Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage Treated as Cruelty under Section 13(1)(ia) HMA:
A Commentary on Smt. Parvati Suryavanshi v. Omprakash Suryavanshi, 2025 MPHC-JBP 58433

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1. Introduction

The decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Smt. Parvati Suryavanshi v. Omprakash Suryavanshi (First Appeal No. 789 of 2022, decided on 14 November 2025) marks a significant development in Indian matrimonial jurisprudence, particularly under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (“HMA”).

The core doctrinal contribution of this judgment is twofold:

1. It expressly characterizes irretrievable breakdown of marriage as a “species” of cruelty under Section 13(1)(ia) HMA, thereby using the statutory ground of cruelty to grant divorce even though “irretrievable breakdown” is not an enumerated ground in Section 13.
2. It holds that where a marriage has undeniably broken down and one spouse has moved on to form a relationship (even an invalid second marriage), the other spouse’s insistence on continuing the legal tie and opposing divorce itself amounts to cruelty, since it infringes the petitioner’s right to live freely and choose a life partner.

At the remedial level, the Court grants divorce to the wife despite her having contracted a void second marriage during the subsistence of the first, but at the same time denies her any right to alimony or claim over the husband’s property. This balancing of relief and consequence is crucial for understanding the emerging judicial approach to fault, breakdown, and financial relief in matrimonial cases.

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2. Factual Background and Procedural History

2.1 The Marriage and Family

• Parties: Appellant-wife – Smt. Parvati Suryavanshi; Respondent-husband – Omprakash Suryavanshi.
• Marriage: Solemnized on 24.05.2002 at Chhindwara, according to Hindu rites and rituals (note: para 3 of the judgment mistakenly mentions 24.05.2022, but the later narrative and chronology make it clear that 2002 is intended).
• Children: Two daughters, Shrishti and Divyani, are born from the wedlock and are in the custody of the husband.

2.2 Marital Discord and Litigation History

The relationship between the parties deteriorated over time, leading to multiple litigations and attempts at settlement:

• Separation around 2010: The spouses stopped cohabiting.
• Joint petition for mutual consent divorce under Section 13-B HMA:
  • They filed a joint petition stating that they were living together only due to “social compulsion”; there were serious ideological differences, lack of coordination, and constant tension.
  • They agreed on a financial arrangement: Rs. 50,000 paid by cheque on 05.11.2014 and another Rs. 50,000 to be paid at the evidence stage.
  • Withdrawal of mutual consent petition on 23.02.2015 after conciliation; they decided to resume cohabitation.
• Brief reunion and fresh separation:
  • They lived together again for about six months, but the relationship as husband and wife could not be revived.
  • The appellant once again left or was compelled to leave the matrimonial home on 23.06.2016.
• Second marriage of the wife:
  • The appellant contracted a second marriage with Shiv Shankar Chourasiya on 21.05.2018 under Arya Samaj customs, without obtaining a formal divorce from the respondent.
  • The respondent filed a complaint case against her and the second husband under Section 494 IPC (bigamy) read with Section 34 IPC.
• Criminal and maintenance proceedings:
  • The appellant had filed a criminal case under Section 498-A IPC (cruelty by husband/relatives for dowry, etc.) against the respondent.
  • She also filed for maintenance under Section 125 CrPC, but later withdrew the maintenance case, particularly after her second marriage.

2.3 The Divorce Petition and Trial Court’s Decision

The wife filed a petition for divorce under Section 13(1)(ia) (cruelty) and 13(1)(ib) (desertion) HMA, alleging:

• Dowry demands and harassment by husband and in-laws.
• Physical assault, torture, and character assassination.
• Being driven out of the matrimonial home in 2009 and again in 2016.
• Husband’s addiction to alcohol and violence.

The husband contested and replied that:

• He is caring for both daughters.
• The wife had remarried in 2018 without divorce, proving her own misconduct.
• The daughters deposed that the mother treated them with cruelty.
• The allegations of cruelty and dowry demands were false, and the wife herself was cruel and irresponsible.

The Principal Judge, Family Court, Chhindwara, by judgment dated 13.05.2022 in HM Case No. 260/2019:

• Held that the second marriage of the appellant was invalid as it was contracted during the subsistence of the first marriage.
• Observed that granting divorce would be like giving a “premium on her misdeeds”, since the appellant had entered into an adulterous/void relationship.
• Dismissed the divorce petition, effectively keeping the parties legally married despite their long separation and the wife’s second relationship.

