Inside-the-Station Confessions Are Inadmissible: Supreme Court reins in Section 106 in circumstantial cases and cautions against joint Section 27 recoveries

Case: Nagamma @ Nagarathna & Ors. v. State of Karnataka, 2025 INSC 1135 (Criminal Appeal No. 425 of 2014)

Court: Supreme Court of India (Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction)

Bench: K. Vinod Chandran, J. (author); K. V. Viswanathan, J.

Date: 22 September 2025

Status: Reportable

Introduction

This appeal arose from a conviction based purely on circumstantial evidence for the murder of a police driver. The prosecution theory was that Accused No. 1 (A1), himself a policeman, had borrowed Rs 1 lakh from the deceased and, upon persistent demands for repayment, instigated his wife (A2), her brother (A3) and brother-in-law (A4) to murder the lender. The alleged stratagem involved calling the deceased to A2’s house on the night of 10 March 2006, immobilising him with chilli powder, and hacking him with two choppers around 2 a.m. on 11 March 2006.

The Trial Court acquitted A1 (accepting a watertight alibi) but convicted A2 to A4 under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC, relying on motive, extra-judicial confessions, recovery of a weapon under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, and the alleged presence of the dead body in A2’s house, coupled with an adverse inference under Section 106 of the Evidence Act. The High Court affirmed. On appeal, the Supreme Court has set aside the convictions and acquitted A2–A4.

The judgment is significant for four reasons: (i) it reiterates that extra-judicial confessions made inside a police station are barred by Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act—even if addressed to private persons; (ii) it reaffirms that Section 106 cannot substitute the prosecution’s primary burden when the chain of circumstances is broken; (iii) it underscores the caution needed with joint or indistinct disclosure statements under Section 27; and (iv) it clarifies that an acquittal of a co-accused on a distinct charge (e.g., instigation under Section 109) does not automatically exculpate others facing a separate 302/34 charge.

Summary of the Judgment

Homicidal death established: The post-mortem (PW-23) recorded 13 ante-mortem chop and lacerated wounds consistent with a brutal frontal attack; homicidal death was undisputed.
Motive not proved: The alleged loan and quarrels were not credibly established through reliable testimony. The wife of the deceased (PW-18) and neighbour (PW-7) did not support the motive in their chief examination; PWs 11 and 12 (mother and brother of the deceased) were unreliable in the broader matrix.
Presence of the body at A2’s house not cogently proved: Multiple witnesses turned hostile or contradicted earlier statements; inquest-witnesses said the inquest was drawn at the hospital, not at A2’s house. The Court nevertheless assumed arguendo that the body was at A2’s house but held that, absent other links, that fact alone cannot convict.
Extra-judicial confessions eschewed: Confessions allegedly made by A2 to the SHO (PW-15), the Sentry (PW-17), the deceased’s wife (PW-18) and PW-7—all made inside the police station—are inadmissible under Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act.
Section 27 recovery weak: A joint/indistinct disclosure by A3 and A4, with recovery of a chopper (MO-16) attributed to A4, was riddled with evidentiary deficiencies: hostile panch witnesses, lack of precise disclosure details, and no forensic linkage to the crime.
Section 106 cannot fill gaps: The mere alleged presence of the body at the accused’s house and the absence of an explanation under Section 313 CrPC could not replace the prosecution’s duty to prove a complete chain of circumstances.
Parity plea rejected on facts: The acquittal of A1 for instigation under Section 109 did not automatically collapse the independent charge against A2–A4 under Section 302/34 IPC.
Result: Convictions and sentences of A2–A4 under Section 302/34 IPC were set aside; all accused acquitted.

