Limits on Non‑Remittable Life Sentences and Standards for Circumstantial Proof of Conspiracy: Commentary on Vinesh v. State of Kerala

Limits on Non‑Remittable Life Sentences and Standards for Circumstantial Proof of Conspiracy: Commentary on Vinesh v. State of Kerala

I. Introduction

The decision of the Kerala High Court in Vinesh v. State of Kerala (2025 KER 90973), delivered by a Division Bench comprising Dr. Justice A.K. Jayasankaran Nambiar and Justice Jobin Sebastian on 27 November 2025, arises out of a brutal abduction and murder case based entirely on circumstantial evidence.

Seven accused (A1–A7) were tried in Sessions Case No.1524 of 2018 before the Additional Sessions Court-IV, Kollam, for offences under Sections 120B, 364, 342, 201 and 302 read with 34 IPC. The prosecution case was that A1, harbouring deep enmity against the deceased Renjith Johnson (who was living with A1’s estranged wife, PW1), conspired with others to abduct, murder, and secretly bury him in Tamil Nadu, and to destroy all trace of the crime.

All seven accused were convicted by the trial court and sentenced, inter alia, to:

  • 10 years’ rigorous imprisonment under Section 120B IPC,
  • 5 years’ rigorous imprisonment each under Sections 364 and 201 IPC,
  • 1 year’s rigorous imprisonment under Section 342 IPC, and
  • Imprisonment for life with a fine of ₹1,00,000 under Section 302 IPC, with a direction that they must undergo at least 25 years’ imprisonment without remission.

On appeal (Crl.A. Nos. 721, 722, 827, 886 and 1447 of 2019), the High Court:

  • Confirmed the conviction of A1 to A5 for all offences charged, but
  • Acquitted A6 and A7 of all charges, and
  • Set aside the “minimum 25 years without remission” rider attached to the life sentences of A1–A5 as beyond the power of the trial court.

The judgment is a significant contribution to criminal jurisprudence on:

  • the standard of proof and structure of reasoning in cases resting on circumstantial evidence,
  • the use of “last seen” evidence coupled with Section 106 of the Evidence Act in abduction-cum-murder cases,
  • the evidentiary value of Call Detail Records (CDRs) and the limits of their use in proving conspiracy,
  • the threshold for invoking Section 120B IPC and Section 10 of the Evidence Act, and
  • the limits on a trial court’s power to impose non-remittable portions of a life sentence.

II. Summary of the Judgment

1. Factual Background in Brief

The deceased, Renjith Johnson, was living with PW1 Jessy, who had earlier been married to A1 Manoj. PW1 left A1 due to cruelty and began cohabiting with the deceased. A1 bore intense animosity towards the deceased for “taking away” his wife and refused reconciliation attempts failed. The prosecution alleged that:

  • A1, between 02.08.2018 and 16.08.2018, conspired with A2–A8 at various locations to abduct and murder the deceased.
  • A5 cultivated a friendship with the deceased, repeatedly calling him and visiting his house under the pretext of buying pet birds.
  • On 15.08.2018, A2, A3 and A5 lured the deceased from his home in a Chevrolet Beat car (MO3), driven by A4.
  • The deceased was wrongfully confined, assaulted en route, and taken to Polachira (near Meenadu), where he was brutally beaten and stamped by A1–A5 and others, causing fatal injuries to the neck and ribs.
  • The body was then shifted from MO3 to a larger Etios car (MO4) near Nedungolam, transported to Samathuvapuram in Tirunelveli District (Tamil Nadu), buried, and incriminating tools and materials (spade, pickaxe, rope) were buried separately.
  • Some parts of the cars and the T-shirt of the deceased were thrown away to obliterate evidence.

PW3, the deceased’s mother, lodged the FIR on 20.08.2018. Following investigation, all accused were charge-sheeted.

2. Trial and Conviction

The trial court framed charges under Sections 120B, 342, 364, 302 and 201 read with 34 IPC. The prosecution examined 63 witnesses (PWs 1–63), marked 225 exhibits, and produced 26 material objects. The defence examined 7 witnesses (DWs 1–7).

