Mental Health, Proportionality and Judicial Review of Armed Forces Training Discipline: Commentary on Ex Flt Cdt Tarang Bhardwaj v. Union of India (2025 DHC 10503-DB)

Mental Health, Proportionality and Judicial Review of Armed Forces Training Discipline:
Commentary on Ex Flt Cdt Tarang Bhardwaj v. Union of India & Ors., 2025 DHC 10503-DB

1. Introduction

The judgment of the Delhi High Court in Ex Flt Cdt Tarang Bhardwaj v. Union of India & Ors., W.P.(C) 11657/2024 (decision dated 27 November 2025), marks an important development at the intersection of military discipline, mental health, and the constitutional principle of proportionality.

The Division Bench (C. Hari Shankar, J. and Om Prakash Shukla, J.) set aside the termination of an Air Force trainee (Flight Cadet) by holding that a career-ending penalty imposed for an alleged theft of a Hand Held Monitor (HHM) was:

  • strikingly disproportionate,
  • irrational and perverse in light of the evidence, and
  • inconsistent with the Indian Air Force’s own disciplinary framework in Air Force Order (AFO) No. 30/2015.

The case is especially significant because the Court:

  • integrates mental health considerations into the assessment of “serious indiscipline” and “officer-like qualities” (OLQ),
  • treats the AFO 30/2015 guidelines as embodying principles of natural justice and proportionality, and
  • clarifies that judicial review under Article 226 extends to correcting perverse and grossly disproportionate disciplinary action even against trainee-cadets of the armed forces.

2. Factual and Procedural Background

2.1 The Parties

  • Petitioner: Ex Flight Cadet Tarang Bhardwaj, appearing in person; a meritorious candidate who:
    • cleared the National Defence Academy (NDA) examination in 2019,
    • joined NDA in 2020, and
    • passed out in May 2023 after three years of successful training.
  • Respondents: Union of India and Air Force authorities, represented by Government counsel and Air Force legal officers.

2.2 Factual Matrix

After NDA, the petitioner joined the Air Force Academy (AFA) in June 2023 in the Logistics Branch. Around September 2023 he developed Grade-4 acne and was prescribed isotretinoin at Military Hospital, Secunderabad.

In late 2023 and early 2024, he began to exhibit significant psychiatric symptoms: low mood, loss of interest, reduced energy, poor concentration, disturbed sleep, pessimistic thoughts, episodic anxiety and passive death wishes. He was referred to psychiatry, placed in a low medical category, and at one stage admitted with a diagnosis of “Observation for suspected mental and behavioural disorder”.

During this period, two HHM-related incidents occurred in January 2024:

  • HHMs (tablets) were issued to all cadets as part of training.
  • The petitioner’s own HHM allegedly went missing. While searching, he found tablets identical to his. Believing one to be his, he picked it up; later, seeing another identical device, he switched them, assuming the second was his.
  • Subsequently:
    • his original HHM was returned to him,
    • a course-mate’s HHM was reported missing, and
    • CCTV footage showed the petitioner taking and returning an HHM.

The Air Force treated the events as two incidents of theft of HHMs from fellow cadets. An informal investigation under AFO 30/2015 was carried out, and on its basis a Training Review Board (TRB) was convened. The TRB:

  • found that the petitioner had twice engaged in theft of HHMs,
  • classified these as “serious indiscipline” under paras 9(d), 9(q) and 14 of AFO 30/2015, and
  • recommended termination of his training and cadetship under paras 18(d)(iii) and 23(f).

The competent authority accepted the recommendation. By order dated 19 June 2024, the petitioner’s training and cadetship at AFA were terminated. A “Gate Pass” dated 21 June 2024 effectuated his exit from the Academy.

2.3 Reliefs Sought

The writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution sought:
  • Certiorari to quash the dismissal/termination from AFA,
  • Mandamus directing reinstatement into the Academy and continuation of training, and
  • directions for payment of outstanding arrears for the training period.

3. Summary of the Judgment

The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition and set aside the termination, with consequential benefits.

