Mandatory FIR and the Non‑Conclusive Status of Preliminary Enquiries: “Those Who Investigate Must Also Be Investigated”

Case: Vinod Kumar Pandey & Anr. v. Seesh Ram Saini & Ors.; Vinod Kumar Pandey & Anr. v. Vijay Aggarwal & Anr.

Citation: 2025 INSC 1095 | Court: Supreme Court of India | Date: 10 September 2025

Bench: Pankaj Mithal, J.; Prasanna B. Varale, J.

Introduction

This reportable decision addresses the delicate and consequential question of how the criminal process must respond when allegations of cognizable offences are made against senior investigating officers themselves. Two writ petitions under Article 226 read with Section 482 CrPC sought directions for registration of FIRs against two CBI officers—Inspector Vinod Kumar Pandey and Joint Director Neeraj Kumar—for alleged offences under multiple provisions of the IPC, including Sections 166, 218, 463, 465, 469, 506, 341, 342 and 120-B.

The writ petitions, filed by (i) Sheesh Ram Saini (complaint dated 05.07.2001) and (ii) Vijay Aggarwal (complaint dated 23.02.2004), were partly allowed by a Single Judge of the Delhi High Court in 2006 with directions to register FIRs and to have the investigation conducted by the Special Cell of the Delhi Police. The High Court arrived at a prima facie view that cognizable offences were disclosed, rejecting the contrary conclusions of a CBI Joint Director’s preliminary enquiry report dated 26.04.2005.

Letters Patent Appeals filed by the CBI officers were dismissed on maintainability in 2019. The Supreme Court, condoning delay on the ground that the appellants were bona fide pursuing LPAs, decided to test the correctness of the Single Judge’s orders on the merits, as a Division Bench would have done, and thereby addressed the core procedural and substantive questions: Can writ courts direct FIR registration despite a departmental preliminary enquiry finding no offence? What is the role of such an enquiry in the statutory scheme post-Lalita Kumari? Must alternative remedies be exhausted before invoking Article 226/Section 482 CrPC? Which agency should investigate when the accused are investigating officers themselves?

Summary of the Judgment

• Delay condoned; LPAs’ maintainability not adjudicated: The Supreme Court condoned the delay in challenging the 2006 orders, noting the appellants were diligently pursuing LPAs. It expressly declined to decide LPA maintainability and instead examined the Single Judge’s orders on the merits.
• CBI’s impleadment refused: The Court rejected impleadment of CBI as a party, reasoning that the institution was not the aggrieved party; the personal grievance lies with the officers. A respondent can support but not assail an impugned judgment.
• FIR must be registered: Upholding the High Court’s direction, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that when information discloses a cognizable offence, Section 154 CrPC mandates FIR registration. A preliminary enquiry is generally unnecessary for such allegations; if conducted, its report cannot bar FIR.
• Preliminary enquiry’s limited role: Treating the CBI Joint Director’s report as a preliminary enquiry, the Court clarified it can be considered by the Investigating Officer (IO) during the investigation but cannot be treated as conclusive or as a ground to refuse FIR registration.
• High Court’s findings are prima facie: The Court emphasized that the High Court’s view on commission of cognizable offences is only prima facie and must not fetter the IO’s independent assessment. After investigation, the IO may file a closure report or a chargesheet as warranted.
• Investigating agency modified: The Supreme Court replaced the Special Cell (which handles terrorism-related cases) with the Delhi Police, directing investigation by an officer not below the rank of Assistant Commissioner of Police.
• Protective directions: The appellants must join and cooperate in the investigation. No coercive steps, including arrest, shall be taken if they cooperate, unless the IO records satisfaction that custodial interrogation is necessary.
• Expeditious timeline: Given the vintage (alleged acts of 2000), the Court urged completion of the investigation “as expeditiously as possible, preferably within three months.”
• Accountability principle highlighted: In a telling line, the Court observed: “It is high time that sometimes those who investigate must also be investigated to keep alive the faith of the public at large in the system.”

