Inter‑Departmental Jurisdiction of Internal Complaints Committees under the POSH Act: Commentary on Dr. Sohail Malik v. Union of India (2025 INSC 1415)

Inter‑Departmental Jurisdiction of Internal Complaints Committees under the POSH Act: Commentary on Dr. Sohail Malik v. Union of India (2025 INSC 1415)

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of India’s decision in Dr. Sohail Malik v. Union of India, 2025 INSC 1415 (Civil Appeal No. 404 of 2024, decided on 10 December 2025), is a significant landmark in the law on workplace sexual harassment under the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 (“POSH Act”).

The core controversy was jurisdictional: can an Internal Complaints Committee (ICC) constituted in one department of the Government of India inquire into a complaint of sexual harassment against an officer employed in a different department of the Government of India? Or must the complainant necessarily approach the ICC of the respondent’s own department?

The appellant, Dr. Sohail Malik, is a 2010 batch Indian Revenue Service (IRS) officer posted as OSD, Investigation, CBDT, Delhi. The complainant (“aggrieved woman”) is a 2004 batch IAS officer posted as Joint Secretary, Department of Food and Public Distribution (DFPD), Krishi Bhawan, New Delhi. The allegation was that the appellant sexually harassed her at her workplace at Krishi Bhawan on 15 May 2023.

Separate criminal proceedings were initiated via an FIR under various provisions of the IPC and Section 67 of the IT Act, and a charge-sheet was filed. In parallel, the aggrieved woman filed a POSH complaint before the ICC of her own department (DFPD) on 24 May 2023. The DFPD ICC issued notice to the appellant to participate in the inquiry.

Challenging this, the appellant approached the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT), then the Delhi High Court, and finally the Supreme Court, contending that only the ICC of his own department (Department of Revenue/CBDT) had jurisdiction. Both CAT and High Court rejected this contention. The Supreme Court has now affirmed those decisions.

This judgment clarifies and settles:

  • that ICC jurisdiction is anchored in the complainant’s workplace, not restricted to the respondent’s department;
  • that Section 11(1) POSH (“where the respondent is an employee”) is procedural, not a jurisdictional limitation; and
  • that for Central Government employees, the inquiry into POSH complaints functions as a two‑stage process: (a) a fact‑finding inquiry (which can be conducted by the ICC at the complainant’s workplace); and (b) a subsequent disciplinary inquiry by the respondent’s department, using its own ICC as the inquiring authority under the CCS (CCA) Rules.

The decision is a major precedent for inter‑departmental and “third‑party” sexual harassment complaints and for interpreting the POSH Act as a social welfare statute in line with constitutional guarantees of equality and dignity.

II. Summary of the Judgment

1. Issues Framed

The Court identified four principal issues (para 30):
  1. Whether the ICC in one Central Government department can entertain a POSH complaint against an employee of another Central Government department.
  2. Whether the phrase “where the respondent is an employee” in Section 11 POSH mandates that the inquiry must be conducted by the ICC at the respondent’s own workplace.
  3. If not, how is the respondent’s department to take action under Section 13 POSH based on findings of an ICC constituted in the aggrieved woman’s department?
  4. Whether the ICC proceedings in the present case (conducted by the DFPD ICC) caused any prejudice to the appellant warranting interference.

