Irretrievable Breakdown, Long Separation and Mutual Cruelty as Grounds for Divorce under Article 142: Commentary on Nayan Bhowmick v. Aparna Chakraborty

1. Introduction

The Supreme Court of India’s decision in Nayan Bhowmick v. Aparna Chakraborty, 2025 INSC 1436, marks another important step in the evolving jurisprudence on irretrievable breakdown of marriage and the use of Article 142 of the Constitution to grant divorce despite the fault-based structure of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (“HMA”).

The case concerns a marriage between two working professionals employed as Development Officers at the Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC), who have been living separately since November 2001 and in litigation since 2003. The trial court granted divorce on the ground of desertion; the Gauhati High Court (Shillong Bench) set that decree aside, holding that the wife had not intended to abandon the marriage and that the husband was trying to take advantage of his own wrong. The Supreme Court restores the decree of divorce but does so by anchoring its decision in:

The long period of separation and complete absence of cohabitation;
The irretrievable breakdown of the marriage;
The spouses’ deeply incompatible and non-accommodating approaches to matrimonial life, amounting to mutual mental cruelty;
The Court’s Article 142(1) power to do complete justice, unshackled from the strict fault-based scheme of Section 13 HMA.

The new and nuanced point of law emerging from this judgment is that, where parties have been separated for an exceptionally long period and have entrenched, incompatible conceptions of marriage, their refusal to accommodate each other itself constitutes mutual cruelty; in such a situation, the Supreme Court may, under Article 142, dissolve the marriage on the basis of irretrievable breakdown, even where the statutory fault ground (here, desertion) is contested.

2. Factual Background and Procedural History

2.1 Marriage and Separation

The parties married on 4 August 2000 in Shillong, according to Hindu rites.
They had known each other since 1992 as colleagues, both working as Development Officers at LIC.
According to the wife, after marriage the husband and his family insisted that she give up her job, despite her responsibility to support her ailing mother, brother and other dependants.
She alleges that due to continuous ill-treatment and pressure to resign, she was compelled to leave the matrimonial home in 2001 (specific date: 29 November 2001 as per High Court’s narration).
There are no children from the marriage.

2.2 First Divorce Petition (2003) – Dismissed as Premature

In 2003, the husband filed a divorce petition under Section 13(1)(i-b) HMA (desertion) before the Additional Deputy Commissioner (Judicial), Shillong.
On 18 May 2006, this petition was dismissed as premature, as the statutory two-year period of desertion had not fully elapsed in the manner required by the Act.
The husband challenged this by RFA No. 9(SH) of 2006 before the Gauhati High Court, but withdrew the appeal on 22 November 2007 with liberty to file a fresh suit.

2.3 Second Divorce Petition (2007) – Trial Court Decree

On 29 November 2007, the husband instituted a fresh suit (MAT Divorce Suit No. 13(T) of 2007) under Sections 13(1)(i-a) and 13(1)(i-b) HMA, alleging cruelty and desertion.
The trial court (Additional Deputy Commissioner, Shillong) by judgment dated 9 March 2010 dissolved the marriage, holding that the husband had proved desertion under Section 13(1)(i-b).

2.4 High Court Appeal (2010) – Decree Set Aside

The wife filed RFA No. (SH) 1 of 2010 before the Gauhati High Court (Shillong Bench).
By judgment dated 13 April 2011, the High Court allowed the appeal and set aside the decree of divorce.
The High Court made several key findings:
- No intentional permanent forsaking (animus deserendi) by the wife was proved.
- The husband’s claim that the wife demanded that he live apart from his mother as a condition for return was uncorroborated by other witnesses.
- The husband’s reconciliation efforts were minimal: a single letter after almost a year (12 November 2002), which the High Court read as an ultimatum rather than a sincere attempt at reunion.
- The High Court concluded that the husband was “trying to take advantage of his own wrong”, contrary to Section 23(1) HMA, by creating a hostile atmosphere and then pleading desertion.
- It emphasised that courts should preserve the sanctity of marriage and not dissolve it merely because one party asserts that it has broken down.