Key holdings:

  1. Scope of Judicial Review: While courts ordinarily do not reappreciate evidence or substitute punishments in disciplinary matters, they can interfere in “extreme cases” where punishment is:
    • strikingly disproportionate, or
    • perverse or irrational.
    The Court relied on the Supreme Court’s articulation of this exception, particularly in Union Of India v. Sunil Kumar, (2023) 3 SCC 622.
  2. Interpretation of AFO 30/2015: The Court undertook a detailed reading of AFO 30/2015 and held that:
    • its procedures are designed to comply with principles of natural justice, and
    • its “guiding principles” require:
      • correction rather than purely punitive penalties,
      • differentiation between “intent” and “error of judgment”,
      • consideration of circumstances beyond the trainee’s control, and
      • consideration of the trainee’s overall record and attitude.
  3. Mental Health and Mens Rea: On the basis of:
    • witness testimonies indicating suicide attempts and profound psychological disturbance, and
    • psychiatric reports showing depression and anxiety from October 2023 to February 2024,
    the Court held that the petitioner was under serious mental and emotional distress at the time of the alleged incidents in January 2024.
  4. Characterisation of Conduct: Even assuming the factual allegations to be correct, the Court held that:
    • the acts were, at most, negligence or ignorance,
    • there was no evidence of dishonest intention or financial gain, and
    • the circumstances were “completely incongruous with a dishonest and cheating mindset” and consistent with a “clear error of judgment.”
  5. Officer-Like Qualities (OLQ): The mere single episode, committed under a transient mental health crisis, could not justify branding the petitioner as lacking OLQ or being unfit to be an officer, particularly given:
    • his NDA record,
    • youth (19–21 years), and
    • absence of any other misconduct.
  6. Disproportionate Punishment and Perversity: Termination of training was described as:
    • “purely punitive and career destructive”,
    • the “harshest punishment” imposed on a first-time offender, and
    • contrary to AFO 30/2015’s emphasis on correction and consideration of negligence/ignorance and circumstances beyond control.
    The Court held that the decision was one that “no reasonable authority could have reached” and thus perverse.
  7. Distinguishing Ex Flt Cdt Mohit Bhandari: The Court distinguished the earlier Delhi High Court judgment in Ex Flt Cdt Mohit Bhandari v. Union of India, 2019 SCC OnLine Del 7403, on the ground that there, unlike in the present case, there was no allegation or medical evidence of disturbed mental state or need for psychiatric intervention.

On this basis, the Court set aside the termination order and directed that all consequential benefits be granted within four weeks of production of the certified copy of the judgment.

4. Regulatory Framework: Air Force Order (AFO) No. 30/2015

4.1 Classification of Indiscipline and “Thefts/Fraud” (Para 9)

AFO No. 30/2015 is the governing policy for dealing with disciplinary cases against trainees/cadets in the Air Force. Para 9 catalogues acts treated as “major indiscipline”. Para 9(d) specifically provides:

“Thefts/Fraud. Strict disciplinary action will be taken against Trainees, who are involved in any kind of theft/fraud/forgery.”

The Air Force relied on this provision to classify the HHM incidents as “serious indiscipline”.

4.2 Informal Investigation and First Instance of Indiscipline (Paras 12–13)

Paras 12 and 13 establish a graded and context-sensitive disciplinary scheme:

  • Para 12: For a first instance of serious indiscipline:
    • The Flight Commander or immediate superior must conduct an informal investigation.
    • This officer may dismiss the case or refer it upwards to senior instructional authorities.
    • The senior authority must:
      • ascertain the facts,
      • consider the circumstances leading to the act, and
      • consider the trainee’s overall performance in training.
  • Para 13: Where the circumstances leading to the act:
    • were beyond the control of the trainee,
    • the authority must consider overall performance and past disciplinary record,
    • and may dispose of the case with relatively mild corrective punishments under para 18(a), such as:
      • denial of privileges,
      • extra duties/endurance runs,
      • extra drills (not exceeding seven).

Thus, even for “serious” offences, the framework allows leniency where circumstances are beyond the trainee’s control and the overall record is sound.

4.3 Trigger for Training Review Board (TRB) (Para 14)

Para 14 allows the Commandant or equivalent authority to convene a TRB in the first instance itself where an act of indiscipline reflects:

  • “gross lack of Officer Like Qualities” or
  • “attitudinal deficiency”.

In such cases, the TRB may recommend:

  • lesser punishments (under para 18(c)), or
  • termination of training (para 18(d)(iii) & (iv)).