2. Core Holdings

In substance, the Supreme Court held:
  • ICC at complainant’s workplace has jurisdiction
    The ICC constituted at the workplace of the aggrieved woman has jurisdiction to inquire into her complaint even if the respondent is an employee of a different department or workplace (paras 46–49, 72(i)-(ii)).
  • “Where the respondent is an employee” in Section 11(1) is conditional, not locational
    The word “where” in Section 11(1) POSH is used as a conditional conjunction (“if” / “in that case”), not as a reference to place (paras 36–45). It describes what procedure the ICC must follow when the respondent:
    • is an employee (apply his/her service rules);
    • has no service rules (use prescribed procedure); or
    • is a domestic worker (forward to police under Section 509 IPC, etc.).
    It does not mean that only the ICC located at the respondent’s workplace can inquire.
  • Respondent need not be employee of same workplace as complainant
    Definitions of “respondent”, “employee” and “workplace” in Section 2 POSH are neutral and do not require that the respondent be employed in the complainant’s department (paras 47–49).
  • Two‑stage inquiry model for civil servants
    Based on POSH Act, CCS Rules and the DoPT Office Memorandum dated 16.07.2015, the Court clarifies:
    1. Stage 1 – Preliminary / fact‑finding inquiry under POSH, which can validly be conducted by the ICC at the complainant’s workplace.
    2. Stage 2 – Formal disciplinary inquiry under the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, where the ICC of the respondent’s own department functions as the inquiring authority (paras 60–68, 72(iii)).
    The Stage‑1 ICC’s report goes to the respondent’s employer, which then decides whether to issue a charge-sheet and commence disciplinary proceedings.
  • Employer’s duty to co‑operate is statutory
    Under Section 19(f) POSH, the respondent’s employer (even if a different department) is statutorily obliged to co‑operate with the ICC at the complainant’s workplace and provide necessary information (paras 59–60, 66–71, 72(iv)).
  • No prejudice shown to appellant
    The appellant failed to show that inquiry by the DFPD ICC caused any legal prejudice. The ICC secured cooperation and information from his department; the process did not violate his rights (para 70). All future contentions as to merits remain open to him in disciplinary proceedings, except the jurisdictional challenge which is now concluded (para 71).
  • Appeal dismissed; ICC report to be acted upon
    The appeal is dismissed. The ICC report (earlier kept in sealed cover) is to be transmitted to the appellant’s department forthwith for appropriate further action under the POSH Act and applicable service rules (para 73).

III. Analysis

A. Precedents and Legal Sources Relied Upon

1. Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan and the constitutional foundation of POSH

The Court re‑affirms that the POSH Act’s architecture is rooted in the seminal judgment in Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, (1997) 6 SCC 241 (para 10). In Vishaka, the Supreme Court:

  • Recognised workplace sexual harassment as a violation of:
    • Articles 14 and 15 (right to equality and non-discrimination),
    • Article 19(1)(g) (right to practise any profession, etc.), and
    • Article 21 (right to life and dignity).
  • Drew upon CEDAW and international human rights norms.
  • Framed binding guidelines (the Vishaka Guidelines) requiring all employers to set up complaints committees.

The POSH Act is explicitly acknowledged as a legislative response to that constitutional mandate, intended to fill the vacuum identified in Vishaka. Therefore, its provisions are to be read as implementing and operationalising fundamental rights, not as narrow procedural hurdles.

2. Medha Kotwal Lele v. Union of India and the Complaints Committee as Inquiry Authority

In Medha Kotwal Lele v. Union of India, (2013) 1 SCC 311, the Court, in an interim order (26.04.2004), held that:

“Complaints Committee as envisaged by the Supreme Court in its judgment in Vishaka … will be deemed to be an inquiry authority for the purposes of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964 … and the report of the Complaints Committee shall be deemed to be an inquiry report under the CCS Rules. Thereafter the disciplinary authority will act on the report in accordance with the Rules.” (para 11)

This position was later embedded in:

  • CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964 – making sexual harassment a form of misconduct (Rule 3C); and
  • CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 – by inserting a proviso to Rule 14(2) specifying that the Complaints Committee shall be deemed to be the inquiring authority where there is a complaint of sexual harassment (paras 60–62).

This historical background is critical to the present judgment:

  • It confirms that ICC findings are not merely advisory; they have a recognised status as an inquiry report under service rules.
  • It also underpins the Court’s acceptance of a two‑stage model:
    a POSH inquiry (fact‑finding) feeding into a formal service‑law inquiry and disciplinary process.

3. Text-and-context jurisprudence: RBI v. Peerless, Eera, and Balasinor Nagrik Coop. Bank

The Court grounds its interpretive approach in a line of precedents that emphasise reading a statute textually and contextually, particularly in social welfare legislation.

