Mandatory Age Determination under JJ Act and the Limited Scope of Appeals Against Acquittal in POCSO Cases: Commentary on Annapurna Jajodiya v. State of Bihar

Mandatory Age Determination under the Juvenile Justice Act and the “Possible View” Test in Appeals Against Acquittal in POCSO Prosecutions:
A Commentary on Annapurna Jajodiya v. State of Bihar, Patna High Court (03.11.2025)

1. Introduction

1.1. Case Background

The decision in Annapurna Jajodiya v. The State of Bihar & Anr., Criminal Appeal (SJ) No. 3416 of 2025, delivered orally by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Alok Kumar Pandey of the Patna High Court on 03 November 2025, arises from an appeal against acquittal in a Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (“POCSO Act”) case.

The appellant (the prosecutrix, whose name is anonymised in the judgment as per POCSO practice) challenged the judgment dated 17.06.2025 of the Additional Sessions Judge–VI-cum-Special Judge, POCSO, Patna, in Special (POCSO) Case No. 227 of 2018. In that trial, Respondent No. 2, Ashish Sinha, a neighbour of the prosecutrix, had been acquitted of offences under:

  • Sections 354 and 354-A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) – relating to assault or criminal force with intent to outrage modesty, and sexual harassment; and
  • Sections 8 and 12 of the POCSO Act – relating to sexual assault and sexual harassment upon a child.

The prosecution case, in essence, was that on 09.11.2018 the minor victim went to purchase a toothbrush from a nearby shop, was allegedly lured into the accused’s house, shown obscene video clips, and wrongfully restrained, and was threatened with dire consequences if she disclosed the incident to anyone. On her return, she disclosed the incident to her family, and a First Information Report (FIR) was lodged at the Mahila Police Station, Patna, on 13.11.2018 (Mahila P.S. Case No. 171 of 2018).

1.2. Procedural History and Parties

  • Trial Stage: After investigation, a charge-sheet was filed under Sections 354, 354-A IPC and Sections 8, 12 POCSO. The trial court framed charges and, upon evaluating oral and documentary evidence, acquitted the accused.
  • Appeal: The victim, as appellant, invoked her statutory right to challenge the acquittal. The State of Bihar and the accused (Ashish Sinha) were respondents.

The High Court heard counsel for the appellant and the learned Additional Public Prosecutor (APP) for the State, and dismissed the appeal at the admission stage itself, upholding the acquittal.

1.3. Core Legal Issues

The judgment centrally engages with two clusters of issues:
  1. POCSO and Age Determination:
    • Whether the prosecution proved, beyond reasonable doubt, that the victim was a “child” (below 18 years) so as to attract the POCSO Act.
    • How Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (“JJ Act 2015”) and the Supreme Court’s ruling in Jarnail Singh v. State Of Haryana shape the method and standard of age determination for victims of offences.
  2. Scope of Appellate Interference with Acquittals:
    • Under what circumstances can a High Court, in an appeal against acquittal, reverse a trial court’s judgment?
    • What is the legal significance of the “possible view” doctrine and the concept of “double presumption” of innocence?

The decision is therefore an important reaffirmation of: (i) the mandatory and structured process of age determination in POCSO cases via the JJ Act framework; and (ii) the heavily circumscribed jurisdiction of appellate courts while examining appeals against acquittal, particularly where findings of fact turn on appreciation of oral testimony.

2. Summary of the Judgment

2.1. Outcome

The Patna High Court dismissed the criminal appeal at the admission stage and upheld the acquittal of Respondent No. 2 for offences under Sections 354, 354-A IPC and Sections 8, 12 of the POCSO Act.

