Implementing Mayoral Reservation Without Framed Rules: Commentary on Bharat Cheda v. State of Arunachal Pradesh

1. Introduction

The decision of the Gauhati High Court (Itanagar Permanent Bench) in Bharat Cheda v. The State of Arunachal Pradesh & Ors., 2025 GAU-AP 1298-DB, addresses two important questions in Indian public law:

Whether the executive can operationalise a statutory reservation scheme when the “manner” of implementation has not yet been fleshed out in rules; and
To what extent Public Interest Litigation (PIL) can be used to challenge internal electoral processes of local bodies, particularly where the petitioner is neither directly affected nor fully candid with the court.

The petitioner assailed the reservation of the post of Mayor of Itanagar Municipal Corporation (IMC) for women, made by the Deputy Commissioner (DC), Itanagar Capital Region, and sought a direction that the State Election Commission conduct the mayoral election without such reservation. The challenge was mounted under Article 226 of the Constitution as a PIL.

A Division Bench comprising Justice Kalyan Rai Surana and Justice Pranjal Das dismissed the PIL at the motion stage itself, imposing costs on the petitioner for suppression of material facts. In doing so, the Court reaffirmed an important doctrinal point: where a statute confers power “subject to rules” or to be exercised in a “prescribed manner”, the non-framing of rules does not necessarily paralyse the exercise of that power, unless the statute expressly makes such rules a condition precedent.

2. Factual and Procedural Background

2.1 The statutory setting

The dispute arises under the Arunachal Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 2019 (“2019 Act”). Two provisions are central:

Section 15 – Reservation of seats of Councillors

(1) All Seats shall be reserved for persons belonging to Arunachal Pradesh Scheduled Tribes in the Corporation;

(2) One-third out of the total number of seats, reserved under sub-section (1), shall be reserved for women belonging to the Arunachal Pradesh Scheduled Tribes.

Section 53 – Election of Mayor, Deputy Mayor and their term of office

(1) The Corporation shall at its first meeting and thereafter at the expiration of every two and half years, elect one of its Councillors to be the Chairperson to be known as the Mayor and another Councillor to be the Deputy Mayor of the Corporation:

Provided that the office of the Mayor shall be reserved for the Arunachal Pradesh Scheduled Tribes Women; by rotation or by lots in the manner prescribed.

In constitutional terms, these provisions implement Article 243‑T(4) of the Constitution, which provides that the offices of Chairpersons in Municipalities shall be reserved for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and women, “in such manner as the Legislature of a State may, by law, provide.”

2.2 Administrative steps leading to the dispute

The Directorate of Urban Local Bodies intimated that the State Election Commission was contemplating holding general elections to the IMC in November/December 2025.
By letter dated 22.10.2025, the Deputy Commissioner-cum-District Municipal Election Officer, Capital Itanagar, convened a meeting to determine:
- Reservation of municipal ward seats for women (APST) under Section 15(2); and
- Reservation of the Mayor’s office for women (APST) under Section 53(1) proviso.
The letter explicitly recorded that:
- A draw of lots would be conducted at Pare Hall, DK State Convention Centre, Itanagar, at 11:00 hrs on 28.10.2025.
- Part A (Ward seats) was under Section 15(2);
  Part B (post of Mayor) stated: “Reserved for Women (APST) under Section 53(1) of APMC Act 2019 r/w Section 7(ii) of APMC (Amendment) Act 2021”.
Draw of lots was held on 28.10.2025, and the result was notified by the DC (through the AC–Election).
A subsequent communication, dated 22.12.2025 [28.12.2025], from the DC reserved the post of Mayor of IMC for women, and this was the specific letter impugned in the PIL.
Earlier, on 05.03.2020, a Board Proceeding Report (Memo No. DC/ICC/MUN ELN-07/2020) had already determined, by draw of lots under Section 53(1), the tenure of the office of Mayor for male and female candidates in IMC. This prior use of the same method was not disclosed by the petitioner.