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Lalita Kumari v. Government Of Uttar Pradesh (2014) 2 SCC 1:
  • Rule: Registration of FIR is mandatory when information discloses a cognizable offence. A preliminary enquiry is permissible only when information does not disclose a cognizable offence but indicates the need for verification.
  • Application here: The Court aligned with Lalita Kumari, clarifying that the CBI’s preliminary enquiry cannot be treated as conclusive to deny FIR. It may be looked at during investigation, but cannot stymie the Section 154 obligation.
• Ramesh Kumari v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2006) 2 SCC 677:
  • Rule: Police must register FIR upon disclosure of a cognizable offence; genuineness or credibility of information is not a precondition to registration. Alternative remedies are not a substitute for the statutory duty to register.
  • Application here: The Court reaffirmed that the police cannot refuse registration by pre-judging credibility, especially pertinent where allegations target investigators themselves.
• Sakiri Vasu v. State of U.P. (2008) 2 SCC 409:
  • Rule: High Courts generally discourage writs/Section 482 petitions where alternative remedies exist (e.g., Section 156(3) CrPC), but this is not an absolute bar.
  • Application here: The Court recognized the principle but underscored that the alternative remedy rule cannot override the duty to register FIR; writ oversight was justified given the reluctance to act against CBI officers.
• Anurag Bhatnagar & Anr. v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr., 2025 INSC 895:
  • Rule: Approaching the court without exhausting alternative remedies is a procedural irregularity, not illegality; courts can direct FIR registration where cognizable information is conveyed.
  • Application here: The decision reinforced that technical objections on exhaustion of remedies cannot defeat FIR registration where the law mandates it.
• Pradeep Nirankarnath Sharma v. State of Gujarat (2025) 4 SCC 818:
  • Rule: Allegations of abuse of official position and corrupt practices while holding public office are cognizable; FIR registration is required without insisting on preliminary enquiry.
  • Application here: Provided a contemporaneous foundation for treating the allegations against the CBI officers as cognizable, warranting registration and investigation.

Legal Reasoning

• Threshold of cognizable offence met: The Court endorsed the High Court’s prima facie view that the complaints disclosed cognizable offences:
  • Seizure of documents on 26.04.2000 without contemporaneous seizure memo; memo prepared only on 27.04.2000, contrary to record and the CBI Manual. Prima facie engagement of Sections 218, 463, 465, 469, 166 and 120-B IPC.
  • Summoning Vijay Aggarwal post-bail (07.06.2001, 11.06.2001), indicating potential mala fide and malicious exercise of authority; allegations of intimidation and coercion to procure withdrawal of a complaint against a senior CBI officer.
• Preliminary enquiry cannot stifle FIR: Reinforcing Lalita Kumari, the Court stressed that a preliminary enquiry, if held, is at most non-conclusive material; it cannot replace the statutory mandate to register an FIR where cognizable offences are disclosed. Courts may direct registration notwithstanding a contrary departmental enquiry report.
• Writ jurisdiction is not ousted by alternative remedies: While High Courts should ordinarily discourage writs in the face of alternate statutory mechanisms, the rule is not absolute. Where police decline or are reluctant to act—especially against fellow investigators—constitutional and inherent powers can be invoked to ensure legality and accountability.
• Independence of investigation safeguarded: By declaring the High Court’s observations to be prima facie and allowing the IO to consider the preliminary enquiry report without treating it as conclusive, the Court insulated the investigative process from judicial overreach while enforcing the Section 154 duty.
• Appropriate investigating agency designation: Recognizing that the Special Cell is ordinarily tasked with terrorism-related matters, the Court sensibly redirected the case to the Delhi Police, with an officer not below ACP rank to preserve seniority and impartiality.
• Impleadment and locus clarifications: The Court clarified that:
  • The institution (CBI) was not the party aggrieved by FIR directions against individual officers; the officers are the real parties affected.
  • A respondent (or pro forma respondent) may support, but cannot assail, an impugned judgment unless it independently challenges it.
• Sanction and limitation objections deferred: Although Section 197 CrPC (sanction for prosecution) and Section 140 of the Delhi Police Act (limitation) were invoked by the respondents, the Court did not uphold these as barriers at the FIR-registration stage. The judgment proceeds on the accepted position that such defences do not arise pre-registration and may be addressed at appropriate later stages (e.g., cognizance).
• Procedural fairness and proportionality: A balanced protection was given to the accused officers—no coercive steps if they cooperate and appear when called; arrest only upon recorded satisfaction of necessity for custodial interrogation—thereby harmonizing accountability with due process.