2.2. Key Findings

The Court’s reasoning can be summarised as follows:
  • Failure to Prove Minority of the Victim:
    The prosecution asserted that the victim was a minor, but:
    • Only a photocopy of the birth certificate was produced and marked for identification; it was not proved in accordance with law.
    • The Investigating Officer (IO) merely “verified it online” without producing a verification report or certified copy.
    • No school record (admission register, matriculation certificate) or municipal birth certificate was properly proved.
    • No medical age determination test (e.g., ossification test) was conducted.
    In view of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Jarnail Singh and Section 94 JJ Act 2015, the Court held that the prosecution failed to conclusively establish that the victim was a child under 18, thereby undermining the POCSO charges.
  • Evidentiary Weaknesses and Contradictions:
    The Court endorsed the trial court’s assessment that:
    • There were material discrepancies between the victim’s testimony in court and her prior statements under Sections 161 and 164 CrPC, especially regarding the alleged showing of pornographic video, which appeared for the first time in her examination-in-chief at trial.
    • Allegations such as the accused urinating in the bathroom were not mentioned by the victim (PW-1) herself but surfaced through PW-3 (the mother), indicating embellishment.
    • No recovery or seizure was effected of:
      • The accused’s mobile phone;
      • The alleged obscene video;
      • The chocolates allegedly offered; or
      • The toothbrush allegedly purchased.
      The IO admitted that no attempt was made to trace or seize such material evidence.
    • All witnesses except the victim herself (PW-1) were hearsay witnesses, deposing only what they had been told by her.
    • There was evidence of an ongoing rivalry/dispute between the victim’s family and the accused’s sister-in-law, which the IO did not adequately investigate or rule out as a possible motive for false implication.
    Together, these factors substantially impaired the credibility of the prosecution case.
  • Unexplained Delay in FIR:
    While the incident allegedly occurred on 09.11.2018, the FIR was lodged on 13.11.2018. Although PW-3 (mother) and PW-4 (family friend) claimed to have confronted the accused on the very day of the incident, no cogent explanation for the delay of four days was offered. The IO admitted that no inquiry was made to ascertain the cause of delay. The Court held that this unexplained delay cast doubt on the authenticity of the FIR.
  • Standard in Appeals Against Acquittal – “Possible View” and Double Presumption:
    After extensively citing Supreme Court precedents, the Court held that:
    • In an appeal against acquittal, there is a double presumption of innocence in favour of the accused.
    • The appellate court can interfere only if the trial court’s view is perverse, wholly unsustainable, or based on a clear misreading or omission of material evidence.
    • If the trial court’s assessment represents a “possible view” on the evidence, the High Court must not substitute its own assessment merely because another view is also possible.
    Applying these principles, the High Court concluded that the trial court had taken a plausible, legally tenable view in acquitting the accused; hence no interference was warranted.
  • Burden of Proof Not Shifted to the Accused:
    The Court rejected the appellant’s contention that, once the victim’s version was supported initially, the burden shifted to the accused to prove his innocence. It emphasised that:
    • The prosecution had not discharged its initial burden to prove the charge beyond reasonable doubt, particularly regarding the victim’s age and the internal consistency of her testimony.
    • Unless a prima facie case is established by the prosecution, the evidentiary burden does not shift to the accused.

Accordingly, the Court held that the acquittal was neither perverse nor contrary to law and dismissed the appeal.

3. Precedents and Authorities Cited

3.1. Jarnail Singh v. State Of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 263

This is the foundational precedent on age determination cited by the High Court. In Jarnail Singh, the Supreme Court held that Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007—though framed for determining the age of a “child in conflict with law”—should also govern the determination of the age of a child victim of crime.

The Court in Jarnail Singh articulated a clear hierarchy of evidence for age determination (as quoted in paragraphs 22–23 of the present judgment):

  1. First Preference: Matriculation or equivalent certificate.
  2. Second Preference (if 1 is unavailable): Date of birth certificate from the school first attended (other than a play school).
  3. Third Preference (if 1 and 2 are unavailable): Birth certificate from a municipal authority, corporation, or panchayat.
  4. Fourth (Residual) Step: Only when all the above are unavailable, obtain and rely on medical opinion (ossification test or other tests) from a duly constituted Medical Board.

Crucially, the Supreme Court held that whichever of these documents, in order of priority, is available and proved becomes “conclusive proof” of age for the purposes of criminal adjudication. The Patna High Court adopts this framework and then maps it onto the statutory regime under the JJ Act 2015.