2.3 The PIL

The petitioner, Bharat Cheda, a private individual and not an elected Councillor, filed the present PIL challenging:

The DC’s letter reserving the post of Mayor for women; and
The manner in which the meeting for reservation and mayoral election was convened.

On 01.11.2023, the High Court issued a short returnable notice. The State produced documents, including the DC’s communications and the earlier Board Proceedings. After hearing, the Court reserved judgment on 13.11.2025 and pronounced it on 20.11.2025.

3. Issues before the Court

The Bench crystallised the controversy into three “points of determination”:

Public interest question: Whether the petitioner had raised any issue of public interest at all, justifying a PIL?
Validity of the meeting: Whether the meeting to elect a Mayor for IMC was duly convened?
Legality of reservation process: Whether the manner in which the post of Mayor was reserved for women warranted judicial examination or interference?

4. Summary of the Judgment

The High Court’s key conclusions may be summarised as follows:

No genuine public interest: The petitioner was not a councillor and produced no material to show that any elected Councillor had objected to the reservation or election process. The grievance was personal or political rather than in public interest. Point (i) was answered in the negative.
Meeting duly convened; correct statutory reference: The DC’s letter of 22.10.2025 correctly:
- Invoked Section 15(2) to reserve one-third ward seats for APST women; and
- Invoked Section 53(1) proviso (read with the 2021 Amendment) to reserve the Mayor’s post for APST women through draw of lots.
The contention that the meeting had been wrongly held “under Section 15(1)” and not Section 53(1) was held to be wholly misconceived. Point (ii) was answered in the affirmative, against the petitioner.
Reservation by draw of lots valid even without framed rules: Relying on Surinder Singh v. Central Government and Sonvir Alias Somvir v. State (Nct Of Delhi), the Court held that:
- The proviso to Section 53(1) itself prescribes reservation for APST women by rotation or lots; and
- The absence of formal rules prescribing the “manner” of drawing lots does not prevent the executive from implementing this statutory mandate.
Thus, the reservation of the Mayor’s post for women was intra vires and constitutionally consistent with Article 243‑T(4). Point (iii) was answered in the negative, i.e., no interference was warranted.
Suppression of material facts; abuse of PIL jurisdiction: The petitioner failed to disclose that:
- In 2020, the Mayor’s post had already been subjected to a draw of lots under Section 53(1) through a Board Proceeding Report; and
- The same method had been accepted and implemented without challenge.
This amounted to suppression of material facts and lack of candour. The PIL was therefore dismissed at the motion stage with costs of Rs. 10,000/- payable to IMC, to be used for disaster management purposes.

5. Detailed Analysis

5.1 Statutory Framework and Constitutional Context

The core of the dispute lies in interpreting the proviso to Section 53(1) of the 2019 Act:

“Provided that the office of the Mayor shall be reserved for the Arunachal Pradesh Scheduled Tribes Women; by rotation or by lots in the manner prescribed.”

The petitioner’s argument hinged on the phrase “in the manner prescribed” — contending that:

Only the State Legislature, by law, could prescribe the manner of reservation (by rotation or lots);
Such “manner” must be detailed in rules or some formal legislative instrument; and
In the absence of such rules, the DC could not resort to a draw of lots on his own initiative.

The Court approached this in light of:

The enabling constitutional provision, Article 243‑T(4); and
Established Supreme Court jurisprudence on the effect of phrases like “subject to rules” or “in the prescribed manner”.

5.2 Maintainability of the PIL and the Public Interest Requirement

On the first point of determination, the Court underscored a basic but increasingly important principle: PIL jurisdiction cannot be invoked to ventilate individual, political or factional grievances in the guise of public interest.

Key factual features weighed against the petitioner:

He was not an elected Councillor of IMC.
He produced no evidence that any Councillor had challenged:
- the reservation of the Mayor’s post for women; or
- the manner of draw of lots.
Councillors had their own statutory fora and remedies to raise electoral or procedural challenges, which had not been used.

On this basis, the Court held that the petitioner was not raising any public interest issue. The PIL was essentially an outsider’s challenge to an internal electoral arrangement of the municipal body, without institutional or representational backing from those directly affected.

