Glorification of Vigilantism, Cannibalistic Gore, and Communal Denigration Justifies Outright Refusal of Film Certification: Delhi High Court on CBFC’s Powers and Post-FCAT Appeals

Glorification of Vigilantism, Cannibalistic Gore, and Communal Denigration Justifies Outright Refusal of Film Certification: Delhi High Court on CBFC’s Powers and Post-FCAT Appeals

Introduction

In Shyam Bharteey v. Central Board of Film Certification Regional Officer Delhi & Anr., 2025 DHC 7975 (RFA-IPD 1/2023), decided on 10 September 2025, the Delhi High Court (per Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora, J.) dismissed an appeal under Section 5C of the Cinematograph Act, 1952 challenging the Central Board of Film Certification’s (CBFC) refusal to certify the Hindi film “Masoom Kaatil.”

The case presents a meticulous application of the statutory certification framework—particularly the Central Government’s 1991 Guidelines issued under Section 5B—against a film found to glorify vigilante violence, depict cannibalistic gore, contain communal and caste-based denigration, and involve minors as perpetrators of violence. It also clarifies procedural aspects of appellate jurisdiction after the abolition of the Film Certification Appellate Tribunal (FCAT), confirming that appeals against CBFC refusals lie to the High Court.

Key issues included: (i) the scope of CBFC’s discretion to refuse certification without suggesting cuts, (ii) the “overall impact” test under the 1991 Guidelines, (iii) limits of artistic freedom under Article 19(1)(a) vis-à-vis Article 19(2), and (iv) the change in appellate forum and process post-FCAT abolition.

Summary of the Judgment

The High Court upheld the CBFC’s decision to refuse certification to “Masoom Kaatil,” agreeing with the unanimous findings of both the Examining Committee (five members) and the Revising Committee (eight members). The Committees concluded that the film:

  • Justifies vigilante violence and killings;
  • Is communal in its portrayal and contains caste-based remarks;
  • Is replete with gruesome violence, extreme gore, and depictions of human cannibalism;
  • Includes extreme violence on animals;
  • Denigrates religions in a manner likely to incite further violence;
  • Depicts school-age teenagers as perpetrators of violent, anti-social acts; and
  • Uses expletives extensively.

These findings squarely engaged the 1991 Guidelines: 1(a); 2(i), 2(iii)(a) and (c), 2(iv), 2(vii), 2(xiii); and 3(i). The Court held that there was no basis to interfere, particularly since the Appellant did not place the film on record, did not challenge the Committees’ factual findings, and sought only an “A” certificate with cuts. The Court also emphasized that the Committees were within their jurisdiction to refuse certification outright rather than propose excisions.

The Court reiterated that after the Tribunal Reforms Act, 2021 abolished the FCAT, appeals under Section 5C of the Cinematograph Act lie to the High Court. Consistent with the Chief Justice’s Office Order dated 07.07.2021, such matters are registered as “RFA-IPD” until rules are framed.

Result: Appeal dismissed; CBFC’s refusal sustained.

Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The Court placed its reasoning within a well-established constitutional and statutory framework, drawing on two seminal Supreme Court authorities:

  • S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram, (1989) 2 SCC 574. The Supreme Court recognized cinema’s unique power to influence thought and action, justifying prior restraint through certification. The judgment emphasized that films can cumulatively shape attitudes, and that the medium’s combination of sight and sound can produce profound effects on audiences. This bolsters the legitimacy of content-based pre-certification, especially where material risks public order, decency, or morality (Article 19(2)).
  • Raj Kapoor v. Laxman, (1980) 2 SCC 175. The Court highlighted that the Cinematograph Act is a special regime designed to police the “explosively expanding cinema menace” where socially harmful content is a risk. The architecture of expert boards, hearings, appeals, and judicial review was validated, balancing artistic freedom with “socially necessary restraints.”

These cases undergird the Delhi High Court’s deference to expert certification bodies when their decisions rest on articulated statutory guidelines and a reasoned “overall impact” assessment.

B. Statutory and Regulatory Framework Applied

  • Cinematograph Act, 1952: Sections 4 (application for certification), 5B (Government-issued guidelines), and 5C (appeal).
  • Cinematograph (Certification) Rules, 1983: Rule 22 (Examining Committee’s powers; including Rule 22(9)(f) permitting refusal of certification where film is unsuitable even for restricted exhibition) and Rule 24(1) (Chairperson’s suo motu referral to Revising Committee).
  • 1991 Guidelines under Section 5B:
    • 1(a): films must be “responsible and sensitive to the values and standards of society.”
    • 2(i): anti-social activities such as violence must not be glorified or justified.
    • 2(iii)(a): prohibits depictions of children as perpetrators or forced witnesses to violence; 2(iii)(c): prohibits needless cruelty to animals.
    • 2(iv): bans avoidable gore, cruelty and horror likely to dehumanise or desensitise viewers.
    • 2(vii): protects against content offending human sensibilities by vulgarity, obscenity, or depravity.
    • 2(xiii): proscribes visuals or words promoting communal, obscurantist, anti-scientific, or anti-national attitudes.
    • 3(i): mandates judging the film in its entirety considering its overall impact.
  • Post-FCAT appellate procedure: After the Tribunal Reforms Act, 2021 abolished the FCAT, Section 5C appeals lie to the High Court; the Delhi High Court’s Office Order (07.07.2021) directs such appeals to be registered as RFA-IPD pending rules.

C. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

  1. Deference to Expert Committees Under a Clear Statutory Matrix. The Court noted two independent, unanimous screenings—by a five-member Examining Committee and an eight-member Revising Committee—each issuing detailed reasons mapping directly onto the 1991 Guidelines. No perversity, illegality, or misdirection was shown.
  2. Overall Impact Test and Cumulative Effect. Citing the 1991 Guidelines (3(i)) and Rangarajan, the Court evaluated the film’s “overall impact,” finding pervasive glorification of vigilante violence, extreme gore and cannibalism, communal/caste denigration, and the portrayal of minors as perpetrators. This cumulative effect was antithetical to public order, decency, and morality.
  3. Glorification of Vigilantism Is Per Se Disqualifying. The Court emphasized that encouraging lawlessness—especially by showing protagonists taking the law into their own hands—undermines the rule of law and can endanger public peace. Coupled with graphic depictions of killing and cannibalism, the content posed a serious risk of inciting violence.
  4. Communal and Religious Denigration Is Expressly Prohibited. The film was found to contain communal and caste-based remarks and to denigrate religions, invoking Guideline 2(xiii). In a diverse, secular polity, such portrayals threaten social harmony and cannot be certified.
  5. Minors as Perpetrators of Violence Breach Guideline 2(iii)(a). Showing school-age teenagers engaged in gore and anti-social acts—without a corrective or condemning narrative—risked corrupting impressionable audiences and glamorising juvenile wrongdoing.
  6. Extreme Violence on Animals Offends Guideline 2(iii)(c). Depictions of cruelty to animals must not be “presented needlessly”; the Committees found “extreme violence on animals,” further supporting refusal.
  7. No Duty to Suggest Cuts When the Film Is Unfit “as a Whole.” The Appellant’s plea for an “A” certificate with excisions was rejected. Under Rule 22(9)(f), Committees may refuse certification outright if a film is unsuitable even for restricted exhibition. Both Committees had concluded the film was “not fit for any certificate,” and the Court found no reason to compel granular cuts.
  8. Limited Judicial Review and Burden on Appellant. The Appellant did not place the film on record and did not substantively challenge the Committees’ factual findings. Absent demonstrated arbitrariness, mala fides, or misapplication of the law, the Court would not substitute its view for that of expert bodies.
  9. Freedom of Expression and Article 19(2). The Court reiterated that artistic freedom is subject to reasonable restrictions for decency, morality, public order, and incitement to offences, and that the content here traversed these constitutional limits.
  10. YouTube Content Is Not a Comparator for Public Exhibition. Respondents correctly noted that personalized online viewing is not equivalent to certification for public, theatrical exhibition. The Court did not accept the Appellant’s reliance on online availability as a ground for certification.

D. Issues Framed Against the Factual Matrix

  • Whether CBFC’s outright refusal without proposing cuts is lawful: Yes, where cumulative content violates multiple guidelines and is unfit “as a whole.”
  • Whether the depiction of minors as violent perpetrators is impermissible: Yes, breaches Guideline 2(iii)(a).
  • Whether communal/religious denigration bars certification: Yes, per Guideline 2(xiii) and the constitutional imperative to preserve social harmony.
  • Whether extreme gore, cannibalism, and animal cruelty cross the line: Yes, under Guidelines 2(iv), 2(vii), 2(iii)(c), and 1(a), especially where lacking redeeming or corrective narrative.
  • Scope of appellate review: Limited to checking legality, reasonableness, adherence to guidelines, and procedural fairness; deference to expert fact-finding.
  • Appellate forum post-FCAT: High Court under Section 5C, registered as RFA-IPD per Office Order dated 07.07.2021.

