Locus Standi to Initiate Bar Council Disciplinary Proceedings and the Status of Advocates Serving as POSH ICC Members:
A Commentary on Ms. Jayna Kothari v. Manish Kumar, Karnataka High Court (2025)

1. Introduction

This judgment of the Karnataka High Court in W.P. No.19619 of 2022, decided on 7 November 2025 by Justice M. Nagaprasanna, addresses a significant and relatively novel intersection of two domains:

the disciplinary jurisdiction of State Bar Councils under Section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961; and
the role of advocates acting as external members of Internal Complaints Committees (ICCs) under the POSH Act (Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013).

The petitioner, Ms. Jayna Kothari, is a designated Senior Advocate. She accepted an appointment as an external member of the ICC constituted by Zoomcar India Pvt. Ltd. under the POSH Act. The ICC found the first respondent, Manish Kumar, guilty of sexual harassment and recommended his dismissal. Parallel to challenging this finding in statutory appeal, Manish Kumar also filed a complaint before the Karnataka State Bar Council alleging professional misconduct by Ms. Kothari.

The central issue before the High Court was whether:

an advocate who, in her individual capacity, serves as an external ICC member can be subjected to professional misconduct proceedings at the instance of a person who is not her client, and whether such a complainant has locus standi to invoke Section 35 of the Advocates Act.

Closely linked to this was the question of the threshold obligation of the Bar Council to form a “reason to believe” that an advocate is guilty of “professional or other misconduct” before referring a complaint to its Disciplinary Committee.

The judgment builds upon, and significantly extends, the earlier decision of the same High Court in Paras Jain v. Karnataka State Bar Council (2024 SCC OnLine Kar 21042) and integrates a long line of Supreme Court and High Court authorities on:

the meaning of “misconduct”;
who can complain of professional misconduct (locus standi); and
how strictly Bar Councils must apply the “reason to believe” threshold.

2. Factual Background and Procedural History

2.1 Role of the Petitioner as External ICC Member

Zoomcar India Pvt. Ltd. constituted an Internal Complaints Committee (ICC) under the POSH Act to inquire into complaints of sexual harassment. The company requested Ms. Jayna Kothari, a Senior Advocate with special expertise in gender and workplace harassment issues, to act as the ICC’s external member and “General Counsel to the ICC” in a non-advocacy capacity. According to the judgment:

She had no prior professional association with Zoomcar as its counsel.
She served on the ICC in her personal and individual capacity, not as the company’s advocate.
She did not receive fees or honorarium for this role.

2.2 POSH Complaint and ICC Proceedings

On 23 May 2019, a female employee of Zoomcar filed a complaint of sexual harassment against Manish Kumar (respondent no.1), then an employee of the company. The complaint alleged conduct falling within the definition of “sexual harassment” in Section 2(n) of the POSH Act.

The ICC:

Issued notice to Manish Kumar inviting his response within 10 days.
Received several emails and submissions from him denying the allegations.
Conducted an inquiry on 31 July 2019, where both parties were heard, their statements recorded, and arguments addressed.
Recorded that neither party requested to cross-examine the other.
Deliberated and on 6 August 2019 issued its finding holding Manish Kumar guilty of sexual harassment and creating a hostile work environment, and recommended dismissal — a major penalty under the company’s disciplinary regime.

On the basis of the ICC report, Zoomcar terminated Manish Kumar’s employment on the same date.

2.3 Appeal under the POSH Act and Adverse Remarks

Manish Kumar filed an appeal under Section 18 of the POSH Act before the Additional Labour Commissioner, challenging the ICC report and his termination. On 18 April 2020, the Additional Labour Commissioner:

Set aside the findings of the ICC as “baseless”; and
Made adverse remarks against the conduct of the ICC and specifically against Ms. Kothari, suggesting irregularities and lack of fairness.

These remarks became an important rhetorical foundation for Manish Kumar’s complaint to the Bar Council, though they were later neutralised.

