Mercy, Apology and the Proper Use of Contempt Power: A Detailed Commentary on Vineeta Srinandan v. High Court of Judicature at Bombay on its Own Motion (2025 INSC 1408)

I. Introduction

1. The case in context

The decision in Vineeta Srinandan v. High Court of Judicature at Bombay on its Own Motion, 2025 INSC 1408, rendered by a two‑Judge Bench of the Supreme Court of India (Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta, JJ.) on 10 December 2025, revisits and refines the law on criminal contempt, particularly in relation to:

the acceptance of apology under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (“Contempt Act”);
the scope of the court’s discretion to remit punishment even after a finding of guilt; and
the proper use of precedent and the limits of mechanically relying on earlier contempt decisions.

The judgment opens with a strong normative statement about contempt jurisdiction:

“The power to punish necessarily carries within it the concomitant power to forgive… this power is not a personal armour for Judges, nor a sword to silence criticism… Mercy, therefore, must remain an integral part of the judicial conscience…”

This sets the tone for a decision that, while affirming that the appellant’s conduct did amount to criminal contempt, ultimately remits the sentence in light of an early, unconditional and apparently genuine apology, and corrects what it perceives as a misapplication of precedent by the Bombay High Court.

2. Parties and procedural posture

Appellant / Contemnor: Vineeta Srinandan, former Director (Cultural), Seawoods Estates Ltd. (“Seawoods”), a residential complex.
Respondent: High Court of Judicature at Bombay, acting suo motu in criminal contempt.
Jurisdiction: Criminal appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Section 19(1)(b) of the Contempt Act (appeal as of right against an order punishing for contempt).

3. Factual background

The controversy arises out of a highly charged dispute over stray dogs and dog feeding in an urban residential society:

Seawoods had filed a writ petition (W.P. No. 11652 of 2023) in the Bombay High Court challenging the vires of Rule 20 of the Animal Birth Control Rules, 2023.
During these proceedings, one Ms. Leela Verma moved an intervention application and brought to the High Court’s notice a circular dated 29 January 2025 issued by the appellant in her capacity as “Director Cultural” of Seawoods.

The circular, which the Supreme Court refers to as the “contemptuous circular”, contained sweeping allegations against:

a “dog feeder’s mafia” said to have a “strong presence in the judicial system”; and
High Court and Supreme Court Judges allegedly aligned with this “mafia”, with orders that “defend dog feeders ignoring the value of human life”.

Crucially, the circular alleged, inter alia:

“… Judges don't want to see [evidence] and completely avoid taking cognizance of such material… we are convinced that there is a big Dog mafia operating in the country, who has a list of High Court and Supreme Court judges having views similar to the dog feeders…”

and further:

“… Justice wants to impose this illegal order on us by using his power on the NMMC officer and the police.”

These statements prompted the High Court to initiate suo motu criminal contempt proceedings.

4. High Court’s decision

The Bombay High Court, in Suo Motu Criminal Contempt Petition No. 2 of 2025, held that:

the circular amounted to criminal contempt under Section 2(c) of the Contempt Act, particularly as:
- it scandalised and lowered the authority of the Court; and
- it was issued during the pendency of the writ petition, thereby interfering with the due course of judicial proceedings and the administration of justice.
the appellant’s explanation and apology were not genuine; and
relying heavily on earlier Supreme Court decisions (particularly Rajendra Sail, Roshan Lal Ahuja, D.C. Saxena, and Perspective Publications), it concluded that imputing improper motives to the court cannot be “fair criticism” and warranted punishment.

Accordingly, the High Court convicted the appellant for criminal contempt and sentenced her to:

simple imprisonment for one week; and
fine of ₹ 2,000/- under Section 12 of the Contempt Act.

This judgment was appealed to the Supreme Court.

5. Issues before the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court identified two central questions:

Whether the appellant’s challenge to the High Court’s judgment is sustainable in law;
More specifically, whether the High Court was justified in declining to accept the appellant’s apology and, consequently, refusing to remit the sentence imposed under Section 12 of the Contempt Act.

II. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Judgment

1. Finding of contempt affirmed, but sentence remitted

The Supreme Court drew a crucial distinction between:

the finding of criminal contempt; and
the imposition (and remission) of punishment under Section 12.

