Judicial Independence and Transparent Selection for Special Courts: Commentary on Devanand Puttappa Nayak v. State of Karnataka

Judicial Independence and Transparent Selection for Special Courts:
Commentary on Devanand Puttappa Nayak v. State of Karnataka

I. Introduction

1. The Case in Context

The decision in Devanand Puttappa Nayak v. State of Karnataka (Karnataka High Court, WP No. 26355 of 2025, decided on 17 November 2025, per Ashok S. Kinagi J.) is a significant addition to Indian constitutional and administrative jurisprudence on:

  • the transparency and fairness required in public appointments under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution;
  • the independence of the judiciary and tribunals exercising judicial powers; and
  • the circumstances in which a High Court may issue a writ of mandamus compelling the State to frame rules or guidelines.

The judgment concerns appointments to the Karnataka Land Grabbing Prohibition Special Court, Bengaluru, constituted under the Karnataka Land Grabbing Prohibition Act, 2011 (“the 2011 Act”). This Special Court adjudicates alleged acts of land grabbing and disputes over ownership, title and lawful possession, as well as offences under Chapter XIV-A of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964.

2. Parties

  • Petitioner: Devanand Puttappa Nayak, aged about 63, a retired District and Sessions Judge with an unblemished service record, who applied for the post of Judicial Member of the Special Court.
  • Respondents:
    • The State of Karnataka, represented by the Principal Secretary, Revenue Department;
    • The Registrar, Karnataka Land Grabbing Special Courts, Bengaluru.

3. Factual Background

Section 7 of the 2011 Act provides for the constitution of the Special Court with:

  • a Chairman who is or was a Judge of a High Court;
  • two Judicial Members who are or were District Judges; and
  • two Revenue Members who hold or have held a post not below the rank of Deputy Commissioner.

On 16 July 2025, a Public Notice / Advertisement was issued calling for applications to the posts of:

  • Chairman,
  • Judicial Members, and
  • Revenue Members

of the Karnataka Land Grabbing Prohibition Special Court. The petitioner, being a retired District and Sessions Judge, applied for the post of Judicial Member on 8 August 2025.

The core grievance was that:

  • the advertisement and the statutory framework only prescribed minimum eligibility qualifications; and
  • no selection procedure, no comparative criteria, and no transparent process were prescribed to decide which of the many eligible candidates would be selected.

This, according to the petitioner, rendered the process arbitrary, non-transparent and violative of Articles 14 and 16, particularly given that the appointments are to judicial posts in a Special Court.

4. Key Issues

  1. Whether the absence of any prescribed selection procedure or criteria for appointing the Chairman, Judicial Members and Revenue Members of the Special Court renders the process arbitrary and unconstitutional under Articles 14 and 16.
  2. Whether the High Court can, in exercise of its powers under Articles 226 and 227, direct the State Government to frame rules or guidelines regulating the selection and appointment to such posts.
  3. Whether appointment of Judicial Members solely through an executive-controlled, unguided process is compatible with the independence of the judiciary and the doctrine of separation of powers.

II. Summary of the Judgment

1. Holding

Justice Ashok S. Kinagi allowed the writ petition and issued the following operative directions:

  • The writ petition is allowed.
  • The respondents (State of Karnataka and Registrar of the Special Court) are directed to frame appropriate guidelines or regulations for the selection and appointment to the posts of Chairperson, Judicial Member and Revenue Member of the Karnataka Land Grabbing Prohibition Special Courts.
  • This exercise must be completed within three months from the date of receipt of the order.
  • All pending interlocutory applications were disposed of.

2. Key Findings

  • Section 7 of the 2011 Act and the 2017 Rules prescribe only minimum qualifications and composition of the Special Court but are silent on any selection procedure or comparative criteria.
  • Such a vacuum results in a lack of transparency and unguided discretion in the hands of the executive, making the process arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 16.
  • The Public Notice dated 16.07.2025, which merely reproduced minimum qualifications without any indication of selection methodology, was held to be violative of Articles 14 and 16.
  • Given that the Special Court exercises judicial functions, appointments of its members—particularly Judicial Members—must comply with principles of judicial independence and separation of powers.
  • The State’s failure to exercise its rule-making power under Section 18 of the 2011 Act, despite the clear necessity, constitutes a dereliction of constitutional duty justifying a writ of mandamus.