3.2. Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015

The Court notes that the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000 and the 2007 Rules have been superseded by the JJ Act 2015. Section 94 of the 2015 Act lays down the procedure for age determination. The relevant portion, quoted in the judgment, essentially replicates the Jarnail Singh hierarchy:

  1. Date of birth certificate from school or matriculation/equivalent certificate from the examination board; failing which,
  2. Birth certificate from a corporation/municipality/panchayat; failing which,
  3. Ossification test or other medical age determination tests.

The Patna High Court treats this statutory scheme as a mandatory procedural framework, particularly where the minority of the prosecutrix is a jurisdictional fact for applying the POCSO Act.

3.3. Early Precedent on Appeals Against Acquittal – Surajpal Singh v. State, 1952 SCR 193

In Surajpal Singh, the Supreme Court clearly held that while the High Court has full power to review evidence in an appeal against acquittal, the acquittal reinforces the presumption of innocence. Therefore, a trial court’s decision acquitting the accused should be reversed only for “very substantial and compelling reasons”.

This is the earliest articulation of the principle that appellate courts must be cautious in interfering with acquittals—a theme repeatedly echoed in later decisions and adopted by the Patna High Court.

3.4. Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2008) 10 SCC 450

The Court quotes paragraph 75 of Ghurey Lal, where the Supreme Court reiterated that an appellate court should be “slow to interfere” with an acquittal, particularly because:

  • The trial court had the advantage of observing the demeanour of witnesses.
  • An acquittal should not be disturbed unless “totally perverse or wholly unsustainable.”

This principle directly informs the Patna High Court’s insistence that there must be demonstrable perversity, not merely a difference of opinion, to justify overturning an acquittal.

3.5. H.D. Sundara & Ors. v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581

The High Court cites paragraph 8 of this decision, where the Supreme Court distilled key principles governing appeals against acquittal:

  • Acquittal strengthens the presumption of innocence.
  • The appellate court can review oral and documentary evidence.
  • The main question is whether the view taken by the trial court is a “possible view” on the evidence.
  • If the view is indeed possible, the appellate court cannot substitute it merely because another view is also possible.
  • Interference is justified only if the only reasonable conclusion is guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

These principles are directly applied in the present case to uphold the acquittal.

3.6. Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415

The Patna High Court quotes paragraph 42 of Chandrappa, which has become the classic statement of law on appeals against acquittals. The five principles may be summarised as:

  1. The appellate court has full power to review and reappreciate the evidence.
  2. No statutory restriction on such power exists in the CrPC.
  3. Expressions like “substantial and compelling reasons” are not legal limitations but emphasise judicial restraint.
  4. There is a double presumption in favour of the accused upon acquittal.
  5. If two reasonable views are possible, the appellate court should not disturb the acquittal.

The Patna High Court explicitly relies on these principles, especially points (4) and (5), to justify non-interference in the trial court’s view.

3.7. Murugesan v. State, (2012) 10 SCC 383

The Court quotes extensively from Murugesan, which elaborates the conceptual distinction between:

  • A view that may be “wrong” or “erroneous” (in the opinion of the appellate court); and
  • A view that nonetheless qualifies as a “possible view” on the evidence.

The Supreme Court in Murugesan held that so long as the trial court’s conclusion:

  • Can reasonably be arrived at on the evidence; and
  • Is supported by reasons referable to the record;

the appellate court must not supplant its own view merely on the basis of disagreement. The Patna High Court uses this to emphasise that its role is not to decide whether the trial court’s conclusion is the best possible one, but only whether it is a legally tenable one.

3.8. Hakeem Khan v. State of M.P., (2017) 5 SCC 719

The Court cites this decision to show that the Supreme Court has consistently respected trial court acquittals where the trial court’s view was “more than just a possible view” and it would not be safe to convict multiple accused in a serious offence like murder on reappreciation alone.

This reinforces the threshold for interference: unless the prosecution’s case is so overwhelming that only a conclusion of guilt is possible, acquittals should not be reversed.

3.9. Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 561

The latest Supreme Court authority cited in the judgment further refines the standard for reversing acquittals. The appellate court may interfere only if:

  1. The acquittal is vitiated by patent perversity;
  2. There is misreading or non-consideration of material evidence on record; and
  3. No two reasonable views are possible – that is, only the view consistent with guilt is reasonably possible from the evidence available.

The Patna High Court concludes that none of these conditions are met in the present case.