On the first, the Court agreed with the High Court:

It accepted that the “contemptuous circular” did indeed satisfy the essential ingredients of criminal contempt as defined in Section 2(c) of the Contempt Act.

However, the Court parted ways with the High Court on the question of punishment:

It held that the High Court was not justified in invoking Section 12 to impose imprisonment and fine in the face of an early, unconditional apology.
It concluded that the High Court failed to exercise its sentencing discretion with due circumspection, particularly under the proviso and Explanation to Section 12(1).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court:

Set aside the High Court’s judgment “to the aforesaid extent”, i.e., to the extent of punishment; and
Remitted the sentence imposed upon the appellant, considering her genuine remorse.

The conviction for criminal contempt thus formally remains, but the appellant is effectively spared imprisonment and fine.

2. Key holdings distilled

The Court’s conclusions (para 10) can be distilled as follows:

The High Court’s reliance on earlier Supreme Court decisions in D.C. Saxena, Perspective Publications, Roshan Lal Ahuja, and Rajendra Sail was misplaced, because:
- the facts were materially different; and
- those decisions often involved absence of apology, withdrawal of apology, or far graver allegations.
Given the appellant’s genuine remorse and repentance from the very outset, the ends of justice would be adequately served by remitting the sentence.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. The factual and legal matrix: Why this was contempt

1. Content and tone of the circular

The circular went far beyond mere disagreement with judicial orders or policy on stray dogs. It:

alleged a nationwide “dog feeder’s mafia” with a “strong presence in the judicial system”;
claimed that certain judges are on a “list” of judges sharing views with dog feeders;
suggested that:
“Judges don't want to see [videos, evidence] and completely avoid taking cognizance of such material.”
asserted that the concerned Judge was “using his power on the NMMC officer and the police” to impose an “illegal order”.

These assertions attack:

the integrity, impartiality and motive of individual Judges; and
the institutional legitimacy of the judicial system by suggesting it is co‑opted by a “mafia”.

They are not couched as reasoned legal criticism; instead, they are accusatory and conspiratorial, implying corruption or capture of judges by special interest groups.

2. Statutory definition of criminal contempt

Section 2(c) of the Contempt Act (though not reproduced in full in the judgment) defines “criminal contempt” as including:

“the publication (whether by words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representation, or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which…”
- (i) scandalises or tends to scandalise, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of, any court; or
- (ii) prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of any judicial proceeding; or
- (iii) interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner.

The Supreme Court accepts that the circular:

scandalised and lowered the authority of the Court by imputing improper motives; and
being issued during the pendency of the writ proceedings, it interfered with the due course of judicial proceedings and the broader administration of justice.

Interestingly, while the Court reiterates that contempt powers are not a shield against fair criticism, it does not disturb the High Court’s conclusion that the statements crossed the line from criticism to scandalisation.

B. Section 12 of the Contempt Act: Punishment and forgiveness

1. Text and structure of Section 12(1)

Section 12(1) of the Contempt Act, as reproduced in the judgment, provides:

“12. Punishment for contempt of court.—(1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act or in any other law, a contempt of court may be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees, or with both:

Provided that the accused may be discharged or the punishment awarded may be remitted on apology being made to the satisfaction of the Court.

Explanation.—An apology shall not be rejected merely on the ground that it is qualified or conditional if the accused makes it bona fide.”

The Supreme Court emphasises several important aspects:

The main clause uses the phrase “may be punished”, indicating discretion, not a mandatory requirement to impose punishment.
The proviso explicitly empowers the court to:
- discharge the contemnor; or
- remit the punishment awarded,
“on apology being made to the satisfaction of the Court”.
The Explanation significantly provides that even a qualified or conditional apology cannot be rejected merely on that ground, if it is bona fide.

2. Dual focus: Not only on punishment, but also on remission

Although the marginal note reads “punishment for contempt of court”, the Court stresses that a “holistic reading” shows Section 12 is equally about:

the imposition of punishment; and
the remission or discharge upon apology.

The Court makes a crucial doctrinal clarification:

“Even after a finding of guilt and the imposition of punishment, the Court retains the discretion to exercise such power [of remission].”

This reinforces that:

the Court’s power to forgive or remit is not exhausted once conviction and sentence are recorded;
repentance that emerges even at a later stage can justify remission of sentence, as long as the Court’s conscience is satisfied regarding the genuineness of the apology.