2.5 Supreme Court Appeal (Civil Appeal No. 5167 of 2012)

The husband appealed to the Supreme Court against the High Court’s judgment.
At the admission stage, on 26 March 2012, the Supreme Court referred the parties to mediation; the mediation failed, as recorded in the report dated 10 April 2012.
Despite both parties working in the same LIC branch, they did not resume cohabitation or interaction; no subsequent reconciliation efforts were made.
By the time of the final judgment (15 December 2025), the parties had been:
- Separated for about 24 years (since 29 November 2001); and
- In litigation for about 22 years (since 2003).

3. Issues Before the Supreme Court

While the procedural foreground was a challenge to the High Court’s refusal to sustain a decree of divorce on the ground of desertion, the Supreme Court effectively addressed a broader set of issues:

Desertion and Fault: Whether the wife’s departure from the matrimonial home and continued separate residence amounted to desertion within the meaning of Section 13(1)(i-b) HMA, justifying divorce.
Irretrievable Breakdown and Long Separation: Whether an exceptionally long period of separation (24 years) with no realistic prospect of reconciliation and no cohabitation could, by itself, justify divorce, even if the strict statutory requirements of “fault” (desertion, cruelty, etc.) are disputed.
Mutual Cruelty through Incompatible Marital Expectations: Whether deeply entrenched and mutually non-accommodating expectations about married life (notably, wife’s insistence on continuing work vs husband’s family’s expectation she resign) can amount to cruelty to each other, regardless of which spouse’s stance is objectively more reasonable.
Scope of Article 142: Whether and to what extent the Supreme Court, in exercise of its power to do “complete justice” under Article 142(1) of the Constitution, can:
- Dissolve a marriage on the ground of irretrievable breakdown, and
- Bypass or soften the strictures of the fault-based scheme of Section 13 and the bar on taking advantage of one’s own wrong under Section 23(1) HMA.

4. Summary of the Judgment

4.1 Core Holding

The Supreme Court (Manmohan, J., with Joymalya Bagchi, J. concurring) allowed the husband’s appeal, restored the decree of divorce, and set aside the Gauhati High Court’s judgment. The Court held that:

The parties had been living separately for 24 years, with litigation ongoing for 22 years, and all efforts at reconciliation had failed.
Their marriage had clearly broken down irretrievably; there was no realistic prospect of cohabitation.
In such circumstances, the marriage had become a mere “legal fiction”, subsisting only on paper, and its continuance amounted to cruelty to both parties.
The spouses had strongly held, mutually incompatible views about marital life and had refused to accommodate each other over a very long period; this mutual intransigence itself constituted cruelty to one another.
Relying on the Constitution Bench decision in Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan, the Court reaffirmed that its power under Article 142(1) is not fettered by the doctrine of fault and blame underlying Section 13(1)(i-a) HMA.
In exercise of Article 142, the Court can dissolve a marriage on the ground of irretrievable breakdown to do complete justice, even where the statutory fault ground is either contested or not judicially established in the usual way.
Accordingly, the Court declared that the marriage had irretrievably broken down and, on that basis, dissolved the marriage, upholding the trial court’s decree “insofar as it grants a decree of divorce”.

4.2 Sanctioned Legal Propositions

From the reasoning, the following propositions are particularly notable:

Where parties have been separated for a very long period (here 24 years), with no hope of reconciliation and no children, the continuance of the legal tie may itself be treated as cruelty to both parties within Section 13(1)(i-a).
Spouses who hold strong, irreconcilable views about marriage and refuse to adjust or accommodate each other over a substantial period can be said to be committing mutual mental cruelty, irrespective of moral assessment of who is “right”.
The Supreme Court’s Article 142 power to do complete justice:
- Is not constrained by the fault-based design of Section 13 HMA;
- Permits dissolution of marriage on irretrievable breakdown in appropriate, exceptional cases;
- Allows the Court to look beyond apportionment of blame where the reality of a dead marriage is indubitable.
Earlier decisions like Savitri Pandey v. Prem Chandra Pandey, which had warned that mere breakdown is not by itself a statutory ground for divorce, stand read down in the context of Article 142 after Shilpa Sailesh.
While courts must ordinarily strive to preserve the sanctity of marriage, that policy does not justify forcing parties to remain in a marriage devoid of substance, particularly when:
- The separation has been very long;
- Reconciliation is clearly impossible; and
- No third-party interests (such as minor children) are at stake.

5. Detailed Analysis

5.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

5.1.1 Bipinchandra Jaisingbhai Shah v. Prabhavati

Although not directly analysed by the Supreme Court in this judgment, Bipinchandra Jaisingbhai Shah v. Prabhavati was cited by the High Court as the classic authority on desertion under Hindu matrimonial law. It established that desertion entails:

Factum of separation; and
Animus deserendi – an intention to permanently abandon the marital relationship without reasonable cause and without the other spouse’s consent.

The High Court relied on this test to conclude that the husband had not proven the wife’s intention to permanently forsake the marriage. The Supreme Court, however, chose not to revisit the factual analysis of desertion in detail; instead, it shifted the core basis of relief to irretrievable breakdown and cruelty, driven by long separation and Article 142.

5.1.2 Savitri Pandey v. Prem Chandra Pandey (2002) 2 SCC 73

The wife’s counsel invoked Savitri Pandey for the proposition that a marriage cannot be dissolved merely because one party asserts that it has broken down. In that case, the Court had stressed:

“The marriage between the parties cannot be dissolved only on the averments made by one of the parties that as the marriage between them has broken down, no useful purpose would be served to keep it alive…”

In the present judgment, the Supreme Court acknowledges Savitri Pandey but notes (para 30) that this authority has been read down in Shilpa Sailesh, specifically in relation to the Supreme Court’s power under Article 142. Thus, while breakdown alone is not a statutory ground under Section 13, the Supreme Court is constitutionally empowered to dissolve a marriage on irretrievable breakdown to do complete justice.

5.1.3 Rakesh Raman v. Kavita (2023) 17 SCC 433

This recent precedent is central to the Court’s approach. In Rakesh Raman, the Court held that when parties have lived separately for 25 years, the marriage is “only on paper” and has long irretrievably broken down; the continuance of such a marriage constitutes cruelty to both spouses and is a ground for divorce under Section 13(1)(i-a).

The Supreme Court explicitly notes that the reasoning in Rakesh Raman is “squarely applicable” (para 23), given that:

The parties in the present case have been separated for 24 years;
They have no children; and
There is no realistic prospect of reconciliation.

This authority thus supports the dual characterisation of:

The marriage as irretrievably broken; and
The continuation of the marriage as a form of mental cruelty to both parties.

5.1.4 Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli (2006) 4 SCC 558

A three-judge bench in Naveen Kohli had observed that:

An unworkable marriage which has ceased to be effective is a source of misery and futility;
Where there has been a long period of continuous separation, it can fairly be inferred that the matrimonial bond is beyond repair;
In such cases, for the law not to recognise the breakdown would be harmful to society and to the parties.

The present judgment draws from this line of thinking, particularly when it notes that the law’s refusal to sever a purely formal tie does not preserve sanctity of marriage; instead, it may perpetuate mental cruelty (paras 25–26, 33–34).

5.1.5 Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh (2007) 4 SCC 511

In Samar Ghosh, another three-judge bench provided a detailed exposition of mental cruelty and acknowledged that:

Long periods of continuous separation may fairly indicate that the marriage is beyond repair;
In such cases, the marriage may become a “legal fiction” propped up only by a legal tie, and refusal to dissolve it may itself amount to cruelty.

