Mere Presence During Rioting: Supreme Court Upholds the Standard for Unlawful Assembly Liability

1. Introduction

In DHIRUBHAI BHAILALBHAI CHAUHAN & ANR. v. STATE OF GUJARAT (2025 INSC 381), the Supreme Court of India considered the appeal of six individuals (and one who had passed away during trial) who had been convicted by the High Court of Gujarat for being part of an unlawful assembly. The alleged assembly conducted acts of violence and property destruction in the midst of riots that occurred at Village Vadod in the State of Gujarat post the Godhra incident of early 2002.

The core legal questions were whether the appellants could be held guilty solely by virtue of their presence at the scene of the riot, and if the High Court was justified in reversing the trial court’s acquittal purely on that ground. The Supreme Court delved deeply into the evidentiary standards required to infer participation in an unlawful assembly, ultimately emphasizing that mere presence without further incriminating conduct or evidence is insufficient for criminal liability under the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court overturned the High Court’s partial reversal of the trial court’s acquittal. It restored the trial court’s original conclusion that the prosecution had failed to establish any specific overt act or incitement on the part of the appellants. The Court noted that the appellants happened to be at the scene of a large-scale riot – comprising over a thousand individuals – and that no prohibited orders (such as curfew) were in place at the time. Absent concrete evidence showing their active participation in the violence, or any incriminating material seized from them, the Court held there was no basis to presume guilt. Emphasizing caution in mass-riot scenarios, the Court underscored that it is “extremely difficult to particularize what each person in a large mob has done,” while also ensuring that innocent bystanders are not wrongfully convicted.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

The Supreme Court referred to notable precedents on unlawful assemblies, including Masalti v. State Of U.P., Busi Koteswara Rao & others v. State of Andhra Pradesh, and Nagarjit Ahir v. State Of Bihar. These cases address the principle that, while it can be difficult to assign individualized roles in large disruptive gatherings, courts must avoid guilt by mere association or presence.

The judgments iterate that the onus is on the prosecution to prove an accused person’s active participation or clear intention in a mob’s criminal activities – whether through incitement, actual violence, or possession of destructive implements. The Supreme Court’s reliance on these authorities reinforced the doctrine that a mere bystander or a curious onlooker cannot be presumed guilty simply because he or she was present near the scene of a riot.

B. Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning centered on the principle enshrined in Section 149 of the IPC, which assigns vicarious liability to every member of an unlawful assembly for acts committed in pursuit of the assembly’s common object. The Court clarified that liability under this provision emerges only when:

• There is proof of the accused’s participation or active membership in the group, signified by overt acts or possession of instruments/weapons capable of furthering the unlawful objective.
• The prosecution can highlight specific evidence differentiating the accused from a mere spectator or a resident who was naturally present at or near the scene.

In this case, the High Court convicted the appellants on the ground that police had arrested them at the scene of the riot. However, the Supreme Court concluded that mere presence and subsequent arrest during the “stampede-like” dispersal was not enough to show they were active participants. Critically, none of the officers provided clear testimony detailing how the arrests occurred or what the appellants specifically did prior to apprehension.

C. Impact

This ruling carries potentially far-reaching implications for the handling of riot-related prosecutions. It effectively safeguards the rights of innocent bystanders who may be swept up in large disturbances. Prosecutions in future similar cases will be required to prove active engagement or specific unlawful behavior, rather than relying solely on location and timing. Simultaneously, it underscores the necessity of thorough police investigations, including gathering of strong eyewitness accounts and material evidence to link individuals to the actual acts of wrongdoing.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Unlawful Assembly (Section 149 IPC): A group of five or more persons with a common object to commit an offense or carry out a common purpose in a violent or disruptive manner. Each member may be held liable for the actions of the entire group if it is proved they shared the purpose or actively participated in it.

Vicarious Liability: Under criminal law, “vicarious liability” means every member of a group can be held responsible for offenses committed by any member in furtherance of the group’s unlawful common purpose. However, the prosecution must still demonstrate that the accused consciously joined or supported the group’s illegal objective.

Bystander: A person who is merely present where an incident takes place without a contributing wrongdoing or complicity. The Court cautioned that, in large mob situations, many individuals may appear present but not necessarily partake in illegal actions.

5. Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s decision in Chauhan & Anr. v. State of Gujarat underscores the principle that, where a large crowd is involved in an act of rioting, the mere presence of an individual at the scene does not create an irrebuttable inference of guilt. Restoring the trial court’s acquittal, the Court cautioned against convicting innocent bystanders, stressing the need for tangible, corroborative evidence that shows active participation or incitement to violence.

In practical terms, this case highlights the importance of careful evidence-gathering and rigorous scrutiny of witness statements when prosecuting mob-related offenses. While acknowledging the unique difficulties involved in mass-riot cases, the Court firmly reinforced the fundamental doctrine that freedom from undue conviction is paramount. Indeed, aligning with analogous precedents, the judgment affirms that courts must remain vigilant to errors arising from ambiguous or generalized evidence, hence ensuring that “mere presence” does not suffice to impose criminal liability.