Mere Framing of Issues Is Not Commencement of Trial; Subsequent Facts and Additional Divorce Grounds Can Be Introduced by Amendment

Introduction

This commentary examines the Allahabad High Court’s decision in Chitranshi v. Rajnarayan Tripathi (Matters under Article 227 No. 1261 of 2023), delivered on September 22, 2025 by Hon’ble Manish Kumar Nigam, J. The case arose from matrimonial proceedings under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (HMA), in which the husband (plaintiff-respondent) sought divorce on grounds including desertion and cruelty. During the pendency of the case, and after issues were framed, the husband sought to amend his pleadings under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) to incorporate subsequent facts that, in his view, further substantiated cruelty.

The wife (defendant-petitioner) challenged the Family Court’s order allowing the amendment on the footing that the application was made after framing of issues—hence barred by the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 CPC—and that the amendment impermissibly altered the cause of action by introducing a new ground. The High Court was called upon, in its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, to test the legality and propriety of the Family Court’s order dated December 12, 2022 permitting amendment on costs of Rs. 800.

At the core were two legal issues:

When does “commencement of trial” occur for the purposes of the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 CPC, and does mere framing of issues bar amendments?
Can a petitioner in a divorce proceeding amend the petition to add subsequent facts and/or additional grounds under Section 13 HMA without impermissibly changing the cause of action?

Summary of the Judgment

The High Court dismissed the Article 227 petition and upheld the Family Court’s order allowing amendment. Key holdings include:

Mere framing of issues does not, by itself, amount to commencement of trial. In the present case, no evidence had been led; hence the timing of the amendment did not attract the strict bar under the proviso to Order VI Rule 17.
Even if the trial had technically commenced, amendments can still be permitted if, despite due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter earlier, or if the facts arose subsequently and are necessary to determine the real controversy.
In matrimonial disputes under Section 13 HMA, there is no prohibition against pleading multiple statutory grounds. Adding subsequent facts—particularly those that may amount to cruelty—does not necessarily change the cause of action. Even if an additional ground is sought to be introduced, an amendment may be allowed to avoid multiplicity of proceedings.
The proposed amendments in paragraphs 7, 11, and 14 were found to be elaborations of facts that emerged during pendency, potentially relevant to the ground of cruelty, and therefore necessary for a complete adjudication.
The writ petition lacked merit; directions were issued to the Family Court to expedite the trial in accordance with Section 21-B HMA.

Detailed Analysis

Factual Background and Procedural History

The husband instituted a divorce petition (Marriage Petition No. 291 of 2020) under Section 13 HMA on grounds of desertion and cruelty. The wife filed a written statement denying the allegations. On July 27, 2022, the Family Court framed issues (in essence, whether the husband was entitled to a decree of divorce and consequential reliefs). Thereafter, on October 13, 2022, the husband moved an application under Order VI Rule 17 CPC to amend three paragraphs of the petition to:

Para 7: add that the wife persistently doubted and accused the husband of extramarital relations—an assertion linked to cruelty.
Para 11: introduce allegations concerning the wife’s close association with a colleague (named) and the nature of their interactions, said to go beyond mere friendship, causing mental agony to the husband—again pleaded as cruelty.
Para 14: narrate a specific incident dated July 29, 2022 of alleged abuse and criminal intimidation by the wife and her colleague, the lodging of an FIR under Sections 504 and 506 IPC, and the husband’s pleaded apprehension for his safety—facts said to have arisen during the pendency.

The Family Court allowed the amendment on December 12, 2022. The wife invoked Article 227, contending that: (i) post-issue amendment was barred by the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 CPC; (ii) CPC procedure applies to Family Court proceedings by virtue of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 and Section 21 HMA; and (iii) the amendments altered the cause of action by adding a new ground.

Statutory Scheme Engaged

Section 13 HMA: enumerates statutory grounds for divorce including cruelty and desertion, among others.
Order VI Rule 17 CPC: empowers courts to permit amendments at any stage to determine the real questions in controversy; proviso restricts post-commencement-of-trial amendments unless due diligence is established.
Order XIV CPC: framing of issues; identifies the first hearing and crystallizes points of variance.
Order XVIII CPC: hearing and production of evidence; indicates the stage at which the party with the right to begin leads evidence.
Section 10 Family Courts Act read with Section 21 HMA: apply CPC procedure to matrimonial proceedings subject to statutory variations.
Section 21-B HMA: mandates expeditious trial of matrimonial causes.

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1) Mohinder Kumar Mehra v. Roop Rani Mehra, (2018) 2 SCC 132

The High Court placed principal reliance on this decision. The Supreme Court retraced the evolution of Order VI Rule 17 (omitted in 1999 and restored in 2002 with a proviso) and clarified:

Object: to prevent parties from introducing new cases after evidence has commenced, thereby curbing delay and surprise.
Commencement of trial: While technically it begins when the case is posted for evidence after issues, amendments may still be allowed if filed before evidence or if the parties lead evidence keeping in view the proposed amendments such that no prejudice is caused.
Courts retain discretion to allow amendments post-commencement when due diligence is shown and the amendment is necessary to determine the real controversy.