The trial court found all seven accused guilty and imposed the sentences mentioned above, directing that if the fine was realised, compensation would be paid to the deceased’s parents and PW1 under Section 357(1) CrPC, and adding a direction that none of the accused would be released on remission before completing a minimum of 25 years’ imprisonment.

3. High Court’s Final Orders

The High Court, on appeal, held as follows:

  • Conviction of A1–A5 affirmed for:
    • Criminal conspiracy (Section 120B IPC),
    • Abduction (Section 364 IPC),
    • Wrongful confinement (Section 342 IPC),
    • Murder (Section 302 IPC), and
    • Causing disappearance of evidence (Section 201 IPC), all read with Section 34 IPC.
  • Conviction of A6 and A7 set aside; they were acquitted of all charges on benefit of doubt due to insufficiency of evidence linking them to the conspiracy or to the homicidal acts.
  • Sentencing modified:
    • The life sentence of A1–A5 under Section 302 IPC was maintained, as was the fine of ₹1,00,000 each.
    • The rider that they must undergo a minimum of 25 years’ imprisonment “without remission” was held “uncalled for” and beyond the powers of the trial court, and therefore deleted.

Thus, the judgment simultaneously tightens evidentiary standards for implicating peripheral actors in a criminal conspiracy, and restrains sentencing courts from creating non-remittable “minimum life terms” without statutory authority.

III. Analysis of the Judgment

A. Precedents and Their Influence

1. Circumstantial Evidence: Chain of Circumstances and Standard of Proof

The Bench begins by carefully reaffirming the settled law on circumstantial evidence, drawing from a series of Supreme Court authorities:

From these, the Court distils the familiar but stringent tests:

  • Each incriminating circumstance must be cogently and firmly established.
  • The circumstances must be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards guilt.
  • The cumulative effect must form a complete chain, leaving no reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused.
  • The evidence must be inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence.
  • If two views are reasonably possible, the one favouring the accused must prevail.

This sets a high evidentiary bar, which the Court then painstakingly applies, leading to differential outcomes for A1–A5 on the one hand and A6–A7 on the other.

2. Motive in Circumstantial Cases

On motive, the Bench leans on:

  • Suresh Chandra Bahri v. State of Bihar [1995 Supp (1) SCC 80],
  • Sukhpal Singh v. State of Punjab [(2019) 15 SCC 622], and
  • Subhash Aggarwal v. State of NCT of Delhi [(2025) 8 SCC 440].

These cases clarify that while motive is not always indispensable, its proof can be a vital link strengthening the chain in circumstantial cases. Here, the testimonies of PW1 (estranged wife of A1) and PW3 (mother of the deceased) established persistent cruelty by A1, PW1’s elopement with the deceased, and A1’s simmering animosity— providing a strong and credible motive for A1 to eliminate the deceased.

3. “Last Seen” Theory and Section 106 Evidence Act

For the “last seen” principle and the interplay with Section 106 of the Evidence Act, the Court cites and relies upon:

These decisions endorse the proposition that where:

  1. the prosecution proves that the victim was last seen alive in the company of the accused, and
  2. the accused fail to offer any plausible explanation as to what happened thereafter, particularly when the death is proximate in time,

the Court may legitimately draw an adverse inference, aided by Section 106, that the accused are responsible for the victim’s death—especially in abduction-cum-murder scenarios.

4. Identification Evidence and Non-Holding of Test Identification Parade (TIP)

On the challenge that no TIP was conducted before PW3 identified A2, A3, and A5 in court, the Bench refers to:

These authorities affirm that:

  • TIP is not a sine qua non for accepting in-court identification evidence.
  • Failure to hold a TIP does not render such evidence inadmissible; it affects the weight, not the admissibility.
  • Where a witness had ample opportunity to observe the accused, and the identification is credible, courts may rely on dock identification even without prior TIP.

Applying this, the Court accepts PW3’s in-court identification of A2, A3 and A5 as reliable, considering they had visited her house, stayed long enough to be observed, and interacted with her and the deceased in broad daylight.