In essence, the Court established that:

Appointments to judicial posts in special courts cannot be made merely on the basis of minimum qualifications with no prescribed selection procedure; transparency, defined criteria and a structured process are constitutionally mandated, and courts can compel the executive to frame appropriate rules or guidelines.

III. Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

(a) Renu & Ors. v. District & Sessions Judge, Tis Hazari & Anr., (2014) 2 SCR 537

The Court relied heavily on Renu, where the Supreme Court stressed transparency in public appointments, especially in the judicial domain. Paragraph 16 of Renu, quoted in the judgment, lays down that:

  • Advertisements must specify the number of posts,
  • Clearly indicate the qualifications and eligibility criteria,
  • Set out the schedule of the recruitment process, and
  • Specify either the rules under which selection is to be made or, in the absence of rules, the procedure proposed to be followed.

This is to:

  • prevent arbitrariness;
  • prevent changing criteria mid-way;
  • ensure equality of opportunity among candidates.

Applying these principles, the High Court held that the Public Notice of 16.07.2025 fell short of constitutional requirements, because:

  • it did not outline any selection procedure;
  • it provided only minimum eligibility qualifications and nothing more;
  • it failed to inform candidates of how comparative merit would be judged.

Therefore, the Court treated Renu as directly applicable, extending its logic to appointments of retired judges and senior officers to a Special Court.

(b) Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Assn. v. Union of India, (2015) 13 SCR 1 / (2016) 5 SCC 1

Relying on the Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Assn. decisions (principally the line of cases dealing with judicial appointments), the High Court reaffirmed that:

  • Judicial appointments must be made on the basis of clearly defined criteria through a declared, published process.
  • Equality of opportunity must be ensured for all who are eligible.
  • The process must safeguard judicial independence from executive dominance.

The High Court draws a structural analogy: if appointment of High Court and Supreme Court judges necessitates such transparency and judicial primacy, a similar standard must govern appointments to bodies exercising judicial powers like the Land Grabbing Special Court.

(c) Madras Bar Association v. Union of India, (2021) 7 SCC 369

In Madras Bar Association, the Supreme Court scrutinized tribunal structures and appointment procedures in light of:

  • independence of the judiciary,
  • separation of powers, and
  • the need for adequate qualifications and experience of tribunal members.

The High Court here invoked this line of reasoning to stress that:

  • Special Courts and tribunals adjudicate citizen’s rights and must therefore be independent and credible.
  • Qualifications and processes must align broadly with those applicable to ordinary courts.
  • Arbitrary or minimalistic criteria for appointment of judicial members are not acceptable.

The Court specifically emphasised from this jurisprudence that tribunal members must be appropriately qualified and selected through a process that protects judicial independence.

(d) State of A.P. & Ors. v. K. Mohanlal & Anr., (1998) 5 SCC 468

The Advocate General invoked K. Mohanlal, where the Supreme Court upheld the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 and held that:

  • while consultation with the Chief Justice is mandatory for appointment of the Chairman,
  • such consultation is not required for appointment of all other members (including Revenue Members) of the Special Court.

Section 7 of the Karnataka Act is almost identical to Section 7 of the Andhra Pradesh Act. However, the High Court distinguished the reliance on K. Mohanlal by pointing to:

  • subsequent Supreme Court jurisprudence (e.g., Supreme Court AOR cases, Madras Bar Association, etc.);
  • evolving, stricter standards on judicial independence, tribunal appointments and the role of the judiciary in selection processes;
  • the fact that the issue here was not the constitutional validity of Section 7 as such, but the absence of any selection procedure or comparative criteria under that framework.

Thus, K. Mohanlal does not preclude a High Court from requiring the State to develop transparent procedures consistent with later constitutional standards.

(e) Ganeshkumar Rajeshwar Rao Selukar & Anr. v. Mahendra Bhaskar Limaye & Ors., (2025) 8 SCC 634

The High Court cites this later Supreme Court decision (read with Supreme Court AOR) to advance a key principle:

The primacy of the judiciary is imperative in selection and appointment of judicial officers, including judges of the High Court and Supreme Court. Judicial appointments must occur without influence or control of the other limbs of the State; as the executive is often a litigant, it cannot be a dominant participant in the process.

Transposed to the present context, this means:

  • Appointments of Judicial Members of the Special Court cannot be left to the exclusive, unguided discretion of the executive.
  • Some form of judicial participation or primacy in the selection process is constitutionally desirable, even if the statute is silent.