2.4 Writ Petition to Expunge Adverse Remarks

Aggrieved by the remarks against her, Ms. Kothari filed W.P. No.8237 of 2020 before the Karnataka High Court seeking their expungement. A coordinate bench, by order dated 19 April 2023:

Allowed the writ petition; and
Expunged all adverse remarks made against her in the Labour Commissioner’s order.
Significantly, this was done with no objection from Manish Kumar himself, who appeared in person.

The coordinate bench, however, expressly did not enter into the legality or correctness of the ICC report itself; it confined itself to cleansing the record of remarks against the external member.

2.5 The Bar Council Complaint

Meanwhile, even before the Labour Commissioner’s order, Manish Kumar had, on 11 September 2019, filed a disciplinary complaint before the Karnataka State Bar Council against Ms. Kothari, registered initially as Complaint No.109/2019 and later as D.C.E. No.66/2022.

The complaint alleged, in substance, that:

She did not act independently or impartially as ICC external member and instead “sided” with the company.
She played the role of “advisor/consultant” to Zoomcar, holding meetings with the CEO before and after the ICC report.
She brought along a junior colleague from her firm during ICC proceedings, allegedly contrary to POSH provisions.
She was abusive and brash towards Manish Kumar during the inquiry.
Her law firm Ashira Law and her brother, Advocate Rohan Kothari, allegedly benefited from the situation by filing caveats on behalf of the company, implying a conflict of interest and an attempt to generate business for her firm.
She allegedly advised the company and its CEO on how to pressure Manish Kumar into a monetary settlement and to dissuade him from challenging the ICC report.

The relief sought was drastic: cancellation or lifetime suspension of her Bar Council membership, on the premise that she posed a “threat to the sacred institution”.

The Bar Council issued a notice. Ms. Kothari filed a detailed reply on 12 December 2019. Thereafter, the matter lay dormant until 2022, when a fresh notice dated 17 July 2022 was issued, indicating that the complaint remained alive and was being processed as D.C.E. No.66/2022.

2.6 The Present Writ Petition

In W.P. No.19619 of 2022, Ms. Kothari approached the High Court seeking:

A writ of prohibition restraining the Karnataka State Bar Council from proceeding with Complaint No.109/2019 / D.C.E. No.66/2022.
A writ of certiorari quashing the complaint itself.
A writ of certiorari quashing the notice dated 17 July 2022.

Her core case was that:

Her role on the ICC was an individual, quasi-judicial appointment under the POSH Act, not a professional engagement as advocate of Zoomcar or of Manish Kumar.
There was no advocate–client relationship with Manish Kumar; hence, he lacked locus standi to complain of “professional misconduct”.
The complaint was a vindictive attempt to penalise her for a quasi-judicial decision adverse to him.
The Bar Council had failed to apply the mandatory standard of “reason to believe” under Section 35 of the Advocates Act before entertaining the complaint.

Manish Kumar opposed the petition, insisting that:

Her appointment as external member was itself irregular under the POSH Act.
She acted in a mala fide, biased, and unprofessional manner, in collusion with the employer and her law firm.
Receipt of fees (which he alleged) and the involvement of Ashira Law showed she treated ICC work as part of professional practice, attracting the Bar Council’s disciplinary jurisdiction.

3. Summary of the Judgment

The High Court allowed the writ petition and:

Quashed the Bar Council complaint in D.C.E. No.66/2022; and
Quashed the notice dated 17 July 2022 issued by the Karnataka State Bar Council.

The Court held that:

Under Section 35 of the Advocates Act, the Bar Council must have a “reason to believe” that an advocate is guilty of professional or other misconduct before it can refer a complaint to its Disciplinary Committee.
A person complaining of professional misconduct must ordinarily possess locus standi — typically as a client or someone directly aggrieved by the advocate’s professional conduct.
Manish Kumar, having no advocate–client relationship with Ms. Kothari and being merely a person adversely affected by her quasi-judicial decision as ICC member, had no locus to file a professional misconduct complaint.
The complaint was, at best, an attempt to wreak vengeance for an adverse ICC finding and to intimidate an external member for performing a statutory function, which is not permissible.
Consequently, since the root of the disciplinary proceedings—the complainant’s standing—was defective, the complaint itself was not maintainable and the Bar Council could not lawfully proceed further.

