"Last Seen Together" Is Only a Weak Link: Supreme Court Reaffirms Limits of Circumstantial Evidence and Section 106 in Manoj @ Munna v. State of Chhattisgarh (2025 INSC 1466)

1. Introduction

The Supreme Court of India in Manoj @ Munna v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 INSC 1466 (Criminal Appeal No. 1129 of 2013, decided on 18 December 2025), has once again underlined a foundational rule of criminal jurisprudence: a conviction cannot rest solely on the "last seen together" theory, even when coupled with the accused’s silence or inadequate explanation under Section 106 of the Evidence Act.

The judgment, authored by Prashant Kumar Mishra, J. (with Sanjay Karol, J. concurring), sets aside the conviction of the appellant Manoj @ Munna under Sections 302 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), which had been affirmed by the High Court of Chhattisgarh. The case is entirely based on circumstantial evidence, primarily:

an alleged motive (financial need to recover his jeep), and
the last seen together evidence from two key witnesses (PW-18 Bedram and PW-20 Chamru Singh).

The core legal questions before the Court were:

Whether the last seen together evidence, by itself, can sustain a conviction for murder and causing disappearance of evidence;
How far Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (facts especially within the knowledge of the accused) can be used to draw an adverse inference where the accused does not explain how he parted company with the deceased.

This judgment consolidates and re-emphasises earlier Supreme Court jurisprudence on circumstantial evidence, the "panchsheel" parameters of proof, the inherently weak nature of last seen evidence, and the limited role of Section 106. It is an important precedent for all criminal trials built on circumstantial evidence.

2. Factual Background and Procedural History

2.1 Alleged incident

The prosecution narrative was as follows:

On 07.06.2004, the appellant Manoj, along with five co-accused, allegedly committed dacoity and in that course caused the death of Yuvraj Singh Patle, a tractor driver.
The accused were charged under Sections 302, 302/34, 396, 201 and 120-B IPC (murder, common intention, dacoity with murder, causing disappearance of evidence, and criminal conspiracy).
It was also alleged that on 06.06.2004 the appellant was last seen with the deceased, having taken him on his motorcycle from Salhevara. The deceased’s dead body was found the next day (07.06.2004).

2.2 Medical evidence

The post-mortem was conducted by Dr Ashish Sharma (PW-13) at Primary Health Centre, Gandai (Ex. P-20). He found extensive burn injuries (2nd–3rd degree), decomposition, swelling, two ligature marks on the neck, lacerated wounds on the temporal region and collar bone, and burnt palms and legs. He opined that:

Cause of death: shock and burn injury,
Nature of death: homicidal.

Thus, the fact of homicidal death was not in dispute before the Supreme Court.

2.3 Prosecution evidence and defence

The prosecution examined 26 witnesses.
The appellant was examined under Section 313 CrPC, and he denied all incriminating circumstances, alleging false implication.

2.4 Trial Court’s findings

The Trial Court:

Acquitted the other five accused on the same broad evidentiary foundation; but
Convicted the appellant Manoj under Sections 302 and 201 IPC and imposed:
- Life imprisonment with fine under Section 302 IPC, and
- Five years rigorous imprisonment with fine under Section 201 IPC.

The conviction was based principally on:

The testimonies of PW‑18 (Bedram), PW‑20 (Chamru Singh) and PW‑22 (D.S. Marko, Executive Magistrate),
The last seen theory: that the appellant was the last person seen in the company of the deceased before his death,
An inference that the appellant had a financial motive (needing money to get back his jeep) and had looted the tractor after murdering the driver.

2.5 High Court’s decision

The High Court of Chhattisgarh (11.05.2011, Criminal Appeal No. 306/2008) affirmed the conviction and sentence, relying heavily on:

The last seen together evidence, and
The fact that the appellant offered no explanation as to when he parted company with the deceased.

The High Court inferred that the only reasonable conclusion was that the appellant had committed the murder and had burned the body to destroy evidence.