4. Detailed Legal Analysis

4.1. Age Determination under JJ Act 2015 and Its Centrality in POCSO Prosecutions

The POCSO Act applies only where the victim is a “child,” defined as a person below 18 years of age. Thus, the victim’s age is a jurisdictional fact for the application of POCSO. Without proof of minority, POCSO provisions cannot validly be invoked.

In this case:

  • The prosecution claimed the victim was a minor.
  • A photocopy of a birth certificate was produced but:
    • It was not proved by examining the issuing authority or custodian of records.
    • No original or certified copy was exhibited as evidence.
    • The IO’s “online verification” was not backed by any documentary verification report in evidence.
  • No school admission register or matriculation certificate (which enjoy primacy under JJ Act and Jarnail Singh) was brought on record as proved material.
  • No ossification test or medical age determination was ordered or conducted, despite the absence of proven documentary evidence.

The High Court, invoking Section 94 JJ Act 2015 and Jarnail Singh, concludes that:

“In the light of the aforesaid discussion made above, the age of victim must conclusively proved through school record or through medical evidence but in the present case the medical evidence regarding age or any documentary proof has not been proved…”

This has two important doctrinal consequences:

  1. Strict Compliance with Section 94 JJ Act is Mandatory:
    By treating the JJ Act procedure as mandatory and demanding “conclusive proof” of age, the Court sends a clear signal to investigating agencies and trial courts that:
    • Loose or informal reliance on photocopies or unproved documents will not suffice.
    • The hierarchy of documents and medical examination mandated by Section 94 must be followed, recorded, and proved.
  2. Failure in Age Proof Affects POCSO, Not Necessarily IPC Offences:
    In principle, even if POCSO fails for want of proof of age, IPC provisions like Sections 354 and 354-A may still apply irrespective of the victim’s age. However, in this case, the Court found that the overall evidentiary weaknesses – contradictions, lack of corroborative material, hearsay evidence, and investigative lapses – affected the entire prosecution case, including the IPC charges.

4.2. Evaluation of Witness Testimony and the “Sterling Witness” Standard

In sexual offences, courts often rely substantially on the testimony of the victim, recognising the difficulty of obtaining independent eyewitnesses and direct corroboration. However, the law also recognises that:

  • If the victim’s testimony is consistent, cogent, and natural, it may be treated as that of a “sterling witness” and can sustain conviction even without corroboration.
  • If the testimony contains serious contradictions, unexplained improvements, or material omissions, its reliability is compromised.

Here, the High Court, echoing the trial court, highlights:

  • The new element of the accused allegedly showing a pornographic video, introduced only during PW-1’s examination-in-chief in court, not mentioned in her earlier statements under Sections 161 and 164 CrPC.
  • Allegations like the accused urinating in the bathroom being made by PW-3 (mother) but not by PW-1 herself—suggesting either embellishment or contradiction.
  • Absence of recovery of the phone, video, or other physical articles that might have lent some corroboration to the victim’s version.

In this context, the Court agrees that the victim cannot be treated as a “sterling witness”. This does not mean her testimony is automatically disbelieved, but that the Court is not prepared to base a conviction solely on her uncorroborated and internally inconsistent testimony, especially where the standard is proof beyond reasonable doubt.

4.3. Hearsay Evidence and Lack of Independent Witnesses

The Court underscores that:

  • PW-2 (sister), PW-3 (mother), PW-4 (family friend), and PW-5 (brother) were all hearsay witnesses, testifying only to what the victim told them after the incident.
  • The IO (PW-6) confirmed that no independent eyewitness had seen the occurrence.
  • Crucially, the IO did not examine the shopkeeper from “Krishna Store” where the victim claimed to have gone to buy a toothbrush—an omission which deprived the Court of even peripheral corroboration of the victim leaving the house for the stated purpose.

While in many sexual offence cases, the absence of independent witnesses is understandable (and not fatal), the Court here treats the combination of:

  • Hearsay testimonies;
  • Material contradictions in the victim’s own statements; and
  • Non-examination of potentially relevant witnesses and non-seizure of critical physical evidence

as cumulatively creating reasonable doubt.

