Mens Rea under the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act and Judicial Scrutiny of Circumstantial Evidence: A Commentary on Shaik Shabuddin v. State of Telangana (2025 INSC 1449)

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I. Introduction

This judgment of the Supreme Court of India in Shaik Shabuddin v. State of Telangana is significant on multiple fronts:

• It clarifies that for conviction under Sections 3(1)(w)(i) and 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (“SC/ST Act”), mere proof that the victim belonged to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe is not sufficient. The prosecution must also establish that the accused knew or were aware of the victim’s caste status, and that the offence was committed with that knowledge.
• It reiterates orthodox principles on:
  • the limited role of the “last seen together” theory in circumstantial cases,
  • the inadmissibility of confessions made in police custody to witnesses procured by the police, and
  • the proper application of Section 27 of the Evidence Act to “discoveries” of material objects.
• It refines sentencing jurisprudence in heinous rape–murder cases by converting a sentence of life imprisonment “for the remainder of life without remission” to a fixed term of 25 years’ imprisonment without remission, emphasising the role of mitigating factors and reformation.
• It also shows the Supreme Court’s concern for parity and access to justice by directing legal aid for similarly placed co-accused who had not filed appeals.

Though the special leave was formally limited to the quantum of sentence, the Court consciously scrutinised the High Court’s approach to conviction on certain counts, expressly distancing itself from several aspects of the High Court’s reasoning. The Court was careful to ensure that its confirmation of the conviction for rape and murder would not be misread as an endorsement of legally unsound evidentiary reasoning adopted below.

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II. Background and Procedural History

1. Factual matrix

On 24 November 2019, the deceased – the wife of PW-1 – was dropped at Yellapatar village by her husband to pursue their occupation of hawking utensils. When she did not return and her mobile phone calls went unanswered, PW-1 lodged a complaint. A search involving PW-1, relatives, and the police ensued.

On the next day, PW-3 found the dead body of the deceased in bushes beside the road leading to Yellapatar. PW-1 identified the body and informed the police. An inquest followed and the law was “set in motion”. Initially registered as a missing/unnatural death, the case was altered to include:

• Sections 376D (gang rape) and 302 read with 34 IPC (murder with common intention), and
• Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act (enhanced punishment when an SC/ST victim suffers specified offences “on the ground” of her caste).

The prosecution alleged that accused A1–A3 followed the deceased into an isolated area near Ramnaik Thanda, pulled her into bushes, raped her one by one despite her resistance, and to avoid identification post-incident, A1 slit her throat while A2 and A3 held her hands and legs. It was further alleged that A2 stole her mobile phone and A3 took Rs. 200 from her.

2. Trial court’s decision

The trial court convicted all three accused (A1–A3) of:

• Sections 302 & 376D read with 34 IPC – death sentence for murder, life imprisonment for gang rape, with fines and default simple imprisonment.
• Section 3(2)(v) SC/ST Act – enhanced sentence (life imprisonment) in view of the caste status of the deceased.
• Section 3(1)(w)(i) SC/ST Act – three years’ rigorous imprisonment and fine for sexual assault upon an SC/ST woman.
• Section 404 read with 34 IPC (as against A2 and A3) – three years’ rigorous imprisonment and fine for dishonest misappropriation of property belonging to a deceased person.

3. High Court’s judgment

On appeal, the High Court:

• Confirmed the convictions on all counts (IPC and SC/ST Act) against all three accused.
• Modified the death sentence to imprisonment for life without remission, directing that the accused remain in prison till the end of their natural life.

Its reasoning relied heavily on:

• a “last seen together” theory based on PW-4 and PW-5 having seen the deceased and the accused moving in the same direction,
• a confession allegedly made by the accused in the presence of PW-15 at the police station, and
• “recoveries” of material objects (mobile phone, knife, cash, clothes) under Section 27 of the Evidence Act.

4. Supreme Court: scope of appeal and intervention

The Supreme Court granted leave limited to the question of sentence as against A2 (Shaik Shabuddin). However, it expressly recorded that it had:

This triggered a careful re-examination of the evidentiary basis of the conviction and resulted in partial acquittals (under the SC/ST Act and Section 404 IPC) for A2, alongside modification of the sentence under Section 302 IPC.

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III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Judgment

1. Convictions affirmed

The Supreme Court affirmed, as against A2, the convictions under:

• Section 302 read with 34 IPC – murder committed in furtherance of common intention.
• Section 376D read with 34 IPC – gang rape committed with common intention.