2.4 First Appeal Before the High Court

Aggrieved, the wife filed the present First Appeal under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 before the Madhya Pradesh High Court, Jabalpur Bench, challenging the dismissal of her divorce petition.

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3. Issues Before the High Court

The High Court had to address, directly or implicitly, the following key issues:

1. Whether the Family Court was justified in dismissing the divorce petition primarily based on the wife’s void second marriage and the idea that she should not be allowed to take advantage of her own wrong.
2. Whether, on the evidence and overall circumstances, the appellant-wife was entitled to divorce on the ground of cruelty under Section 13(1)(ia) HMA (and incidentally, also desertion under Section 13(1)(ib)).
3. Whether a situation of irretrievable or complete breakdown of marriage—though not expressly a statutory ground—can be treated as a form of cruelty and thus justify granting divorce.
4. What should be the financial consequences if divorce is granted: specifically, whether the wife, who had contracted a void second marriage during subsistence of the first, can claim alimony or proprietary rights against the respondent.

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4. Summary of the Judgment

4.1 Findings on Second Marriage

The High Court agrees with the Family Court that the appellant’s second marriage, contracted on 21.05.2018 during the subsistence of the first marriage, is invalid. Under Hindu law, a second marriage while the first spouse is alive and the first marriage subsists is void and attracts Section 494 IPC.

However, the High Court emphasizes that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage was not the core issue in the divorce petition. The real question was whether the respondent-husband had treated the appellant with cruelty, entitling her to a decree of divorce.

4.2 Recognition of Irretrievable Breakdown as Cruelty

After examining the facts—including long separation since 2010, failed attempts at reconciliation, the wife’s second relationship, and both parties leading completely separate lives—the Court concludes that the marriage has undergone a complete breakdown.

Although irretrievable breakdown of marriage is not an explicit ground in Section 13 HMA, the Court holds that:

“Irretrievable breakdown of marriage is a species within genus of cruelty.”

The Court reasons that when a marriage has irretrievably broken down, forcing the parties to remain in a dead relationship inflicts day-to-day mental cruelty, because they are denied the freedom to exercise their life choices, including the choice of a partner. The respondent’s act of opposing divorce despite the absence of any realistic possibility of reunion is treated as an independent act of cruelty.

4.3 Ground for Grant of Divorce

On this reasoning, the Court:

• Allows the appeal.
• Holds that the petition under Section 13(1)(ia) HMA is allowed on the ground of cruelty.
• Formally dissolves the marriage solemnized on 24.05.2002 between the appellant and the respondent.

The cruelty here is not confined to past physical or mental acts alleged by the wife; it is defined in terms of the continued legal bondage in a dead marriage and the husband’s unjustified opposition to divorce, which prevents the wife from living a life of her choosing.

4.4 Consequences in Terms of Alimony and Property

Balancing the equities, the Court concludes with an important caveat:

“Appellant will not have any right of alimony against respondent nor she can make any claim of property of respondent.”

Thus, while the appellant is granted the relief of divorce, she is effectively disentitled from seeking monetary relief or proprietary claims against the respondent (subject, of course, to statutory and property rights independently existing under other laws, which the judgment does not meticulously parse).

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5. Detailed Analysis

5.1 Statutory Framework

The core statutory provisions relevant to this case are:

• Section 13(1)(ia) HMA: Divorce on the ground that the other spouse has treated the petitioner with cruelty.
• Section 13(1)(ib) HMA: Divorce on the ground that the other spouse has deserted the petitioner for a continuous period of not less than two years.
• Section 13-B HMA: Divorce by mutual consent.
• Section 11 read with Section 5(i) HMA: A second marriage contracted during the lifetime of a spouse and during subsistence of a valid first marriage is void.
• Section 23 HMA (background principle): The Court shall not grant relief if the petitioner is taking advantage of his or her own wrong or disability (the “own wrong” principle).
• Section 25 HMA: Power of the Court to grant permanent alimony and maintenance, taking into account conduct of the parties.
• Section 19 Family Courts Act, 1984: Appeal to the High Court from judgments and decrees of the Family Court.
• Section 494 IPC: Criminal offence of bigamy.
• Section 125 CrPC: Maintenance to wife, children and parents.

The High Court’s innovation lies in the interpretation of “cruelty” under Section 13(1)(ia) to incorporate a situation of irretrievable breakdown of marriage.

