Heirs’ Right to Continue Eviction Proceedings: Supreme Court Affirms Automatic Substitution under Section 21(7) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972

Introduction

The Supreme Court’s decision in Murlidhar Aggarwal (D) through L.R. Atul Kumar Aggarwal v. Mahendra Pratap Kakan (Dead) through L.Rs. & Ors. (2025 INSC 564) settles a decades-long battle over a cinema hall in Allahabad, but more importantly crystallises two critical propositions of law:

• A landlord’s death during the pendency of an eviction petition under Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Urban Buildings Act does not extinguish the petition; the legal representatives (LRs) may step in and prosecute it on the strength of their own requirement by virtue of Section 21(7).
• Appellate authorities must provide cogent reasons before upsetting findings of bona fide need and comparative hardship recorded by the Prescribed Authority; perfunctory reversal is impermissible.

The ruling will resonate in every tenancy dispute governed by the 1972 Act, especially where generational change occurs mid-litigation.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court (K.V. Viswanathan and M.M. Sundresh, JJ.):

1. Allowed the landlord’s appeal, set aside the Allahabad High Court’s order, and restored the Prescribed Authority’s decree for eviction and compensation.
2. Granted the tenant’s heirs time until 31 December 2025 to vacate, subject to an undertaking and payment of arrears.
3. Held that:
   • The Prescribed Authority’s elaborate findings on bona fide need and comparative hardship were well-founded.
   • The Appellate Authority and High Court erred in overturning those findings without adequate reasoning.
   • Section 21(7) expressly enables legal representatives to prosecute the petition on the basis of their own need; no fresh application is necessary.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Murlidhar Aggarwal v. State of U.P., (1974) 2 SCC 472
  Earlier round concerning the same property under the 1947 Act. Although it ended in tenants’ favour, the Court noted the landlord’s genuine need. The Prescribed Authority relied on this historical finding as corroborative background.
• Joginder Pal v. Naval Kishore Behal, (2002) 5 SCC 397 & Dwarka Prasad v. Niranjan, (2003) 4 SCC 549
  Cited for the proposition that “bona fide requirement” must be construed liberally to include the needs of family members.
• Mohd. Ayub v. Mukesh Chand, (2012) 2 SCC 155
  Emphasised that a tenant’s failure to show attempts to secure alternative accommodation tips comparative hardship against him. The Court applied this to note 63 years of post-lease occupation without evidence of search for another venue.
• Sushila v. Iind Adj, Banda, (2003) 2 SCC 28
  Interpreted Rule 16(2) factors; Supreme Court drew parallels to hold that long tenancy can be outweighed by other considerations, such as the landlord’s lack of any alternative premises.
• Sheshambal v. Chelur Corporation, (2010) 3 SCC 470
  Distinguished. That case terminated on landlady’s death because her heirs had no need; here, Section 21(7) combined with positive evidence of the son’s disability made the heirs’ need palpable.
• Other supportive cases: Ganga Devi v. District Judge, Nainital, (2008) 7 SCC 770; Bhagwan Dass v. Jiley Kaur, 1991 Supp (2) SCC 300 – both on comparative hardship and tenant’s duty to search for alternatives.

Legal Reasoning of the Court

1. Bona fide Need Re-affirmed
   • The Prescribed Authority found the landlord’s wealth “in the negative”, salary meagre and speculative income irregular.
   • Appellate reversal lacked particulars; simply branded the need “not bona fide” without dissecting evidence.
   • Supreme Court held this violates settled appellate norms—findings of fact cannot be upset sans “convincing reasons”.
2. Applicability of Section 21(7)
   • Text of Section 21(7) allows LRs to “prosecute such application further on the basis of their own need”.
   • The landlord’s son (Atul Kumar) placed an affidavit of disability and unemployment; uncontroverted by tenant.
   • Thus, the petition survived and did not require re-filing.
3. Comparative Hardship
   • Tenant’s family owns/operates multiple cinema houses, film distribution business, agricultural lands.
   • No material that they explored alternative premises.
   • Landlord family has no commercial property other than the suit cinema; son is physically handicapped.
   • Balancing these factors, hardship rested with the landlord.
4. Rule 16(2) Factors
   • Long tenancy (since 1952) is a factor against eviction (Rule 16(2)(a)).
   • But tenant has other venues and resources (Rule 16(2)(b)).
   • Landlord has no substantial existing business (Rule 16(2)(c)).
   • Net result: justification for release remains strong.

Likely Impact on Future Litigation and the Law

• Confirms that heirs can seamlessly step into eviction proceedings without instituting a fresh petition, provided they demonstrate need—streamlining litigation where landlords die mid-course.
• Re-asserts that appellate bodies must respect factual findings of authorities of first instance unless perverse—will curb arbitrary reversals.
• Tenant’s long possession alone is insufficient if they unquestioningly retain lucrative premises while landlord lacks any suitable alternative—may embolden landlords in similar stalemates.
• Guidance on reading Rule 16(2) in conjunction with comparative hardship proviso will influence how Prescribed Authorities draft orders, ensuring detailed engagement with each statutory factor.
• Commercial-use premises (cinema halls, showrooms) are squarely covered by the liberal interpretation of “bona fide requirement”, providing clarity in non-residential contexts.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Bona fide need: A genuine, honest requirement of the landlord (or family) to use the premises—not a pretext to raise rent or harass the tenant.
• Comparative hardship: Statutory exercise where the authority balances the inconvenience to landlord if release is refused against hardship to tenant if eviction is ordered.
• Prescribed Authority vs. Appellate Authority: The Prescribed Authority is the “trial court” under the Act. Its factual findings receive deference unless shown to be perverse.
• Section 21(7): A unique “survival” clause: if landlord dies during the petition, heirs can continue the case citing their own requirement—no need to start from scratch.
• Rule 16(2) factors: A checklist guiding authorities in business-premises cases; length of tenancy, alternative accommodation, extent of landlord’s existing business, etc.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s verdict is a textbook application of statutory interpretation, procedural propriety and equitable balancing. By foregrounding Section 21(7), the Court ensured that justice is not derailed by unavoidable human events like death. Simultaneously, it reprimanded perfunctory appellate intervention, thereby preserving the sanctity of first-instance fact-finding. For practitioners, the case is now a leading authority on:

1. The scope of heirs’ rights in pending eviction proceedings under the U.P. Act of 1972.
2. The correct approach to comparative hardship where the tenant is commercially affluent yet keeps premises for decades beyond lease.
3. The necessity for reasoned appellate orders anchored in the evidentiary record.

Ultimately, the decision strikes a balance between protecting tenants from arbitrary eviction and upholding landlords’ legitimate, and sometimes desperate, need to reclaim property for self-employment.