The Allahabad High Court used this precedent to hold that merely framing issues is not the decisive bar; in any case, the correct focus is on whether evidence has begun and whether due diligence/subsequent facts justify amendment.

2) Vidyabai v. Padmalatha, (2009) 2 SCC 409

Vidyabai is critical on the timing question: the Supreme Court held that filing of affidavits in lieu of examination-in-chief marks the commencement of “trial” for the proviso. It also observed that the date of framing issues is the “first hearing,” not necessarily the start of trial. The High Court’s observation that mere framing of issues does not mean commencement is consistent with this line.

3) Salem Advocate Bar Association (T.N.) v. Union of India, (2005) 6 SCC 344

Cited for the object of the 2002 amendment to Order VI Rule 17: to prevent belated and dilatory amendments after trial commences unless due diligence exists. The High Court invoked this to emphasize that the proviso is a curtailment, not an absolute prohibition.

4) Rajesh Kumar Aggarwal v. K.K. Modi, (2006) 4 SCC 385

This authority clarifies the structure of Order VI Rule 17: the first limb is discretionary (“may”) and the second limb is imperative (“shall”)—all amendments necessary to determine the real controversy must be allowed, provided no injustice or irremediable prejudice is caused. The High Court relied on this principle to adopt a liberal approach in the matrimonial context where subsequent events impact the core controversy.

5) Chander Kanta Bansal v. Rajinder Singh Anand, (2008) 5 SCC 117

Reaffirms that the 2002 amendment aims to prevent surprise and delay—nonetheless, courts may permit post-commencement amendments where due diligence is shown. This supports the High Court’s stance that subsequent facts material to cruelty can and should be brought on record to do complete justice.

6) Nitaben Dinesh Patel v. Dinesh Dayabhai Patel, (2021) 20 SCC 210

Of particular relevance to matrimonial matters: the Supreme Court allowed an amendment after commencement of trial when the fact of an actual second marriage surfaced during cross-examination—an instance of subsequent knowledge. The High Court analogized this to hold that when critical facts emerge later (here, conduct and an FIR post-filing), amendments may be allowed to ensure that the real dispute (e.g., cruelty) is adjudicated comprehensively.

7) Raj Kumar Gurawara v. S.K. Sarwagi & Co. Pvt. Ltd., (2008) 14 SCC 364

Relied upon by the petitioner to argue restraint on amendments that change the nature of the case or cause of action. The High Court distinguished this, noting that the proposed amendments here did not transform the nature of the matrimonial cause; rather, they elaborated the cruelty ground with subsequent events. Furthermore, even if a new ground under Section 13 HMA were sought, courts may allow such addition to avoid multiplicity, subject to fairness and absence of prejudice.

Legal Reasoning

The High Court’s reasoning proceeds in three linked steps:

Commencement of Trial and the Proviso: Drawing from Mohinder Kumar Mehra and Vidyabai, the Court held that “commencement of trial” is not synonymous with “framing of issues.” In this case, no evidence had begun; therefore, the technical bar under the proviso had not crystallized. Even if one assumed technical commencement (say, upon listing for evidence), courts can still permit amendments if due diligence is shown or if material facts arose later.
Subsequent Facts and the Real Controversy: The Court underscored that Order VI Rule 17 is anchored in enabling the court to determine the real controversy. Where facts come into existence after filing (e.g., conduct allegedly amounting to cruelty; penal complaints lodged during pendency), bringing them on record is essential for a fair and complete adjudication. The Court cited Nitaben to show that subsequent revelations—even mid-trial—may warrant amendment if promptly sought, which was the case here (amendment moved soon after issues).
Cause of Action vs. Grounds Under Section 13 HMA: The Court rejected the contention that the amendment impermissibly changed the cause of action. The original petition pleaded cruelty and desertion; the proposed additions were pegged to cruelty and were, in substance, elaborative. Importantly, the Court added that, conceptually, Section 13 HMA permits a petition on one or more grounds; a decision on one ground does not operate as res judicata against another. Therefore, even if an additional statutory ground were introduced via amendment, that would be permissible to avoid multiplicity and to consolidate matrimonial disputes in one proceeding—subject always to fairness to the opposite party.

Applying these principles, the Court found that the Family Court had exercised discretion judiciously by allowing the amendment with nominal costs, without causing demonstrable prejudice, and in aid of a comprehensive resolution. Consequently, no ground for supervisory interference under Article 227 was made out.

