From Points to Principles: The New Regime for Designating Senior Advocates
Commentary on Jitender @ Kalla v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) (2025 INSC 667)

1. Introduction

The decision in Jitender @ Kalla v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) transcends the criminal appeal in which it arose. Invoking the doubts voiced in the interlocutory stage of that matter, a bench of three judges—Justice Abhay S. Oka (author), Justice Ujjal Bhuyan and Justice S. V. N. Bhatti—undertook an unprecedented reassessment of the Supreme Court’s own guidelines concerning the designation of Senior Advocates. These guidelines, originally crafted in Indira Jaising v. Supreme Court of India (2017) (“Indira Jaising-1”) and marginally fine-tuned in Indira Jaising-2 (2023), instituted a 100-point matrix, a compulsory interview and the involvement of Bar members in the decision-making Permanent Committee. Seven-and-a-half years of experimentation exposed structural, logistical and constitutional faults in that regime. The present judgment therefore revisits, prunes and reshapes the framework while leaving space for future evolution by High Courts and the Supreme Court.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• Deletion of the 100-point formula. Para 87(i) expressly nullifies para 73.7 of Indira Jaising-1, thereby abolishing the point-based assessment, compulsory interview and Bar-member scoring.
• Role of the Full Court restored. Designation decisions must now emanate directly from the Full Court of the Supreme Court or the concerned High Court. Judges may still consult senior Bar members, but the latter will not participate in voting or scoring.
• Applications retained, but consent-centric. Advocates may continue to apply; conversely, Courts may suo motu designate deserving lawyers after securing consent.
• Annual exercise & local rule-making. Every High Court and the Supreme Court must frame new rules within four months, accommodate diversity, and conduct at least one designation exercise each calendar year.
• Secret ballot left to judicial wisdom. No blanket prohibition; Full Courts may resort to secret ballots when consensus fails.
• Inclusive focus. Trial-court practitioners and specialised-tribunal lawyers must receive genuine consideration; designation cannot remain the preserve of constitutional-court regulars.
• Permanent Secretariat retained. It will collate data, verify credentials and place applications before the Full Court.
• Scope of Article 142. The Court clarifies that its intervention is not a “review” but an exercise of the power it had reserved in para 74 of Indira Jaising-1—that guidelines may be refined in light of experience.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and their Influence

1. Indira Jaising-1 (2017) 9 SCC 766
   Upheld the constitutionality of s. 16 Advocates Act & created the 100-point matrix with a Permanent Committee (Chief Justice, two senior judges, Attorney/Advocate-General, plus a nominated Bar member). It was the first attempt at national uniformity and transparency.
2. Indira Jaising-2 (2023) 8 SCC 1
   Modified weightage (reduced publications, increased judgment-related points) and reiterated that improvement is ongoing. It retained interviews and the matrix.
3. Amar Vivek Aggarwal v. Punjab & Haryana HC (2022) 7 SCC 439 and E.S. Reddy v. Chief Secretary, A.P. (1987) 3 SCC 258
   Used to re-emphasise that designation is a conferred distinction—not an entitlement claimable by application.

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

a) Statutory Interpretation of Section 16(2)

The Bench stressed three statutory qualifiers—ability, standing at the Bar and special knowledge/experience in law. It held that the 1973 amendment deliberately replaced “experience” with “special knowledge or experience in law”, signalling that mere length of practice must not dominate. Accordingly:

• Assigning automatic marks for >20 years in practice distorted legislative intent.
• “Standing at the Bar” is a composite of integrity, fairness, mentorship, courtroom conduct, etc.—qualities not quantifiable in a short interview.

b) Structural Flaws in the 100-Point Mechanism

• Interview Inadequacy: A 10–15-minute interaction cannot reliably gauge personality or probity; many senior counsel (including the Attorney-General) found the practice embarrassing and dignity-diluting.
• Subjectivity & Logistics: Judges and Bar members lacked time to read hundreds of judgments, synopses and publications per candidate; outsourcing evaluation would undermine judicial responsibility.
• Integrity Blind Spot: The matrix contained no negative marks for professional misconduct; a persuasive interview could eclipse a tarnished reputation.
• Bar Participation: Direct scoring by non-judges conflicted with the statutory prerogative vested solely in Courts.

c) Article 142 as a Dynamic Tool

Paras 74 (Indira Jaising-1) and 51 (Indira Jaising-2) had expressly anticipated future revision. Thus, the present Bench used Article 142 not to “review” the earlier judgments but to course-correct on the empirical evidence that the earlier mechanism was unworkable. This distinction defused the preliminary objection regarding maintainability.

d) Normative Re-orientation

1. From Computation to Collective Judgment: Emphasis shifts from arithmetic scoring to informed deliberation by the Full Court.
2. Dignity and Diversity: Protecting the dignity of senior professionals and broadening access for district-court and first-generation lawyers.
3. Rule-making Federalism: High Courts may tailor rules to local conditions while adhering to constitutional minima of transparency and fairness.

3.3 Impact on Future Cases and the Legal Ecosystem

• Immediate Operational Impact. Any designation process currently underway may proceed under the old rules; however, new exercises must await the fresh rules mandated within four months.
• Empowerment of Trial Bar. By directing High Courts to include district-court feedback and acknowledging cross-examination skills, the judgment democratises a previously appellate-centric honour.
• Reduced Lobbying Potential. Removal of Bar members from voting lessens peer-pressure and canvassing; the emphasis on character and integrity addresses public trust concerns.
• Administrative Burden on Judiciaries. Full Courts will now shoulder deeper examination duties; while heavy, it arguably preserves judicial primacy.
• Template for Other Professional Honors. The reasoning may influence appointments to law officers, tribunal members, or designation‐equivalents (e.g., Queen’s Counsel in common-law jurisdictions).

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Article 142 (Constitution)

Empowers the Supreme Court to pass any order necessary for “complete justice” in any cause. It operates ex debito justitiae, filling legal gaps without rewriting statutes.

Full Court

An administrative meeting of all sitting judges of a Court (SC or a High Court) to decide non-judicial matters—appointments, designations, transfers, etc.

Senior Advocate (India)

A lawyer on whom a constitutional court confers a special rank for recognised excellence; subject to practice restrictions (e.g., cannot file vakalatnama, must act through an instructing advocate).

Secret Ballot vs. Consensus

When judges cannot reach unanimity, voting (potentially secret to avoid interpersonal discomfort) can finalise decisions democratically.

Permanent Secretariat

An administrative cell envisioned to receive applications, verify records (FIRs, disciplinary actions, reported cases), compile dossiers and place them before the Full Court.

5. Conclusion

Jitender @ Kalla ushers a decisive pivot in India’s law of professional distinction. Discarding the numerical fetishism of the 100-point grid and the quasi-competition of interviews, the Court restores the primacy—and responsibility—of collective judicial judgment, tempered by structured data from a Secretariat. By emphasising integrity, ability and inclusive standing at the Bar, the ruling re-aligns the designation process with the text and spirit of s. 16 of the Advocates Act. Yet the door remains open: High Courts retain flexibility to innovate, provided transparency and fairness guide every step. In the broader constitutional tapestry, the judgment showcases Article 142 as an instrument of iterative governance—correcting judicial experiments that fall short, without sliding into impermissible legislation. The precedent signals that legal institutions must periodically audit their own creations, keeping both precedent and purpose in harmonious tension.