5. Proof of Homicidal Death and Intent

To infer homicidal death and intention to kill from the injuries, the Court refers to State of West Bengal v. Mir Mohammed Omar [(2000) 8 SCC 382], recognising that the nature, location, and severity of injuries may justify inferring that the assailants intended to cause death or such bodily injury as was sufficient in the ordinary course to cause death.

Here, the post-mortem findings (fracture of ribs causing lung rupture, fracture of cricoid cartilage, multiple injuries over head, neck, and chest) were held consistent with homicidal violence amounting to murder under Section 300 IPC.

6. Criminal Conspiracy and Section 10 of the Evidence Act

The Court’s detailed treatment of conspiracy is anchored in:

From these, the Court reiterates key principles:

  • Conspiracy is complete with the agreement to commit an illegal act; execution is not necessary.
  • It is usually proved through circumstantial evidence—conduct, communications, coordinated acts.
  • Section 10 of the Evidence Act incorporates the doctrine of “partnership in crime”: once there is reasonable ground to believe a conspiracy exists, anything said, done or written by one conspirator in reference to the common design becomes admissible against all.
  • However, there must be clear evidence of a meeting of minds; mere knowledge, presence, or passive association is insufficient.
  • Courts must guard against the “dragnet” effect of conspiracy charges where vague or peripheral acts are used to implicate all accused in the substantive offences.

These principles directly inform the Court’s differential approach: they support a finding of conspiracy against A1–A5 but preclude extending that liability to A6 and A7 on the evidence available.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Establishing the Chain of Circumstances

The Court identifies seven key incriminating circumstances relied on by the prosecution:

  1. Motive: A1’s enmity towards the deceased due to PW1’s relationship with him.
  2. “Last seen” evidence: PW3 seeing the deceased leave home with A2, A3 and A5 in MO3 car on 15.08.2018.
  3. Medical and forensic evidence: Homicidal death proved by post-mortem; identity established by DNA and tattoo identification.
  4. Eye-witness at critical junctures:
    • PW2 seeing A2 and associates brutally assaulting a man near Polachira, and
    • PW4 seeing A1–A5 transferring a dead body from MO3 to MO4 near Nedungolam.
  5. Discovery of the body at Samathuvapuram (Tamil Nadu) at the instance of A3.
  6. CDR evidence showing sustained telephonic coordination between A1–A5 around the dates and times of the crime.
  7. Recoveries of vital incriminating objects: rope, pickaxe, spades, T-shirt, car parts, wooden stick, and presence of the deceased’s blood in both vehicles.

The Court then scrutinises each link to evaluate whether, cumulatively, they form a chain consistent only with guilt for A1–A5 and insufficient for A6–A7.

2. Motive as a Reinforcing Link

The testimonies of PW1 and PW3 convincingly establish:

  • A1’s past cruelty towards PW1,
  • her elopement with the deceased, and
  • the ongoing hostility between A1 and the deceased over her treatment.

The Court treats this as a strong and credible motive for A1 to plan the elimination of the deceased. While motive alone cannot sustain a conviction, it makes the subsequent conduct of A1 and his close associates (A2–A5) consistent with a homicidal plan, particularly when coupled with other circumstances.

3. “Last Seen” and Section 106: From Abduction to Murder

PW3 testified that on 15.08.2018 at about 2:30 p.m., A2, A3 and A5 came to her house, went upstairs to meet the deceased under the pretext of buying pigeons (he dealt in pet birds and dogs), and then left with him in MO3 car. She had enough time to see them clearly.

The defence argued that:

  • PW3’s dock identification was unreliable without a prior TIP, and
  • she could be mistaken in identifying A2, A3 and A5.

The Court rejects these contentions. On the facts:

  • The accused were not strangers passing by; they visited her home, interacted with the deceased, and lingered long enough to be observed.
  • The identification occurred in court without serious impeachment in cross-examination.
  • The law does not demand TIP as a mandatory precondition where the opportunity to see the accused is substantial and the court finds the witness reliable.

Crucially, this evidence establishes that the deceased was last seen alive in the company of A2–A3–A5. Given the short interval between this and the subsequent homicidal outcome, the Court invokes the “last seen” principle and Section 106 of the Evidence Act:

  • The fact that the victim was last in the custody or company of A2–A5 is especially within their knowledge.
  • They offered no plausible explanation in their Section 313 CrPC statements as to when and how they parted from the deceased or what befell him.