2.6 Appeal before the Supreme Court

The appellant approached the Supreme Court, represented by an Amicus Curiae, raising, inter alia, the following contentions:

The case was purely one of circumstantial evidence, and the chain was incomplete.
The same evidence that was rejected for the other five accused had been selectively relied upon for convicting the appellant, resulting in unfair discrimination.
The last seen evidence (PW‑18 and PW‑20) was unreliable, and the alleged motive was not proved.

The State defended the conviction, contending that last seen together plus other circumstances sufficed to uphold the verdict.

3. Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court framed a single core issue (para 10):

Whether the Trial Court and the High Court were correct in convicting the appellant solely on the basis of the theory of last seen together?

The Court held:

The prosecution’s case rested entirely on circumstantial evidence; homicidal death was established, but:
- Motive was not proved – there was no evidence that the appellant, having allegedly looted the tractor, tried to sell it or used it to raise funds.
- The only substantial circumstance proved against the appellant was that he was last seen together with the deceased.
Relying on a consistent line of precedents, the Court reiterated that:
- Last seen together is a weak piece of evidence and cannot, by itself, complete the chain of circumstances leading only to the guilt of the accused.
- The mere failure of the accused to explain when he parted company with the deceased (Section 106 of the Evidence Act) cannot substitute for the prosecution’s duty to prove a complete chain beyond reasonable doubt.
In this case, the evidence raised a suspicion that the appellant might have committed the offence, but suspicion, however strong, could not form the legal basis of conviction.

Consequently, the Supreme Court:

Set aside the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the High Court (para 35);
Acquitted the appellant of all charges under Sections 302 and 201 IPC;
Directed that since the appellant was already on bail, his bail bonds stood discharged (para 35).

4. Analysis

4.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

4.1.1 Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116

This decision is the bedrock of Indian law on circumstantial evidence. The Court in Sharad Birdhichand laid down the famous five "golden principles" (panchsheel) (para 13 of the present judgment), namely:

(1) Circumstances from which guilt is to be drawn must be fully established;
(2) The facts so established must be consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt of the accused;
(3) Circumstances must be of a conclusive nature and tendency;
(4) They must exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved;
(5) There must be a chain of evidence so complete as to leave no reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused.

The present bench explicitly adopts these principles as the governing framework (paras 12–13). The Court stresses the distinction between “may be guilty” and “must be guilty”, emphasising that the prosecution’s case must move beyond conjecture.

4.1.2 Umedbhai Jadavbhai v. State of Gujarat (1978) 1 SCC 228

Quoted in para 14, Umedbhai emphasises that in a circumstantial case:

All the circumstances must cumulatively and inexorably point to the accused’s guilt; and
Any missing link can prove fatal to the prosecution’s case.

In Manoj @ Munna, this principle is used to underscore that absence of proof of motive and the lack of other corroborative links (such as recovery, conduct, confessions, or forensic links) render the chain incomplete.

4.1.3 Padman Bibhar v. State of Odisha, 2025 INSC 751

This is a recent judgment authored by the same judge (Prashant Kumar Mishra, J.) and is cited in para 25. In Padman Bibhar, the Court acquitted the accused where the prosecution primarily relied upon last seen together and stressed that conviction cannot rest solely on that basis.

The present decision reinforces and continues that line of reasoning, signalling a clear judicial trend: the mere fact of last seen together, without robust supporting circumstances, is legally inadequate to sustain a conviction for murder.

4.1.4 Rambraksh v. State of Chhattisgarh (2016) 12 SCC 251

In para 26, the Court cites Rambraksh for two key propositions on the last seen theory:

It applies only when the time gap between the last seen and the discovery of the dead body is so small that the possibility of any person other than the accused committing the crime becomes improbable.
Even then, last seen alone is insufficient; the prosecution must still establish a complete chain of incriminating circumstances.

This authority directly undermines the High Court’s approach, which treated last seen plus non-explanation as sufficient to convict.

4.1.5 Krishnan @ Ramasamy & Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu (2014) 12 SCC 279 and Arjun Marik v. State of Bihar 1994 Supp (2) SCC 372

In para 27, the Court reproduces the observation in Arjun Marik (as cited in Krishnan) that:

“…it is settled law that the only circumstance of last seen will not complete the chain of circumstances… and, therefore, no conviction on that basis alone can be founded.”