The present bench directly invokes this reasoning (para 26), reinforcing the conceptual overlap between irretrievable breakdown and mental cruelty. The Court uses this to support treating long separation and refusal to cohabit as cruelty under Section 13(1)(i-a).

5.1.6 Prabhavathi @ Prabhamani v. Lakshmeesha M.C. (Civil Appeal No. 8790/2024)

The wife relied on this decision, where the Court had cautioned that the “bogey” of irretrievable breakdown cannot be used to the advantage of a spouse who is solely responsible for destroying the marriage. In that case, the Court was not willing to reward the wrongdoer by relying only on breakdown.

The present bench distinguishes Prabhamani (para 27) by emphasising that:

This is not a case of unilateral fault where one spouse is solely responsible; rather, the long separation stems from deep and mutual incompatibility in marital expectations.
The husband is not merely wielding the bogey of breakdown; instead, the objective facts (24 years’ separation, no cohabitation, failed mediation) show that the marriage is beyond salvage.

5.1.7 Dr. Anita v. Indresh Gopal Kohli (Order dated 14 November 2025)

This decision, rendered after reservation of judgment in the present case, is noted but held inapplicable (para 27). The Court clarifies that, unlike in Dr. Anita, here there is cogent evidence that both parties have refused to cohabit because of a fundamental divergence in their approach to matrimonial life.

5.1.8 Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan (2023) 14 SCC 231 – The Constitutional Pivot

The Constitution Bench decision in Shilpa Sailesh is the jurisprudential backbone of this case. It held that:

The Supreme Court, under Article 142(1), has power to dissolve a marriage on the ground of irretrievable breakdown, even though such a ground is not statutorily provided in Section 13 HMA.
The power to do complete justice is not fettered by the fault-based doctrine that structures Section 13(1)(i-a).
Apportioning blame may be neither feasible nor desirable in cases where the marriage is plainly dead and the parties’ personalities and conduct have led to mutual misery.

The present judgment reproduces key passages from Shilpa Sailesh (paras 52, 56, 57, 76), including:

“An unworkable marriage, which has ceased to be effective, is futile and bound to be a source of greater misery for the parties. The law of divorce built predominantly on assigning fault fails to serve broken marriages… No spouse can be compelled to resume life with a consort… nothing is gained by keeping the parties tied forever to a marriage which has, in fact, ceased to exist.”

and:

“…this Court, in exercise of power under Article 142(1)… has the discretion to dissolve the marriage on the ground of its irretrievable breakdown… where the marriage has completely failed and there is no possibility that the parties will cohabit together…”

By directly applying these principles, the Court in Nayan Bhowmick situates itself firmly within the post-Shilpa Sailesh framework.

5.1.9 Earlier Case Law Referenced in Shilpa Sailesh

The judgment also indirectly draws upon cases like:

V. Bhagat v. D. Bhagat (1994) 1 SCC 337;
Ashok Hurra v. Rupa Bipin Zaveri (1997) 4 SCC 226;
Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli (supra);
The UK decision in Owens v. Owens [2018 AC 899], cited in Shilpa Sailesh for the proposition that even otherwise “pleasant” individuals can be stuck in irreparably unhappy marriages.

These authorities collectively support the view that the law must recognise irretrievable breakdown in exceptional cases, even within a fault-oriented statutory scheme.

5.1.10 PRADEEP BHARDWAJ v. PRIYA (2025 SCC OnLine SC 1436)

The Court refers to this coordinate bench decision (para 31), where it exercised Article 142 to dissolve a marriage on account of complete detachment and prolonged estrangement, holding that:

The marital bond had broken down irretrievably and could not be repaired;
The institution of marriage rests on dignity, mutual respect and companionship; when these are irreparably lost, forcing the parties to remain legally bound serves no purpose.

This case directly reinforces the approach taken here: irretrievable breakdown is treated as a constitutional ground for divorce in the Supreme Court.