  • RBI v. Peerless General Finance & Investment Co. Ltd., (1987) 1 SCC 424 (para 32):
    The Court reiterated that interpretation must depend on both text and context: statutes are to be read as a whole; no word or section should be read in isolation; and the best interpretation matches the textual meaning with legislative purpose.
  • Eera v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2017) 15 SCC 133 (paras 33–34):
    Separate concurring opinions of Dipak Misra, J. and R.F. Nariman, J. emphasise:
    • the duty to interpret social welfare and human rights legislation purposively,
    • avoiding interpretations that render the statute ineffective or produce absurdity,
    • but without doing violence to the statutory text.
    The Court in Malik cites Eera to justify looking beyond literalism when construing POSH, a statute integral to gender equality and dignity.
  • Balasinor Nagrik Coop. Bank Ltd. v. Babubhai Shankarlal Pandya, (1987) 1 SCC 606 (para 35):
    Reaffirms the rule that a section must be read as a whole and no part of it should be omitted when interpreting its meaning. This is central to rejecting the appellant’s attempt to isolate the words “where the respondent is an employee” in Section 11(1) POSH.

4. Meaning of “where”: Davies Jenkins, S.G. Glass Works and legal lexicons

The crux of the appellant’s argument turned on the word “where” in Section 11(1) POSH. To address this, the Court draws on:

  • Davies Jenkins & Co. Ltd. v. Davies (Inspector of Taxes), [1968] AC 1097 (House of Lords), where “where” in a tax statute was interpreted as meaning “if” or “whenever”, not as denoting a place (para 39).
  • S.G. Glass Works (P) Ltd. v. CCE, (1995) 1 SCC 680 (para 40), where this Court, construing an excise notification, noted that “where” can describe a situation or condition, not a physical place.
  • Standard legal lexicons (Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, P. Ramanatha Aiyar’s Advanced Law Lexicon, and Justice C.K. Thakker’s Encyclopaedic Law Lexicon) reinforcing this functional, conditional usage of “where”.

On this basis, the Court concludes that “where” in Section 11(1) POSH is a conditional conjunction, not a jurisdictional or locational marker (paras 41–45).

5. DoPT OM dated 16.07.2015: Two‑stage handling of sexual harassment complaints

A highly significant practical source is the Office Memorandum No. 11013/2/2014-Estt (A-III) dated 16 July 2015 (DoPT), titled “Steps for conducting inquiry in case of allegation of Sexual Harassment” (paras 62–65). The OM:

  • Confirms that Complaints Committees/ICCs:
    • receive and investigate complaints (preliminary enquiry / fact‑finding); and
    • also act as Inquiring Authorities in formal disciplinary inquiries under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules.
  • Describes a two‑stage process:
    1. Fact‑finding / preliminary enquiry (paras 7–8, 9, 11, 12);
    2. Formal departmental inquiry (paras 12–14) following issue of charge-sheet by the Disciplinary Authority.

The Supreme Court uses this OM to structure its solution for inter‑departmental cases: the ICC of the complainant’s department can complete Stage‑1, while the ICC of the respondent’s department conducts Stage‑2 disciplinary inquiry (paras 65–68, 72(iii)).

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Interpreting Section 11(1) POSH: “where the respondent is an employee”

Section 11(1) POSH is the pivot of the judgment. The Court carefully deconstructs its structure (paras 36–45). The provision creates three distinct situations:

  1. When the respondent is an employee: the ICC/Local Committee shall inquire in accordance with the service rules applicable to the respondent.
  2. When no such rules exist: the ICC/Local Committee shall inquire in such manner as may be prescribed.
  3. In case of a domestic worker: the Local Committee shall, if a prima facie case exists, forward the complaint to the police under Section 509 IPC and other relevant provisions.