The Air Force treated the HHM episode as an act indicative of gross lack of OLQ and thus convened a TRB directly.

4.4 Guiding Principles for Punishment (Para 17)

Crucially, para 17 lays down “guiding principles” which are normative constraints on disciplinary action:

  • Natural justice: All authorities must strictly adhere to principles of natural justice and use discretion judiciously.
  • Uniformity and legality: Punishments must be uniform and capable of standing scrutiny in a court of law (para 17(a)).
  • Correction over retribution: “Punishments must be viewed as a means of correction and not be solely punitive” (para 17(b)).
  • Intent vs error: “An ‘intent’ and an ‘error of judgment’ should be differentiated” (para 17(c)).
  • Proportionality: Punishment must be commensurate with gravity of offence and not harsh or disproportionate (para 17(d)).

The Court repeatedly drew upon these principles to test the legality and rationality of the TRB’s recommendation and the termination order.

4.5 TRB’s Mandate and Guidelines (Para 23)

Para 23 prescribes detailed guidelines for TRB functioning. The TRB must:

  • ascertain facts based on available evidence (23(a));
  • clearly establish that the act of indiscipline was actually committed by the trainee (23(b));
  • investigate possible involvement of other trainees (23(c));
  • while making recommendations, consider:
    • past conduct,
    • attitude towards training/service,
    • number of warnings,
    • overall suitability for continuation (23(d)).
  • consider deferment of commission and re-flighting if:
    • the trainee has basic OLQ, and
    • the act is due to negligence/ignorance (23(e)).
  • recommend termination for “gross indiscipline/lack of OLQ/attitudinal deficiency” (23(f)), but only after considering all the above factors.

The Court used these provisions to hold that:

  • negligence/ignorance and circumstances beyond control are recognised defences or mitigation, and
  • TRBs must adopt a holistic and corrective approach, not reflexively opt for termination.

5. Core Legal Issues

The judgment, though framed as a writ petition against termination, in substance deals with the following legal questions:

  1. Scope of Judicial Review: To what extent can a High Court, under Article 226, interfere with disciplinary findings and punishment in armed forces training matters, particularly for a trainee-cadet?
  2. Application of AFO 30/2015: Did the Air Force and TRB properly apply AFO 30/2015, especially:
    • the requirement to consider circumstances beyond the trainee’s control, and
    • the distinction between intentional misconduct and error of judgment?
  3. Mental Health and Intent: What is the effect of demonstrated mental health disturbances on:
    • characterising conduct as “theft” (with dishonest intention), and
    • assessing OLQ and suitability to continue?
  4. Proportionality of Punishment: Was termination of training — a career-ending penalty — a proportionate response to the conduct alleged, particularly in light of:
    • the petitioner’s medical condition,
    • spotless prior record, and
    • the internal policy’s orientation toward correction?
  5. Perverse Findings: Were the TRB’s and authority’s conclusions so unreasonable and unsupported by material as to be perverse?

6. Precedents and Authorities Cited

6.1 Precedents Relied Upon by the Petitioner

  • Chandi Kumar Das Karmarkar v. Abanidhar Roy, AIR 1965 SC 585
    This case holds that a bona fide claim of right, if reasonable, negates the offence of theft by undermining the element of “dishonest intention”.
    Relevance: The petitioner argued that he honestly believed the HHM he took to be his own, thus lacking the mens rea of theft. While the Delhi High Court did not explicitly rely on this case, the notion that honest belief negates theft informs its approach to distinguishing theft from negligent confusion.
  • M.M. Malhotra v. Union of India, (2005) 8 SCC 351
    This decision emphasises that “misconduct” in service law generally involves wilful wrongdoing, not mere error of judgment.
    Relevance: The petitioner cited it to contend that absent wilful dishonesty, his conduct should not attract the severest disciplinary consequences.
  • Mohd. Giasuddin v. State of A.P., (1977) 3 SCC 277
    A criminal law case emphasising the reformative theory of punishment: focus on rehabilitation and future potential rather than purely retributive sanctions.
    Relevance: The petitioner used it to argue that, especially for a young first-time offender, the disciplinary response should be rehabilitative.
  • Ranjit Thakur v. Union Of India, (1987) 4 SCC 611
    A leading judgment on proportionality in military justice. The Supreme Court held that a sentence “so strikingly disproportionate as to shock the conscience” is open to judicial review.
    Relevance: The petitioner invoked it to argue that termination for the HHM incident, given his circumstances, was shockingly disproportionate.
  • Bhagat Ram v. State of H.P., (1983) 2 SCC 442
    The Court held that courts can interfere where the punishment is wholly disproportionate to the misconduct.
    Relevance: Supports the petitioner’s proportionality challenge to the penalty.
  • Om Kumar v. Union of India, (2001) 2 SCC 386
    This is the seminal Supreme Court judgment distinguishing between:
    • Wednesbury unreasonableness (traditional judicial review), and
    • proportionality (more intensive review in fundamental rights cases).
    Relevance: The petitioner relied on this to place proportionality at the core of Article 14 review even in service matters.