4.4. Delay in Lodging the FIR

The alleged incident occurred on 09.11.2018; the FIR was lodged on 13.11.2018. In sexual offences, delay in reporting can often be explained by social stigma, fear, family hesitation, or trauma. Courts have consistently held that delay, per se, is not fatal if satisfactorily explained.

However, in this case:

  • PW-3 and PW-4 stated that they confronted the accused on the same day as the incident.
  • Despite this prompt confrontation, there was a gap of four days before lodging the FIR.
  • The IO admitted that no inquiry was made regarding the reasons for this delay.

The Court notes that this unexplained delay “questions the authenticity of the FIR.” It is not simply the existence of delay, but:

  • The absence of any explanation; and
  • The apparent inconsistency between prompt confrontation and delayed legal action

that leads the Court to see the delay as a factor adding to doubt, especially when coupled with other infirmities.

4.5. Investigative Lapses vs. Substantive Doubt

The appellant’s counsel argued that the case should not be thrown out merely because of faulty investigation. Indeed, the Supreme Court has often said that defective investigation does not necessarily entitle the accused to acquittal if the core evidence is otherwise reliable.

However, the High Court implicitly distinguishes between:

  • Mere procedural lapses (e.g., a technical flaw in seizure memos) where the substantive evidence remains strong; and
  • Lapses that go to the root of the prosecution story (e.g., failure to prove age, failure to secure the only possible physical corroboration of a digital offence).

Here, the IO’s failures—non-proof of age documents, non-seizure of alleged pornographic content or mobile phone, non-examination of a key local witness, and non-inquiry into the cause of delay—are not viewed as minor defects, but as structural weaknesses that leave the court without adequate material to convict.

4.6. Application of the “Possible View” Doctrine and Double Presumption

After analysing the evidence, the High Court turns squarely to the legal standard in appeals against acquittal. Synthesising the long line of Supreme Court jurisprudence cited, the governing principles can be distilled as:

  1. The trial court’s acquittal reinforces the presumption of innocence, creating a double presumption in favour of the accused.
  2. The appellate court can reappreciate evidence but should interfere only if:
    • The trial court’s view is perverse (i.e., against the weight of evidence, based on conjecture, or ignoring material evidence); or
    • Material evidence has been misread or omitted; and
    • No two reasonable views are possible – i.e., only a finding of guilt is reasonably open on the record.
  3. If the trial court’s view is one of the “possible views” that a reasonable fact-finder could adopt based on the evidence, the appellate court must not disturb the acquittal even if it might have taken another view.

The High Court applies this standard as follows:

  • It acknowledges that the trial court’s assessment of contradictions, unexplained delay, absence of age proof, and investigative omissions constitutes a plausible reasoning leading to acquittal.
  • Even if an appellate court could hypothetically reach a different conclusion, the view actually taken by the trial court is not “impossible” or irrational, but is reasonably supportable by the record.

On that account, the High Court holds that the trial court’s judgment is a “plausible view based on the evidence available”, and therefore it cannot be branded perverse or set aside.

4.7. Dismissal at the Admission Stage

An additional procedural nuance is that the High Court dismissed the appeal at the admission stage itself, even though it heard both sides. This indicates that:

  • The Court found no arguable legal or factual infirmity on the face of the record that could justify issuing notice or calling for a full-scale appellate hearing.
  • Given the strong binding precedents and the robustness of the trial court’s reasons, any further appellate scrutiny was viewed as unwarranted.

5. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

5.1. POCSO Act, 2012 – Basic Idea

The POCSO Act is a special law designed to protect children (persons under 18) from sexual offences. Its key features include:

  • Sexual assault (Section 8): Physical sexual contact without penetration, involving sexual intent, with a child.
  • Sexual harassment (Section 12): Conduct of a sexual nature (words, gestures, showing pornography, etc.) towards a child.
  • Stringent punishments and “child-friendly” procedures, such as in-camera trials and restrictions on disclosure of identity.

If the victim is not proved to be a child, the POCSO Act cannot be applied.

5.2. IPC Sections 354 and 354-A

  • Section 354 IPC: Punishes assault or criminal force used with intent to outrage the modesty of a woman.
  • Section 354-A IPC: Punishes specific forms of sexual harassment, such as:
    • Physical contact and advances involving unwelcome sexual overtures;
    • Demand or request for sexual favours;
    • Showing pornography against the will of a woman;
    • Sexually coloured remarks.