Key points in the Court’s construction:

  • The three scenarios are connected by “where” and “or” in an “where … and where … or …” pattern (para 45). This shows “where” introduces conditions (if/when), not locations.
  • The phrase “where the respondent is an employee” is therefore a procedural trigger: it tells the ICC which procedural framework to apply (service rules vs prescribed rules vs forwarding to police). It does not identify which ICC has jurisdiction.
  • Isolating “where the respondent is an employee” and reading “where” as “at the place where” would violate the rule against reading words in isolation and distort the section’s overall structure (paras 35, 45–46).

Hence, the appellant’s central reading — that the complainant must complain to the ICC of the department in which the respondent is “an employee” — is rejected as textually unsustainable.

2. Do the complainant and respondent have to share the same “workplace”?

The Court then turns to whether the POSH Act implicitly requires that the complainant and respondent work in the same workplace (paras 47–50). It relies on statutory definitions:

  • “Aggrieved woman” (Section 2(a)):
    Any woman (employed or not) who alleges sexual harassment “in relation to a workplace”.
  • “Respondent” (Section 2(m)):
    “a person against whom the aggrieved woman has made a complaint under section 9” – crucially, not “an employee of her workplace”, but simply “a person”.
  • “Employee” (Section 2(f)):
    “a person employed at a workplace” – without any cross‑reference that this must be the complainant’s workplace.
  • “Workplace” (Section 2(o)):
    Broadly defined to include:
    • Government departments, organisations, offices, etc. (2(o)(i));
    • private sector entities (2(o)(ii));
    • hospitals, sports institutions, etc.;
    • any place visited by the employee arising out of or during the course of employment, including transportation (2(o)(v)); and
    • dwelling places (2(o)(vi)).

From this, the Court draws two core conclusions (paras 48–49):

  1. The statute was deliberately drafted to capture scenarios where the perpetrator is not from the complainant’s own workplace, e.g. third-party harassment, visitors, employees of other organisations, etc.
  2. Nothing in the definitions requires that the respondent be employed in the same department, office, or entity as the aggrieved woman: the statutory emphasis is on the complainant’s access to a redressal mechanism at her workplace, not on organisational symmetry.

3. Harmonising Section 19(h): Criminal complaints and POSH are concurrent, not mutually exclusive

The appellant argued that Section 19(h) POSH — which requires employers to “cause to initiate action under the IPC or any other law … where the perpetrator is not an employee” — implies that the only remedy for a complainant vis‑à‑vis a non‑co‑employee perpetrator is a criminal case (para 28, 50).

The Court firmly rejects this reading (para 50):

  • Section 19(h) is a positive duty on the employer to facilitate criminal action if the aggrieved woman so desires.
  • It is not in derogation of, or an exception to, the employer’s obligations under POSH to:
    • prevent harassment,
    • constitute an ICC, and
    • process complaints through that ICC.
  • Even where the respondent is completely outside the employer’s organisation, the POSH mechanism and criminal law can function in tandem.

Therefore, Section 19(h) does not carve out a class of “outsider respondents” for whom POSH procedures are unavailable.

4. Contextual and purposive interpretation of POSH as social welfare legislation

Building on Vishaka and Eera, the Court explicitly recognises POSH as a social welfare legislation whose primary purpose is to:

  • ensure a safe working environment for women;
  • enable them to work without fear of sexual harassment;
  • enforce their fundamental rights to equality, dignity, and livelihood (paras 52–53).

Against that backdrop, the Court stresses two practical considerations (paras 54–57):

  1. Requiring a complainant to approach the ICC of the respondent’s department:
    • forces her into an alien workplace,
    • exacerbates psychological and procedural hurdles, and
    • is inconsistent with the statutory goal of easy access to redressal at her own workplace.
  2. Given that “workplace” includes any place visited in the course of employment (Section 2(o)(v)), limiting jurisdiction to the respondent’s ICC would:
    • undermine the very expansion of “workplace” meant to capture work‑related locations beyond the office premises;
    • produce absurd results where a complainant must chase different ICCs depending on where and by whom she is harassed.