In the context of an abduction-cum-murder case, this silence and absence of explanation provide a powerful link in the chain, permitting the inference that the abductors were also the killers, unless displaced by credible contrary evidence—which it was not.

4. Proof of Homicidal Death and Identity of the Body

The body was recovered in a partially decomposed state from a pit at Samathuvapuram, Tirunelveli (Tamil Nadu), pursuant to A3’s disclosure. The Court addresses two critical issues:

  1. Was the death homicidal?
    PW32, the doctor who conducted the post-mortem (Exhibit P42), reported:
    • multiple ante-mortem injuries over head, neck, and chest,
    • fractured ribs rupturing the lungs,
    • fracture of the cricoid cartilage in the neck.
    These were held consistent with a brutal assault, not accidental or suicidal injuries. Applying Mir Mohammed Omar, the Court holds that such injuries clearly indicate an intention to cause death or at least such bodily injury as was sufficient in the ordinary course to cause death—thus attracting Section 300 IPC.
  2. Was the body that of Renjith Johnson?
    Identification was established through:
    • DNA report (PW53, Ext.P107) linking the disinterred remains to PW3’s son,
    • tattoo marks identified by PW1 (Jessy) as matching the deceased, and
    • MO1 lungi and MO2 T-shirt on the body, recognised by PW1 as clothes she had given the deceased.
    Thus, both scientific and ocular evidence converged to confirm identity.

5. Eye-Witness Support: PW2 and PW4

(a) PW2 at Polachira: Linking A2 and A4 to the Assault

PW2, an Employment Assurance Scheme worker, had responsibility for tending coconut saplings at Polachira. On Independence Day (15.08.2018) after 5 p.m., she went to Polachira and:

  • noticed a white car parked near a bund close to a pig farm,
  • saw A2 (“Kattunni”) and two or three others brutally kicking and stamping a man, and
  • fled in fear to inform one Subash.

She also later saw the same white car driven away by a man she identified as A4. Her identification of A2 as one of the assailants, and of A4 as the driver, withstood cross-examination and was uncontested by any suggestion of prior animus.

The Court accepts PW2 as an independent, credible witness whose testimony:

  • corroborates the presence of A2 and A4 at the scene of the assault, and
  • strengthens the prosecution narrative of the sequence leading to the homicidal injuries.
(b) PW4 at Nedungolam: Transfer of the Body Between Cars

PW4, a friend of A2, deposed that he saw A1–A5 at Nedungolam while they were transferring a dead body from MO3 (Chevrolet Beat) to MO4 (Etios) near a certain spot. He had personal acquaintance with A2, and his narrative was partly corroborated by forensic evidence:

  • Human blood matching the deceased’s profile was found inside MO3 and in the dicky of MO4.

Though there was a minor omission regarding A5 in his earlier statement under Section 162 CrPC, his evidence about the presence of A1–A4 was not shaken. The Court, therefore, relies on PW4 to connect A1 and A4 in particular to the disposal phase of the crime.

6. Section 27 Discoveries and Incriminating Recoveries

The Court gives substantial weight to recoveries made pursuant to admissible portions of disclosure statements under Section 27 of the Evidence Act:

  • Body of the deceased: Disinterred at Samathuvapuram on A3’s pointing out. Although the investigating officer had some prior indication that the body might be in Tirunelveli, the exact spot was not known. The Court rightly notes that Section 27 still applies because the discovery of the particular place and the buried body was a “fact discovered” consequent upon A3’s statement (Ext.P136).
  • Rope, pickaxe, spades (MO7–MO10): These implements used to bury the body and dispose of incriminating materials were recovered from an abandoned place in Tamil Nadu on the basis of A1’s disclosure.
  • T-shirt (MO2) and car parts (MO18, MO19, MO25): Recovered from an abandoned area 4 km north of Salaipudhur Toll Plaza at A2’s instance.
  • Wooden stick (MO5): Recovered pursuant to A5’s disclosure as one of the weapons used in the assault.