6.2 Precedents Relied Upon by the Respondents

  • B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749
    Reaffirmed that:
    • courts do not act as appellate authorities over departmental inquiries,
    • they do not reappreciate evidence, and
    • interfere with punishment only in rare cases of irrationality or shocking disproportion.
    Relevance: Cited to limit the Court’s power to re-evaluate the disciplinary findings and penalty.
  • Union of India v. P. Gunasekharan, (2015) 2 SCC 610
    Enumerates a negative list of what courts cannot do in disciplinary matters (e.g., cannot reappreciate evidence, substitute their own conclusions on guilt).
    Relevance: Used to argue that the High Court should not interfere with the TRB’s view of the facts or the quantum of punishment.
  • Ex Flight Cadet Mohit Bhandari v. Union of India, 2019 SCC OnLine Del 7403
    A Delhi High Court decision upholding the termination of an Air Force trainee, emphasising limited judicial interference and distinguishing the status of trainees from commissioned officers.
    Relevance: Respondents relied on this to argue that trainee-cadet terminations are a matter of internal discipline, not ordinarily open to detailed judicial scrutiny.
  • Life Insurance Corporation of India v. S. Vasanthi, (2014) 9 SCC 315 and Union of India v. Parma Nanda, (1989) 2 SCC 177
    Both judgments reinforce that the nature and quantum of punishment are primarily within the disciplinary authority’s domain, with courts showing restraint.
    Relevance: To resist the petitioner’s plea for re-assessment of punishment.

6.3 Supreme Court in Union Of India v. Sunil Kumar, (2023) 3 SCC 622

Although cited by the High Court itself at para 30, Sunil Kumar is crucial in framing the standard for judicial interference:

  • Reaffirms limited scope of judicial review in disciplinary matters.
  • However, expressly recognises that in “extreme cases” where the punishment is:
    • shocking to the conscience,
    • strikingly disproportionate, or
    • perverse or irrational,
    courts can and should intervene.

The Delhi High Court leans on this “extreme case” exception to justify interference with the penalty of termination imposed on the petitioner.

7. Court’s Legal Reasoning

7.1 Scope of Judicial Review and Proportionality

The Court begins by candidly acknowledging the orthodox position: High Courts under Article 226 do not act as appellate bodies in disciplinary matters. They:

  • do not reappreciate evidence, and
  • do not ordinarily substitute their own view on appropriate punishment.

However, following Sunil Kumar and earlier authorities like Ranjit Thakur and Bhagat Ram, the Court emphasises that it is “not completely powerless”. It can intervene where:

  • the punishment is on its face “strikingly disproportionate”, or
  • there is “perversity or irrationality”.

The central inquiry forming the backbone of the reasoning is thus:

Whether, in the peculiar facts and in light of AFO 30/2015, the termination of the petitioner’s training and cadetship for the alleged HHM incident was so disproportionate, arbitrary or irrational as to warrant interference.

7.2 Application of AFO 30/2015: Internal Standards as Legal Benchmarks

A key feature of the judgment is the Court’s close reading of AFO 30/2015, particularly paras 9, 12–14, 17 and 23. Rather than treating the AFO as purely internal, the Court:

  • treats its “guiding principles” and TRB guidelines as binding standards against which the legality and reasonableness of the disciplinary decision must be tested, and
  • reads them as incorporating constitutional ideas of:
    • natural justice,
    • contextual assessment of conduct,
    • proportionality, and
    • rehabilitative orientation.