The Court therefore did not find it necessary to enter into the merits of the allegations (such as the alleged conflict of interest or attendance of her junior), because, in the absence of locus and a valid “reason to believe”, Section 35 could not be invoked at all.

4. Legal Framework

4.1 Section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961

Section 35 governs “Punishment of advocates for misconduct”. Key elements are:

The State Bar Council may act “on receipt of a complaint or otherwise” when it has “reason to believe” that an advocate is guilty of “professional or other misconduct”.
If such reason exists, the case “shall” be referred to the Disciplinary Committee.
After notice and hearing, the Disciplinary Committee may dismiss the complaint, reprimand, suspend, or remove the advocate from the roll.

Two aspects are crucial here:

The “reason to believe” standard is a jurisdictional threshold; it cannot be reduced to automatic registration of any and every complaint.
The misconduct contemplated is “professional or other misconduct”, which has been judicially understood to mean conduct that renders the advocate unfit to be a member of the profession, generally involving a nexus with professional duties or serious moral delinquency.

4.2 The POSH Act and ICC External Members

Under the POSH Act, every employer must constitute an Internal Complaints Committee with:

a Presiding Officer (senior woman employee);
employee members; and
one external member from an NGO or a person familiar with issues of sexual harassment.

The ICC performs a quasi-judicial function: receiving complaints, inquiring into allegations, and making findings and recommendations, which the employer is generally bound to implement (subject to appeal under Section 18 and judicial review).

An advocate who serves as external member:

does not ipso facto act as counsel for either party;
acts as part of a statutorily mandated adjudicatory body rather than as a party’s legal representative; and
may be remunerated or may voluntarily serve without fees, but the function remains quasi-judicial, not adversarial representation.

5. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The judgment draws heavily on earlier Supreme Court and High Court decisions, many synthesised previously in Paras Jain. Their collective import is central to the Court’s reasoning.

5.1 Supreme Court on What Constitutes “Misconduct”

(a) R. Janardhana Rao v. G. Lingappa, (1999) 2 SCC 186

An advocate borrowed money from another advocate and defaulted. The creditor-advocate filed a professional misconduct complaint. The Supreme Court held:

The borrowing occurred not in the advocate’s professional capacity, but as a private individual “acting as a needy person”.
Failure to repay might justify civil or (today) criminal action (e.g., under Section 138 NI Act), but not disciplinary proceedings for professional misconduct.

This case illustrates that not every wrongful act by an advocate is “professional misconduct”; there must be a nexus to professional character or conduct.

(b) Noratanmal chouraria v. M.R. Murli, (2004) 5 SCC 689

This is the leading authority on “misconduct” under the Advocates Act. The Court:

Recognised that “misconduct” is not defined in the Act and has a broad, contextual meaning.
Described misconduct as:
- “improper behaviour, intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule or standard of behaviour”;
- a “transgression of some established and definite rule of action”.
Stressed that, under Section 35, the focus is on “professional or other misconduct” of a member of a noble profession whose conduct must justify public confidence as an officer of the court.
Held that the Bar Council’s power is not unlimited; initiation of proceedings requires a charge whose nature warrants disciplinary action and must be judged “qua profession” in most cases.

The Court also emphasised the special, stricter standards applied to advocates due to their privileged status, but equally cautioned that not every wrong or unpleasant act qualifies as professional misconduct.

5.2 Madras High Court on Locus and Scope of Misconduct

(a) N.S. VARADACHARI v. BAR COUNCIL OF TAMIL Nadu, 2012 SCC OnLine Mad 2365

An advocate gave a legal opinion to a client (A) regarding title to property. Third parties (B, C, D), claiming to be affected by that opinion, filed a complaint against the advocate. The Madras High Court held:

The complainants were “utter strangers” to the advocate; he had never been engaged by them.
The allegedly wrong legal opinion, even if incorrect, did not amount to professional misconduct unless there was an element of moral delinquency or dishonesty.
The Bar Council must have “reasons to believe” based on material facts before referring a complaint, and such belief must not be arbitrary or irrational.
Wrong or negligent legal advice, by itself, is not professional misconduct.