This line of authority is crucial; it treats last seen together as a single, by itself inconclusive, circumstance.

4.1.6 Kanhaiya Lal v. State of Rajasthan (2014) 4 SCC 715

In para 28, the Court notes that Kanhaiya Lal explicitly characterises last seen together as weak evidence and holds that conviction under Sections 302 and 201 IPC cannot be sustained solely on that basis without independent corroboration.

4.1.7 Precedents on Section 106: Sabitri Samantaray and Anees

The Court discusses Section 106 of the Evidence Act in detail (paras 30–33) and cites:

Sabitri Samantaray v. State of Odisha (2023) 11 SCC 813 – clarifying that:
- Section 106 does not relieve the prosecution of its primary burden to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt;
- It comes into play only after the prosecution has established a chain of events from which a reasonable inference of involvement arises.
Anees v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) (2024) 15 SCC 48 – reiterating that:
- Section 106 is an exception to Section 101;
- It is meant for situations where facts are especially within the knowledge of the accused and are difficult for the prosecution to prove;
- It cannot be used to override the foundational rule that the prosecution must first establish a prima facie chain of incriminating facts.

These precedents are directly used to reject the High Court’s approach of treating the appellant’s silence as a decisive incriminating factor.

4.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

4.2.1 Step 1 – Acknowledge homicidal death but isolate the real controversy

The Court readily accepts (para 11) that:

The deceased died a homicidal death, supported by clear medical evidence.

The dispute therefore was not about the nature of death, but whether the appellant could legally be held responsible for it based only on circumstantial evidence.

4.2.2 Step 2 – Apply the Sharad Birdhichand "panchsheel"

After stating the five conditions for conviction on circumstantial evidence (paras 12–13), the Court assesses whether those criteria are satisfied in this case. Two aspects are crucial:

Motive – a key circumstance argued by the prosecution; and
Last seen together – the primary evidentiary circumstance accepted by the lower courts.

4.2.3 Step 3 – Dissection of the alleged motive

The prosecution’s theory was that:

The appellant needed money to recover his jeep; therefore
He killed the driver and looted the tractor, intending to sell it to raise money.

The Court rejects this as unproven (para 15(i)):

No evidence that the appellant attempted to sell or dispose of the tractor;
The tractor was recovered from another place after about a month, with no link established to the appellant’s financial dealings;
Thus, the alleged financial motive remains a bare assertion, not a proven circumstance.

Hence, a vital potential link in the circumstantial chain – motive – is missing.

4.2.4 Step 4 – Examination of the "last seen together" evidence

The Court meticulously reconstructs the last seen narrative through PWs 18 and 20 (paras 16–22):

PW-18 (Bedram):
- The appellant and co-accused Bhagwandas requested that the deceased bring the tractor to Salhevara.
PW-20 (Chamru):
- He went with the deceased to Salhevara by tractor on 06.06.2004.
- At Salhevara, they met the appellant and Bhagwandas and had tea at Tihati Hotel.
- The accused stated they would go to Banjari with the deceased and tractor to collect cable wire, and asked PW-20 to wait.
- Before going to Banjari, the appellant and the deceased took PW-20 by motorcycle to the house of one Mangal Patle and told him to stay there. They never returned that night.
- PW-20 waited till about 2:00 p.m. the next day, then returned to his village and informed PW-18; they searched in Banjari but found neither tractor nor deceased.
PW-22 (Executive Magistrate D.S. Marko):
- He conducted an identification (dock identification in jail), during which PWs 18 and 20 correctly identified the appellant.

On this basis, the Court accepts (para 22) that the prosecution has established that the deceased was last seen alive in the company of the appellant and Bhagwandas on the evening of 06.06.2004.

4.2.5 Step 5 – Is last seen together, by itself, enough?

This is the crux of the judgment (paras 23–28). The Court asserts:

The doctrine of last seen rests on a logical presumption that when someone is last seen alive with the accused and is soon thereafter found dead, the accused should be able to explain the circumstances of separation (para 24).
However, consistent with earlier authorities (Rambraksh, Krishnan, Arjun Marik, Kanhaiya Lal, Padman Bibhar), last seen is at best a weak link that requires:
- a narrow time gap between last seen and death, and
- independent corroborative circumstances (such as recovery of weapon, forensic evidence, call records, motive, extra-judicial confession, conduct, etc.).