Unlike POCSO, these provisions do not depend on the victim being a minor, though age may influence sentencing and gravity.

5.3. “Child” and Age Determination under JJ Act (Section 94)

Under both JJ Act and POCSO, a “child” is a person below 18 years. Section 94 JJ Act 2015 provides a structured method for determining age:

  1. Look first for school or matriculation certificates;
  2. If not available, look for municipal/panchayat birth certificates;
  3. If none exist, then use medical tests (ossification, etc.).

Courts treat these documents, when properly proved, as conclusive of age.

5.4. Hearsay Evidence

“Hearsay” evidence is when a witness testifies about what they have heard from someone else, rather than about what they personally saw or experienced. For example:

  • Victim tells her mother: “The neighbour showed me an obscene video.”
  • The mother (PW-3) testifies that “the victim told me the neighbour showed her an obscene video.”

The mother’s statement is hearsay regarding the incident itself. Hearsay is generally less reliable and not a substitute for direct testimony, although it may be admissible to explain subsequent conduct or to corroborate timing of disclosure.

5.5. FIR, Section 161 CrPC, and Section 164 CrPC

  • FIR (First Information Report): The initial report lodged with the police about a cognizable offence. It sets the criminal law machinery in motion.
  • Section 161 CrPC Statement: Statements made by witnesses to the police during investigation. These are not substantive evidence but can be used to test credibility (e.g., to do a contradiction in cross-examination).
  • Section 164 CrPC Statement: A voluntary statement or confession recorded by a Magistrate, often treated as having higher reliability due to judicial oversight. Still, the substantive evidence is the testimony in court; Section 164 is often used to corroborate or contradict that testimony.

Inconsistencies between these statements and the witness’s in-court testimony can weaken credibility.

5.6. “Acquittal”, “Perverse Finding”, and “Possible View”

  • Acquittal: A finding that the prosecution has not proved the charge beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in the accused being found not guilty.
  • Perverse Finding: A finding that is so contrary to the evidence, or so unreasonable, that no rational person could have arrived at it; or one that is based on ignoring crucial evidence.
  • Possible View: A conclusion that a reasonable judge could reach on the basis of the evidence, even if another judge might reach a different conclusion. If the trial court’s view is “possible” in this sense, the appellate court will not interfere with an acquittal.

5.7. Double Presumption of Innocence

Every accused person is presumed innocent until proven guilty. When a trial court acquits an accused:

  • The original presumption of innocence remains; and
  • The acquittal itself reinforces that presumption.

This is why appellate courts give added deference to a trial court’s acquittal, especially in close or borderline cases.

6. Impact and Implications of the Judgment

6.1. For POCSO Prosecutions: Rigour of Age Determination

The judgment sends a strong signal that age proof is not a mere formality in POCSO cases. Its implications include:

  • Police and Prosecutors:
    • Must obtain and formally prove primary age documents (school records, municipal birth certificates, etc.) at the earliest stage.
    • Where such records are unavailable or doubtful, must ensure that medical age determination tests are conducted and properly documented.
    • Cannot rely on photocopies, online printouts, or IO’s oral assurances without admissible proof.
  • Trial Courts:
    • Must insist on compliance with Section 94 JJ Act, and not treat age as undisputed simply because the prosecution asserts it.
    • Must record specific findings on age, supported by documentary or medical evidence.
  • Defence Counsel:
    • Will likely challenge weak or informal age determinations more vigorously, especially in borderline age cases.

Failure to meet the standard laid down here can result in the POCSO part of the case collapsing, leaving only general IPC offences in play (if at all).

6.2. On Evidentiary Standards in Sexual Offences

While Indian courts have often emphasised that the testimony of a prosecutrix, if credible, can alone sustain conviction, this case underscores a complementary point:

  • Credibility is key. Where the victim’s account shows material improvements or contradictions without satisfactory explanation, or where critical physical or digital evidence is not even attempted to be secured, courts will hesitate to convict.
  • The concept of a “sterling witness” sets a high bar. It is not enough that the victim repeats the allegation; the Court examines consistency, spontaneity, plausibility, and the absence of material contradictions.