However, it did so on a different evidentiary basis than that adopted by the High Court, consciously rejecting certain “circumstances” relied upon by the latter.

2. Convictions set aside

The Court set aside A2’s convictions under:

• Section 3(2)(v) SC/ST Act – no evidence that A2 knew the deceased’s caste or that the offence was committed “on the ground that” she was a member of an SC/ST.
• Section 3(1)(w)(i) SC/ST Act – same reasoning: no proof of knowledge of caste status or caste-based targeting.
• Section 404 read with 34 IPC – the alleged “recovery” of the mobile phone from A2 was invalid as a Section 27 discovery, and independent proof that the handset belonged to the deceased was lacking.

3. Sentence modified

On sentence, the Court:

• Agreed with the High Court that this was not a “rarest of the rare” case warranting the death penalty.
• Nevertheless found the High Court’s imposition of life imprisonment “till the last breath” (without remission) to be excessive in A2’s case, given several mitigating factors:
  • A2’s age (40 years at the time of the offence);
  • Responsibility for his wife, four children, and aged parents;
  • No prior criminal record;
  • No material suggesting he posed a continuing grave danger to society; and
  • Good conduct in custody, with no report indicating he was beyond reformation.
• Modified the sentence for murder under Section 302 read with 34 IPC to imprisonment for life with a non-remittable minimum of 25 years – i.e., A2 must serve 25 years without remission, after which ordinary remission rules may apply.
• Directed that the sentences under Sections 302/34 and 376D/34 IPC run concurrently.

4. Direction regarding co-accused

Recognising that A1 and A3 were identically convicted and sentenced but had not filed appeals, the Court directed:

This measure seeks to ensure that similarly situated co-accused are not left at a procedural disadvantage.

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IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Circumstantial Evidence and Safeguards

1. The “last seen together” theory and Section 106 Evidence Act

The trial and High Court treated the testimony of PW-4 and PW-5 – who saw the deceased and the accused moving in the same direction towards Yellapatar/Ramnaik Thanda – as a “last seen together” circumstance. The High Court went further to invoke Section 106 of the Evidence Act, treating the accused’s failure to explain what transpired thereafter as an incriminating link completing the chain of circumstances.

The Supreme Court sharply curtailed this reasoning:

• The Court pointed out that no prior acquaintance between the accused and the deceased had been established.
• On the evidence, the deceased and the accused were shown only to have been in the same vicinity at similar times – not necessarily walking together or interacting.
• On these facts, the Court held that a robust “last seen together” theory could not be posited. The evidence only supported that they were “in the same vicinity just prior to the time of the crime”, not that they were last seen in each other’s company in a manner that demands an explanation from the accused.

Legally, this aligns with prior Supreme Court jurisprudence which emphasises that:

• The “last seen” circumstance is only one link in the chain of circumstantial evidence, not a conclusive presumption of guilt.
• Section 106 does not shift the primary burden of proof from the prosecution; it only permits an adverse inference in limited situations where certain facts are exclusively within the knowledge of the accused, and only after the prosecution has established a coherent primary chain of circumstances.

By disapproving the High Court’s expansive use of Section 106, the Supreme Court reaffirms that:

2. Confession made in the presence of PW-15 at the police station

The High Court had relied upon a confession allegedly made by the accused to PW-15 and another witness (Md. Yunus) at the instance of PW-25, the DSP and Investigating Officer. These witnesses were “secured” to the police station, and the confession was recorded there while the accused were in police custody.

The Supreme Court categorically rejected this:

• It emphasised that there can be no reliance on such a confession “at the behest of the police”.
• The accused were in police custody at the time of confession, which attracts the embargo of Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act, making confessions to police officers or while in police custody inadmissible, except to the limited extent permitted by Section 27.
• The Court noted that the High Court’s view that such a confession could be relied upon “cannot at all be countenanced”.

This reiteration is firmly rooted in the longstanding doctrine that:

• Confessions in police custody are inherently suspect due to the possibilities of coercion or inducement.
• The only narrow exception is Section 27, which allows proof of that portion of the information which “distinctly relates to the fact thereby discovered”.

