Hostile-Witness Declaration Must Be Exceptional; Mere Knowledge of Victim’s Caste Suffices Under Section 3(2)(v) SC/ST Act

A detailed commentary on Shivkumar @ Baleshwar Yadav v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 INSC 1231 (Supreme Court of India, 14 October 2025)

Introduction

This reportable decision of the Supreme Court of India, delivered by K.V. Viswanathan, J. (for the Bench also comprising B.V. Nagarathna, J.), affirms the conviction and sentence of the appellant for offences under the Indian Penal Code (IPC), the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO), and Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (SC/ST Act).

The case arose from the abduction and sexual assault of a minor girl from a Scheduled Caste community in May 2018 in Surajpur District, Chhattisgarh. The Trial Court convicted the appellant under Sections 363, 366, 376, 506 IPC, Section 4 POCSO, and Section 3(2)(v) SC/ST Act, awarding concurrent sentences, including life imprisonment under the SC/ST Act. The High Court affirmed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appellant’s challenge, upholding the concurrent findings.

Two aspects of the judgment are particularly significant:

• An emphatic restatement that declaring one’s own witness “hostile” under Section 154 of the Evidence Act (now Section 157 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023) is an extraordinary measure, not to be used casually; small omissions or trivial inconsistencies do not justify such a course.
• A clear application of the post-2016 amendment to Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act—holding that the prosecution need only establish the accused’s knowledge that the victim belonged to a Scheduled Caste; proof that the crime was motivated by caste is not required. The Court further invoked Section 8(c) (presumption as to knowledge from personal acquaintance) to sustain the conviction.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court upheld:

• The credibility of the victim’s testimony (PW-2), corroborated by her Section 164 CrPC statement and medical and forensic evidence.
• The proof of minority based on the school admission register (Section 35 Evidence Act), buttressed by the testimony of the school teacher (PW-9) and the father (PW-1).
• The chain of custody and forensic findings confirming the presence of semen and human sperm on the victim’s slides and underwear and on the accused’s underwear.
• The applicability of Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act based on the accused’s knowledge of the victim’s caste, supported by the statutory presumption under Section 8(c) arising from personal acquaintance.

On procedure, the Court expressed strong disapproval of the prosecutorial practice of indiscriminately seeking to declare witnesses hostile and the corresponding casual grant of such permission by trial courts. Reiterating established principles, the Court emphasized that the discretion under Section 154 Evidence Act must be exercised sparingly, only when warranted by clear hostility, material resiling, or evident untruthfulness.

Finding no reason to interfere with the factual findings and legal conclusions of the courts below, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the convictions and sentences (to run concurrently).

Analysis

Factual Matrix and Evidence Appreciation

• Victim’s testimony (PW-2): The victim narrated that while carrying food to her grandfather, the appellant grabbed and threatened her, took her to a forested area, and forcibly had sexual intercourse. Her account included subsequent movements (being left at a relative’s home and later intercepted by police). She affirmed she belonged to a Scheduled Caste and that the accused knew her caste. Her statement under Section 164 CrPC (25.05.2018) aligned with her deposition on material particulars.
• PW-1 (father) and PW-4 (grandfather): The father lodged the FIR and initially suspected the appellant due to his proximity and frequent visits. The grandfather corroborated the victim’s movement that evening. The prosecutor treated the father “hostile” without adequate basis, drawing the Court’s censure.
• Age proof (PW-9, teacher; admission register): The school admission register recorded the victim’s date of birth as 15.09.2004; admission on 01.07.2011 in Class I; school leaving on 02.04.2016. The Court, relying on Section 35 Evidence Act and consistent oral testimony, accepted the victim’s minority at the time of offence in May 2018.
• Medical and forensic evidence (PW-10, doctor; PW-14 to PW-18 on seizure/forwardal): The doctor observed a hymenal cut at the 6 o’clock position with fresh bleeding and opined forcible intercourse. Slides and garments were seized; the FSL report indicated the presence of semen and human sperm on all three exhibits (victim’s slides and underwear; accused’s underwear). The chain of custody was found intact.
• SC/ST status and knowledge: The caste certificate (Ex.P-7) established the victim’s Scheduled Caste status. Evidence showed the accused was a neighbor, frequently visited the victim’s family, and worked in their village—supporting knowledge of caste. The Court invoked Section 8(c) presumption to that effect, which the defense failed to rebut.