The Court stresses:

  • Para 17(b): punishment should be corrective, not solely punitive.
  • Para 17(c): intent must be distinguished from error of judgment.
  • Para 13: circumstances beyond the trainee’s control and overall performance must be considered.
  • Para 23(d)–(e): TRB must consider past conduct, attitude, warnings, and may defer commission or re-flight where basic OLQ is present and the act is due to negligence/ignorance.

By highlighting these, the Court holds that negligence/ignorance and uncontrollable circumstances are recognised mitigants under the AFO and can be a “plausible defence for not terminating” training.

7.3 Assessment of Mental Health Evidence and Mens Rea

The Court then painstakingly examines the material generated in the informal investigation:

  • Witness 1: Described two suicide attempts by the petitioner by hanging, thwarted by anti-suicidal fans; recorded that the petitioner tried to cover this up by reporting a “broken fan” due to cleaning.
  • Witness 3: Reported that:
    • the petitioner himself stated he had anxiety and sometimes did things without distinguishing right from wrong,
    • the petitioner’s performance history was exemplary (clearing tests in first attempt), and
    • in his view, the petitioner required medical intervention.
  • Witness 9: Mentioned an earlier incident where the petitioner inadvertently kept his HHM and failed to retrieve it despite being told, indicating absent-mindedness or distress.
  • Witness 10: Stated that the petitioner had told him “meri halat theek nahi lag rahi”, was in poor health, and largely confined to his cabin; when his HHM went missing and was later found in the petitioner’s cabin, he believed it to be an honest mistake.

Medical evidence from the Command Hospital, Air Force, Bengaluru (20 May 2024) and earlier:

  • documented classic depressive and anxiety symptoms from October 2023 to February 2024, including passive death wishes;
  • noted admission with “disconnect from the world” and intermittent loss of perception of reality; and
  • placed him in a low medical category and under psychiatric observation.

The alleged HHM incidents occurred in mid-January 2024 — squarely within this medically documented period of severe mental and emotional disturbance. The Court therefore rejects:

  • the respondents’ claim that the mental health plea was an afterthought, and
  • the suggestion that there was no causal or contextual link between his mental state and the impugned conduct.

Instead, the Court finds the petitioner’s stance — that he was under serious psychological distress due to medication and other factors — to be:

  • consistent over time,
  • corroborated by multiple witnesses, and
  • supported by contemporaneous medical records.

7.4 Evaluation of Officer-Like Qualities (OLQ)

The Air Force had asserted that the petitioner lacked OLQ, citing the alleged theft as an indicator. The Court firmly disagrees:

  • The petitioner:
    • cleared NDA in his first attempt,
    • successfully completed three years of training at NDA,
    • had no prior misconduct, and
    • was still very young (between 19 and 21 years).
  • There was no material, apart from this single HHM episode, to justify a conclusion of lack of OLQ.
  • Given his transient mental health crisis, it would be “unfair” to categorise him as lacking OLQ or being unworthy of becoming an officer.

The Court’s approach implicitly recognises that:

  • OLQ is a long-term attribute to be gauged over sustained performance, not determined conclusively by one incident under extraordinary psychological strain.
  • The AFO’s requirement to consider overall suitability, past conduct, and attitude was not complied with by the TRB.

7.5 Theft vs Negligence/Error of Judgment

Without dwelling on criminal law labels, the Court essentially conducts a mens rea analysis:

  • There is no allegation or proof of any prior theft or dishonesty in the petitioner’s record.
  • There is no evidence of financial gain from the HHM episodes.
  • The contemporaneous record shows a trainee:
    • mentally disturbed,
    • struggling to adjust to the training environment, and
    • subject to suicidal ideation.

The Court concludes:

“That situation is completely incongruous with a dishonest, and cheating mindset and completely consistent with a clear error of judgment in his actions.”

And further:

“A young trainee/cadet experiencing short term psychiatric issues or at best, whose act can be termed as negligent and/or ignorant, cannot be treated as a thief or person unworthy of being an officer.”

These findings dovetail with para 17(c) and para 23(e) of AFO 30/2015, which call for distinguishing intent from error of judgment and providing for more lenient outcomes where conduct stems from negligence/ignorance.