The Court reiterates that even if the last seen circumstance is accepted fully, it cannot by itself meet the Sharad Birdhichand standard of a complete chain of evidence pointing only to guilt.

4.2.6 Step 6 – Section 106 Evidence Act and the accused’s silence

The High Court had placed weight on the fact that the appellant did not give any explanation as to when he parted company with the deceased, and drew an adverse inference under Section 106 of the Evidence Act.

The Supreme Court corrects this approach (paras 29–33). It emphasises:

Section 106 applies when a fact lies especially within the knowledge of a person, shifting a limited burden of explanation to that person (para 30).
However:
- It does not shift the primary burden of proof away from the prosecution (para 30, 32, 33);
- An adverse inference under Section 106 can only be drawn when the prosecution has already established a strong prima facie chain of circumstances (para 31–32);
- Silence or a false answer by the accused may then become an additional link, but not a substitute for missing essential links (Sabitri Samantaray, Trimukh Maroti Kirkan and Anees cited).

In the present case, where the only substantial circumstance is last seen, and where:

motive is unproved,
there is no recovery of incriminating articles linked to the appellant,
no forensic or scientific evidence links him to the homicide,

the Court holds that failure to explain last company cannot, by itself, complete the chain. Section 106, therefore, cannot rescue the prosecution from its own evidentiary deficiencies.

4.2.7 Step 7 – Application of the benefit of doubt doctrine

In para 34, the Court accepts that the circumstantial evidence raises a doubt that the appellant may have committed the offence. But it reiterates the classical doctrine:

Whenever reasonable doubt arises in the mind of the Court, the benefit must go to the accused, not to the prosecution.

Since here, apart from last seen together, there is no corroborative evidence to conclusively connect the appellant with the homicidal act or the burning of the body, conviction cannot be sustained. Thus, the appeal is allowed, and the appellant is acquitted (paras 34–35).

4.3 Impact of the Judgment

4.3.1 Strengthening safeguards in circumstantial evidence cases

This decision reaffirms and strengthens the discipline required in cases based on circumstantial evidence:

Courts must scrutinise each link – motive, opportunity, conduct, recovery, forensic evidence – and ensure the cumulative effect leads only to guilt.
Where one or more key links (for instance, motive or recovery) are missing, a conviction is legally unsafe.

4.3.2 Clarifying the limited role of "last seen together"

The judgment gives a clear message to Trial Courts and prosecution agencies:

Last seen together is inherently weak and never sufficient by itself to convict for murder.
Reliance on last seen must be accompanied by:
- a very narrow time-gap between last seen and death, and
- strong corroborative circumstances.

This will likely influence how investigations are conducted – encouraging a more thorough search for corroborative evidence (electronic records, CDRs, CCTV, forensic traces, financial trails, etc.), rather than over-extended reliance on a single type of circumstantial evidence.

4.3.3 Re-asserting the proper scope of Section 106 Evidence Act

The judgment plays a significant role in arresting a tendency to overuse Section 106 to cure weaknesses in the prosecution’s case:

It reiterates that Section 106 is exceptional and cannot be used to invert the burden of proof in criminal trials.
Courts are cautioned that:
- Non-explanation or silence of the accused can be used only as a supporting link, not as the main pillar of the prosecution’s case.
- It cannot relieve the prosecution from proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

This will have a systemic impact by reinforcing the presumption of innocence and constraining prosecutorial and judicial overreach in criminal trials.

4.3.4 Consistency and fairness in multi‑accused trials

An underlying concern raised by the defence (though not explicitly elaborated in the ratio) was that the same evidence that was found insufficient to convict the co-accused was used to convict the appellant alone. The Supreme Court’s insistence on a complete and convincing chain of circumstances promotes consistency and fairness in multi‑accused trials, discouraging selective use of weak evidence to single out one accused for conviction.

5. Complex Concepts Simplified

5.1 Circumstantial evidence

Circumstantial evidence is evidence that does not directly prove a fact in issue, but instead proves other facts from which the main fact can be logically inferred.