Impact and Prospective Significance

• Strengthened accountability of investigating agencies: The emphatic dictum—“those who investigate must also be investigated”—is likely to be cited to ensure that allegations against law enforcement are not insulated by internal enquiries, institutional reluctance, or procedural objections.
• Recalibration of the role of preliminary enquiries: Agencies like the CBI often conduct preliminary enquiries under their manuals. This decision reaffirms that such enquiries cannot supplant the statutory scheme: they are non-conclusive and cannot defeat the mandatory duty to register FIRs in cognizable cases.
• Writ practice in FIR matters: The decision situates writ oversight within a principled framework: while alternative remedies exist (e.g., Section 156(3) CrPC), writ/Section 482 intervention remains available where state agencies demur or refuse to act—especially in sensitive cases involving their own personnel.
• Operational guidance for police:
  • Do not evaluate credibility or genuineness before FIR registration where cognizable offences are disclosed.
  • If a preliminary enquiry exists, treat it as one piece of non-conclusive material during investigation.
  • Assign appropriate units—avoid diverting specialized anti-terror cells to routine criminal allegations unless warranted by subject matter.
• Sanction and limitation raised but undecided: By not treating Section 197 CrPC and Section 140 DPA as pre-FIR bars, the Court implicitly aligns with the broader jurisprudence that these issues arise at the stage of cognizance or trial, not at registration. Future cases will continue to parse the scope of “official duty” for sanction purposes.
• Judicial restraint coupled with enforceability: The format of relief—directing FIR and a time-bound, impartial investigation with protective safeguards—may serve as a template in analogous cases, ensuring both accountability and fairness.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Cognizable offence: A crime for which police can register an FIR and investigate without prior court permission (e.g., many IPC offences listed in the complaints here).
• FIR (First Information Report): A written record of information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, triggering investigation under Section 154 CrPC.
• Preliminary enquiry: A pre-FIR verification sometimes conducted by police/CBI to ascertain basics where the information does not clearly disclose a cognizable offence. Per Lalita Kumari, it is not required where the information clearly discloses a cognizable offence; if conducted, it cannot bar FIR and is not conclusive.
• Article 226 and Section 482 CrPC: High Courts’ constitutional and inherent powers, respectively, to ensure legality, prevent abuse of process, and secure the ends of justice. Alternative remedies do not absolutely bar their use.
• Section 197 CrPC (Sanction): A protective provision requiring prior governmental sanction for prosecution of public servants for acts purportedly done in the discharge of official duty. Typically arises at cognizance, not at FIR-registration stage.
• Section 140, Delhi Police Act: A limitation and protection clause for actions done under color of duty. Its application is contextual and generally does not preclude FIR registration.
• Pro forma respondent: A party added for completeness or to support a decision, but not necessarily entitled to challenge the decision absent its own separate grievance.
• No coercive steps; custodial interrogation: Courts often protect accused from arrest if they cooperate, reserving arrest for when the IO records specific need for custodial interrogation (e.g., to recover evidence, prevent tampering, or ensure presence).

Key Takeaways

• When information discloses a cognizable offence, the police must register an FIR; assessments of credibility or genuineness are for investigation, not a precondition to registration.
• Preliminary enquiries—if any—are non-conclusive and cannot be used to deny FIR registration; they may be considered by the IO as part of the investigative material.
• High Courts may direct FIR registration under Article 226/Section 482 CrPC even where alternative remedies exist, particularly where institutional reluctance is evident.
• Investigations against investigating officers must proceed with impartiality and appropriate agency assignment; specialized terrorism units should not be deployed unless subject matter so demands.
• Protective directions can balance accountability with due process: cooperate-and-no-arrest frameworks unless custodial interrogation is justified on record.
• The decision underscores public confidence in the justice system: investigators can and must be investigated when credible allegations arise.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s decision in 2025 INSC 1095 consolidates and operationalizes core post-Lalita Kumari principles in a sensitive context: alleged wrongdoing by high-ranking investigators. It decisively holds that the statutory mandate to register an FIR on disclosure of a cognizable offence cannot be neutralized by departmental preliminary enquiries or by reliance on alternative remedies as a jurisdictional shield. By designating an appropriate agency, preserving the IO’s autonomy, permitting non-conclusive use of preliminary enquiry materials, and providing calibrated protections to the accused officers, the Court crafts a careful balance between accountability and fairness. The resonant message—that “those who investigate must also be investigated”—is poised to shape future litigation involving allegations against enforcement officials, fortifying the rule of law and public trust in equal measure.