5.2 Treatment of Second Marriage and “Own Wrong”

The Family Court had dismissed the divorce petition essentially on the logic that:

• The appellant’s second marriage during subsistence of the first was invalid and amounted to adulterous conduct.
• To grant her divorce would be to give a “premium on her misdeeds” – in other words, she should not be allowed to benefit from her own wrong (an application of the Section 23 HMA principle, though not expressly cited).

The High Court accepts that the second marriage is void but firmly rejects the Family Court’s use of that fact as a ground to deny divorce itself. It reasons:

• The dispositive issue is whether the marriage between the parties has in fact broken down and whether the respondent has treated the appellant with cruelty.
• The wife’s misconduct (void second marriage) may indeed have consequences for alimony and other reliefs, but it cannot be used to perpetuate a dead marriage and keep both parties in a legal relationship devoid of substance.

This approach implicitly narrows the scope of the “own wrong” doctrine. The Court seems to say: even if the petitioner has committed a subsequent wrong (here, bigamy), that wrong should not be used to indefinitely block dissolution where the marriage is already defunct and no useful purpose is served by keeping it alive.

5.3 Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage as a “Species of Cruelty”

The doctrinal centerpiece of the judgment is in paragraph 11:

“Irretrievable breakdown of marriage is not one of the ground provided in Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. Court cannot shut its eyes to practical difficulties and problems of parties. If divorce is not granted in cases of irretrievable breakdown of marriage then it will amount to further pushing party towards continuous pain and suffering. Irretrievable breakdown of marriage is a species within genus of cruelty. Whenever, there is Irretrievable or complete breakdown of marriage then both parties are under pain and suffers day to day cruelty as they were not permitted to exercise their choices and option to choose their partners in life. Other party opposes the prayer for divorce despite their being no possibility of their living together. Said conduct of party in deriving pleasure from difficulties and tension of other party also amounts to cruelty.”

This paragraph reshapes the understanding of “cruelty” under Section 13(1)(ia) HMA in three significant ways:

1. Conceptual reclassification: The Court states that irretrievable breakdown is a subset of cruelty. In effect, it “imports” a non-statutory ground into the statutory scheme by reclassifying it under cruelty.
2. Continuing mental cruelty of forced cohabitation in law: It views the continued legal subsistence of a broken marriage as causing “day-to-day cruelty” to both parties by denying them the freedom to form new relationships and move on with life.
3. Opposition to divorce as cruelty: Where it is clear that there is no possibility of reunion, the act of a spouse resisting divorce to prolong tension and suffering is itself treated as a form of mental cruelty.

This goes beyond classical conceptions of cruelty (physical violence, public humiliation, false accusations, etc.) and fuses the breakdown theory of divorce with the statutory fault-based regime under Section 13.

5.4 Fundamental Right to Choose One’s Life Path and Partner

In paragraph 12, the Court links the relief of divorce to the appellant’s fundamental right to live freely and choose her life:

“...petition filed under Section 13(1) (ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 is allowed on ground that respondent is treating appellant with cruelty in not giving her option to live her life freely according to her choice which is fundamental right of appellant and unnecessarily opposing petition for divorce when she is already living with another man though marriage between them is invalid.”

By invoking the language of “fundamental right”, the Court appears to draw on Article 21 of the Constitution—right to life and personal liberty—which the Supreme Court has interpreted to include the right to dignity, autonomy, and choice of partner (for example, in decisions relating to inter-faith and inter-caste marriages, live-in relationships, and consensual adult relationships).

The Court’s reasoning indicates:

• A spouse’s continued insistence on maintaining the legal bond of marriage, solely to obstruct the other spouse from moving on, violates the latter’s autonomy.
• Such insistence, when the marriage is practically dead, becomes a form of controlling behaviour and mental cruelty.

Thus, the judgment subtly constitutionalizes matrimonial relief by aligning the interpretation of “cruelty” with constitutional values of dignity and personal autonomy.

5.5 Relief: Divorce Granted, but No Alimony or Property Claim

The High Court’s remedial structuring is carefully calibrated:

• It grants the primary relief of divorce, so that both parties are free from the legal tie of a long-dead marriage.
• At the same time, recognizing the fault of the appellant in contracting a void second marriage during subsistence of the first, it holds that:
  • The appellant will not be entitled to alimony from the respondent.
  • She cannot make any claim over the respondent’s property.

This dual approach reflects:

1. A willingness to separate the question of marital status from the question of monetary relief. The wife’s misconduct will not bar her from dissolution, but it will significantly weigh against her in deciding financial entitlements.
2. An implicit application of the discretionary nature of Section 25 HMA, under which the Court can deny or reduce alimony considering the conduct of the parties.