5.1.11 Kumari Rekha v. Shambhu Saran Paswan (2025 SCC OnLine SC 1032)

Similarly, the Court cites Kumari Rekha (para 32) to underline that:

“Non-availability of grounds for dissolution of Hindu marriage is not a bar for this Court to exercise its powers under Article 142… when the Court is satisfied that it is a case of irretrievable breakdown of marriage.”

This authority is important in confirming that even where strict statutory grounds are unavailable or unproven, the Supreme Court may still grant divorce under Article 142, provided the factual matrix clearly establishes irretrievable breakdown.

5.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

5.2.1 Long Separation and Absence of Reconciliation as Cruelty

The Court highlights (paras 20–23) several undisputed facts:

The parties have been living separately since 29 November 2001 – about 24 years by the time of judgment.
Matrimonial litigation started in 2003 and has been pending for 22 years.
There are no children from the wedlock.
Mediation ordered by the Supreme Court in 2012 failed, and no subsequent reconciliation efforts were made by either party.
Despite working in the same LIC branch, the parties do not interact.

The Court then draws on its earlier decisions (notably Rakesh Raman, Naveen Kohli, Samar Ghosh) to state that:

A long period of separation with no realistic hope of reconciliation amounts to cruelty for both spouses;
Such a marriage is a mere “paper marriage” or “legal fiction” propped up by law, but devoid of real substance;
Perpetuating such a legal tie is contrary to the underlying purpose of matrimonial law, which is to foster human dignity and peace, not to force parties into legal bondage.

5.2.2 Strongly Held Incompatible Views as Mutual Cruelty

A significant doctrinal development lies in paragraph 24:

“In the case at hand, spouses have strongly held views with regard to the approach towards matrimonial life and they have refused to accommodate each other for a long period of time. Consequently, their conduct amounts to cruelty to each other. This Court is of the view that in matrimonial matters involving two individuals, it is not for the society or for the Court to sit in judgment over which spouses' approach is correct or not. It is their strongly held views and their refusal to accommodate each other that amounts to cruelty to one another.”

This reasoning is important for several reasons:

The Court refuses to moralise or choose between competing visions of married life (e.g., wife’s choice to continue employment vs. husband’s family’s preference for a non-working daughter-in-law).
Instead of identifying a “guilty” and an “innocent” spouse, the Court recognises a situation of structural incompatibility and mutual non-accommodation.
It holds that this prolonged inability to accommodate each other’s core expectations amounts to mutual mental cruelty.
This marks a move away from a strictly fault-centric model (who did what to whom) toward an outcome-centric model (has the relationship itself become a source of cruelty for both?).

Thus, without needing to decide whether the wife’s refusal to resign or the husband’s insistence was “right” or “wrong”, the Court treats the irreconcilable clash itself, persisted in for decades, as cruelty.

5.2.3 Response to the “Bogey of Irretrievable Breakdown” Argument

Addressing the reliance on Prabhamani by the wife, the Court notes:

In some cases, the plea of irretrievable breakdown may indeed be a “bogey” raised by a spouse who has engineered the breakdown and now seeks to take advantage of their own wrong.
However, this is not such a case: here, both spouses have, over two decades, refused to reconcile, despite working in the same office and having opportunities to reconnect.
Thus, irretrievable breakdown is not being invoked as a tactical plea but as a description of an incontrovertible factual reality.

5.2.4 Article 142: Power “Not Fettered by the Doctrine of Fault and Blame”

The Court then explicitly shifts into the Article 142 analysis (paras 28–32):

It reiterates that under Article 142(1), the Supreme Court has the discretionary power to dissolve a marriage on the ground of irretrievable breakdown.
Relying heavily on Shilpa Sailesh, it confirms that:
- The power to do complete justice is not curtailed by the fault-and-blame framework of Section 13(1)(i-a);
- The Court is not obliged to apportion guilt in cases where the “life-like situation is known indubitably” and the marriage is plainly dead;
- Public policy, properly understood, supports giving legal finality to a dead marriage in appropriate cases.
The Court also notes that:
- Savitri Pandey must now be read subject to the clarifications in Shilpa Sailesh about the Supreme Court’s constitutional powers; and
- As confirmed in Kumari Rekha, even the absence of a statutory ground does not prevent the Supreme Court from granting divorce under Article 142 where there is clear irretrievable breakdown.