This reflects a broader trend in PIL jurisprudence: higher courts increasingly insist that:

PILs should not be used to circumvent appropriate party status or local remedial structures; and
PIL petitioners must demonstrate some nexus with the public interest claimed, or at least a clear, systemic constitutional issue.

5.3 Validity of the Meeting and Correctness of Statutory Reference

The petitioner contended that the notice to convene the meeting for reservation and election of the Mayor had been issued “under Section 15(1)” (pertaining to councillor seats) and not under Section 53(1), rendering the process illegal.

The Court carefully examined the DC’s letter dated 22.10.2025 and found this reading to be incorrect:

The letter clearly bifurcated the subject matter:
- Part A – Ward seats reserved for women (APST) under Section 15(2);
- Part B – Post of Mayor reserved for women (APST) under Section 53(1) read with Section 7(ii) of the 2021 Amendment.
The “remarks” column in Part B explicitly recorded that the post of Mayor was being reserved for women (APST) under Section 53(1).

On this basis, the Court held that the argument—that the meeting was wrongly convened under Section 15(1) instead of Section 53(1)—was wholly misconceived. Consequently, the meeting to elect the Mayor was held to have been duly convened, and the second point of determination was answered against the petitioner.

5.4 Absence of Rules and the Power to Implement Reservation

The central doctrinal contribution of this judgment lies in its treatment of the argument that, in the absence of specific rules, the executive had no power to reserve the Mayor’s post by drawing lots.

The High Court drew heavily on two Supreme Court precedents relied upon by the State:

Surinder Singh v. Central Government, (1986) 4 SCC 667; and
Sonvir Alias Somvir v. State (Nct Of Delhi), (2018) 8 SCC 24.

5.4.1 The Surinder Singh principle

In Surinder Singh, the Supreme Court examined whether the Central Government could dispose of properties from a “compensation pool” under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954, in the absence of detailed rules.

The Punjab & Haryana High Court had held that since disposal of such property was “subject to the rules” (Sections 8 and 40), the absence of rules stripped the Government of jurisdiction to dispose of the property by auction. The Supreme Court reversed this view, holding that:

When a statute grants power “subject to rules”, the existence of rules is not a condition precedent for exercising that power, unless the statute explicitly says so.
The expression “subject to rules” should be understood as “in accordance with the rules, if any”. If rules are framed, they bind; if not, the power still exists and can be exercised on the basis of the statute itself.
Had the legislature intended that no action could be taken without rules, it could have used words such as “except in accordance with the rules framed…”.

The Gauhati High Court quoted paragraphs 6–7 of Surinder Singh to reaffirm that legislative intent is the touchstone: absent clear language making rules a precondition, statutory power does not lie dormant until rules are framed.

5.4.2 The Sonvir alias Somvir decision

In Sonvir, the Supreme Court interpreted Sections 4 and 8 of the Identification of Prisoners Act, 1920. Section 4 authorised police officers to take measurements (including fingerprints) of arrested persons “in the prescribed manner”, while Section 8 empowered the State Government to make rules.

A Full Bench of the Delhi High Court had held that, in the absence of rules under Section 8, the police could not take fingerprints under Section 4. The Supreme Court rejected this, holding that:

The rule-making power under Section 8 is enabling; it uses the word “may”.
To hold that no measurements can be taken until rules are framed would be inconsistent with the object of the Act (paras 68–69).
The phrase “in the prescribed manner” relates to procedural details, not to the existence of the power itself (para 68).

The Gauhati High Court quoted paras 65–69 of Sonvir to emphasise that a similar interpretive approach applies to Section 53(1) proviso of the 2019 Act.

5.4.3 Application to the proviso to Section 53(1)

Applying these principles, the Court reasoned as follows:

The proviso to Section 53(1) itself provides that the office of Mayor shall be reserved for APST women, “by rotation or by lots in the manner prescribed”.
The absence of separately framed rules prescribing the exact procedure (e.g., format of lots, notice formalities for the draw, etc.) does not nullify the statutory power to implement reservation by drawing lots.
The DC’s act of conducting a draw of lots, in a transparent meeting convened for that purpose, was within the four corners of the statute.
Furthermore, the same method had been used earlier in 2020 to determine mayoral tenure by gender under Section 53(1), without challenge.