The blanket statement that the appellant will have “no right” to the respondent’s property, however, could be read cautiously. While she can be denied a share in his separate property by way of post-divorce matrimonial claims, it does not extinguish her pre-existing or statutory rights (e.g., stridhan or beneficial interests in joint property), which are governed by separate legal principles and were not specifically adjudicated upon in this case.

5.6 Precedential Context and Broader Jurisprudence

Notably, the judgment does not cite any previous case-law explicitly. Nonetheless, its reasoning aligns with and extends themes found in several Supreme Court decisions (these are not cited in the judgment but are relevant for contextual understanding):

• Irretrievable breakdown & Art. 142 (Supreme Court):
  In cases like Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli (2006), Satish Sitole v. Ganga (2008), and more recently the Constitution Bench in Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan (2023), the Supreme Court exercised its Article 142 power to dissolve marriages on the ground of irretrievable breakdown, and repeatedly urged Parliament to make it an express statutory ground. The Court, however, has clarified that High Courts and subordinate courts do not have Article 142 powers and therefore cannot grant divorce purely on irretrievable breakdown as an independent ground.
• Cruelty and long separation:
  In Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh (2007), the Supreme Court laid down broad, non-exhaustive categories of what may constitute mental cruelty, including long periods of separation and complete breakdown of marriage. Other decisions such as K. Srinivas Rao v. D.A. Deepa (2013) have also taken a purposive and expansive approach to “mental cruelty”.
• “Own wrong” under Section 23 HMA:
  In earlier decisions (e.g., Dharmendra Kumar v. Usha Kumar (1977)), the Supreme Court held that the bar against taking advantage of one’s own wrong has to be applied narrowly—it is not any and every misconduct but only such conduct as is the cause of the ground for relief that bars the remedy.

Within this context, the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Parvati Suryavanshi effectively:

1. Bridges the gap between the Supreme Court’s exclusive use of irretrievable breakdown under Article 142 and the statutory scheme by incorporating breakdown into the statutory ground of cruelty.
2. Softens the “own wrong” bar by holding that a petitioner’s later misconduct (void second marriage) should not freeze a dead marriage but can legitimately affect alimony and property relief.

This makes the judgment an important state-level precedent for reading irretrievable breakdown into Section 13(1)(ia) HMA, especially in the jurisdiction of Madhya Pradesh.

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6. Clarification of Key Legal Concepts

6.1 Cruelty under Section 13(1)(ia) HMA

• “Cruelty” is not defined in the HMA; it has been shaped by case-law.
• It includes both physical cruelty (assault, violence) and mental cruelty (insults, humiliation, persistent neglect, false allegations, conduct causing deep mental anguish).
• The present judgment adds that keeping a spouse legally bound in a hopelessly broken marriage and opposing divorce to cause prolonged suffering can also amount to mental cruelty.

6.2 Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage

• A marriage is said to be in irretrievable breakdown when the relationship has reached a point where there is no realistic possibility of the spouses living together again as husband and wife.
• It is not currently an explicit statutory ground for divorce under Section 13 HMA.
• The Supreme Court has used its constitutional power (Article 142) to dissolve such marriages, but other courts cannot rely on irretrievable breakdown as an independent ground; they may, however, consider it as an aspect of cruelty, as done here.

6.3 Void vs. Voidable Marriages

• A void marriage has no legal existence from inception (e.g., a second marriage during subsistence of the first, under Section 11 read with Section 5(i) HMA).
• A voidable marriage is valid until annulled by a decree (e.g., marriage under coercion, fraud, impotence).
• The appellant’s second marriage in this case is void because she had a living spouse and the prior marriage was not dissolved.

6.4 Bigamy and Section 494 IPC

• Section 494 IPC criminalizes marrying again during the lifetime of a husband or wife, when the first marriage is valid and subsisting.
• The respondent filed a complaint under Section 494/34 IPC against the appellant and her second husband.
• A conviction under Section 494 IPC is separate from, and does not automatically dissolve, the first marriage; a decree of divorce is still required.

6.5 Alimony and Maintenance

• Alimony (permanent maintenance) under Section 25 HMA is a discretionary relief, dependent on the financial circumstances and conduct of the parties.
• A spouse’s misconduct, including bigamy or adulterous life, can be a valid ground to deny or reduce alimony.
• Section 125 CrPC provides for summary maintenance to wives, children, and parents. A wife who remarries or lives in adultery may legally lose entitlement to such maintenance.