Detailed Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

State of West Bengal v. Vindu Lachmandas Sakhrani alias Deru, AIR 1994 SC 772; Suraj Pal v. State of U.P., AIR 1995 SC 419: These were relied upon by the appellants to argue that acquittal of one co-accused charged with common intention/common object should inure to others. The Court distinguished both:
- In Vindu Lachmandas, both spouses were charged only with 302/34; acquittal of one undermined the very foundation of “common intention.”
- In Suraj Pal, the sole convicted accused had no independent charge apart from 149.
- Present case: A1 faced a distinct instigation charge under Section 109, whereas A2–A4 faced an independent 302/34 charge. Acquittal of A1 on alibi could not exculpate A2–A4 on parity alone.
Babu v. State of Kerala, (2010) 9 SCC 189: Cited to emphasize that absence of motive is not fatal if the chain of circumstances is otherwise complete; conversely, where the chain is weak, lack of motive weighs in favour of the accused. The Court found motive unproved and the chain fractured.
Santosh Singh v. State of NCT of Delhi, (2023) 19 SCC 321: Clarified there is no general presumption against an owner/tenant if a dead body is found on the premises; Section 106 can aid the prosecution only after a cogent chain is established. The Court applied this to reject the State’s plea that the alleged presence of the body in A2’s house and lack of explanation could, by themselves, ground a conviction.
Shivaji Chintappa Patil v. State Of Maharashtra, (2021) 5 SCC 626: Reiterated that Section 106 does not shift the primary burden from the prosecution, even where an accused is the “last seen” person under the same roof. The Court invoked this to hold that the prosecution must first make out a prima facie chain.
State of U.P. v. Deoman Upadhyaya, 1960 SCC OnLine SC 8: On Sections 25–26 Evidence Act: confessions to police are inadmissible; confessions while in police custody are inadmissible unless made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate. The Court relied on this to exclude confessions made inside the police station, including those allegedly made to private persons.
State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu @ Afsan Guru, (2005) 11 SCC 600; Kishore Bhadke v. State of Maharashtra, (2017) 3 SCC 760: Joint or simultaneous disclosures do not per se become inadmissible under Section 27, but courts must scrutinize their reliability; the “utterance in chorus” problem makes such disclosures inherently suspect unless precisely proven. The Court found the instant disclosure evidence sketchy.
Mohd. Inayatullah v. State of Maharashtra, (1976) 1 SCC 828: Clarified the scope of “fact discovered” under Section 27: limited to the object, the place, and the accused’s knowledge; inculpatory assertions like “used in the commission of the offence” must be eschewed. The Court applied this to limit the probative force of the alleged disclosure.
Manoj Kumar Soni v. State of M.P., 2023 SCC OnLine SC 984: Disclosure-based recoveries can be contributory, not standalone, proof. Without more, they rarely meet the threshold of proof beyond reasonable doubt. The Court followed this to discount the Section 27 recovery in isolation.

2. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

Homicide proved; identity of perpetrators not: The medical evidence (PW-23) unambiguously established homicide by chopping instruments. However, ocular witnesses (PW-20, PW-22) turned hostile, eliminating direct attribution to A2–A4.
Motive failed on evidence: The State’s loan-and-quarrel narrative faltered. PW-18 (wife of the deceased) did not support the loan theory in chief and admitted having told an inquiry officer that A1 and the deceased had cordial relations with no transactions. PW-7 (neighbour constable) did not support the loan in chief. PWs 11 and 12 (mother and brother) were found unreliable given contradictions about their access, relationships, and early-morning communications.
“Body at A2’s house” not firmly established; even if assumed, insufficient: Multiple witnesses (PWs 6, 7, 8, 18) contradicted their earlier statements; PWs 1 and 4 stated the inquest was prepared at the hospital, undermining the alleged crime-scene narrative. The Court nevertheless assumed, arguendo, that the body was at A2’s house based on the SHO’s station diary and verification by a constable. Even so, applying Santosh Singh and Shivaji Patil, it held that this single circumstance, without a complete chain, cannot convict; Section 106 cannot supply missing links.
Inside-the-station confessions excluded under Sections 25–26: The alleged confessions to the SHO (PW-15) and in the presence of PW-17 were barred by Section 25. The alleged confessions made by A2 inside the police station to PW-18 (the deceased’s wife) and PW-7 (neighbour) were also eschewed under Section 26, the Court treating the in-station confessional environment as vitiated for evidentiary purposes unless before a Magistrate. This is a critical doctrinal reaffirmation that extra-judicial confessions made within a police station are inadmissible—irrespective of the addressee.
Section 27 recovery too infirm to connect the accused: The IO (PW-24) claimed both A3 and A4 volunteered to point out the chopper; only A4 allegedly led recovery of MO-16 from bushes near a helipad. However: (a) the IO did not clarify whether the disclosures were simultaneous or sequential; (b) panch witnesses (PWs 2 and 3) turned hostile, alleging signatures were taken at the police station; (c) the precise terms of the disclosure and exact spot were not proved with clarity; and (d) crucially, there was no forensic linkage of the recovered weapon with the crime. Guided by Navjot Sandhu, Kishore Bhadke, Inayatullah, and Manoj Kumar Soni, the Court refused to treat this recovery as an inculpatory link against A3 or A4.
Hostile and unreliable witnesses; contradictions about time and place: Tenants-turned-eyewitnesses (PWs 20, 22) denied tenancy and disowned Section 161 CrPC statements. Key relatives’ testimonies were inconsistent on when and from whom they learned of the death (4 a.m. vs 7 a.m.) and whether they saw the body at the house or the hospital. The Trial Court and High Court were faulted for finding “credible material” in hostile testimonies where none existed.
Temporal gap unexplained; genesis uncertain: The prosecution’s own case posited the deceased arrived at A2’s house around 10 p.m.; death occurred around 2 a.m. The interregnum was unexplained, adding to the break in the chain.
Parity plea rejected: The acquittal of A1 (instigation under Section 109) did not, by itself, entitle A2–A4 (charged under Section 302/34) to acquittal. The Court distinguished the precedents and emphasized charge-specific analysis.
Outcome: The Court set aside the conviction, holding that the chain of circumstances was far from complete. Suspicion, however strong, could not substitute legal proof beyond reasonable doubt.