These recoveries, corroborated by independent witnesses (e.g., PW33) and the investigating officer (PW62), are held to be lawful and strongly incriminating, further tightening the circumstantial chain against A1–A5.

7. Hardware Shop Evidence and CCTV Corroboration

The prosecution also established that, after the killing and body transfer:

  • A3 bought MO7 (nylon rope) from a hardware shop owned by PW9, and
  • A3 and A4 bought MO8 (pickaxe) and MO9–MO10 (spades) from another hardware shop where PW10 worked.

PW9 identified A3 as the rope purchaser; PW10 identified A3 and A4 as purchasers of the digging tools. Their testimonies were consistent and survived cross-examination.

CCTV footage from PW10’s shop, analysed by PW55 (Assistant Director, FSL), showed A3 and A4, as recorded in Ext.P110, corroborating the oral evidence. The Court thus holds that the prosecution proved the purchase of the burial tools by A3 and A4 on the night of 15.08.2018, which dovetails with the subsequent burial at Samathuvapuram.

8. Call Detail Records and Proof of Conspiracy

The CDR evidence is central to the conspiracy allegation. The prosecution, through nodal officers (PWs 46, 47, 48), proved subscriber details and call records of several numbers. In particular:

  • Deceased: 9633442891 (Airtel, Ext.P70–P71)
  • A1’s mother (used as an indicator of calls to A1): 9745254557 (Vodafone, Ext.P77–P78)
  • A2’s main SIM: 7558959188 (Vodafone, Ext.P80–P81)
  • A5’s SIM: 9544530363 (Vodafone, Ext.P94–P96)
  • A6’s SIM: 9544432815 (Vodafone, Ext.P97–P99)
  • Phone no. 9746377858 in the name of Girija (A3’s wife), with A3 having access (Airtel, Ext.P67–P69)
  • Two numbers in the name of Mini (alleged associate of A2): 7902759490 and 9847737809 (Vodafone, Ext.P85–P90)
  • PW22’s number 7592058056 and PW21’s number 9188220638, allegedly lent to A5/A7 and A4 respectively.

A composite table of calls between 10.08.2018 and 15.08.2018 (reproduced in the judgment) shows high frequency of calls among:

  • A2’s SIM,
  • A5’s SIM,
  • A6’s SIM,
  • A1’s mother’s number,
  • deceased’s number, and
  • the numbers attributed to A3 and A4.

Key inferences drawn:

  • Multiple calls from A2’s SIM to A1’s mother’s number suggest that A1 was using A2’s number to communicate with his mother in the run-up to the crime (11–15 August 2018).
  • The pattern and timing of calls among A1–A5 correlate with other proved circumstances (visits to the deceased’s house, abduction, assault, disposal trip).
  • This telephonic coordination, in conjunction with physical evidence, supports a finding of a planned and executed conspiracy by A1–A5.

At the same time, the Court is cautious about over-extending these inferences:

  • Phones themselves were not recovered, a fact the trial court glossed over by speculating that the accused must have hidden or discarded them.
  • The Bench acknowledges that while such speculation might be plausible, it cannot substitute for proof, especially to implicate peripheral actors in a broad conspiracy.

9. Conspiracy: Why A1–A5 but Not A6–A7?

Applying the doctrinal framework on conspiracy (as summarised in Ramachandran and Nalini), the Court distinguishes sharply between the core conspirators (A1–A5) and alleged peripheral participants (A6 and A7).

(a) Evidence Against A6 and A7

The prosecution case regarding A6 and A7 was essentially:

  • A7 hired MO3 and later MO4, allegedly to facilitate the abduction and disposal of the body.
  • A6 was allegedly “posted” near the deceased’s house to monitor his movements on 15.08.2018.
  • They were present with A4 at a rented house and near a pond at Parankimamvila on 14.08.2018 (PW18’s testimony).
  • They were in telephonic contact with the core accused as per CDRs.

The trial court treated their association, presence, and calls as sufficient to hold them part of the conspiracy. The High Court disagrees.