3. The standard for accepting or rejecting apology

The Court recognises that:

the apology must be genuine, bona fide, and must satisfy the “judicial conscience” of the Court; and
this discretion must itself be exercised judiciously, not arbitrarily or punitively.

Against this yardstick, the Court finds fault with the High Court:

The High Court characterised the appellant’s apology as “perfunctory” and merely “for formality”, with expressions of remorse being “borrowed”.
However, the Supreme Court notes the absence of any concrete material to show that the apology was not bona fide.
To the contrary, the appellant:
- entered appearance at the first opportunity;
- filed a reply‑affidavit dated 18 February 2025;
- unambiguously accepted that:
  “a grave error was committed in the issuance of the contemptuous circular”;
- explained that it was done under mental pressure from residents; and
- expressly tendered an unconditional and unqualified apology, coupled with her resignation from the Board of Directors as an act of repentance.

In such circumstances, the Supreme Court holds that the High Court ought to have considered remitting the sentence under Section 12(1), instead of rejecting the apology on a purely subjective assessment of its tone.

C. Proper use of precedent: Ratio decidendi and factual context

1. The High Court’s reliance on earlier contempt cases

The High Court had relied upon:

Rajendra Sail v. M.P. High Court Bar Association, (2005) 6 SCC 109;
Roshan Lal Ahuja, In re, 1993 Supp (4) SCC 446;
D.C. Saxena v. Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India, (1996) 5 SCC 216;
Perspective Publications (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1971 SC 221.

From these, the High Court derived the proposition that:

a communication imputing improper motives to the Court or its Judges cannot be regarded as fair criticism and may amount to contempt; and
in such cases, apologies are often not accepted and punishment is warranted.

2. Supreme Court’s corrective: Context and ratio decidendi

The Supreme Court accepts the broad proposition that imputation of improper motives can be contemptuous, but holds that the factual matrices of those cases are too different to warrant their mechanical application here, particularly at the sentencing stage and in relation to apology.

The Court refers to two important precedents on the doctrine of precedent itself:

Royal Medical Trust v. Union of India, (2017) 16 SCC 605 (three‑Judge Bench), which emphasises that:
“The ratio of a decision has to be understood regard being had to its context and factual exposition… If it is based on a particular fact or the decision of the Court is guided by specific nature of the case, it will not amount to the ratio of the judgment.”
Union of India v. Dhanwanti Devi, (1996) 6 SCC 44 (three‑Judge Bench), which elaborates that:
“It is not everything said by a Judge while giving judgment that constitutes a precedent… A decision is only an authority for what it actually decides… The enunciation of the reason or principle on which a question before a court has been decided is alone binding as a precedent… It would, therefore, be not profitable to extract a sentence here and there from the judgment and to build upon it…”

Applying these principles, the Supreme Court notes the crucial distinctions:

D.C. Saxena and Perspective Publications:
- In both, contemnors had not offered any apology.
- The allegations in D.C. Saxena were extremely serious, involving scurrilous accusations against the then Chief Justice of India in a writ petition.
Roshan Lal Ahuja:
- An apology was initially offered but was subsequently withdrawn.
Rajendra Sail:
- An unconditional apology was tendered, but
- the allegations were of a particularly grave nature, involving public statements at a rally accusing a sitting Judge of being bribed and possessing disproportionate assets.
- The Court therefore declined to accept the apology in view of the extreme seriousness and public impact of the allegations.

In contrast, in Vineeta Srinandan:

the appellant immediately responded to the show‑cause notice;
she admitted her error in clear terms;
she tendered an unconditional apology at the earliest opportunity; and
there was no subsequent conduct showing any attempt to justify, repeat, or escalate the allegations.

Thus, the Supreme Court holds that the High Court misapplied these precedents by:

treating their outcome (refusal of apology, imposition of punishment) as if it were a controlling rule in all contempt cases; and
failing to account for the distinctive factual features and the centrality of apology and remorse in the present matter.