(f) Dr. Sanjay Lakhe Patil v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., 2018 SCC OnLine Bom 1661 and Aeltemesh Rein v. Union of India, (1988) 4 SCC 54

The Division Bench and Full Bench decisions in Dr. Sanjay Lakhe Patil, relying on Aeltemesh Rein, were invoked to justify:

  • the Court’s power to issue a writ of mandamus directing the government to exercise its rule-making power or consider bringing statutory provisions into force;
  • the principle that even where the executive’s power is discretionary, that discretion must be exercised in a just, reasonable and fair manner and not allowed to remain in limbo indefinitely.

Applying this to the Karnataka context:

  • Section 18 of the 2011 Act authorises the State Government to make rules for carrying out the purposes of the Act.
  • The State had failed to frame rules regulating the selection process for over a decade, despite repeated appointments to the Special Court.
  • This inaction, combined with the constitutional stakes involved (judicial independence, equality of opportunity), justified a specific direction to frame rules within a time-bound period.

(g) Other References

  • Karnataka Kaigarika Pradeshabhivruddi Mandali v. State of Karnataka, WP No. 33055/2019 (Karnataka High Court, 08.05.2020) – cited generally to reinforce that appointments to public offices must be fair, transparent and based on informed criteria.
  • State of A.P. v. State of Karnataka, AIR 2001 SC 1560 – relied upon by the petitioner for broader constitutional principles of federalism and governance, though not central to the ratio.
  • Division Bench of Karnataka High Court in WP No. 47747/2017 – upholding the constitutional validity of the 2011 Act itself; the present challenge does not question the Act’s validity but its implementation and the absence of rules.

2. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

(a) Minimum Qualifications vs. Selection Procedure

The Court begins by dissecting Section 7 of the 2011 Act:

  • It prescribes the composition of the Special Court (Chairman + four members);
  • It sets minimum qualifications:
    • Chairman: a person who is or was a Judge of a High Court;
    • Judicial Members: persons who are or were District Judges;
    • Revenue Members: persons not below the rank of Deputy Commissioner.
  • The proviso requires consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court for appointment of the Chairman, but no such consultation is mandated for Judicial Members.

However, neither the Act nor the Karnataka Land Grabbing Prohibition Special Court (Conditions of Service of the Chairman and Members) Rules, 2017 contain:

  • any procedure for inviting applications (beyond the occasional advertisement),
  • any selection mechanism (such as a selection committee, interviews, written assessments or evaluation matrix),
  • any comparative criteria for assessing candidates (e.g., seniority, experience in land matters, integrity record, judgments quality, etc.).

This vacuum is constitutionally problematic because:

  • where multiple candidates possess the same minimum qualification—for example, several retired District Judges—there must be a non-arbitrary basis for choosing one over the others;
  • keeping candidates “in the dark” about criteria and process violates fairness and the principle of legitimate expectation;
  • the absence of rules leaves appointments to unguided discretion of the executive, which offends Articles 14 and 16.

(b) Articles 14 and 16: Equality and Non-Arbitrariness in Public Employment

The Court reiterates foundational constitutional doctrine:

  • Article 14 forbids arbitrariness in State action.
  • Article 16 guarantees equality of opportunity in matters of public employment.

From Renu and allied jurisprudence, the following propositions are applied:

  • Public posts, including judicial posts, must be filled through a transparent, fair and rational process.
  • Advertisements must clearly specify eligibility criteria, number of posts and selection method.
  • Appointments made in contravention of statutory rules are void ab initio.

The present advertisement:

  • only reflected the bare minimum qualification in Section 7;
  • did not state the rules or procedure under which selection would be made;
  • did not disclose how merit would be assessed among many eligible retired District Judges or Deputy Commissioners.

Consequently, the Court held that:

The failure to prescribe any selection criteria or process constitutes dereliction of duty by the State, infringes the fundamental right to equal opportunity in public employment, and renders the public notice dated 16.07.2025 violative of Articles 14 and 16.

(c) Judicial Independence and Separation of Powers

A central pillar of the reasoning is the nature of the Special Court:

  • It determines rights in immovable property (title and possession);
  • It tries offences related to land grabbing;
  • It exercises powers akin to a civil court and criminal court in many respects.