In this sense, the Court’s interpretation ensures that POSH is not defeated by formalistic jurisdictional objections that would deter complaints.

5. Reconciling inquiry and punishment: Distinguishing fact‑finding from disciplinary action

A critical plank of the appellant’s argument was that only his own department could take disciplinary action against him and therefore only the ICC of his department should conduct the POSH inquiry (paras 28, 58).

The Court accepts the first proposition but rejects the second, by carefully distinguishing:

  • Authority to inquire into facts (fact‑finding) – can be exercised by the ICC at the complainant’s workplace under the POSH Act; and
  • Authority to impose penalty – remains with the disciplinary authority/employer of the respondent, acting under service rules (paras 59–60, 67–68).

Section 13 POSH bridges the two:

  • The ICC, on completion of inquiry, reports its findings to the “employer” or “District Officer” and makes recommendations (Section 13(1), (2), (3)).
  • The “employer” is then obligated to act on those recommendations within 60 days (Section 13(4)) – but POSH does not say the employer of the complainant and respondent must be the same (para 59).

In the Government servant context, this is read with the CCS (CCA) Rules and the DoPT OM:

  1. The ICC of the complainant’s department conducts the Stage‑1 fact‑finding inquiry under POSH and sends its report to the respondent’s employer (paras 65–68).
  2. The respondent’s Disciplinary Authority then decides whether there is ground to issue a charge-sheet and order a Stage‑2 disciplinary inquiry (para 64).
  3. The ICC of the respondent’s department (constituted under POSH/CCS Rules) then acts as the inquiring authority for that disciplinary proceeding, following Rule 14 CCS (CCA) (paras 61–65, 68).

Thus, the Court preserves:

  • the complainant’s right to local access to an ICC;
  • the respondent’s right that disciplinary action is taken only by his own employer following due process; and
  • the integrity of the service rules regime.

6. Prejudice and fairness in the present case

Lastly, the Court examines whether, in the specific facts, inquiry by the DFPD ICC caused any prejudice to the appellant (Issue IV, paras 69–71). It notes:

  • The DFPD ICC, during its inquiry, communicated with the respondent’s department and obtained information on his scope of duty, relevant records, etc. (para 70).
  • The respondent’s department complied with its duty under Section 19(f) POSH to provide necessary information and support (para 70–71).
  • No specific denial of due process or procedural unfairness was shown by the appellant; his challenge is essentially jurisdictional, not about the manner of inquiry.

Since the ICC report is only a fact‑finding document that may lead to disciplinary proceedings where full opportunity will be given, the Court holds there is no prejudice justifying interference. It therefore:

  • upholds the validity of the ICC proceedings at the aggrieved woman’s workplace;
  • directs transmission of the report to the appellant’s department; and
  • leaves all other defences on facts and merits open to the appellant in any disciplinary inquiry (except jurisdiction, which stands concluded).

C. Impact of the Judgment

1. Clarification of inter‑departmental and inter‑entity jurisdiction under POSH

The most immediate and far‑reaching impact is that:

  • Any woman can complain to the ICC at her own workplace under Section 9 POSH, even if the alleged harasser is employed in a different organisation, department or entity.

This has consequences beyond Central Government departments:

  • In public sector undertakings, autonomous bodies, and private corporations, employees often interact across entities. This judgment strongly suggests that:
    • the complainant’s ICC can inquire into harassment by visiting vendors, consultants, empanelled professionals, or employees of affiliate companies; and
    • the respondent’s employer remains responsible for disciplinary action after receiving the ICC’s findings and recommendations.
  • It reduces the likelihood that employers or respondents can derail complaints on a “wrong forum” or “lack of jurisdiction” argument by virtue of organisational boundaries.

2. Strengthening the complainant‑centric design of POSH

By locating jurisdiction primarily in the complainant’s workplace ICC, the Court significantly:

  • lowers procedural and psychological barriers to reporting;
  • acknowledges the stigma and power imbalances that deter women from pursuing complaints, especially in unfamiliar or hostile environments; and
  • aligns the legal mechanism with POSH’s protective intent, ensuring that “workplace” in Section 2(o) is a substantive shield, not a formalistic trap.