3. Section 27 Evidence Act and improper “recoveries”

The High Court treated the seizure of:

• MO-1 (mobile phone),
• MO-11 (knife),
• MO-21 (cash), and
• MOs 12–20 (clothes of the accused)

as “discoveries” under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. According to the prosecution, these items were handed over along with the confession by the accused to PW-15, and the clothes were seized as being worn by them at the time of arrest.

The Supreme Court was critical of this attempt to treat ordinary seizure as a Section 27 discovery:

• There was no concealment of the items. The material objects were said to be in the possession of the accused at the time of arrest, or directly handed over in the police station.
• On these facts, there was no “discovery” in consequence of information leading the police to a previously unknown location or object.
• The Court held that this “goes against the very principle of Section 27”, which applies only to information leading to the discovery of a fact (typically location of a concealed object) not otherwise known to the police.
• It further stressed that recovery must be made “in the presence of witnesses” at a place indicated by the accused, not by a simple seizure from their person in custody.

This position resonates with classic authorities such as Pulukuri Kottaya v. King-Emperor (PC, 1947), which held that Section 27 is limited to that portion of the information that distinctly leads to discovery, and cannot be used to smuggle in inadmissible confessional content.

By holding that:

the Court has reaffirmed that:

• Section 27 is not a carte blanche to legitimise every police-originated seizure.
• Investigators must strictly comply with the statutory conditions if they wish to rely on Section 27.

4. Despite exclusion of tainted circumstances, the chain of evidence remained complete

Notwithstanding its rejection of the High Court’s reliance on:

• an over-extended “last seen together” theory,
• the police-station confession, and
• Section 27 recoveries,

the Supreme Court carefully reconstructed the circumstantial chain from other reliable evidence:

• Presence in the vicinity:
  • PW-5 saw the accused proceeding towards Ramnaik Thanda at around 9:00 a.m. and noticed the deceased going in the same direction with a bag of utensils.
  • PW-4, working in a nearby field, heard the shrieks of a woman around 10:30 a.m., went in search but found no one, and also saw the accused moving from the direction of Ramnaik Thanda (where the body was later found) towards Yellapatar.
  • PW-4 later confirmed that the shrieks originated from the very location where the body was discovered.
• Post-incident conduct:
  • PW-6 saw the accused at his shop at about 11:30 a.m.; they sat on a bench and A2 drank water. He specifically noticed blood stains on the clothes of all the accused.
  • PW-8 spoke to the accused being missing from the village after the incident.
• Medical evidence:
  • PW-18, who performed the post-mortem, noted 14 ante-mortem injuries and clear findings of sexual assault, establishing both homicidal death and rape.
  • The preliminary post-mortem report (Ex. P-18) placed the time of death at 24–28 hours prior to examination, aligning almost exactly with the time PW-4 and PW-5 placed the accused and the deceased in the relevant area, and when PW-4 heard the shrieks.
• DNA and forensic evidence:
  • PW-21 collected the blood samples of the accused and spoke to the DNA/SRT analysis.
  • Autosomal STR analysis showed that seminal stains on the saree of the victim matched the DNA profiles of A1 and A2, establishing their involvement in the sexual assault.
• Failure of the alibi:
  • The accused suggested an alibi in their statements under Section 313 CrPC but failed to substantiate it.

The Court concluded that:

Thus, the conviction under IPC provisions was affirmed not by lowering the standard of proof, but by excluding tainted evidence and relying only on lawful, cogent circumstances that collectively left no reasonable doubt.

B. Clarification of Mens Rea under the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act

1. Statutory provisions involved

The accused were charged under:

• Section 3(2)(v) SC/ST Act – which enhances punishment where a person “not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe” commits any offence under the IPC punishable with ten years or more “on the ground that such person is a member of a Scheduled Castes or a Scheduled Tribe”.
• Section 3(1)(w)(i) SC/ST Act – which criminalises, inter alia, any person (not being SC/ST) who intentionally touches an SC/ST woman, uses words or acts of a sexual nature, etc., “knowing that she is a member of a Scheduled Castes or a Scheduled Tribes” or on that ground.

Both provisions, on their text, embed a requirement of knowledge of the victim’s caste and a linking of the criminal act to that caste identity.

2. Supreme Court’s holding

The Supreme Court, after noting that the prosecution had proved that the victim was an SC woman, held:

• There was no evidence that the accused:
  • knew the caste of the victim, or
  • were otherwise acquainted with her such that awareness of her caste could be inferred.
• In the absence of such proof, it could not be said that the offences were committed “with the knowledge of the caste status of the victim”.
• This knowledge is an essential ingredient for conviction under both Sections 3(1)(w)(i) and 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act.
• Consequently, no conviction under the SC/ST Act could be sustained.