For example:

Finding the accused’s fingerprints on a murder weapon is circumstantial evidence that he handled it.
Finding the accused standing over the victim with a bloody knife can be both direct and circumstantial, depending on what exactly is testified.

In such cases, multiple pieces of circumstantial evidence must, when viewed together, form a chain that points only to the accused’s guilt and rules out reasonable alternative explanations.

5.2 "Last seen together" theory

The "last seen together" theory refers to situations where the prosecution proves that the accused was the last person seen alive with the deceased, and shortly thereafter the deceased is found dead.

Logic suggests that in such circumstances, the accused should be able to explain what happened in the intervening period. However:

This is only one circumstance; it does not by itself prove that the accused committed the murder.
There must be little or no time gap between last seen and discovery of the body, and
Other corroborative evidence (motive, recovery, forensic links, etc.) must support the prosecution’s theory.

5.3 Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872

Section 106 states:

When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him.

In criminal trials, this means:

Where a particular fact (e.g., what happened in the privacy of a bedroom, or how and when the accused parted company with the deceased) is uniquely within the accused’s knowledge, the accused may be asked to explain it.
However, this does not shift the overarching burden of proving guilt, which always remains on the prosecution.
Section 106 is invoked only after the prosecution has led substantial evidence forming a near-complete chain.

Non-explanation or false explanation can then add weight to the prosecution’s case, but cannot replace missing substantive evidence.

5.4 "Benefit of doubt"

The benefit of doubt doctrine flows from the presumption of innocence:

If, after evaluating the evidence, there remains a reasonable doubt about the accused’s guilt, that doubt must be resolved in favour of the accused.
This does not mean every theoretical doubt; it must be a reasonable, well‑grounded doubt based on evidence and common sense.

In Manoj @ Munna, the Court holds that the case against the appellant may suggest involvement but does not compel the conclusion that he must be guilty – hence, he is entitled to the benefit of doubt.

5.5 Homicidal death vs. authorship of crime

The term homicidal death simply means that the death was caused by another human being (as opposed to accident, suicide, or natural causes).

Importantly:

Proving that the death is homicidal is only the first step.
The prosecution must still prove that it was this particular accused who caused that homicidal death.

The Supreme Court in this case accepts that the death was homicidal but finds that the link connecting the homicide to the appellant is legally insufficient.

5.6 "Dock identification"

The judgment refers to “Dok identification” (clearly meaning dock identification) by PW‑18 and PW‑20 (para 21). Dock identification is when a witness identifies the accused for the first time in court, pointing to him in the "dock" (the place where the accused stands).

Although admissible, dock identification is often treated with caution, especially if:

No prior Test Identification Parade (TIP) was conducted, and
The accused was already known or visible to the witness in prior proceedings.

In this case, the Court accepts the identity of the appellant but still finds the evidence insufficient to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

6. Conclusion

Manoj @ Munna v. State of Chhattisgarh is an important reaffirmation of fundamental criminal law principles:

In cases based on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must meet the stringent Sharad Birdhichand panchsheel – a complete and conclusive chain that excludes innocence.
The last seen together theory is a weak form of evidence which, standing alone, cannot form the basis of conviction for murder or for causing disappearance of evidence.
Section 106 of the Evidence Act does not dilute the prosecution’s burden. The accused’s silence or failure to explain certain facts may provide an additional link, but only after the prosecution has laid a strong foundational chain.
Where the evidence, even if suspicious, falls short of compelling certainty, the benefit of doubt must go to the accused.

The judgment sends a clear signal to investigators, prosecutors, and courts:

Do not over-rely on a solitary circumstance like last seen together;
Do not use Section 106 as a shortcut to conviction; and
Preserve the integrity of the presumption of innocence by insisting on rigorous, corroborated proof in serious offences like murder.

In doctrinal terms, the decision does not radically change the law, but it significantly reinforces and clarifies the limits of last seen evidence and Section 106. It will be a strong precedent in future cases where courts are asked to convict on thin circumstantial evidence, particularly where last seen together is the central or sole incriminating circumstance.