This approach protects accused persons from wrongful conviction but also serves as a reminder that investigations in sexual offences must be meticulous and prompt, especially where digital evidence (videos, messages) is involved and can be easily lost or manipulated.

6.3. Reinforcement of Appellate Restraint in Acquittal Appeals

The most robust doctrinal reaffirmation in this judgment is of the limited scope of appellate interference with acquittals. The High Court’s extensive citation of Supreme Court jurisprudence (from Surajpal Singh to Babu Sahebagouda) consolidates:

  • The centrality of the “possible view” doctrine; and
  • The idea that an acquittal should be reversed only in rare cases of clear perversity, misreading, or omission of material evidence.

For future cases:

  • Victim or State appeals against acquittal in sexual offences need to demonstrate more than mere disagreement with the trial court’s appreciation of evidence.
  • They must pinpoint specific errors of law, gross misappreciation of evidence, or demonstrably irrational conclusions.
  • Appellate courts, including High Courts, are reminded to exercise restraint unless the trial court’s view is untenable, not merely unpersuasive to them personally.

6.4. Balancing Child Protection with Fair Trial Rights

A broader policy tension lies at the heart of this judgment:

  • On one hand, the POCSO Act and child-protection jurisprudence demand sensitivity and proactive enforcement against sexual crimes involving children.
  • On the other hand, the criminal justice system must protect the accused from conviction on the basis of uncorroborated, inconsistent, or doubtful evidence, especially when substantial liberty interests are at stake.

By insisting on strict compliance with the age-determination framework and upholding the high standard for overturning acquittals, the Patna High Court leans strongly towards fair trial safeguards, while implicitly urging investigating agencies to do a more thorough and professional job to support prosecutions.

7. Conclusion: Key Takeaways

The judgment in Annapurna Jajodiya v. State of Bihar does not introduce entirely novel doctrines, but it crystallises and applies several important principles with particular clarity in the context of POCSO prosecutions and appeals against acquittal. The key takeaways are:

  1. Age Proof is Jurisdictional for POCSO:
    Where the prosecution asserts that the victim is a minor, it must prove this through the structured hierarchy of evidence under Section 94 JJ Act 2015, mirroring Jarnail Singh. Photocopies and informal IO verification are not enough. Failure to do so may fatally undermine POCSO charges.
  2. Victim’s Testimony Must Withstand Scrutiny:
    While a credible victim’s testimony can suffice for conviction in sexual offences, material contradictions between different statements (FIR, 161, 164, and court testimony), unexplained improvements, and absence of corroborative steps (such as seizure of the alleged pornographic video) can prevent a witness from being treated as “sterling” and thus make conviction unsafe.
  3. Investigative Duties Are Critical:
    Non-examination of relevant witnesses (like the shopkeeper), non-seizure of alleged digital or physical evidence, and failure to investigate apparent motives or rivalries can significantly weaken the prosecution case, especially when combined with evidentiary contradictions.
  4. Unexplained Delay in FIR Can Add to Doubt:
    Particularly where family members claim to have acted promptly in confronting the accused but still delay lodging an FIR, absence of any explanation by the prosecution or IO may cast doubt on the authenticity of the prosecution story.
  5. Appeals Against Acquittal Face a High Bar:
    The High Court’s role is not to re-try the case but to ascertain whether the trial court’s acquittal is perverse or wholly unsustainable. If the trial court’s decision represents a “possible view” based on the evidence, the appellate court should not interfere, even if another view of the evidence is also possible.
  6. Double Presumption of Innocence:
    Once acquitted, an accused enjoys a reinforced presumption of innocence, and appellate intervention must be justified by demonstrable errors, not just alternate plausibility.

In sum, this decision underscores that successful prosecution in POCSO and sexual offence cases demands rigorous adherence to statutory procedures (especially age determination), careful, consistent witness testimony, and meticulous investigation. Simultaneously, it reaffirms that appellate courts must respect the limits of their jurisdiction in overturning acquittals, especially in cases turning primarily on appreciation of oral evidence.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Patna High Court

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