The upshot is that the Court does not need to definitively affirm or overturn the High Court’s detailed factual findings on desertion, animus deserendi, or “taking advantage of one’s own wrong” under Section 23(1). Even assuming some ambiguity on fault, the constitutional power under Article 142 is sufficient to dissolve the marriage.

5.2.5 Sanctity of Marriage vs. Perpetuation of “Paper Marriages”

In paragraphs 33–34, the Court addresses the general argument that courts should preserve the sanctity of marriage:

It acknowledges that the general approach should indeed be to preserve marriage and avoid dissolution merely at the asking of one party.
However, in cases such as this:
- The parties have been separated for an extraordinary length of time;
- There is no sanctity left in the marriage in any real sense;
- Reconciliation is “not in the realm of possibility”;
- No children exist whose interests might be adversely impacted by divorce.
The Court warns against the “pendency of matrimonial litigation for a long duration” which results in perpetuating the marriage only on paper, without serving any useful purpose (para 34).
It considers it to be in the best interest of both parties and of society that such ties be severed where the marriage is irretrievably broken and litigation has dragged on for years.

Thus, the notion of “sanctity of marriage” is reinterpreted in a manner consistent with human dignity: sanctity does not consist in preserving a hollow legal bond at the cost of prolonged suffering and stagnation.

5.3 Interplay with Sections 13 and 23 HMA

Although the trial court had granted divorce on desertion and the High Court had reversed it partly on grounds linked to Section 23(1) (bar on taking advantage of one’s own wrong), the Supreme Court takes a different route:

It does not expressly set aside the trial court’s finding on desertion, but upholds the decree of divorce “insofar as it grants a decree”, re-grounding the justification in cruelty and irretrievable breakdown as seen through Article 142.
In doing so, it effectively bypasses the High Court’s insistence on strict proof of animus deserendi and its view that the husband was taking advantage of his own wrong.
Section 23(1), which prevents a spouse from taking advantage of their own wrong to obtain relief, is implicitly displaced in the context of Article 142 when the Court sits in constitutional capacity to do complete justice.

The effect is a functional dual-track system:

Statutory track (Trial Courts and High Courts):
- Bound by the explicit grounds in Section 13 HMA (desertion, cruelty, etc.);
- Constrained by Section 23(1) – no advantage of one’s own wrong;
- Must strictly apply fault-based evidentiary standards.
Constitutional track (Supreme Court under Article 142):
- Can grant divorce on irretrievable breakdown even when fault is contested or ambiguous;
- Not strictly constrained by Section 23(1), because the focus is on complete justice, not just fault allocation;
- May treat long separation and mutual incompatibility as mutual cruelty, without needing to identify a sole wrongdoer.

5.4 Impact and Policy Reasoning

The Court’s approach reflects several underlying policy judgments:

Human dignity and autonomy: Forcing parties to remain in a legally subsisting but dead marriage is inconsistent with respect for individual dignity, especially where each has clearly chosen a separate life over decades.
Realism over formalism: The Court privileges the real state of the relationship over formal legal labels and procedural technicalities.
Reduction of litigation misery: Long-pending matrimonial disputes, especially where reconciliation is clearly impossible, generate sustained emotional and financial strain; concluding such litigation is itself a form of justice.
Neutrality about lifestyle choices: The Court deliberately avoids endorsing one spouse’s conception of a “good” marriage (e.g., housewife vs. working wife). Instead, it focuses on compatibility and accommodation, not on moral judgments about lifestyle preferences.

6. Complex Concepts Simplified

6.1 Desertion under Section 13(1)(i-b) HMA

Desertion in matrimonial law is not simply living apart. It consists of two elements:

Factum of separation: The spouses are not living together.
Animus deserendi: A clear intention by one spouse to permanently abandon the marriage without reasonable cause and without the other spouse’s consent.