6.6 Property and Matrimonial Claims

• Under Hindu law, marriage does not automatically create co-ownership in property. A wife does not by marriage alone acquire a share in her husband’s separate property.
• However, she has rights to:
  • Stridhan – property gifted to her, which remains her absolute property.
  • Her share, if any, in jointly acquired property or properties held in her name.
• The High Court’s statement that she cannot claim the respondent’s property should therefore be read in the context of post-divorce matrimonial/property claims, not as extinguishing independent property rights under other laws.

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7. Impact and Implications

7.1 For Matrimonial Jurisprudence in Madhya Pradesh

Within the territorial jurisdiction of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, this decision sets a strong precedent that:

• Irretrievable breakdown of marriage can ground a divorce decree under Section 13(1)(ia) HMA as cruelty.
• Opposition to divorce in a clearly dead marriage itself constitutes cruelty, particularly where such opposition is a means to prolong the other spouse’s suffering.

Practically, this opens a significant avenue for litigants in long-separated, non-functional marriages to seek divorce even without classic evidence of cruelty, provided they can demonstrate:

• Prolonged separation.
• Failed attempts at reconciliation.
• Total absence of a marital relationship in substance.

7.2 For the “Fault vs. Breakdown” Debate

Indian matrimonial law under the HMA is largely based on the fault theory—divorce is granted where one spouse proves a matrimonial offence (cruelty, adultery, desertion, etc.) by the other. Over time, there has been a growing move, at least at the Supreme Court level, towards a breakdown theory.

This judgment effectively:

• Blends breakdown into the fault framework by treating irretrievable breakdown as a “species” of cruelty.
• Provides a workable doctrinal bridge for High Courts to alleviate the harshness of fault-based rules without openly overstepping statutory text.

7.3 For Parties Who Have Remarried Without Divorce

The case sends two important signals:

1. A spouse who has wrongly entered into a void second marriage may still obtain a divorce decree from the first marriage, especially if the marriage has long been broken and both parties are living separate lives.
2. However, such misconduct will likely undermine their claim to alimony and financial relief. Courts may free them from the dead marriage but will not necessarily give them monetary benefit flowing from that marriage.

7.4 Potential for Review or Appeal

There is an inherent tension between:

• Supreme Court pronouncements that irretrievable breakdown is not a ground under Section 13 HMA and can only be invoked by the Supreme Court under Article 142.
• The present judgment’s express statement that irretrievable breakdown is a species of cruelty under Section 13(1)(ia).

However, the High Court mitigates this tension by formally anchoring the decree in “cruelty”, not in breakdown per se. Whether such characterisation will withstand scrutiny if challenged in the Supreme Court remains an open doctrinal question, but the approach is broadly consistent with the expansive interpretation of mental cruelty in earlier Supreme Court jurisprudence.

7.5 Policy and Social Implications

• The judgment reflects a more humane and realistic approach to matrimonial disputes, recognizing that forcing parties to remain in a legal tie after the relationship has irretrievably broken down serves little social purpose and causes substantial mental anguish.
• It reinforces the individual autonomy of spouses, especially women, by linking the right to exit a dead marriage with the fundamental right to live freely and choose one’s life partner.
• At the same time, it signals a strong disapproval of bigamous or void second marriages by tying such misconduct to the denial of financial relief.

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8. Conclusion

The Madhya Pradesh High Court’s decision in Smt. Parvati Suryavanshi v. Omprakash Suryavanshi is a noteworthy and bold step in the evolution of Indian matrimonial law.

It establishes an important precedent that:

• Irretrievable breakdown of marriage can be judicially recognized as a form of “cruelty” under Section 13(1)(ia) HMA.
• Opposing divorce in a clearly dead marriage, thereby denying a spouse the freedom to move on, itself constitutes mental cruelty.
• A spouse’s subsequent wrong (such as a void second marriage) does not justify perpetuating a dead first marriage, but can validly bar or limit financial relief like alimony and property claims.

By grounding its approach in both practical realities and constitutional values of autonomy and dignity, the judgment offers a nuanced balance between upholding marital responsibilities and recognizing the right to exit a marriage that has long ceased to function. It is likely to influence future matrimonial litigation in Madhya Pradesh and may contribute more broadly to the ongoing shift from a strictly fault-based model towards a more breakdown-oriented and autonomy-sensitive divorce jurisprudence in India.