In light of Supreme Court decisions like Supreme Court AOR and Madras Bar Association, the High Court reasons:

  • Independence of the judiciary and separation of judicial powers from the executive are basic structural features of the Constitution.
  • The executive is frequently a litigant before such tribunals and special courts.
  • Allowing the executive to exclusively control appointments, without safeguards or judicial involvement, undermines judicial independence.

The Court thus states:

  • The exclusion of the judiciary from the appointment process of Judicial Members is detrimental to judicial independence.
  • The current scheme, where only the Chairman’s appointment requires consultation with the Chief Justice, but judicial members are entirely within executive discretion, fails to reflect contemporary constitutional norms.

While the Court does not itself design a new appointment process, it clearly indicates that:

Judicial appointments to Special Courts must occur without dominance or undue influence of the executive; some form of judicial primacy or significant judicial participation in the selection process is constitutionally required.

(d) Rule-Making Power and Judicial Mandamus

Section 18 of the 2011 Act empowers the State Government to make rules to carry out the purposes of the Act. Yet:

  • Since 2011, the State has not framed any rules regarding the selection procedure for Chairman and Members.
  • Appointments have been made “from time to time” as a matter of executive policy, without codified selection norms.

Drawing from Dr. Sanjay Lakhe Patil and Aeltemesh Rein, the Court applies the principle that:

  • Discretionary powers must be used reasonably, fairly and within a reasonable time.
  • Where the failure to exercise a rule-making power results in the non-implementation or unconstitutional implementation of a statute, the Court may issue a writ of mandamus directing the government to act.

Therefore, the High Court:

  • declines to accept the State’s stand that appointments are a matter of “policy” and “pleasure”; and
  • compels the State to frame appropriate guidelines or regulations within three months.

(e) Scope and Limits of the Relief Granted

The Court’s relief is significant yet measured:

  • It allows the petition and declares the public notice dated 16.07.2025 to be violative of Articles 14 and 16.
  • However, it does not intricately rewrite the statutory framework or itself prescribe a detailed procedure.
  • Instead, it places the onus on the executive to design constitutionally compliant rules/guidelines, presumably incorporating:
    • clear eligibility and evaluation criteria,
    • a transparent selection process, and
    • judicial involvement in appointments of Judicial Members.

This respects the principle that courts should not ordinarily enter the policy-making or legislative domain, while still ensuring that constitutional mandates are enforced.

3. Impact of the Judgment

(a) On the Karnataka Land Grabbing Prohibition Special Court

The most immediate impact is on the functioning of the Karnataka Land Grabbing Prohibition Special Court:

  • The State must design and notify a detailed selection framework for:
    • Chairperson,
    • Judicial Members, and
    • Revenue Members.
  • Future advertisements must:
    • clearly state the number of vacancies,
    • spell out the selection process (e.g., interview, evaluation of record, etc.),
    • indicate the criteria for comparative assessment (such as seniority, domain expertise, integrity, prior judgments, etc.), and
    • identify the rules or guidelines under which selection will be made.
  • Given the Court’s emphasis on judicial independence, it is likely that the new framework will involve consultation with or participation of the Chief Justice / High Court even in the appointment of Judicial Members and possibly in the structuring of the selection committee.

(b) On Tribunal and Special Court Appointments in Karnataka

The decision has wider resonance beyond this particular Special Court:

  • It sends a clear message that any tribunal or special court exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers must have:
    • clear selection norms, and
    • adequate safeguards for judicial independence.
  • Statutory schemes that only specify minimum qualifications but leave the rest to executive discretion are now more vulnerable to constitutional challenge.
  • It may prompt:
    • a review of appointment procedures to all State-level tribunals and special courts,
    • greater involvement of the High Court in the selection of judicial members across such bodies.

(c) On Administrative Law: Mandamus to Frame Rules

The judgment further consolidates the principle that:

  • When a statute confers a rule-making power needed for its effective and constitutional implementation,
  • and the executive fails to exercise that power for an unreasonable length of time,
  • courts can issue a writ of mandamus directing that rules/guidelines be framed within a fixed time-frame.

This reinforces Aeltemesh Rein and Dr. Sanjay Lakhe Patil, and is especially pertinent where:

  • fundamental rights (Articles 14, 16, 21) are at stake; and
  • the inaction leads to partial or distorted implementation of a legislative scheme.