D. Normative framing: Contempt power, criticism, and mercy

1. Contempt not as “armour” or “sword”

The judgment’s first paragraph is particularly significant for the broader philosophy of contempt jurisdiction:

“The power to punish necessarily carries within it the concomitant power to forgive… this power is not a personal armour for Judges, nor a sword to silence criticism… Mercy… must remain an integral part of the judicial conscience…”

This achieves three things:

It acknowledges judicial fallibility and the possibility of “lapse” on both sides.
It expressly cautions against using contempt to shield judges from criticism as individuals or to quell public debate on matters of public interest.
It places mercy and forgiveness at the heart of contempt sentencing, especially where genuine remorse is shown.

2. Balancing “majesty of law” with human fallibility

The Court explicitly states that Section 12(1) reflects a balance:

On one side, the “majesty of law” and the need to protect the judiciary from attempts to malign and discredit it;
On the other, the recognition of human fallibility, error, and the possibility of atonement by way of genuine apology.

This balance is operationalised through:

the language “may be punished” (discretion);
the proviso’s power to discharge or remit; and
the Explanation’s insistence that even qualified apologies can be accepted if bona fide.

Thus, the judgment is not a dilution of contempt law’s substantive reach (it does affirm that the conduct was contempt), but a recalibration of sentencing and the approach to apology.

IV. Impact and Doctrinal Significance

A. Clarifying the law on apology and remission under Section 12

This decision makes several important contributions to the jurisprudence on Section 12:

Remission is available even after conviction and sentencing.
The Court explicitly affirms that its jurisdiction to remit punishment persists “even after a finding of guilt and the imposition of punishment”, provided genuine repentance is shown.
Apology must be evaluated on concrete material, not subjective suspicion alone.
A court must identify some objective basis to reject an apology as insincere. Merely labelling an apology “perfunctory” or “for formality” is insufficient if:
- it is offered at the earliest opportunity;
- the contemnor accepts fault unequivocally; and
- there is no contrary conduct suggesting lack of remorse.
Explanation to Section 12 has real teeth.
By emphasising that even qualified or conditional apologies cannot be rejected if bona fide, the Court underlines that:
- the substance (genuineness) of apology matters more than formal perfection; and
- courts should not be hyper-technical or unduly sceptical in reading apology affidavits.

B. Sentencing philosophy in criminal contempt

The judgment signals a more restorative and corrective approach to contempt punishment:

Imprisonment should be a last resort, especially when the contemnor is not a repeat offender and expresses early remorse.
The focus shifts from retribution to:
- vindicating the authority of the court (which can be achieved by a formal finding of contempt); and
- reforming the attitude of the contemnor (often achieved through public censure and the process itself).

This is consistent with a broader global trend of treating “scandalising” contempt as a narrowly confined remedy, to be invoked sparingly and with sensitivity to freedom of speech concerns.

C. Guidance for High Courts in handling criticism of the judiciary

For High Courts (and subordinate courts), this decision sends several clear messages:

Contempt jurisdiction is not for personal vindication.
Judges must be wary of responding to criticism—however intemperate—through the lens of personal hurt or institutional insecurity.
Early, unconditional apologies should ordinarily weigh heavily against custodial sentences.
Especially where contemnors are laypersons or non-lawyers, genuine contrition should incline courts towards remission rather than incarceration.
Precedent must be applied with factual sensitivity.
Decisions like Rajendra Sail and D.C. Saxena cannot be used as blanket authority to reject all apologies in contempt matters. Their true ratio is inseparable from:
- the gravity of the accusations; and
- the contemnors’ defiant or non‑remorseful stance.

D. Beyond contempt: A reminder on the doctrine of precedent

Although delivered in a contempt case, the Court’s reliance on Royal Medical Trust and Dhanwanti Devi has wider doctrinal implications:

Courts must isolate the ratio decidendi in earlier judgments and resist the temptation to:
- quote sentences “here and there”; or
- treat judicial rhetoric as binding legal rule detached from facts.
This caution applies across domains—constitutional, criminal, civil—and is particularly important where earlier judgments use strong language, as contempt judgments often do.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. What is “criminal contempt”?

Under Indian law, contempt of court is broadly of two types:

Civil contempt: Willful disobedience of court orders or undertakings.
Criminal contempt: Conduct that:
- scandalises or tends to scandalise, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of any court;
- prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of any judicial proceeding; or
- interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice.

In Vineeta Srinandan, the conduct—through the circular—was held to be criminal contempt primarily because it:

imputed improper motives and collusion to judges; and
was issued while related proceedings were pending, thereby interfering with judicial functioning and public confidence.