3. Impact and Significance

Confession jurisprudence tightened in practice: The ruling sends a clear signal that extra-judicial confessions made inside a police station are generally inadmissible, whether addressed to police personnel (Section 25) or to private persons while the maker is in the police station (Section 26), unless recorded before a Magistrate. Prosecutors must avoid building cases on such statements.
Section 106 guarded against overuse: The decision fortifies the principle that Section 106 Evidence Act (facts especially within accused’s knowledge) cannot be invoked to cure foundational gaps. Mere presence of a dead body at a premises, without more, does not flip the burden.
Section 27 recoveries scrutinised: Joint or indistinct disclosures, imprecise recovery narratives, hostile panch witnesses, and lack of forensic corroboration will severely degrade probative value. Precision in recording the exact words of disclosure, independent attestation, and scientific linkage are vital.
Circumstantial evidence discipline: The judgment reiterates that each link must be cogent and reliable; the chain must exclude every hypothesis except guilt. Where motive, last-seen, recovery, confessions, and scene-of-crime proof are brittle, courts will not sustain convictions.
Parity principle calibrated: Acquittal of a co-accused under a distinct charge (e.g., Section 109) does not automatically unravel separate charges under Sections 302/34 against others. Appellate courts must conduct a charge-specific, evidence-specific inquiry.
Operational guidance for investigators and prosecutors:
- Do not rely on “in-station” confessions; use Magistrate-recorded statements where applicable.
- Secure independent, credible recovery witnesses; record exact disclosure language; promptly pursue forensic testing to link weapons to injuries.
- Preserve the integrity of the inquest location and documentation; inconsistencies (house vs hospital) can be fatal to the chain.
- Where motive is essential to knit a circumstantial chain, corroborate it through neutral sources and documentary proof.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Extra-judicial confession: A confession made outside a court. It can sometimes be used if voluntary and reliable—but confessions made to a police officer (Section 25) or while in police custody (Section 26) are barred unless made before a Magistrate. This case clarifies that even confessions to private persons inside a police station fall foul of Section 26.
Section 106, Evidence Act: When a fact is especially within the knowledge of a person, the burden of proving that fact may fall on them. However, this does not relieve the prosecution of first establishing a prima facie case with a coherent chain of circumstances. It is an aid, not a substitute for the primary burden.
Section 27, Evidence Act (discovery): Allows proof of that part of a statement by an accused in custody which leads to the discovery of a fact (e.g., recovery of a weapon). Only the information that directly relates to the discovery (the object, the place, and the accused’s knowledge) is admissible; self-inculpatory assertions like “I used it in the crime” are not. Joint or indistinct disclosures are viewed with caution.
Hostile witness: A witness who departs from their prior statement. Their testimony is not automatically discarded; courts may rely on credible parts. But prior police statements (under Section 161 CrPC) are not substantive evidence; they can only be used to contradict or corroborate in limited ways.
Sections 302/34 IPC vs. Section 109 IPC: Section 302 punishes murder; Section 34 attributes liability where acts are done in furtherance of common intention. Section 109 addresses abetment by instigation. Acquittal on a 109 charge due to alibi does not automatically negate independent 302/34 charges against others.

Key Takeaways

Confessions made inside a police station are inadmissible whether made to a police officer (Section 25) or to private persons while in police custody or its equivalent environment (Section 26), unless made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate.
Section 106 cannot fill gaps in a broken circumstantial chain; the prosecution must first establish a coherent and complete set of circumstances.
Joint or indistinct Section 27 disclosures, unsupported by precise recording, independent attestation, and forensic linkage, carry minimal probative weight.
Courts should be skeptical of convictions resting on hostile testimonies, inconsistent inquest locations, and unproven motive theories.
Parity arguments based on co-accused acquittal must be evaluated within the framework of the specific charges and evidence against each accused.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s decision in Nagamma @ Nagarathna is a meticulous reaffirmation of core criminal law safeguards in cases built on circumstantial evidence. By excluding inside-the-station confessions under Sections 25–26, reining in overbroad use of Section 106, and insisting on rigor in Section 27 recoveries, the Court has underscored that suspicion, conjecture, and procedural shortcuts cannot sustain a conviction for murder. The ruling will influence trial and appellate courts to subject extra-judicial confessions, recovery memos, and motive evidence to exacting scrutiny, and it offers practical guidance to investigators on how to build reliable chains of proof. In the broader legal context, the judgment strengthens evidentiary discipline and due process in criminal adjudication, ensuring that only cases meeting the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt result in conviction.