(d) On Public Employment Jurisprudence

The decision also confirms that the standards of fairness and transparency in recruitment apply not only to:

  • entry-level civil service posts,
  • clerical or subordinate judiciary jobs,

but equally to:

  • appointments of retired judges and senior civil servants to statutory positions in tribunals and special courts.

In short, “high status” of the candidates does not dilute the constitutional requirements of:

  • public advertisement meeting the Renu standards,
  • clear and objective criteria,
  • non-arbitrariness, and
  • equal opportunity.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Writ of Mandamus

A writ of mandamus is an order issued by a constitutional court (like a High Court or the Supreme Court) directing a public authority to:

  • perform a duty which it is legally obliged to perform, and
  • which it has failed or refused to perform.

In this case, mandamus was issued to direct the State to exercise its rule-making power under Section 18 of the 2011 Act to frame selection guidelines, because such inaction was undermining fundamental rights.

2. Articles 14 and 16

  • Article 14: Guarantees “equality before the law” and “equal protection of the laws”. It forbids arbitrary, irrational or discriminatory State actions.
  • Article 16: Specifically guarantees “equality of opportunity in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State”. Public posts must be filled fairly and transparently.

Even for posts filled from among retired judges or senior officers, the State must adopt a fair selection process that does not arbitrarily favour one eligible person over another.

3. Separation of Powers and Judicial Independence

  • Separation of powers: The Constitution divides power between the legislature (makes laws), the executive (implements laws) and the judiciary (interprets laws and adjudicates disputes).
  • Judicial independence: Courts must be free from external influence, especially from the executive and legislature, to fairly adjudicate disputes.

When the executive is a major litigant before a special court or tribunal, it is especially important that:

  • the executive does not have unfettered control over appointments to that body;
  • there is judicial participation or primacy in selecting judicial members;
  • the process ensures the perception and reality of independence.

4. Minimum Qualifications vs. Selection Criteria

Minimum qualifications are the basic eligibility requirements (e.g., “must be or have been a District Judge”). They only determine who can apply.

Selection criteria and procedure are the methods and standards used to choose among the many eligible candidates, such as:

  • service record and integrity,
  • specialised experience in relevant areas (like land law),
  • performance in interviews or written assessments,
  • objective scoring matrices,
  • membership of a selection committee, etc.

The Court held that relying only on minimum qualifications without comparative criteria is constitutionally insufficient.

5. “Pleasure Appointments”

The State argued that these posts are “pleasure appointments” (akin to appointments that can be made and terminated at the pleasure of the government). The Court implicitly rejects this broad characterisation, stating that:

  • even if tenure and continuation are under executive control to some degree,
  • the initial appointment process to a judicial body must still comply with Articles 14, 16 and principles of judicial independence.

V. Conclusion

The decision in Devanand Puttappa Nayak v. State of Karnataka crystallises several important principles for the governance of tribunals and special courts:

  1. Transparency and Fairness are Mandatory in Judicial Appointments:
    Appointments to judicial posts in statutory special courts cannot rest merely on statutory minimum qualifications. Clear selection procedures, announced criteria, and transparent processes are required to satisfy Articles 14 and 16.
  2. Judicial Independence Requires Limits on Executive Discretion:
    Where special courts exercise judicial powers, particularly in disputes involving the State itself, executive dominance in appointments is incompatible with judicial independence and separation of powers. Some form of judicial involvement or primacy in the appointment of judicial members is constitutionally desirable.
  3. Courts Can Compel Rule-Making When Rights Are at Stake:
    Although rule-making is generally a legislative or executive function, prolonged failure to frame essential rules—especially where this undermines fundamental rights—justifies a writ of mandamus directing the State to frame appropriate rules within a time-bound period.
  4. Applicability Beyond One Tribunal:
    The reasoning is not confined to the Karnataka Land Grabbing Prohibition Special Court. It has potential implications for all special courts and tribunals in Karnataka (and by persuasive value, elsewhere), reinforcing the need for codified, transparent, and constitutionally compliant appointment procedures.

Overall, this judgment aligns Karnataka’s special court framework with the evolving national jurisprudence on tribunalisation, judicial independence and fair recruitment, and stands as a precedent for ensuring that judicial bodies—whatever their statutory label—are staffed through processes that respect the Constitution’s guarantees of equality, fairness and the rule of law.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Karnataka High Court

Judge(s)

ASHOK S.KINAGI

Advocates

KASHYAP N. NAIK

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