The Court therefore held that reserving the Mayor’s post for APST women by draw of lots could not be treated as ultra vires merely because rules had not been framed. In line with Surinder Singh and Sonvir, the legislation remains fully operational in the absence of subordinate legislation.

5.5 Distinguishing the Nazir Ahmad / Babu Verghese / Ambay Cements line

The petitioner relied on:

Sri Khereshwar Mahadev Va Dauji Maharaj Samiti, Aligarh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (SLP (Crl.) Nos. 13258–13259/2024, decided 05.03.2025), which allegedly followed the principle in Nazir Ahmad;
Babu Verghese v. Bar Council of Kerala, (1999) 3 SCC 422; and
State Of Jharkhand v. Ambay Cements, (2005) 1 SCC 368.

All three decisions broadly reflect the celebrated Nazir Ahmad rule:

When the law requires a thing to be done in a particular manner, it shall be done in that manner alone, or not at all.

However, the Gauhati High Court, after relying on Surinder Singh and Sonvir, concluded that these cases did not assist the petitioner, because:

In the present matter, the core question was whether the power existed at all before rules were framed, not whether the authority had deviated from a specified statutory procedure.
The statute did not prescribe a detailed, mandatory step-by-step procedure for drawing lots; it merely authorised reservation “by rotation or by lots in the manner prescribed.”
Unlike in Babu Verghese or Ambay Cements, there was no allegation that:
- a statutorily mandated stage was skipped; or
- a mandatory condition (like prior approval, publication, or consultation) was ignored.
Rather, the challenge rested on the absence of subordinate rules, which – as per Surinder Singh and Sonvir – does not by itself invalidate the exercise of statutory power.

In essence, the Court implicitly draws a line between:

Cases where the statute itself prescribes a detailed mode of exercise (where Nazir Ahmad applies strictly); and
Cases where the statute confers a general power, accompanied by an enabling power to frame rules, without making rules a precondition (where Surinder Singh and Sonvir apply).

5.6 Suppression of Material Facts and Imposition of Costs

A particularly significant aspect of the judgment is the Court’s finding that the petitioner had suppressed material facts. Specifically:

He failed to disclose the Board Proceeding Report dated 05.03.2020 (Memo No. DC/ICC/MUN ELN-07/2020) which had earlier used the same draw-of-lots method under Section 53(1) to decide mayoral tenure by gender.
That process had already been implemented and accepted, and was directly relevant to assessing the legitimacy of the current method.

The Court characterised this non-disclosure as concealment of material fact with intent to mislead. As a result:

The PIL was dismissed at the motion stage, i.e., without issuing notice to respondents or proceeding to a full hearing; and
The petitioner was directed to pay Rs. 10,000/- as costs to the Itanagar Municipal Corporation within one month, recoverable in accordance with law in default, to be utilised for disaster management purposes.

This reflects the well‑established principle that:

PIL petitioners must come to court with clean hands, full disclosure, and utmost candour. Suppression or selective presentation of facts can itself be a ground for dismissal with costs.

6. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

6.1 “Subject to rules” / “in the manner prescribed”

These phrases often appear in statutes. They mean, generally:

The legislature sets out the core power in the Act;
It authorises the Government to make detailed procedural rules later; and
If rules are made, the power must be exercised consistently with them.

However, as clarified in Surinder Singh and Sonvir, the power itself does not disappear merely because rules are not yet made, unless the statute expressly says that nothing can be done “except in accordance with the rules.”

6.2 Draw of lots

“Draw of lots” is a simple random selection method (like drawing names out of a box). In the context of elections and reservations, it is commonly used to:

Randomly select which wards or offices will be reserved in a particular cycle; and
Ensure fairness and impartiality in allocation, especially where reservation is rotational.

6.3 Proviso

A “proviso” is a clause placed at the end of a statutory provision, typically introduced by the word “Provided that…”. It usually:

Creates an exception to the main rule; or
Qualifies or conditions the main provision.

