Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage as a Stand-Alone Ground for Divorce under Article 142 – Commentary on Pradeep Bhardwaj v. Priya (2025 INSC 852)

1. Introduction

The Supreme Court’s decision in Pradeep Bhardwaj v. Priya (2025 INSC 852) marks another significant step in the evolutionary journey of Indian matrimonial law. The Court, exercising its extraordinary power under Article 142 of the Constitution, dissolved a marriage that had effectively ended sixteen years earlier, notwithstanding concurrent findings of the Family Court and the High Court denying divorce on the statutory ground of cruelty. Crucially, the Court treated “irretrievable breakdown of marriage” as an independent and sufficient basis for divorce, simultaneously enhancing maintenance to the wife and minor son.

Parties:
• Appellant / Husband: Pradeep Bhardwaj – a clerk in a private firm.
• Respondent / Wife: Priya – a homemaker and custodian of the parties’ minor son (born 25-03-2009).

Key Issues:

1. Whether the Court can grant a decree of divorce solely on the ground of irretrievable breakdown when cruelty is not proved.
2. Whether the husband’s acquittal in a criminal case under Sections 498A/406 IPC influences the grant of divorce.
3. Quantum of maintenance payable post-divorce.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court:

• Allowed the appeal and dissolved the marriage by a decree of divorce under Article 142, citing irretrievable breakdown.
• Enhanced the monthly maintenance from ₹7,500 to ₹15,000 for the respondent and the minor son.
• Set aside the Delhi High Court’s order (26-02-2019) which had affirmed dismissal of the husband’s divorce petition.
• Recorded two compelling factors: (i) parties living apart since October 2009 (16+ years), and (ii) husband’s acquittal in the dowry-cruelty FIR.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited & Considered

• Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan (2023) 4 SCC 692
  The Constitution Bench expressly authorised the Supreme Court to dissolve marriages under Article 142 on the ground of irretrievable breakdown, even when the statutory grounds are unproved. Bhardwaj applies this ratio in a factual matrix devoid of mutual consent.
• Amutha v. A.R. Subramaniam (2023 SCC OnLine SC 611)
  Emphasised dignity and welfare of spouses; cautioned against prolonging “dead” marriages. The present judgment invokes this ethos while balancing maintenance rights.
• Classics invoked implicitly: Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli (2006) 4 SCC 558; Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh (2007) 4 SCC 511; Satish Sitole v. Ganga (2008) 7 SCC 734 – all of which pleaded with Parliament to statutorily add irretrievable breakdown as a ground but nevertheless used Article 142 powers piecemeal. Bhardwaj stands on their shoulders.

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Authenticating “futility” of continuance:
   • 16 years of separation – far beyond the 6-month cooling-off period in mutual consent cases and longer than in most precedents.
   • Complete cessation of cohabitation and consortium; mediation attempts failed; animosity entrenched.
2. Weight accorded to criminal acquittal:
   • Respondent’s dowry-cruelty allegations culminated in an acquittal (05-07-2019). The Court inferred loss of trust, making marital revival unrealistic.
   • While acquittal by itself is not a statutory ground, it fed the larger conclusion that the marriage was beyond salvage.
3. Article 142 as a constitutional valve:
   • Powers are “curative and plenary” to do complete justice; therefore, the absence of an explicit statutory ground is not fatal.
   • The decision reaffirms that once statutory remedies fail to correspond with social realities, Article 142 can fill the void.
4. Maintenance calculus:
   • Respondent remains unemployed and shoulders day-to-day care of a 16-year-old.
   • Husband’s earning capacity as a clerk considered moderate; Court doubled maintenance to ₹15,000, signalling that financial security survives dissolution.

3.3 Impact of the Judgment

Short-term:

• Reinforces Supreme Court’s willingness to bypass statutory lacunae in exceptional cases.
• Encourages litigants stuck in long-running unhappy marriages to seek relief directly from the apex court when lower courts are constrained.
• Signals that false criminal allegations may expedite a finding of irretrievable breakdown, though not constituting “creamy” ground by themselves.

Long-term:

• Adds momentum to legislative calls for amending the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 to expressly incorporate irretrievable breakdown as a ground, thereby reducing dependency on Article 142.
• Enriches jurisprudence on maintenance post-divorce: illustrates that alimony can be enhanced even when the husband obtains the decree, dispelling the notion that maintenance invariably favours the “winning” side.
• Family Courts and High Courts may increasingly acknowledge prolonged separation as an evidentiary aid in cruelty / desertion claims, or invoke powers under Section 151 CPC (or inherent jurisdiction) more liberally.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage

A factual situation where marital ties are so fractured that there is no realistic possibility of spouses resuming cohabitation. In India it is not a statutory ground for divorce (except under Special Marriage Act for certain separations), yet the Supreme Court has, through Article 142, treated it as a valid basis in a growing line of cases.

Article 142 of the Constitution

Empowers the Supreme Court to pass any decree or order necessary for “complete justice” in any cause pending before it. It transcends, but does not rewrite, existing statutory law; used sparingly in extraordinary circumstances.

Section 13(1)(a) – “Cruelty”

One of the statutory grounds under the Hindu Marriage Act for divorce. Requires proof that the spouse treated the petitioner with cruelty (physical or mental) of such a nature as to render continued cohabitation unsafe or improper.

Section 24 & 26 HMA vs. Section 125 CrPC

Section 24 provides for interim maintenance and litigation expenses; Section 26 deals with custody and maintenance of children during matrimonial proceedings. Section 125 CrPC is a wider criminal-law remedy to prevent destitution of wives, children and parents, irrespective of personal law.

5. Conclusion

The decision in Pradeep Bhardwaj v. Priya cements the Supreme Court’s post-Shilpa Sailesh posture: a marriage devoid of substance will not be kept on life support merely because the statute books are silent. Crucially, the Court balanced dissolution with enhanced maintenance, reinforcing the principle that ending a marital tie must not extinguish economic rights of the vulnerable spouse and child.

Key takeaways are:

• Irretrievable breakdown is now functionally a stand-alone ground – at least in the Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisdiction.
• False criminal allegations and prolonged separation can together tilt the equity scale toward dissolution.
• Maintenance survives divorce; financial protection remains paramount, irrespective of the decree’s benefactor.
• The judgment renews the clarion call for statutory reform, so that lower courts may provide similar relief without recourse to Article 142.

Overall, the ruling advances a pragmatic, dignity-centric approach to matrimonial disputes, aligning legal outcomes with lived realities and reinforcing that the law should heal rather than prolong human suffering.