2. “Suo motu” contempt

“Suo motu” (Latin for “on its own motion”) means that the court initiates proceedings by itself, without a formal complaint by a party.

In this case:

The Bombay High Court, upon being apprised of the circular by an intervener, took suo motu cognisance of possible criminal contempt.
This reflects the principle that courts are guardians of their own authority and may act proactively to address contempt.

3. “Ratio decidendi” and “obiter dicta”

These are Latin terms used to analyse judicial decisions:

Ratio decidendi: The legal principle or rule that is necessary to decide the case, based on its material facts. This is the part that is binding as precedent under Article 141 of the Constitution.
Obiter dicta: Remarks or observations which are not essential to the decision. They may be persuasive but are not binding as law.

The Supreme Court re‑emphasises that:

not every sentence in a judgment is ratio decidendi; and
courts should not “extract a sentence here and there” and treat it as if it were a binding rule.

In the contempt context, this means:

Earlier strong language about disrespect to courts cannot be abstracted from the case facts and treated as an automatic mandate for harsh punishment in all later cases.

4. “Remission” versus “discharge” in contempt

Under Section 12(1) proviso:

“Discharge” means that the contemnor is effectively released from the proceedings, and may not suffer a conviction or punishment.
“Remission” means that while the finding of guilt may stand, the sentence (punishment) is set aside or reduced.

In Vineeta Srinandan, the Supreme Court:

allowed the conviction for contempt to remain undisturbed; but
remitted the sentence of one week’s imprisonment and fine.

5. “Majesty of law” and criticism of the judiciary

The “majesty of law” is a phrase used to capture:

the dignity and authority of the courts; and
the need to maintain public confidence in the judicial system.

The Court’s position, consistent with earlier jurisprudence, is:

Fair criticism of judicial decisions is part of a healthy democracy and cannot be stifled.
However, baseless, malicious attacks on the integrity or honesty of Judges, or suggestion that courts are agents of conspiracies or mafias, can cross the line and amount to criminal contempt.

The present judgment does not dilute this line; it instead refines how courts should respond once contempt is found, especially in light of apology.

VI. Conclusion: Key Takeaways and Broader Significance

1. What this judgment holds

In essence, the Supreme Court in Vineeta Srinandan holds that:

The appellant’s circular did amount to criminal contempt of court by scandalising the judiciary and interfering with the administration of justice.
However, given her early, unconditional, and apparently genuine apology, the High Court ought to have considered remitting the punishment instead of rejecting the apology.
The High Court’s heavy reliance on earlier contempt precedents was misdirected, as:
- those cases involved different factual situations, particularly as regards the contemnors’ attitudes and apologies; and
- precedent must be applied with keen attention to ratio decidendi and factual context.

2. Doctrinal advances

The judgment makes the following doctrinal contributions:

Reaffirming that the power to punish for contempt includes the power to forgive.
This is not merely moral rhetoric; it is anchored in the structure of Section 12, with its proviso and Explanation.
Clarifying the scope of Section 12(1) proviso.
Courts can:
- accept apologies that are genuinely contrite even if imperfectly phrased; and
- remit punishment even after conviction and initial sentencing.
Reining in mechanical use of prior contempt judgments.
The case urges courts to:
- distinguish cases based on differences in gravity, publicity, and contemnors’ post‑conduct; and
- avoid reflexively following earlier refusals of apology as if they established a hard rule.

3. Practical implications

For future contempt cases, particularly those involving:

intemperate public comments on courts or judges;
laypersons or non‑lawyers; and
prompt and unequivocal apologies,

Vineeta Srinandan will serve as a key precedent to:

argue against custodial sentences;
press for acceptance of apology under Section 12; and
resist over‑reliance on hard‑line contempt cases decided in more egregious circumstances.

4. Broader message

The judgment ultimately reinforces a vision of contempt jurisdiction that:

protects the institutional integrity of the judiciary from scurrilous attacks; yet
remains conscious of free speech and democratic accountability, by insisting that contempt is not a “personal armour” nor a “sword to silence criticism”.

In this balance between authority and forgiveness, Vineeta Srinandan marks an important step towards a more mature, restrained, and humane use of contempt powers in India.