(b) R. Swaminathan v. Bar Council of Tamil Nadu, 2014 SCC OnLine Mad 12777

Here, minority shareholders of a company complained about advocates who had rendered legal opinions to the company (not to the complainants). The High Court quashed the disciplinary proceedings, holding:

The complainant had no jural or contractual relationship with the advocates; he was not their client.
The advocates’ opinions were adverse to him because they supported transactions he opposed; but this does not give him locus standi to allege professional misconduct.
Allowing opposite parties to litigations to file misconduct complaints against the other side’s lawyers would intimidate advocates and jeopardise the justice system.
Bar Councils must guard against being used as tools in such “game plans” meant to keep advocates away from their clients.

This judgment is particularly relevant to the present case because:

Manish Kumar had no advocate–client relationship with Ms. Kothari, yet sought to prosecute her for conduct he disliked.
The Court in R. Swaminathan explicitly warns against such weaponisation of disciplinary processes by adverse parties.

5.3 Karnataka High Court on Locus: Mohammed Bashu and Paras Jain

(a) MOHAMMED BASHU v. Hospet Bar Association, 2008 SCC OnLine Kar 748

This decision, quoted in Paras Jain and then in the present case, contains a crucial statement:

“Any professional mis-conduct by an advocate has to be complained by persons who have the locus standi to complain against the said mis-conduct and the Bar Council of the State is a statutory authority empowered to enquire into any mis-conduct of an advocate and pass appropriate orders and a member of the Bar has no locus standi to complain about any other member of the bar in the realm of professional mis-conduct unless the said member of the Bar is a litigant himself.”

This underscores two principles:

The necessity for a direct legal stake (locus) in the alleged misconduct; and
The Bar Council’s role as a gatekeeper, not a mere post office for any grievance against advocates.

(b) Paras Jain v. Karnataka State Bar Council, 2024 SCC OnLine Kar 21042

This recent Karnataka decision, extensively quoted in the present judgment, synthesised the law on:

Locus standi for filing complaints under Section 35;
The meaning and scope of “misconduct”; and
The duty of the Bar Council to form a rational “reason to believe” before referring matters to the Disciplinary Committee.

In Paras Jain, the Court held that:

Not every aggrieved person in a general sense can file a misconduct complaint; rather, only those whose legal rights have been directly affected or those in a professional relationship with the advocate.
Bar Councils must reject complaints that fail a basic locus + prima facie misconduct test.

The present judgment explicitly applies these principles to the context of complaints against an ICC external member.

5.4 Supreme Court on “Person Aggrieved”: Ayaaubkhan

In AYAAUBKHAN NOORKHAN PATHAN v. STATE OF Maharashtra, (2013) 4 SCC 465, the Supreme Court elaborated the concept of a “person aggrieved”:

A person must show a legal injury, not just a psychological or imaginary grievance.
A stranger without a legal right to a post or property cannot normally be permitted to intervene in the rights of others.

Though not a Bar Council case, this decision supports the broader proposition: standing is essential before invoking judicial or quasi-judicial processes, and busybody complainants must be excluded.

5.5 Other Authorities on Professional Misconduct

BHARAT LAL Pandey v. Ramji Prasad Yadav, (2009) 17 SCC 644 – Representing a wife in multiple cases against her husband does not amount to professional misconduct; advocates are not to be punished simply because the opposite party objects to them acting for their client.
Pandurang Dattatraya Khandekar v. Bar Council of Maharashtra, AIR 1984 SC 110 – Wrong legal advice per se is not misconduct unless it is dishonest or shows moral delinquency.
Various cases (e.g., Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M.V. Dabholkar; R.D. Saxena; D.P. Chadha; CBI v. K. Narayana Rao) collectively emphasise that:
- Misconduct must be judged in the context of the advocate’s professional duties.
- Advocates owe “unremitting loyalty” to their clients and cannot be penalised merely because their services are unwelcome to the other side.
- Negligence or error of judgment alone is not necessarily professional misconduct.

6. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

6.1 Framing of the Core Issue

The Court deliberately distilled the controversy into a single controlling question:

Whether the petitioner’s acceptance of the role of an external member of the Internal Complaints Committee of the company, in her individual capacity and not as an advocate, can amount to professional misconduct under the Advocates Act, 1961?

Answering this necessarily required examining:

the nature of the petitioner’s role (advocate versus quasi-judicial functionary);
the status of the complainant (client or stranger); and
the threshold imposed by Section 35 (reason to believe; professional/other misconduct).

6.2 Absence of Advocate–Client Relationship and Locus Standi

The Court found as a matter of fact and law that:

There was no contract or privity between Ms. Kothari and Manish Kumar in the capacity of advocate–client.
She was not his counsel in any proceeding; nor had he engaged her services.
Her connection with him was solely as a member of a quasi-judicial tribunal (the ICC) that adjudicated allegations against him.

Therefore, by applying the law from Mohammed Bashu, Varadachari, R. Swaminathan, and Paras Jain, the Court concluded that Manish Kumar:

was not a person with standing to complain of professional misconduct; and
could not convert his grievance against an adjudicatory decision into a disciplinary proceeding against the adjudicator-advocate.

In effect, the Court applied a “standing filter”: absent a professional nexus, complaints under Section 35 from opposite or unrelated parties are non-maintainable.

6.3 ICC as Quasi-Judicial Body; Error vs. Misconduct

The Court emphasised that the ICC is a statutorily constituted quasi-judicial body under the POSH Act. Its members:

are charged with fact-finding and recommending disciplinary measures; and
operate within a statutory framework, their decisions subject to appeal and judicial review.

Accordingly:

Merely because the ICC’s findings were reversed by the Additional Labour Commissioner does not mean the ICC members are professionally delinquent.
The proper remedy for an aggrieved employee is the appeal under Section 18 of the POSH Act (which Manish Kumar exercised) and, if necessary, further judicial review — not an attack on the integrity of an external member via Bar Council proceedings.

The judgment implicitly affirms an important distinction:

A wrong or debatable decision by a quasi-judicial body is not, without more, professional misconduct by an advocate-member; at most, it is an error correctable in appeal.

6.4 “Reason to Believe” under Section 35

The Court reiterated that Section 35 requires two cumulative conditions before the Bar Council can refer a matter to its Disciplinary Committee:

A complaint or other credible information; and
A bona fide and rational “reason to believe” that the advocate is guilty of professional or other misconduct.

Drawing from Varadachari and Supreme Court authority (such as Nandlal Khodidas Barot and Dabholkar), the Court noted:

“Reason to believe” is stronger than mere “satisfaction”.
The Bar Council must demonstrate an intelligible nexus between the material before it and its belief; it cannot simply forward every complaint.
This threshold protects advocates from frivolous or vindictive complaints.

In this case, given:

the lack of locus;
the adversarial motivation of the complainant; and
the fact that the grievance centred around the merits of the ICC’s conclusion, not clearly delineated misconduct,

the Court found that the Bar Council ought not to have entertained the complaint at all.

6.5 Mala Fides and Abuse of Process

The Court characterised the complaint as:

a “product of mala fides or suffering from want of bona fides”; and
an attempt “to wreak vengeance” after an adverse quasi-judicial finding.

The fact that:

Manish Kumar had already availed and succeeded in a statutory appeal; and
a coordinate bench had expunged adverse remarks against Ms. Kothari with his own consent

reinforced the view that the continuing pursuit of Bar Council proceedings had become an abuse of process. Allowing such a complaint to proceed would:

undermine the integrity and independence of quasi-judicial processes like ICC inquiries; and
expose advocates acting in such roles to harassment by disgruntled litigants.

6.6 Decision Not to Enter Merits of Alleged Conflict of Interest

Although the complaint alleged:

participation of her law firm Ashira Law in connected matters; and
her brother’s representation of the company in caveats, supposedly representing a conflict of interest,

the Court explicitly declined to adjudicate these factual disputes. It reasoned that:

Since the complaint was itself non-maintainable for want of locus and “reason to believe”, any enquiry into the factual merits would be unnecessary and inappropriate.

This is consistent with a jurisdiction-first approach: where the initiating complaint is legally incompetent, the tribunal must stop at the threshold.

