This case was pivotal in defining the nature of writs of prohibition and certiorari. Atkin L.J.'s exposition clarified that prohibition serves to prevent inferior courts from overstepping their jurisdiction, while certiorari reviews the legality of decisions made by such courts. The principle that these writs are not confined strictly to judicial bodies was emphasized, laying the groundwork for their applicability to administrative actions.

Lord Chancellor Viscount Simon delineated the circumstances under which the writ of certiorari is applicable, distinguishing between juridical and ministerial acts. This distinction is crucial as only juridical acts, which affect the rights of subjects, are susceptible to being quashed via this writ.

This precedent is instrumental in interpreting the term "occupation" beyond its colloquial understanding. It established that "occupation" could encompass legal possession and supervisory control, which are critical in determining the legitimacy of eviction orders.

Chandavarkar, J.'s remarks in this case provided a nuanced understanding of "occupation" within the Factories Act, underscoring that occupation involves more than mere physical presence—it includes legal possession and control over the premises.

This case contributed to the interpretation of "occupy," distinguishing between mere residence and broader forms of occupation that do not necessarily imply residence.

A significant portion of the judgment is devoted to dissecting the terms "occupation" and "possession." The court acknowledged that "occupation" is not strictly synonymous with "residence" and can denote broader forms of control and use. This interpretation was crucial in determining that Respondent 2's use of the premises for a school constituted lawful occupation under Clause 9(3)(ii) of the House Rent Control Order.

The court examined whether Clause 12, which mandates permission for converting residential buildings for non-residential purposes, was a prerequisite for eviction under Clause 9. It concluded that Clause 12 does not condition the validity of eviction applications under Clause 9, thus allowing the eviction order to stand.

The court determined that the eviction order was a juridical act rather than a ministerial one. As such, it fell within the purview of judicial review via the writ of certiorari.

The plaintiffs argued that the second eviction application was barred since a prior similar application had failed. However, the court noted that subsequent amendments provided sufficient statutory support for the second application, negating the petitioners' contentions.

By affirming the High Court's authority to scrutinize eviction orders under Article 226, the judgment reinforces the role of judicial oversight in administrative actions, ensuring that executive bodies do not overreach their statutory powers.

The detailed analysis of "occupation" versus "possession" provides a valuable framework for future cases involving eviction and property rights, guiding courts in assessing the legitimacy of administrative decisions.

The ruling underscores the necessity for landlords and governmental bodies to strictly adhere to the procedural and substantive requirements of housing control statutes when seeking evictions, thereby protecting tenants' rights against arbitrary dispossession.

Future litigations can draw upon this case to argue the limits of governmental authority in eviction scenarios, particularly in contexts where statutory interpretations are contested.