In Section 53(1), the proviso carves out a special rule: even though the Mayor is elected by the Councillors, the office itself must be reserved for APST women in a particular manner.

6.4 Public Interest Litigation (PIL)

PIL allows concerned individuals or groups to approach the High Courts or the Supreme Court to enforce rights of people who may not be able to approach the court themselves. However:

It is not a tool for fighting purely political battles or personal grievances.
The petitioner must demonstrate:
- a genuine public cause, and
- full and frank disclosure of all relevant facts.

6.5 Suppression of material facts / “clean hands” doctrine

Courts expect petitioners — especially in PIL — to disclose all relevant facts, including those that might go against them. If a petitioner:

Deliberately omits crucial information; or
Selectively presents facts to create a misleading picture,

the court may dismiss the case solely on that ground and impose costs, as done in this judgment.

7. Likely Impact and Significance

7.1 For municipal law and women’s representation

The judgment strengthens the enforceability of reservations in municipal leadership positions by:

Confirming that the State’s failure (or delay) to frame procedural rules cannot be used as a weapon to stall or invalidate statutory reservations.
Ensuring that constitutional and statutory mandates — such as reservation of Mayor’s office for women (APST) — remain practically effective.

In effect, any future argument that “no rules exist, therefore no reservation can be implemented” in similar contexts is considerably weakened.

7.2 For administrative law and rule‑making

More broadly, the judgment reinforces a key administrative law doctrine:

Subordinate legislation (rules, regulations) is meant to facilitate, not obstruct, the working of a statute. In the absence of such rules, the core statutory power generally remains exercisable, unless the statute explicitly provides otherwise.

This principle has implications across sectors — land allotment, welfare schemes, licensing, and more — wherever laws contain language like “subject to rules” or “in the prescribed manner”.

7.3 For PIL jurisprudence

On the PIL front, the decision:

Signals a stricter approach to locus standi in challenges to local electoral arrangements, especially when those directly affected (elected representatives) have not complained.
Reinforces that courts will not entertain PILs that:
- lack a clear public dimension; or
- are tainted by suppression of material facts.
Shows willingness to impose monetary costs for misuse of PIL jurisdiction, to deter frivolous or politically motivated litigation.

7.4 For future electoral disputes in local bodies

For future cases involving municipal or panchayat elections:

Challenges to reservations or rotation of offices will have to confront this precedent, which affirms that:
- draw of lots is a legitimate administrative tool; and
- absence of rules is not, by itself, a ground to invalidate such processes.
Litigants will need to show either:
- a clear violation of the parent statute; or
- arbitrariness or discrimination in the way lots were drawn or reservations allocated.

8. Conclusion

The decision in Bharat Cheda v. State of Arunachal Pradesh is noteworthy for at least three reasons:

It clarifies and applies a crucial administrative law principle: where a statute provides for action “subject to rules” or “in the prescribed manner,” the absence of rules does not automatically disable the authority from acting, unless the statute expressly says so. By aligning with Surinder Singh and Sonvir, the Court ensures that legislative programs — here, the reservation of the Mayor’s post for APST women — are not rendered ineffective by executive inaction in rule‑making.
It upholds the validity of reservation and draw‑of‑lots mechanisms in the context of municipal governance, reinforcing the constitutional mandate under Article 243‑T(4) and contributing to the stability and continuity of women’s political representation at the urban local body level.
It sends a strong message on the proper use of PIL and the duty of candour. A petitioner who is neither directly affected nor supported by those who are, and who withholds relevant facts, cannot expect indulgence under the liberal PIL doctrine. The dismissal at the threshold with costs underscores that PIL is a serious tool for genuine public causes, not a tactical instrument in political or personal disputes.

In sum, the judgment is a significant reaffirmation that constitutional and statutory objectives — such as decentralised governance and affirmative action — cannot be thwarted by technical pleas grounded in the absence of subordinate legislation, and that PIL remains a jurisdiction of equity, demanding clean hands and full disclosure from those who invoke it.