioner’s residence. Thus, residence is not integral.

Doctrine of Forum Conveniens

This is a principle allowing courts with jurisdiction to decline to exercise it if another forum is substantially more appropriate for the case. In writ practice, it prevents the expansion of jurisdiction through tenuous connections and ensures cases are heard where the decision-making and operative facts reside.

Tenth Schedule and Article 191(2)

Tenth Schedule, para 2(1)(a): A member is disqualified if he voluntarily gives up membership of his political party.
Article 191(2): Disqualifications for membership of the State Legislature include those specified in the Tenth Schedule.
Role of Speaker: The Speaker adjudicates disqualification petitions; courts can, in appropriate cases, issue directions to ensure timely decision-making, subject to jurisdictional constraints.

Writ of Mandamus in this Context

A mandamus compels a public authority to perform a statutory or constitutional duty. Here, the petitioner sought a mandamus to compel the Speaker to decide the disqualification petition. The availability of such relief turns first on territorial jurisdiction.

Critical Appraisal

The judgment is consistent with the Supreme Court’s settled approach to Article 226(2), reinforcing that the expansionary “cause of action in part” clause cannot be used to justify forum shopping. Applying this in the anti-defection context is practically significant because these cases often attract political urgency and may invite strategic filing. By firmly tethering jurisdiction to the seat of the Speaker and the respondent MLA’s constituency, the Court promotes predictability and coherence.

One procedural note: some High Courts occasionally “return” or transfer writ petitions to the appropriate Bench, but dismissal with liberty is equally orthodox in maintainability rulings. The Court’s preservation of liberty to approach the competent Bench appropriately mitigates prejudice from the dismissal.

Conclusion

New rule crystallized: In anti-defection writs under Article 226, the petitioner’s residence or constituency is not an integral part of the cause of action. The proper territorial forum is determined by where the Speaker sits and where the impugned inaction or decision occurs, and, as applicable, the respondent MLA’s constituency.
Forum conveniens affirmed: Even if a minimal or contrived part of the cause of action is shown within a Bench’s territory, that Bench may decline jurisdiction in favor of the substantially connected forum.
Practical implication: For Madhya Pradesh, challenges to the Speaker’s inaction in disqualification matters should ordinarily be filed before the Bench with territorial nexus to Bhopal (and Sagar in this case), not Indore merely because the petitioner resides or represents a constituency there.
Outcome: Petition dismissed for want of territorial jurisdiction; liberty reserved to approach the competent Bench.

Referenced Authorities

Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu, (1994) 4 SCC 711
Union of India v. Adani Exports Ltd., (2002) 1 SCC 567
Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India, (2004) 6 SCC 254 (principle cited as “forum conveniens” in Article 226)
State of Goa v. Summit Online Trade Solutions Pvt. Ltd., (2023) 7 SCC 791
Rajendra Singh Bhadoriya v. Union Of India, 2019 SCC OnLine MP 6110
Amit Singh Tomar v. Union Of India, W.P. No. 19795/2024 (MPHC, 24 July 2024)
Keisham Meghachandra Singh v. Speaker, Manipur Legislative Assembly, (2020) 2 SCC 614; reported as 2021 (16) SCC 503 (on timelines for Speaker’s decision) – distinguished
Rajendra Singh Rana v. Swami Prasad Maurya, (2007) 4 SCC 270 – distinguished
Ravi S. Naik v. Union Of India, 1994 Supp (2) SCC 641 – distinguished

Note: This commentary analyzes the jurisdictional holding. The merits of the anti-defection claim remain open for consideration by the competent Bench.