If a spouse leaves for valid reasons (e.g., serious cruelty), or with the other spouse’s consent, or with the intention of possibly returning, that is usually not desertion in the legal sense. The High Court held that the wife had left due to ill-treatment and pressure to resign, and hence without animus deserendi. The Supreme Court did not focus on re-evaluating this; instead it looked at the overall breakdown and mutual cruelty.

6.2 Cruelty under Section 13(1)(i-a) HMA

Cruelty in matrimonial law can be:

Physical cruelty: Acts causing bodily harm, violence or the threat of it.
Mental cruelty: Behaviour that causes deep mental pain, suffering or humiliation, making it unreasonable to expect the affected spouse to continue cohabiting.

In modern jurisprudence (e.g., Samar Ghosh), cruelty has been interpreted broadly, covering:

Persistent abusive conduct;
False allegations;
Non-cooperation, deliberate humiliation, or public embarrassment;
Long spells of separation coupled with refusal to resume normal relations, turning the marriage into a source of anguish.

In this case, the Supreme Court extends the concept further: long separation combined with entrenched incompatible expectations and refusal to accommodate each other, over decades, is itself cruelty to both spouses.

6.3 Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage

Irretrievable breakdown of marriage means the relationship has deteriorated so badly that there is no reasonable chance of the spouses living together again as a married couple. Indicators often include:

Very long periods of separation;
Repeated failed attempts at reconciliation;
Constant litigation and allegations;
Complete emotional detachment.

Crucially:

Irretrievable breakdown is not (yet) a statutory ground for divorce under the Hindu Marriage Act.
However, the Supreme Court has held, especially after Shilpa Sailesh, that it can grant divorce on this ground in exercise of its Article 142 powers, to do complete justice.

6.4 Article 142 of the Constitution – “Complete Justice” Power

Article 142(1) provides that:

“The Supreme Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction may pass such decree or make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it.”

In simple terms:

Article 142 allows the Supreme Court to craft remedies that go beyond or differ from ordinary statutory provisions, when strictly following the statute would not achieve justice.
This power is extraordinary and discretionary, meant to be used in rare and exceptional cases.
In matrimonial cases, it has been used to:
- Grant divorce on the basis of irretrievable breakdown even when fault grounds are disputed;
- Compound or adjust other reliefs (maintenance, alimony, custody, etc.) to achieve a fair overall result.

In Nayan Bhowmick, Article 142 is used to dissolve a dead marriage without needing to definitively resolve the contested factual issues about desertion or fault.

6.5 “Taking Advantage of One’s Own Wrong” – Section 23(1) HMA

Section 23(1) HMA prevents a spouse from securing divorce by relying on a situation that they themselves deliberately created through wrongful conduct. For instance:

If a husband drives his wife out by cruelty, he cannot then claim divorce on the ground that she has deserted him.

The High Court used this principle to hold that the husband in this case was trying to take advantage of his own wrong. The Supreme Court, however, effectively neutralises the strict application of Section 23(1) by shifting to Article 142 and mutual cruelty/irretrievable breakdown, where:

The focus is on the present reality of the marriage, not on a fine-grained allocation of past blame alone.

7. Likely Impact of the Judgment

7.1 Consolidation of a Post–Shilpa Sailesh Line

This decision consolidates and extends a clear line of Supreme Court authority:

Naveen Kohli, Samar Ghosh – Early recognition of the link between long separation, irretrievable breakdown and mental cruelty.
Shilpa Sailesh – Constitution Bench endorsement of Article 142 divorce powers based on irretrievable breakdown.
Rakesh Raman, Pradeep Bhardwaj, Kumari Rekha – Application of Article 142 to dissolve marriages with long separation and complete estrangement.
Nayan Bhowmick now squarely fits into this trajectory, adding a nuanced formulation:
- Mutual, entrenched incompatibility and refusal to accommodate each other is itself mental cruelty, warranting divorce.