(b) High Court’s Approach

The Bench holds:

  • Mere presence of A6 and A7 at a house or pond in the company of other accused, and the mere fact that MO3 was also present there, does not necessarily establish an agreement to commit murder.
  • The roles attributed to A6 and A7 are limited and equivocal:
    • A6 was allegedly a lookout; but his physical presence at the crime scene or during key homicidal acts was not proved.
    • A7’s proven role was primarily hiring and making available vehicles (MO3 and MO4); there was no compelling evidence he knew of the murderous plan or common intention to kill.
  • CDR evidence showed contacts, but did not by itself prove that A6 and A7 shared the common design to abduct and murder.
  • No additional overt acts or unequivocal conduct by A6 and A7, prior to or during the murder and burial, were proved to bridge the gap from suspicion to proof.

Given the heavy consequences of a conspiracy finding (imputing liability for all acts of co-conspirators), the Court insists on cogent and convincing evidence of agreement and shared intent. In its absence, A6 and A7 are acquitted of conspiracy, and consequently of all other charges that flow from that foundational offence.

(c) Conspiracy Found Against A1–A5

By contrast, the conspiracy finding against A1–A5 rests on a dense mesh of corroborated circumstances:

  • Motive (A1’s animus) and close relationship among A1–A5.
  • Abduction of the deceased in MO3 by A2, A3 and A5 (PW3, CDR with deceased’s number).
  • Presence of A2 and A4 at Polachira during the fatal assault (PW2).
  • Joint presence of A1–A5 at Nedungolam while transferring the dead body between cars (PW4, forensics in MO3 and MO4).
  • Purchase of burial tools by A3 and A4 (PWs 9 and 10, CCTV analysis).
  • Joint trip in MO4 to Samathuvapuram to bury the body (inferred from A3’s disclosure, recoveries, and CDRs).
  • Subsequent disposal of MO2 T-shirt and car parts by A2; recovery at their instance.
  • Sustained telephonic contacts among A1–A5 around critical stages of the crime.

Taken together, these circumstances:

  • Demonstrate a concert of action across planning, execution, and cover-up phases.
  • Support the inference of a prior agreement to abduct, kill, and destroy evidence.
  • Satisfy the test for conspiracy under Section 120B IPC and Section 10 of the Evidence Act.

10. Section 313 CrPC Silence as an Additional Link

The Court finally notes that A1–A5, in their statements under Section 313 CrPC, offered no plausible explanations regarding:

  • why the deceased was in their exclusive company shortly before he was found dead,
  • their presence at Polachira (PW2), Nedungolam (PW4), and at hardware shops (PWs 9 & 10), or
  • the incriminating recoveries and scientific evidence.

While the burden of proof remains on the prosecution, the unexplained presence of such circumstances against the accused, especially where they exclusively possess the relevant knowledge (Section 106), reinforces the inference of guilt. The Court cites Raja Naykar (2024) in support.

C. Sentencing and the Limit on Non-Remittable Life Terms

The trial court had imposed imprisonment for life under Section 302 IPC on all accused, with an additional “clarification” that they could not be released on remission without undergoing a minimum of 25 years’ imprisonment.

The High Court holds this rider to be:

  • “Uncalled for”, and
  • “beyond the powers of the trial court” to impose.

Accordingly, the Bench modifies the sentence of A1–A5 under Section 302 IPC to:

  • imprisonment for life without any judicially prescribed non-remittable minimum, and
  • retains the fine component and other concurrent sentences under Sections 120B, 364, 342 and 201 IPC.

While the Supreme Court in decisions like Swamy Shraddananda (2) v. State of Karnataka and Union of India v. V. Sriharan has crafted “special category” life sentences where courts can direct that remission shall not ordinarily be considered for a specified minimum term, the High Court in this case emphasises that a trial court—acting within the ordinary sentencing framework—cannot:

  • unilaterally fix a mandatory non-remittable minimum term, especially without clear statutory or binding judicial authority to that effect, or
  • intrude into the executive’s domain of remission and commutation beyond legitimate judicial boundaries.

This clarification is of practical importance: it prevents subordinate courts from informally creating “25-year mandatory life terms” outside the established legal framework.