7.6 Why the Punishment Was Held “Perverse”

Drawing together the medical evidence, witness statements and the AFO’s guiding principles, the Court characterises the termination as:

  • Harsh and disproportionate: Career-ending punishment for a first-time, isolated act occurring amid a documented mental health crisis.
  • Purely punitive, not corrective: Explicitly contrary to para 17(b)’s insistence that punishments be viewed as corrective.
  • Ignoring mitigating factors: Failure to account for:
    • the trainee’s youth,
    • past record and performance,
    • medical condition and suicide attempts, and
    • lack of any prior disciplinary history.
  • Contrary to internal policy: Despite AFO 30/2015 recognising negligence/ignorance and circumstances beyond control as grounds for non-termination and corrective measures, the harshest penalty was imposed.

Thus, the Court holds:

“The impugned termination order, according to us, is perverse and the findings therein are such as no reasonable authority could have reached.”

This satisfies the high threshold for intervention under the “extreme case” exception recognised in Sunil Kumar and earlier proportionality jurisprudence.

7.7 Distinguishing Ex Flt Cdt Mohit Bhandari

Respondents invoked the Delhi High Court’s decision in Ex Flight Cadet Mohit Bhandari to argue for minimal interference. The Court distinguishes it on a critical factual axis:

  • In Mohit Bhandari, there was no allegation that:
    • the trainee suffered from a disturbed mental state, or
    • any medical opinion suggested the need for psychiatric intervention.
  • In contrast, in the present case:
    • there is extensive medical documentation of depression and anxiety,
    • witnesses attest to suicide attempts and statements of psychological distress, and
    • all of this predates and overlaps with the impugned conduct.

Hence, Mohit Bhandari is not a bar to interference in a case where mental health is central to the assessment of intent, OLQ and proportionality.

8. Impact and Implications

8.1 For Armed Forces Disciplinary Regime

This judgment has several implications for armed forces training institutions (AFA, NDA, IMA, etc.) and their internal disciplinary mechanisms:

  • Internal orders are justiciable benchmarks: AFO 30/2015 is not treated as a purely internal, non-justiciable document. Its guiding principles and TRB procedures are used as legally enforceable standards for judging the reasonableness and legality of disciplinary action.
  • Necessity to document and consider mitigating factors: TRBs and commanders must:
    • expressly consider mental health,
    • record analysis of circumstances beyond the trainee’s control,
    • consider the entire service record, and
    • demonstrate application of mind to the corrective vs punitive dilemma.
  • Career-ending penalties as last resort: Termination of training is recognised as the “harshest” and “career-destructive” punishment. This implies:
    • it should be reserved for clear, intentional, and incorrigible misconduct,
    • especially where internal policies already provide graded alternatives (e.g., extra drills, deferment, re-flighting).

8.2 For Treatment of Mental Health in Service Law

The judgment is notable for foregrounding mental health:

  • Integration, not exclusion: Mental health is not treated as an afterthought or excuse. It is integrated into:
    • characterisation of conduct (theft vs negligence), and
    • assessment of OLQ and future suitability.
  • Short-term psychiatric crises: The Court recognises that a trainee can go through short-term debilitating psychiatric episodes without being permanently unfit or morally tainted. This supports:
    • rehabilitative approaches,
    • medical support over punitive exclusion, especially for young trainees.
  • Duty to recognise and respond: Where suicide attempts and diagnoses are on record, disciplinary authorities must:
    • exercise heightened care,
    • consult medical opinion, and
    • avoid equating behaviour under distress with stable character flaws.

8.3 For Judicial Review of Trainee/Cadet Terminations

The judgment clarifies that:

  • Trainees are not outside constitutional protection: Even though trainees are not “appointed” commissioned officers, their exclusion from service is subject to Article 14’s demands of non-arbitrariness and rationality, and Article 21’s protection of livelihood and dignity.
  • Standard of review remains high, but is real: Courts will not routinely re-evaluate evidence, but where:
    • an internal policy is ignored,
    • mitigating factors are disregarded, and
    • punishment is evidently disproportionate,
    courts may set aside the decision as perverse.
  • Precedent for future cadet cases: Future disputes involving termination of trainee-cadets will likely invoke this decision to:
    • press for meaningful application of proportionality, and
    • insist on reasoned consideration of mental health issues.