3. Doctrinal influence on statutory interpretation

The judgment reinforces several interpretive themes that are likely to influence future cases:

  • Text-and-context harmony:
    Literal readings that produce outcomes contrary to the statute’s evident purpose, particularly in welfare statutes, will be resisted.
  • Social welfare orientation:
    Where a statute implements fundamental rights (equality, dignity), courts will read ambiguous expressions in favour of effectiveness rather than restriction.
  • Usage of lexical and comparative material:
    The Court’s reliance on legal dictionaries, foreign case law and domestic precedents on the meaning of “where” may be cited in future statutory construction disputes involving similar wording.

4. Operational implications for government departments

For Central (and by analogy, State) Government departments:

  • Departments must co‑ordinate across ministries and organisations in POSH matters:
    • The complainant’s department ICC can conduct Stage‑1 inquiry.
    • The respondent’s department must co‑operate at Stage‑1 and then conduct Stage‑2 disciplinary inquiry if warranted.
  • Non‑cooperation can amount to breach of Section 19 POSH (especially clauses (d), (e), (f), and (h)) and may invite judicial scrutiny.
  • Departments may need to:
    • revise internal POSH policies,
    • train ICC members on inter‑departmental cases, and
    • set up formal communication channels between ICCs and disciplinary authorities across ministries.

5. Guidance for private employers and Local Committees

Although the case arises in a civil service context, its ratio is of general application under the POSH Act:

  • Private employers should treat this judgment as clarifying that:
    • their ICCs may inquire into complaints against visitors, contractors, clients, and employees of other entities where the harassment occurs at or in connection with their workplace; and
    • they can and should share ICC findings with the respondent’s employer for disciplinary action.
  • Local Committees (for establishments without ICCs) can similarly act as fora for complaints where the aggrieved woman’s workplace has no ICC, even if the respondent is from elsewhere. The conditional “where” logic and complainant‑centric reading equally apply.

6. Interaction with criminal proceedings

The case also underscores that POSH inquiries and criminal proceedings are distinct but complementary:

  • The ongoing criminal case (FIR No. 53/2023) proceeds independently; the Supreme Court consciously abstains from commenting on its merits (para 6).
  • Section 19(h) POSH is now clearly established as an additional obligation, not an alternative pathway that displaces POSH proceedings.

This dual track may, over time, help courts, employers and complainants to more clearly distinguish between:

  • the employment‑law dimension of sexual harassment (workplace safety, code of conduct, internal discipline); and
  • the criminal‑law dimension (offences and penalties under IPC/IT Act).

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. What is an Internal Complaints Committee (ICC)?

Under POSH, every employer above a threshold size must constitute an Internal Complaints Committee. Its key features:

  • Independent body, but located within the employer’s organisation.
  • Receives and inquires into complaints of sexual harassment at the workplace.
  • Has powers akin to a civil court for:
    • summoning persons,
    • examining them on oath, and
    • calling for documents (Section 11(3)).
  • Submits a written report with findings and recommendations to the employer (Section 13).

2. “Workplace” under POSH is much broader than just the office

“Workplace” (Section 2(o)) includes more than just the main office premises. It also covers:

  • field visits, inspection sites, partner offices;
  • guest houses, training centres, conferences, off‑site meetings; and
  • any place visited “arising out of or during the course of employment”, including travel provided by the employer (Section 2(o)(v)).

Thus, harassment on a work trip, in official transport, or at a conference hotel can still be “at the workplace.”