E. Impact and Significance

The decision consolidates and clarifies several important aspects of Indian film certification law:

  • Strengthened CBFC Discretion. Where a film, taken as a whole, glorifies vigilante justice, includes extreme and dehumanising gore, denigrates religions/communities, and involves minors as perpetrators of violence, CBFC may refuse certification outright without an obligation to identify cuts.
  • Operational Primacy of the 1991 Guidelines. The Court applied the guidelines as binding touchstones, underscoring their continued centrality even amidst evolving media landscapes.
  • Reaffirmed “Overall Impact” Standard. Filmmakers cannot rely on isolated scenes or disclaimers where the cumulative narrative endorses unlawful or socially corrosive conduct.
  • Article 19(2) Limits in High-Sensitivity Content. The judgment delineates the constitutional boundary where violent vigilantism and communal denigration move expression from protected speech into prohibited incitement/morality zones.
  • Children and Animal Cruelty Depictions Under Scrutiny. Portraying minors as perpetrators of violence and showing needless cruelty to animals are strong, independent grounds for refusal.
  • Appellate Pathway Clarity. Post-FCAT appeals lie to the High Court; litigants must furnish the full film record and show legal/factual infirmity, not merely seek “A” certificates with cuts.
  • Digital vs. Theatrical Distinction. The Court tacitly endorsed the regulatory distinction between personalized online content and films certified for public exhibition; the latter faces a higher bar due to mass audience impact.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Prior Restraint (Certification): A legally sanctioned, pre-exhibition review of films to ensure compliance with public order, decency, and morality standards. Unlike newspapers, cinema’s immersive power justifies such prior restraint under Indian law.
  • Overall Impact Test: The film must be judged as a whole, not scene-by-scene in isolation. Even if individual scenes might be defensible, the cumulative narrative may still be harmful—e.g., normalising lawlessness or communal hatred.
  • Glorification vs. Depiction: Showing violence or social evil is not per se prohibited; celebrating or justifying it is. Films that condemn wrongdoing or provide a corrective lens may pass scrutiny where films that valorise it will not.
  • Guideline 2(iii)(a) (Children and Violence): Protects minors from being shown as victims or perpetrators of violence or being forced witnesses. Glamourising juvenile delinquency is barred.
  • Guideline 2(xiii) (Communal/Anti-Scientific/Anti-National Attitudes): Prohibits content that promotes communal hatred, denigrates religion, or endorses regressive/obscurantist attitudes undermining constitutional values.
  • Section 5C Appeal Post-FCAT: After FCAT’s abolition in 2021, appeals against CBFC decisions are filed in the High Court (in Delhi, registered as RFA-IPD per administrative directions).

Case Timeline and Procedural Posture

  • 09.08.2022: Appellant applied to CBFC for certification of “Masoom Kaatil” (fee paid).
  • 18.08.2022: Examining Committee (five members) screened the film; unanimously found it unfit.
  • 24.08.2022: Chairperson referred the film suo motu to the Revising Committee (Rule 24(1)).
  • 08.09.2022: Revising Committee (eight members) screened the film; heard the Appellant; declared unfit for any certificate.
  • 19.09.2022: CBFC issued refusal order citing multiple 1991 Guidelines.
  • 02.12.2022: High Court reclassified the original writ as a Section 5C appeal (RFA-IPD 1/2023) due to FCAT abolition.
  • 23.12.2022: Respondents filed a detailed affidavit defending the refusal.
  • 10.09.2025: High Court dismissed the appeal; refusal upheld.

Key Takeaways

  • CBFC can refuse certification outright—without prescribing cuts—when a film, judged in its entirety, violates core certification norms (violence glorification, communal denigration, extreme gore, minors as perpetrators, animal cruelty).
  • The “overall impact” and “prior restraint” doctrines remain central to Indian film certification, consistent with Supreme Court precedent.
  • Artistic freedom under Article 19(1)(a) does not shield content that crosses Article 19(2) thresholds (decency, morality, public order, incitement).
  • After FCAT’s abolition, High Courts hear Section 5C appeals. The standard of review is limited; appellants must demonstrate legal error or perversity, not merely propose excisions.
  • Online availability (e.g., trailers or other content on YouTube) is not a basis to claim entitlement to theatrical/public certification.

Conclusion

The Delhi High Court’s decision in Shyam Bharteey reaffirms the rigorous application of the 1991 Guidelines and the primacy of the “overall impact” test in film certification. It sets a clear doctrinal marker: films that glorify vigilante justice, indulge in dehumanising gore, denigrate religions or communities, involve minors as violent perpetrators, or depict needless cruelty to animals can be refused certification outright. The Court’s approach—deferential to specialized committees where reasoned findings align with statutory norms—clarifies the limited scope of appellate interference and the proper balance between artistic expression and constitutionally sanctioned restraints under Article 19(2).

In the post-FCAT era, this judgment also offers procedural clarity on appellate routes and reinforces the responsibility of filmmakers to internalize certification norms at the scripting and production stages. Ultimately, it underscores that while cinema is a powerful medium for social reflection, its power entails a commensurate obligation to respect the legal and constitutional guardrails that safeguard public order, decency, morality, and communal harmony.

Case Citation

Shyam Bharteey v. Central Board of Film Certification Regional Officer Delhi & Anr., 2025 DHC 7975, Delhi High Court, decided on 10 September 2025 (RFA-IPD 1/2023), per Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora, J.

Case Details

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