9. Key Legal Concepts Explained

9.1 Judicial Review under Article 226

Article 226 of the Constitution empowers High Courts to issue writs (such as certiorari and mandamus) for enforcement of fundamental rights and “for any other purpose”. In disciplinary matters, judicial review is:

  • not an appeal on facts,
  • focused on:
    • procedural fairness,
    • adherence to law and internal rules,
    • reasonableness (non-arbitrariness), and
    • proportionality in extreme cases.

9.2 Principle of Proportionality

Proportionality asks whether:

  1. the measure (punishment) pursues a legitimate aim (discipline),
  2. it is suitable to achieve that aim,
  3. no less restrictive measure is available, and
  4. the impact on the individual is not excessive compared to the aim pursued.

In service law, this translates to the question: Does the punishment fit the misconduct? Termination for a minor or excusable lapse, particularly where alternatives exist, can be struck down as disproportionate.

9.3 Principles of Natural Justice

Natural justice broadly consists of:

  • Audi alteram partem: the right to a fair hearing, including adequate opportunity to present one’s case.
  • Nemo judex in causa sua: no one should be judge in their own cause (impartial decision-maker).

AFO 30/2015 explicitly requires adherence to natural justice in para 17. Although the judgment does not dwell extensively on alleged denial of adequate hearing, it treats the broader failure to consider relevant material (medical evidence, past record) as a violation of fair and reasonable decision-making.

9.4 Theft and Dishonest Intention

Under criminal law (Section 378 IPC), theft requires:

  • moving property out of someone’s possession,
  • with dishonest intention, and
  • without that person’s consent.

A bona fide belief of entitlement (claim of right) can negate dishonest intention. In disciplinary contexts, while strict IPC elements are not mechanically applied, the presence or absence of dishonesty remains crucial in distinguishing:

  • serious moral turpitude (e.g., deliberate theft), from
  • negligent or confused behaviour, particularly under mental distress.

9.5 Officer-Like Qualities (OLQ)

In armed forces training, OLQ is a composite term covering traits like:

  • discipline and integrity,
  • courage and leadership,
  • responsibility and maturity,
  • team spirit and adaptability.

The judgment underscores that:

  • OLQ is to be assessed holistically over time,
  • a single lapse under severe mental strain cannot conclusively demonstrate lack of OLQ, and
  • AFO 30/2015 itself requires considering overall record and attitude before branding someone as lacking OLQ.

9.6 Training Review Board (TRB)

A TRB is a multi-officer body that:

  • examines serious cases of indiscipline or performance deficiencies in trainees,
  • assesses evidence and provides recommendations on:
    • continuation or termination of training,
    • deferment, re-flighting, or lesser punishments.

Under AFO 30/2015, the TRB must:

  • investigate facts,
  • consider the trainee’s entire record and attitude,
  • look for indications of negligence/ignorance versus intentional misconduct, and
  • apply a graded, not purely punitive, approach.

10. Conclusion and Key Takeaways

The Delhi High Court’s judgment in Ex Flt Cdt Tarang Bhardwaj v. Union of India is significant for several reasons:

  • It confirms that:
    • even in armed forces training institutions,
    • disciplinary action must comply with internal policy, natural justice, and constitutional standards of non-arbitrariness and proportionality.
  • It gives substantive content to AFO 30/2015’s guiding principles by:
    • requiring real consideration of circumstances beyond the trainee’s control,
    • insisting on a clear distinction between dishonest intent and error of judgment, and
    • treating punishment as a tool of correction rather than destruction.
  • It foregrounds mental health as a crucial factor in:
    • characterising alleged misconduct (here, “theft”), and
    • assessing OLQ and long-term suitability.
  • It clarifies the contours of judicial review by holding that:
    • courts will ordinarily defer to military discipline,
    • but will intervene where a decision is perverse, irrational, or imposes a punishment that is strikingly disproportionate to the facts and to the institution’s own normative framework.

In broader terms, the judgment underscores that the armed forces’ legitimate need for discipline does not override the basic demands of fairness, reasoned decision-making, and humane consideration of mental health. It sets a persuasive benchmark for future cases involving trainee-cadets and for how military institutions should align their disciplinary practices with both their own policies and constitutional values.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Delhi High Court

Judge(s)

Justice Om Prakash Shukla

Advocates

Comments