The Court, therefore, acquitted A2 of offences under Sections 3(1)(w)(i) and 3(2)(v).

3. Consistency with prior Supreme Court precedents

This position is consistent with earlier decisions (decided before October 2024) such as:

• Khuman Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2019) 8 SCC 106 – holding that for Section 3(2)(v), the offence must be committed only on the ground that the victim is a member of an SC/ST, and mere proof of the victim’s caste identity is insufficient.
• Asharfi v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2018) 1 SCC 208 – emphasising the need for a caste nexus in invoking Section 3(2)(v).
• Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttarakhand, (2020) 10 SCC 710 – clarifying that the SC/ST Act is intended to protect against caste-based atrocities and not to convert every offence involving an SC/ST victim into an atrocity in the absence of a caste motive.

The present judgment applies these principles in the context of:

• a roadside rape–murder where the deceased was a hawker,
• no established prior relationship or interaction between the accused and the deceased, and
• no evidence that the attack was triggered or coloured by her caste identity.

By insisting on proof of knowledge and caste-based targeting, the Court prevents a drift towards “automatic” application of the SC/ST Act in every case where the victim happens to be a member of a Scheduled Caste/Tribe. It thus preserves the Act’s focus on caste-based atrocities, while ensuring that general criminal law (IPC) remains the primary vehicle for ordinary offences.

C. Acquittal under Section 404 IPC (Dishonest Misappropriation of Property of a Deceased Person)

A2 was convicted by the courts below under Section 404 read with 34 IPC, based on the allegation that he had misappropriated the deceased’s mobile phone.

The Supreme Court set aside this conviction for two main reasons:

• Invalid “recovery” under Section 27:
  • As already discussed, the alleged “handing over” of the mobile to PW-15 while in police custody could not qualify as a discovery under Section 27.
  • Accordingly, the recovery could not be treated as an incriminating circumstance against A2.
• Failure to prove ownership of the handset:
  • PW-22 proved that the mobile number/SIM used belonged to PW-11.
  • However, the handset itself was not conclusively proved to have belonged to the deceased; the prosecution’s case was that the SIM card had been thrown away and was neither recovered nor linked to the handset.
  • Thus, even if the handset was recovered, there was no reliable evidence that it was possessed by the deceased at the time of her death or that A2 dishonestly misappropriated it from her dead body or her estate.

Given that Section 404 requires proof that:

• the property belonged to a deceased person,
• it was in his/her possession at the time of death, and
• the accused dishonestly misappropriated or converted it to his own use,

the failure to prove these elements justified A2’s acquittal on this charge.

D. Sentencing: From Whole-Life Imprisonment to a 25-Year Non-Remittable Term

1. Death penalty and the “rarest of the rare” doctrine

The trial court had imposed the death penalty on all three accused under Section 302 IPC. The High Court found that:

• the case did not fall within the “rarest of the rare” category (as laid down in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684 and Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab, (1983) 3 SCC 470),
• but still considered the crime heinous enough to label the accused a continuing danger, warranting life imprisonment till the end of their natural lives without remission.

The Supreme Court agreed that the death penalty was unwarranted, and there is no challenge to that finding. The real contest was about the length and nature of life imprisonment imposed on A2.

2. Life “till last breath” vs fixed non-remittable term

The High Court’s sentence of life imprisonment “till the last breath without remission” effectively created a de facto whole-life term, akin to what a Constitution Bench later endorsed as permissible in Union of India v. V. Sriharan, (2016) 7 SCC 1.

However, as clarified in earlier cases such as Swamy Shraddananda (2) v. State of Karnataka, (2008) 13 SCC 767, courts also have the power to:

• impose life imprisonment, and
• specify a fixed minimum term without remission (for example, 20, 25, or 30 years),

to balance the gravity of the offence with the possibility of reformation, especially when a death sentence is found disproportionate but ordinary life imprisonment (with the possibility of early remission) is considered too lenient.

3. Mitigating circumstances in A2’s favour

The Supreme Court drew heavily on the High Court’s own factual findings about A2:

• He was 40 years old at the time of the offence – not a very young offender, but also not of such age that reformation could be ruled out.
• He had a family consisting of a wife, four children, and aged parents, and was the sole earning member.
• He had no prior criminal record.
• There was no material to support the finding that he posed a “grave danger” to society at large or that his continued existence required extinguishment.
• There were no adverse reports from jail authorities about his conduct in custody, and nothing suggested he was “beyond reformation”.