7. Impact and Significance

7.1 Protection of Advocates Serving as ICC External Members

The judgment has immediate and substantial implications for advocates who:

serve as external members of Internal Complaints Committees under the POSH Act; or
take up other quasi-judicial or neutral roles (e.g., arbitrators, inquiry officers, fact-finders) outside the usual adversarial representation model.

By holding that adverse parties to such quasi-judicial processes cannot, without more, drag advocate-members before the Bar Council, the Court:

mitigates the chilling effect that fear of disciplinary proceedings might otherwise have on advocates agreeing to such roles;
strengthens the independence and fearlessness of ICC members and other neutral professionals; and
clarifies that accountability for ICC decisions lies primarily through statutory appeals and judicial review, not through Bar Council discipline at the instance of losing parties.

7.2 Clarification of Locus Standi in Bar Council Proceedings

The decision cements, within Karnataka, a clear rule:

A complaint of professional misconduct against an advocate cannot be maintained by a person who has no advocate–client relationship with that advocate and whose grievance relates merely to an adverse outcome of a quasi-judicial or professional process.

This:

builds upon Paras Jain and earlier case law; and
provides a strong precedent for Bar Councils to reject complaints at the threshold where locus standi is absent.

7.3 Strengthening the “Reason to Believe” Filter

The Court’s insistence that Bar Councils must meaningfully apply the “reason to believe” standard has long-term institutional consequences:

It reinforces the Bar Council’s role as a filtering institution, preventing its processes from being misused as tools of harassment.
It encourages a structured preliminary scrutiny of complaints: checking for locus, prima facie misconduct, and absence of obvious mala fides.
It supports the independence and dignity of the profession by deterring frivolous or retaliatory complaints.

7.4 Balancing Accountability and Independence

The judgment does not give advocates blanket immunity when serving in external or quasi-judicial capacities. Rather, it:

channels accountability through appropriate mechanisms (e.g., appeals under the POSH Act, writ jurisdiction of constitutional courts, or complaints by proper parties such as clients or regulatory bodies); and
denies misplaced standing to those whose only grievance is that they lost before a tribunal involving advocates in neutral roles.

This strikes an important balance between:

ensuring that advocates are not unjustly targeted for their independent decision-making; and
preserving avenues to address genuine misconduct where properly alleged by persons with standing.

8. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

8.1 “Professional Misconduct” vs “Other Misconduct”

Professional Misconduct generally refers to:
- wrongful acts or omissions committed in the course of professional practice (e.g., cheating a client, misusing client funds, fabricating documents, knowingly filing false cases); or
- grossly negligent or dishonest legal work that undermines public confidence in the advocate’s professional integrity.
Other Misconduct can cover serious personal misconduct that:
- though not committed in the course of professional work,
- shows such moral turpitude or unfitness (e.g., serious crimes, grave dishonesty) that the advocate can no longer be trusted as a member of the Bar.

However, courts have consistently held that:

not every private dispute or moral failing is “other misconduct”; and
there must be an element of moral delinquency or conduct seriously incompatible with membership of the profession.

8.2 “Locus Standi” (Standing)

“Locus standi” answers the question: who is allowed to complain? In this context:

Typically, a client or someone directly affected by an advocate’s professional conduct can complain.
Opposite parties who simply dislike the advocate’s actions in favour of their clients generally do not have standing.
Strangers or persons with only indirect or speculative injury are not “persons aggrieved”.

Locus standi prevents the disciplinary system from being overwhelmed or manipulated by those with no real legal stake.

8.3 “Reason to Believe”

Before a Bar Council proceeds against an advocate under Section 35, it must have “reason to believe” that misconduct has occurred. This means:

More than suspicion; less than proof beyond reasonable doubt.
There must be some objective, rational basis in the complaint or other material to think that misconduct may have been committed.
It is a legal safeguard against frivolous, malicious, or speculative complaints.

8.4 “Quasi-Judicial” Function

A quasi-judicial body:

is not a formal court, but
is empowered by law to:
- hear parties;
- gather and assess evidence; and
- make findings and pass orders affecting rights (e.g., ICC under POSH, labour authorities, consumer forums).