3. Fact‑finding inquiry vs. disciplinary inquiry

The judgment distinguishes two stages:

  1. Fact‑finding (Preliminary) Inquiry
    Conducted by the ICC under POSH to:
    • establish what happened;
    • assess whether sexual harassment is proved; and
    • recommend action to the employer (e.g., disciplinary action, compensation, etc.).
    This stage may occur in the complainant’s department, even if the respondent is from another.
  2. Disciplinary Inquiry
    Conducted under service rules (e.g., CCS (CCA) Rules) after the Disciplinary Authority issues a charge-sheet. Here:
    • the respondent is given full opportunity to respond, cross‑examine, and present evidence;
    • the ICC of the respondent’s department acts as the formal “Inquiring Authority”; and
    • the employer decides what punishment, if any, to impose.

4. “Where” as a conditional word

In ordinary language, “where” often refers to place: e.g., “Where do you work?”. But in legal drafting, “where” frequently means “if” or “in a situation where”. For example:

  • “Where a person is under 18, he shall be treated as a minor” essentially means “If a person is under 18, he shall be treated as a minor.”

The Supreme Court explains that Section 11(1) POSH uses “where” in this conditional sense. So “where the respondent is an employee” really means “if the respondent happens to be an employee, then apply his service rules”, not “in the place where the respondent is an employee, only that ICC has jurisdiction.”

5. Social welfare legislation

A “social welfare legislation” is a law enacted primarily to protect vulnerable groups or advance social justice (e.g., labour laws, disability rights, gender equality). Courts:

  • interpret such statutes in a way that promotes their protective purpose;
  • avoid interpretations that leave gaps or make remedies harder to access; and
  • still respect the statutory text and structure, but give weight to context and purpose.

The POSH Act is one such law, seeking to operationalise women’s rights under Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), and 21.

6. Employer’s duties under Section 19 POSH

Section 19 sets out extensive positive obligations on employers, including:

  • providing a safe working environment (19(a));
  • constituting and supporting the ICC (19(b)–(f));
  • treating sexual harassment as misconduct under service rules (19(i));
  • helping the complainant initiate criminal proceedings if she chooses (19(g), (h)); and
  • monitoring ICC reports and compliance (19(j)).

The judgment emphasises that these duties are mandatory and extend to inter‑departmental cooperation where the respondent’s employer must assist the ICC of the complainant’s workplace (paras 59–60, 70–71, 72(iv)).

V. Conclusion

Dr. Sohail Malik v. Union of India is a landmark clarification of the POSH regime in India. It firmly establishes that:

  • The ICC at the aggrieved woman’s workplace has jurisdiction to entertain and inquire into her complaint, even when the alleged harasser works in a different department or organisation.
  • The words “where the respondent is an employee” in Section 11(1) POSH are procedural and conditional, not jurisdictional or locational.
  • The definitions of “respondent”, “employee” and “workplace” are purposely wide and do not require that both parties share the same employer or department.
  • For government servants, POSH inquiries operate as a two‑stage process:
    1. a fact‑finding inquiry (which can be conducted by the ICC of the complainant’s department); and
    2. a disciplinary inquiry (conducted by the respondent’s own employer using its ICC as inquiring authority).
  • Employers are under a statutory obligation to co‑operate with ICC proceedings and implement their recommendations.

Doctrinally, the judgment reinforces a purposive, rights‑oriented approach to interpreting social welfare statutes like POSH, grounded in constitutional equality and dignity. Practically, it removes a major jurisdictional barrier that could otherwise frustrate complaints in inter‑departmental, inter‑organisational and “third‑party” harassment scenarios.

In the broader legal landscape, this decision will likely become a primary authority on:

  • the jurisdiction and functioning of ICCs across employers and sectors;
  • the interface between POSH procedures and disciplinary/service rules; and
  • the interpretation of key statutory language where narrow literalism would undermine social justice objectives.

By centring the complaint at the woman’s workplace while safeguarding the respondent’s rights in disciplinary proceedings, the Supreme Court has struck a carefully reasoned balance that advances both workplace safety and procedural fairness, and significantly strengthens India’s anti‑harassment legal framework.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court Of India

Judge(s)

Justice Vijay Bishnoi

Advocates

PIYUSH SHARMA

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