7.2 Clarification on the Role of Fault vs. Breakdown

The judgment further weakens the rigid centrality of the fault model in the Supreme Court’s matrimonial jurisprudence:

While fault (desertion, cruelty, etc.) remains crucial in trial courts and High Courts,
The Supreme Court under Article 142 can move to an effective “no-fault” or “breakdown-based” dissolution in exceptional cases.

This dual approach will likely:

Encourage litigants in dead marriages, where statutory grounds are difficult to prove conclusively, to seek final relief at the Supreme Court level after exhausting ordinary remedies.
Increase pressure on the legislature to statutorily recognise irretrievable breakdown as an independent ground for divorce, to avoid reliance on Article 142 in every such case.

7.3 Shift in Judicial Attitude to “Sanctity of Marriage”

The judgment underscores a more realistic and humane understanding of “sanctity of marriage”:

Sanctity does not require that a purely formal, painful and long-dead relationship be maintained indefinitely.
Rather, sanctity is linked to dignity, companionship, mutual respect – which are absent here.
When those foundational elements are irreparably gone, the truly sanctifying response may be to permit dissolution and allow both spouses to rebuild their lives.

7.4 Recognition of Autonomy in Marital Choices

By refusing to adjudicate which spouse’s approach to marriage (working spouse vs. full-time homemaker, living with in-laws vs. living separately) is “correct”, the Court:

Respects the autonomy of individual spouses to define their own expectations;
Shifts judicial scrutiny away from moralising about ideal marital roles and toward assessing compatibility and cruelty;
Signals greater judicial sensitivity to cases involving working women whose marital conflict stems from resistance to traditional expectations.

7.5 Practical Effect on Lower Courts

For trial courts and High Courts, the judgment:

Does not expand their power to grant divorce on irretrievable breakdown alone – that remains the preserve of the Supreme Court under Article 142.
However, it does:
- Legitimise considering long separation and deep incompatibility as strong evidence of mental cruelty under Section 13(1)(i-a);
- Encourage a more pragmatic evaluation of dead marriages, rather than mechanically focusing only on discrete incidents of cruelty or desertion.

8. Conclusion

Nayan Bhowmick v. Aparna Chakraborty is a significant addition to Indian matrimonial jurisprudence at multiple levels.

First, it confirms that extreme long-term separation (24 years) with failed reconciliation efforts and no children is a compelling indicator of both irretrievable breakdown and mental cruelty. Such a marriage, the Court holds, has no sanctity left and exists only on paper; its continued legal existence is itself unjust.

Second, the Court articulates a nuanced principle: when spouses maintain strongly held, irreconcilable views about marital life and steadfastly refuse to accommodate each other, their conduct amounts to cruelty to one another—even if no single party can be labelled the sole wrongdoer. This shifts the emphasis from moral blame to functional incompatibility and suffering.

Third, the judgment firmly embeds the use of Article 142(1) to dissolve marriages on the ground of irretrievable breakdown within the doctrinal framework established by Shilpa Sailesh. It underscores that the Supreme Court’s power to do complete justice is not constrained by the fault-based design of Section 13 HMA or by specific bars like Section 23(1) in appropriate, exceptional cases.

Fourth, while reaffirming that courts should ordinarily aim to preserve marriages, the judgment clarifies that this policy cannot override the realities of a dead and unbearable relationship. Where reconciliation is impossible and the marital bond has lost its substance, the law must prefer dignity, autonomy and relief from prolonged misery over rigid adherence to formalistic notions of marital permanence.

In sum, Nayan Bhowmick both reflects and furthers a broader shift in Indian family law toward a realist, dignity-oriented, and breakdown-sensitive approach, while still locating such transformative power primarily within the Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisdiction under Article 142. It strengthens the case—jurisprudentially and practically—for eventual legislative recognition of irretrievable breakdown of marriage as a standalone ground for divorce.