Members of quasi-judicial bodies are expected to act:

impartially;
in good faith; and
within the legal framework.

Errors or wrong conclusions can be corrected through appeals or judicial review, but they do not automatically show that the member is professionally corrupt or delinquent.

9. Critical Reflections

While the judgment is robust in protecting advocates from vexatious disciplinary proceedings, a few nuances merit attention.

9.1 Scope for Suo Motu Action by Bar Councils

Section 35 permits the Bar Council to act “on receipt of a complaint or otherwise”. Even where a complaint is filed by a person lacking locus, the information in the complaint could, in theory, prompt the Bar Council to initiate suo motu action if there is independent material suggesting serious misconduct (e.g., fraud, forgery).

The present judgment does not close that door. It addresses the maintainability of the complaint as such, not the Bar Council’s inherent power to act on reliable information from any source. The emphasis is that:

where only an adverse-party grievance exists;
and where allegations revolve around the merits of a quasi-judicial decision and disputed conflict-of-interest claims;

the Bar Council should be slow to find “reason to believe” and should resist being drawn into private vendettas.

9.2 Accountability of ICC Members

Some might worry that this approach might:

shield ICC members (particularly advocates) from accountability for biased or improperly conducted inquiries.

However, several safeguards remain:

Statutory appeal under Section 18 of the POSH Act (which Manish Kumar successfully used to overturn the ICC findings).
Judicial review under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution against ICC findings or appellate orders.
Potential complaints by appropriate parties (e.g., the employer if an ICC member clearly abuses position for personal benefit, or by persons with a direct advocate–client relationship where applicable).

The judgment merely holds that:

losing parties in ICC proceedings cannot ordinarily prosecute neutral members as “advocates guilty of misconduct”; and
disciplinary jurisdiction must not become a backdoor appeal against quasi-judicial outcomes.

9.3 Limited Ratio: Facts Matter

It is important to appreciate that the ratio of this case is tied to its facts:

No advocate–client relationship between complainant and petitioner;
Petitioner acting in a clearly quasi-judicial role under a statute;
Complaint mainly challenging the fairness and merits of a quasi-judicial decision; and
Prior statutory appeal already decided, and adverse remarks against the ICC member expunged.

Different facts (e.g., clear documentary proof of an ICC member using position to extort money or fabricate complaints) might invite a different analysis, possibly justifying Bar Council action, especially if a client or directly affected party complains.

10. Conclusion

The Karnataka High Court’s decision in Ms. Jayna Kothari v. Manish Kumar is a significant addition to the jurisprudence on:

locus standi in Bar Council disciplinary proceedings; and
the scope of professional misconduct vis-à-vis advocates acting in non-traditional, quasi-judicial roles, particularly as POSH ICC external members.

The key takeaways are:

A person who is not a client of an advocate and who complains merely because a quasi-judicial decision was unfavourable to him lacks locus to initiate disciplinary proceedings under Section 35.
Bar Councils must strictly apply the “reason to believe” standard, ensuring a rational nexus between available material and the belief that misconduct has been committed, before referring matters to Disciplinary Committees.
Advocates who serve as external members of ICCs and other quasi-judicial bodies are not to be treated as partisan counsel of one side; their decisions, even if later reversed, do not automatically expose them to charges of professional misconduct.
The appropriate response to dissatisfaction with ICC findings is via the POSH appellate mechanism and constitutional remedies, not via retaliatory Bar Council complaints.

In quashing the Bar Council complaint and prohibiting further proceedings, the Court reinforces both:

the independence and dignity of the legal profession, and
the functional autonomy of statutory quasi-judicial bodies such as ICCs under the POSH Act.

The judgment thus serves as a strong precedent against the misuse of disciplinary machinery as a weapon against advocates who discharge their statutory responsibilities in good faith, even when their decisions prove unpopular with those affected.

Locus Standi to Initiate Bar Council Disciplinary Proceedings and the Status of Advocates Serving as POSH ICC Members: A Commentary on Ms. Jayna Kothari v. Manish Kumar, Karnataka High Court (2025)