IV. Complex Legal Concepts Simplified

1. Circumstantial Evidence and “Chain of Circumstances”

In a case based on circumstantial evidence, the court does not have direct eye-witness testimony to the crime itself. Instead, it relies on surrounding facts—motive, conduct, recoveries, scientific evidence, etc.—to infer what happened.

The law requires:

  • Each circumstance must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
  • When put together, these circumstances must form an unbroken chain that points only to the accused’s guilt and reasonably excludes any other explanation.

2. “Last Seen” Theory

This is a rule of common sense: if a person is last seen alive in the company of certain individuals, and shortly thereafter is found dead, then, unless the companions can give a satisfactory explanation of what happened, it is reasonable to suspect—and, with supporting evidence, to infer—that those companions are responsible.

The shorter the time gap between “last seen alive” and “found dead,” the stronger this inference becomes.

3. Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act

Section 106 states that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him.

This does not mean that the accused must prove his innocence; the prosecution still carries the main burden. But where:

  • the prosecution proves that the victim was in the exclusive custody or company of the accused at a critical time, and
  • only the accused can explain what happened next,

then if the accused remain silent or give no reasonable explanation, the court can draw an adverse inference consistent with guilt.

4. Criminal Conspiracy (Section 120A IPC)

Criminal conspiracy is an agreement between two or more persons to do:

  • an illegal act, or
  • a legal act by illegal means.

The crime lies in the agreement itself; it is not necessary that the illegal act be carried out (though if it is, that strongly supports proof of conspiracy).

Because conspiracies are usually hatched in secrecy, courts allow them to be proved by:

  • patterns of coordinated conduct,
  • communications (including CDRs, messages, etc.),
  • joint participation in different phases of the criminal enterprise.

5. Section 10 of the Evidence Act

Section 10 allows acts and statements of one conspirator, made in reference to the common design, to be used as evidence against all other conspirators—but only once there is reasonable ground to believe a conspiracy exists.

It reflects the idea that conspirators are partners in crime; each one’s acts to advance the common plan are, in law, acts of all.

6. Section 27 of the Evidence Act (Discovery Statements)

Section 27 carves out an exception to the rule that confessions to police are inadmissible. It provides that so much of an accused’s statement as distinctly relates to a fact thereby discovered is admissible.

Example:

  • If an accused in police custody says “I buried the body behind the temple; I will show you,” and the police then find the body there for the first time, the part “I buried it behind the temple; I will show you the spot” becomes admissible to that limited extent.

7. Call Detail Records (CDRs)

CDRs show who called whom, at what time, for how long, and often from what cell tower/location. They are valuable circumstantial evidence to:

  • prove contact between accused,
  • corroborate presence in particular areas, and
  • track movement patterns during the crime window.

However, CDRs alone usually cannot prove guilt; they must be read together with other evidence to show participation in a crime or conspiracy.

8. Test Identification Parade (TIP)

A TIP is an investigative procedure where a witness identifies suspects from a lineup before trial. Its main purpose is to test the witness’s memory and to reduce the risk of dock identification being influenced by seeing the accused in the courtroom.

Non-holding of a TIP:

  • does not make in-court identification inadmissible,
  • but may affect its weight, depending on the circumstances.

Where the witness had ample opportunity to see the accused earlier (e.g., they spent time at the witness’s house), courts may be comfortable relying on dock identification alone.

9. Section 313 CrPC Statement

After the prosecution evidence is closed, the court must, under Section 313 CrPC, put all incriminating circumstances to the accused and seek their explanation. This is not evidence in the strict sense, but:

  • a false or evasive explanation can strengthen the prosecution case, and
  • a reasonable explanation can weaken or neutralise the inferences drawn from the prosecution evidence.

10. Life Imprisonment and Remission

“Imprisonment for life” ordinarily means imprisonment for the rest of the convict’s natural life, subject to statutory powers of remission, commutation, and premature release vested in the executive.

Trial courts cannot, as a matter of routine, fix a rigid minimum non-remittable term (such as “not less than 25 years”) unless they are acting within a legally recognised framework (for example, under special legislation or clear Supreme Court guidelines). Remission is primarily an executive function subject to constitutional and statutory checks.