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The Court anchored its key legal determinations in established precedent:

• Sri Rabindra Kumar Dey v. State of Orissa (1976) 4 SCC 233: The leading authority on Section 154 Evidence Act. It holds that permitting cross-examination of one’s own witness is a matter of judicial discretion, to be used sparingly and only when the witness shows hostility, resiles materially from prior statements, or is otherwise not speaking the truth. The present judgment quotes extensively and uses it to criticize the routine declaration of witnesses as hostile.
• Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakkar v. State Of Gujarat, AIR 1964 SC 1563: Clarifies that Section 154 is not confined to any one stage of testimony and underlines the need for flexibility where a witness subtly contradicts earlier statements. The Court uses this to explain the scope of discretion but stresses that even this wide discretion must be exercised judiciously.
• Gura Singh v. State of Rajasthan (2001) 2 SCC 205: Deprecates wrongly branding a witness “hostile” based on trivial post-event discrepancies. The present Court relies on it to emphasize that minor variances are insufficient to justify hostility.
• Bhagwan Singh v. State of Haryana (1976) 1 SCC 389: Establishes that even a “hostile” witness’s testimony is not effaced and can be relied upon if otherwise trustworthy and corroborated. The present judgment invokes this principle to underline the continued evidentiary value of such testimony.
• State of Chhattisgarh v. Lekhram (2006) 5 SCC 736: Affirms that school registers are admissible under Section 35 Evidence Act for proving age, having evidentiary value when recorded in the course of public duty and corroborated by oral testimony. The Court relies on this to accept the victim’s minority.
• Patan Jamal Vali v. State of A.P. (2021) 16 SCC 225: Clarifies that, post the 2016 amendment to Section 3(2)(v) SC/ST Act, the prosecution need not prove that the offence was committed “on the ground of” the victim’s caste; knowledge that the victim is a member of a Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe suffices. The present case applies this holding, using Section 8(c) to presume such knowledge from personal acquaintance.

Legal Reasoning

• Hostile-witness discipline under Section 154 Evidence Act (now Section 157 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023): The Court reiterates that declaring a witness hostile is extraordinary and permissible only in “special cases.” Small omissions or insignificant inconsistencies cannot justify this step. Trial courts must “scan and weigh the circumstances properly,” and avoid casual or routine permissions. This is an important procedural corrective addressed to both prosecutors and trial courts, aligning with Rabindra Kumar Dey and Gura Singh.
• Proof of minority: By accepting the school admission register as a public document with evidentiary value (Section 35 Evidence Act) and finding corroboration in oral evidence, the Court determined that the victim was a child at the time of the offence. This resonates with Lekhram and cements a pragmatic approach to age proof.
• Credibility of the prosecutrix: The Court found the victim’s testimony cogent, unshaken in cross-examination, and consistent with her Section 164 CrPC statement and medical/forensic evidence. The Court did not require independent corroboration as a matter of law but found sufficient corroboration in any event.
• Medical and forensic corroboration: Fresh hymenal injury with bleeding, coupled with positive FSL findings and a sound chain of custody, fortified the prosecution narrative of forcible sexual intercourse. The Court considered this corroboration substantial.
• Applicability of Section 3(2)(v) SC/ST Act post-2016: The Court applies Patan Jamal Vali to hold that the reduced threshold—mere knowledge of the victim’s caste—governs. Section 8(c) of the Act supplies a presumption of knowledge where the accused had personal acquaintance with the victim or her family. The Court found this presumption unrebutted (accused’s frequent visits as neighbor/laborer, familial familiarity), supporting the life sentence under Section 3(2)(v).
• Concurrent sentencing: The Trial Court imposed multiple sentences, including life imprisonment under the SC/ST Act, to run concurrently. The Supreme Court found no basis to interfere.