Impact and Prospective Significance

Timing of Amendments: The judgment reinforces that mere framing of issues does not foreclose amendments; the critical threshold is commencement of evidence. Even post-commencement, courts retain a measured discretion to allow amendments when subsequent facts emerge or due diligence is shown.
Matrimonial Litigation Efficiency: It encourages consolidation of all relevant grounds and subsequent events in a single matrimonial proceeding. This curtails multiplicity of suits/petitions, aligns with Section 21-B’s mandate for expeditious disposal, and reduces the risk of fragmented adjudication.
Subsequent Events in Family Law: Conduct during the pendency—especially acts alleged to constitute mental cruelty—can be legitimately brought into pleadings, ensuring that the court’s decree reflects the complete and current state of the marital relationship.
Res Judicata Clarified: While not the primary holding, the Court’s observation that a decision on one Section 13 ground does not bar litigation on another confirms a liberal approach to allow amendment for additional grounds, reducing the need for successive petitions.
Procedural Fairness: Although the Court affirmed a liberal approach, it implicitly preserved safeguards: costs for delay or inconvenience; opportunity to file additional written statements; and, critically, avoidance of prejudice to the other side.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Order VI Rule 17 CPC (Amendment of Pleadings): This rule lets parties change or add to their pleadings so that the court can decide the real dispute. After trial begins, amendments are harder to get unless you show you couldn’t have pleaded the point earlier despite diligence, or the facts arose later.
“Commencement of Trial”: In civil procedure, trial usually “commences” when the case moves to the evidence stage—often when affidavits for examination-in-chief are filed. Framing of issues is not the same as the start of trial.
Cause of Action vs. Ground of Relief: “Cause of action” is the bundle of facts giving the right to sue. In divorce cases, the HMA specifies multiple “grounds” (e.g., cruelty, desertion). Pleading additional facts supporting an existing ground usually does not change the cause of action. Even adding another statutory ground may be permissible to resolve the dispute comprehensively.
Subsequent Events: Facts that occur after filing the case. Courts often allow these to be brought on record if they materially affect the rights of parties or the relief to be granted, particularly in ongoing relational disputes like matrimonial cases.
Article 227 Supervisory Jurisdiction: The High Court does not re-try cases or substitute its discretion lightly. It intervenes only for jurisdictional errors, patent illegality, or perversity. Discretionary interlocutory orders (like allowing an amendment) are rarely disturbed unless such errors are shown.
Section 21-B HMA (Expeditious Trial): Matrimonial cases are to be decided quickly. Courts thus balance allowing necessary amendments with firm control over delays and adjournments.

Why the Precedents Mattered Here

Mohinder Kumar Mehra and Vidyabai: Clarified the moment of “commencement,” allowing the High Court to reject the argument that framing of issues automatically bars amendments.
Salem Advocate Bar Association and Chander Kanta Bansal: Framed the policy: curb undue delay but not at the cost of shutting out necessary facts. This dual aim guided the Court to allow the amendment while keeping control over the trial timeline.
Nitaben Dinesh Patel: Illustrated the matrimonial context, where crucial facts surface during trial; the Supreme Court endorsed amendments to reflect such realities. The High Court extended this rationale to later-arising facts relevant to cruelty.
Rajesh Kumar Aggarwal: Emphasized that necessary amendments “shall” be made; thus, if the facts are central to determining cruelty, the court’s duty is to allow the amendment absent prejudice.
Raj Kumar Gurawara: Recognized as stating caution against amendments that fundamentally alter the nature of the case. The High Court persuasively explained why that caution did not apply here since the amendments supplemented, rather than supplanted, the pleaded cruelty ground.

Practical Takeaways for Practitioners

In family disputes, move quickly to amend pleadings when subsequent facts arise; document diligence and timing.
Demonstrate that the amendments are necessary to determine the real controversy (e.g., contemporaneous conduct amounting to cruelty).
Address potential prejudice explicitly: consent to costs, offer additional time for the opposite party’s response, and avoid surprises.
Where multiple grounds under Section 13 HMA exist, seek consolidation in one proceeding to save time and costs and to comply with Section 21-B.
Opposing amendments? Focus on showing prejudice, inconsistency that changes the nature of the case, or lack of due diligence where facts were always known.

Conclusion

Chitranshi v. Rajnarayan Tripathi affirms a principled, purposive approach to amendments in matrimonial litigation. The High Court clarifies that the mere framing of issues does not, without more, amount to commencement of trial for purposes of the Order VI Rule 17 proviso. More importantly, it recognizes that matrimonial disputes are dynamic; subsequent events frequently bear directly on statutory grounds like cruelty. Courts should, therefore, permit amendments that enable a full and fair adjudication, provided they are sought with diligence and do not prejudice the other side.

The judgment also dispels the notion that adding facts (or even another ground under Section 13 HMA) invariably changes the cause of action. On the contrary, to avoid multiplicity and to fulfill the statutory mandate of expeditious disposal, such amendments can—and often should—be allowed, with appropriate procedural safeguards. In supervisory review, absent demonstrable illegality or perversity, such discretionary orders ought not to be disturbed.

As family courts and litigants strive for timely and comprehensive resolutions, this decision offers clear guidance: pleadings should reflect the real, evolving controversy; courts will facilitate necessary amendments while ensuring fairness and efficiency.