Significantly, the State did not argue before the Supreme Court that A2’s conduct in prison was adverse or that he was beyond reformation.

4. The Court’s approach to proportionality and reformation

In light of these factors, the Court concluded that:

Accordingly:

• The conviction under Section 302/34 IPC was maintained.
• The sentence was modified to:
  • life imprisonment with a mandatory non-remittable period of 25 years.
• The sentence under Section 376D/34 IPC was affirmed, to run concurrently.

This approach:

• Respects the gravity of a brutal rape–murder by not permitting early release; 25 years’ incarceration is extremely severe by any standard.
• Yet keeps alive the principle of penological proportionality and the constitutional value of reformation, by not completely closing the door on future remission or parole (after 25 years), subject to statutory and executive discretion.

E. Procedural Fairness and Access to Justice: Directions Regarding Co-Accused

In paragraph 19, the Supreme Court noted that:

• There were three accused in total (A1–A3),
• All had been convicted and sentenced identically by the High Court, but
• Only A2 had approached the Supreme Court.

To prevent inequity, the Court directed:

• The Registry to forward a copy of the judgment to the Member Secretary, Telangana Legal Services Authority.
• The said Authority, through the concerned District Legal Services Authority, to provide legal assistance to A1 and A3 to file appeals in the Supreme Court through the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee.

This direction has broader implications:

• It operationalises Article 39A of the Constitution (free legal aid), ensuring that indigent or uninformed convicts do not remain bound by possibly flawed convictions merely because they could not access the Supreme Court.
• It promotes parity: co-accused similarly situated should not be left serving disproportionate or flawed sentences simply due to procedural happenstance.

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V. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. “Last seen together” theory

This is a principle in circumstantial cases where:

• If a person was last seen alive in the company of the accused,
• and shortly thereafter is found dead,
• and the gap of time is small,
• then, in the absence of a satisfactory explanation from the accused, an inference can sometimes be drawn that the accused is responsible for the death.

However:

• It is not a standalone rule of conviction.
• It must be reinforced by other circumstances (motive, recovery, conduct, forensic evidence, etc.).
• Mere presence in the same vicinity is insufficient to trigger a strong presumption.

2. Section 106 of the Evidence Act

Section 106 says that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of a person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. In criminal trials:

• It does not shift the overall burden of proof (which always lies on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt).
• It only permits the court to expect some explanation from the accused where a particular fact (e.g., what happened inside a closed room) is uniquely within his knowledge.
• It cannot justify conviction if the prosecution has not first made out a strong foundational case.

3. Section 27 of the Evidence Act – “discovery” statements

Sections 25–26 generally render confessions to police inadmissible. Section 27 is a narrow exception:

• If an accused in police custody provides information to the police,
• and in consequence of that information a new fact is discovered (e.g., the location of a weapon concealed in a field),
• then only that portion of the information which “distinctly relates to the fact thereby discovered” is admissible.

Key limits:

• There must be a genuine discovery of something previously unknown.
• Simple seizure of items already on the person of the accused, or already in police knowledge, does not qualify.
• The information must be shown to have led to the discovery; otherwise it cannot be admitted.

4. Mens rea under Sections 3(1)(w)(i) and 3(2)(v) SC/ST Act

For these offences:

• The prosecution must prove not only the underlying crime (e.g., rape, murder) but also that:
  • the victim was a member of an SC/ST, and
  • the accused knew or acted on the ground that the victim was SC/ST.
• Mere co-existence of caste status and crime is insufficient; there must be a caste nexus.

5. Life imprisonment “till last breath” vs fixed minimum term without remission

In Indian law:

• Life imprisonment ordinarily means imprisonment for the remainder of the convict’s natural life, but statutory remission schemes can reduce the actual term.
• Courts, especially after Swamy Shraddananda (2) and Sriharan, can:
  • either direct that life shall indeed mean imprisonment for the entire natural life without remission, or
  • fix a specific non-remittable minimum (e.g., 20/25/30 years), after which remission may be considered.

In Shaik Shabuddin, the Supreme Court chose the latter route, fixing a non-remittable minimum of 25 years.