Impact and Prospective Significance

• Trial practice on hostile witnesses: The Court’s stern reminder will likely recalibrate prosecutorial and judicial approaches. Applications under Section 154 Evidence Act must now be justified with concrete, material divergence or demonstrable hostility; trial courts should record reasons. This can reduce witness harassment, preserve the integrity of testimony, and prevent avoidable appellate infirmities.
• SC/ST Act prosecutions: The judgment reinforces a prosecution-friendly interpretation of Section 3(2)(v) post-2016—knowledge of the victim’s caste is sufficient. Coupled with Section 8(c)’s presumption of knowledge from personal acquaintance, this decision will help sustain convictions where the accused is a neighbor, co-worker, or otherwise familiar with the victim’s family, unless the defense presents compelling rebuttal evidence.
• Age determination: Endorsing school records under Section 35 Evidence Act, when corroborated, streamlines proof of minority in POCSO cases, reducing unnecessary medical ossification tests or contested age inquiries—provided foundational authenticity is established.
• Forensic chain-of-custody: The Court’s acceptance of the chain-of-custody and FSL conclusions emphasizes that meticulous seizure, sealing, documentation, and forwarding protocols remain decisive in sexual offence trials.
• Harmonization with new evidence law: By expressly mapping Section 154 Evidence Act to Section 157 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, the Court signals continuity of principles under the new codification, guiding trial courts operating under the BSA framework.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Hostile witness (Section 154 Evidence Act / Section 157 BSA, 2023): A party ordinarily cannot cross-examine its own witness. In exceptional cases—when the witness turns truly adverse, resiles from material prior statements, or appears to be untruthful—the court may, in its discretion, permit cross-examination. Minor inconsistencies do not suffice. Even “hostile” testimony is not discarded; it can be relied upon if credible and corroborated.
• School register as proof of age (Section 35 Evidence Act): Entries in public records made in discharge of official duty (like school admission registers) are relevant to prove a person’s date of birth. While not conclusive by themselves, when corroborated by oral testimony, courts often accept them as reliable proof of age.
• Section 3(2)(v) SC/ST Act (post-2016): Before 2016, courts often required proof that the offence was committed “on the ground of” the victim’s caste. After the 2016 amendment, it suffices that the accused committed an IPC offence punishable with 10 years or more “knowing” the victim is SC/ST. Motive based on caste is not essential.
• Section 8(c) SC/ST Act—Presumption: If the accused had personal knowledge of the victim or their family, the court presumes the accused knew the victim’s caste, unless the defense proves otherwise. This shifts the evidentiary burden to the accused once acquaintance is shown.
• POCSO Section 4 and IPC Section 376: The same act of penetrative sexual assault on a child can constitute offences under both. As a general principle, courts may record convictions under both provisions, but sentencing is guided by statutory instructions (e.g., Section 42 POCSO provides that where an act is an offence under IPC and POCSO, the higher punishment applies). In this case, concurrent sentences were imposed, including life imprisonment under the SC/ST Act.
• Section 164 CrPC statement: A voluntary statement recorded by a Magistrate soon after the incident often serves as an important corroborative piece, bolstering the victim’s testimony at trial.
• Concurrent sentences: When sentences are to run concurrently, the convict serves them at the same time rather than one after another. Where one sentence is life imprisonment, it generally subsumes concurrent lesser terms.
• Chain of custody: The documented, unbroken trail showing who collected, sealed, stored, transported, and analyzed each piece of evidence. A sound chain ensures that forensic results are attributable to the correct exhibits and are reliable in court.

Conclusion

This judgment is noteworthy for two reasons. First, it delivers a clear and practical message to prosecutors and trial courts: declaring a witness “hostile” is an extraordinary measure to be used judiciously and only for substantive, material deviations—not as a routine tactic. The Court’s reliance on a line of authorities (Rabindra Kumar Dey, Dahyabhai, Gura Singh, Bhagwan Singh) renews and strengthens procedural discipline in criminal trials.

Second, on the merits, the Court consolidates post-2016 SC/ST Act jurisprudence by upholding a conviction under Section 3(2)(v) on the basis of the accused’s knowledge of the victim’s caste, supported by the presumption in Section 8(c) due to personal acquaintance. This lowers the threshold from proving caste-based motive to proving knowledge, aligning with Patan Jamal Vali and making the provision more effective against offences perpetrated on SC/ST victims.

Together with its acceptance of school records to prove minority (per Lekhram) and its endorsement of careful forensic practice, the judgment reinforces a robust, victim-centric, but procedurally fair approach to sexual offence trials involving children from marginalized communities. It will likely influence day-to-day trial management, evidentiary strategy, and appellate scrutiny across the criminal justice system.