V. Impact and Significance

1. Strengthening the Structure of Reasoning in Circumstantial Cases

This decision serves as an instructive template for:

  • how to lay out the governing principles on circumstantial evidence,
  • how to identify and test each incriminating circumstance, and
  • how to examine whether all links in the chain are proved for each accused individually.

Its rigorous application of the “chain of circumstances” doctrine—leading to upholding convictions of A1–A5 but acquitting A6–A7—demonstrates:

  • a commitment to avoiding both wrongful conviction and unwarranted acquittal, and
  • the need to attribute liability to each accused personally, rather than en bloc on the strength of a general narrative.

2. Calibrated Use of CDRs and Digital Evidence

The judgment recognises the growing importance of digital evidence (CDRs, CCTV, etc.), yet cautions against:

  • drawing over-expansive inferences solely from patterns of calls, and
  • treating telephonic contact or shared locations as conclusive proof of conspiracy or shared intent.

This nuanced approach will likely influence future trials in Kerala and beyond, encouraging:

  • better collection and correlation of digital evidence by investigators, and
  • more careful, contextual use of such evidence by courts when inferring criminal liability.

3. Reaffirmation and Refinement of “Last Seen + Section 106” in Abduction-Cum-Murder

The decision strongly reaffirms that:

  • in abduction-cum-murder cases, once the prosecution proves that the victim was last seen alive with the accused and is later found dead, the onus shifts (under Section 106) to the accused to explain the fate of the victim;
  • failure to do so, when considered with other evidence, can justifiably lead to conviction.

At the same time, it underscores that “last seen” cannot stand alone; it must be supported by other links (medical, forensic, recovery, conduct) to form a complete chain.

4. Raising the Threshold for “Conspiracy” Against Peripheral Actors

By acquitting A6 and A7, the Court sends a clear message:

  • Criminal conspiracy is not a catch-all charge to rope in everyone who happens to be in the vicinity of core conspirators.
  • Courts must demand clear evidence of agreement and common design; vague association, presence, or assistance of an equivocal nature (like hiring a car) may not suffice, particularly when knowledge of the criminal objective is not proved.

This approach will likely temper overbroad conspiracy charges and encourage more precise investigation and prosecution of individual roles.

5. Clarifying Sentencing Limits for Trial Courts

The express holding that the trial court exceeded its powers by imposing a 25-year non-remittable minimum on a life sentence is doctrinally significant:

  • It reinforces the separation of powers between judiciary and executive in the domain of remission.
  • It discourages informal judicial experimentation with “modified” life sentences at the trial court level.
  • It promotes uniformity and predictability in sentencing, leaving “special category” life terms to higher courts under well-defined frameworks.

6. Victim Compensation and Restorative Aspects

The trial court’s direction to pay compensation to the deceased’s parents and PW1 under Section 357(1) CrPC was left undisturbed. This continues the trend of Indian courts using sentencing not only to punish but also to provide some measure of reparation to victims and their families.

VI. Conclusion

Vinesh v. State of Kerala is a detailed and carefully reasoned judgment that:

  • Applies classic principles of circumstantial evidence with modern tools like CDRs and CCTV footage.
  • Uses “last seen” evidence and Section 106 of the Evidence Act to convert an abduction case into a firmly established abduction-cum-murder, but without lowering the standard of proof.
  • Draws a principled line between core conspirators and peripheral actors, acquitting A6 and A7 where proof of shared design was insufficient.
  • Reaffirms limits on trial courts’ powers in crafting life sentences with non-remittable minimums.

For practitioners, the case underscores the necessity of:

  • building a meticulously documented circumstantial chain,
  • corroborating digital evidence with independent testimony and scientific proof,
  • tailoring conspiracy allegations to fit each accused’s proven mental state and role, and
  • being vigilant about sentencing orders that trespass into executive prerogatives on remission.

In the broader legal landscape, the judgment strengthens:

  • doctrinal clarity in the law of conspiracy and circumstantial evidence, and
  • institutional discipline in sentencing, ensuring that even in heinous crimes, punishment remains firmly tethered to established legal principles.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Kerala High Court

Judge(s)

JUSTICE JOBIN SEBASTIAN

Advocates

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