6. Common intention – Section 34 IPC

Section 34 IPC imposes joint liability when:

• a criminal act is done by several persons,
• in furtherance of the common intention of all.

It does not create a separate offence but:

• makes each participant liable as if he alone had committed the whole offence,
• provided the act was done pursuant to a shared plan or understanding, which can be inferred from conduct and surrounding circumstances.

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VI. Impact and Future Implications

1. On SC/ST Act prosecutions

This judgment consolidates an important doctrinal point: knowledge of the victim’s caste and a caste-based motive or targeting are essential for conviction under Sections 3(1)(w)(i) and 3(2)(v).

Practical implications:

• Investigating agencies will need to:
  • collect specific evidence of the accused’s awareness of the victim’s caste (prior acquaintance, caste-related slurs, community tensions, threats, etc.), and
  • establish that the offence was committed “on the ground” of that caste status.
• Trial courts must be cautious not to assume atrocity merely because the victim belongs to an SC/ST community.
• Appellate courts may increasingly scrutinise whether the invocation of Section 3(2)(v) is justified, particularly in spontaneous or opportunistic crimes (such as roadside assaults) lacking apparent caste motive.

2. On use of circumstantial evidence and police-led confessions

The Court’s disapproval of:

• stretching the “last seen” theory beyond its legitimate bounds,
• treating police-station confessions as admissible through civilian witnesses, and
• misusing Section 27 for routine seizures,

sends a clear signal:

• Courts must strictly enforce evidentiary safeguards;
• Investigating officers should not attempt to paper over weak investigation by dressing up inadmissible material as Section 27 recoveries or third-party confessions;
• Even in heinous crimes (rape–murder), the ends do not justify the means – convictions must rest on legally sound evidence.

Importantly, the Supreme Court:

• Affirmed the conviction under IPC only after excluding these tainted circumstances,
• And expressly stated that its confirmation “may not be understood as having approved” the flawed reasoning of the High Court.

This preserves the integrity of precedent and ensures that such flawed reasoning is not inadvertently elevated to binding law through the doctrine of merger.

3. On sentencing policy in heinous offences

By reducing a whole-life sentence to a 25-year non-remittable term, the Court:

• acknowledges the gravity of the crime but preserves a window for eventual reformation and reintegration,
• reinforces that even in heinous crimes, punishment must remain proportionate and not wholly extinguish hope of change, unless truly warranted.

Future sentencing in rape–murder cases is likely to:

• Continue to use the “special category” of fixed non-remittable terms (20/25/30 years) as a middle ground between death and standard life with early remission;
• Be more attentive to individualised mitigating factors: age, background, antecedents, conduct in custody, prospects of reformation.

4. On legal aid and parity among co-accused

The direction to extend legal aid to co-accused who have not appealed:

• Signals the Supreme Court’s willingness to intervene suo motu to correct systemic inequities,
• May encourage Legal Services Authorities to more proactively track long-term convicts who may have missed appellate remedies,
• Supports a more equitable criminal justice system, where the finality of conviction does not depend solely on personal access to counsel and resources.

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VII. Conclusion

Shaik Shabuddin v. State of Telangana (2025 INSC 1449) is an important decision that:

• Reinforces that the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act is a caste-specific protective statute – not a general aggravation for all offences against SC/ST victims – by insisting on proof of the accused’s knowledge of the victim’s caste and a caste-based nexus for Sections 3(1)(w)(i) and 3(2)(v).
• Reasserts classical safeguards of criminal evidence:
  • caution in applying the “last seen together” theory,
  • non-reliance on confessions in police custody, even when mediated through civilian “witnesses”, and
  • strict enforcement of the limits of Section 27 on police-led recoveries.
• Demonstrates that a conviction for heinous offences can be sustained on robust, lawful circumstantial and forensic evidence without resorting to dubious shortcuts.
• Modulates sentencing by preferring a fixed 25-year non-remittable term over whole-life incarceration, thus harmonising retributive needs with the enduring constitutional value of reformation.
• Advances access to justice by directing legal aid to non-appealing co-accused, reflecting concern for fairness and parity in criminal adjudication.

Although marked “non-reportable”, the judgment’s careful analysis of the SC/ST Act’s mental element, its insistence on proper evidentiary standards, and its structured approach to sentencing are likely to be persuasive in future criminal cases involving caste-based allegations, circumstantial proof, and the calibration of penalties in serious sexual offences.