Forged Age Proof Cannot Sustain Statutory Rape Conviction: Delhi High Court Reaffirms Burden to Prove Minority Beyond Reasonable Doubt in Arjun v. State (NCT of Delhi)
Case: Arjun v. State (NCT of Delhi) | Citation: 2025 DHC 8203 | Court: Delhi High Court | Bench: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Manoj Kumar Ohri | Date: 16 September 2025
Introduction
This appeal tested a foundational proposition in sexual offence prosecutions premised on the prosecutrix being a minor: the prosecution must prove the girl’s age beyond reasonable doubt. The High Court of Delhi set aside the appellant’s conviction under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), where the trial court had treated the prosecutrix as a minor based on a school record supported by a municipal birth certificate that was later shown to be forged.
The controversy arose from two distinct episodes:
- A March 2013 missing complaint concerning the prosecutrix’s movement with a co-accused (acquitted) without allegations of sexual relations with him; and
- Alleged consensual sexual relations between the prosecutrix and the appellant in 2011 on a promise of marriage.
The prosecution theory of statutory rape under Section 376 IPC hinged entirely on proving the prosecutrix’s minority at the time of the 2011 acts, since she herself consistently said the intercourse was consensual and there was no allegation of force. The High Court found that the prosecution had failed in this core task, largely because the birth certificate underpinning the school record was established to be forged, and there was no alternative reliable age proof.
Summary of the Judgment
- Conviction set aside; appellant acquitted: The High Court allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction and three-year sentence under Section 376 IPC, and discharged the bail bond and surety.
- Age not proved: The prosecution’s entire case on minority rested on a school admission record supported by an MCD birth certificate. The Registrar (Births & Deaths) produced the register for 1996 and stated that the birth certificate relied upon (No. 1234 dated 19.02.1996) did not exist in the official records and was forged. No ossification test or other proof of age was adduced.
- Victim’s consent and absence of force: The prosecutrix repeatedly maintained that sexual relations with the appellant were consensual and that no physical relations occurred with the co-accused. In the absence of proven minority, the core ingredient of rape (lack of consent) could not be presumed.
- Material improvements and delayed naming: The appellant’s name did not appear in the prosecutrix’s first statement (30.03.2013). It surfaced only in her Section 164 CrPC statement (01.04.2013), without dates. Specific dates were introduced for the first time in court (two days before Holi 2011 and 17.03.2011). These were treated as material improvements.
- Trial court error: Despite proceedings recording that the birth certificate was forged, the trial court erroneously relied on it to convict. This vitiated the conviction.
Detailed Analysis
Issues Before the Court
- Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the prosecutrix was a minor at the time of the alleged sexual relations in 2011.
- Whether a school record based on a birth certificate subsequently found to be forged could establish minority.
- Whether the prosecutrix’s testimony (admitting consent and denying force) could, by itself, sustain a rape conviction in the absence of proven minority.
- Whether material improvements and delayed naming of the appellant undermined the credibility of the prosecution case.
Factual Matrix and Evidentiary Highlights
- First police interaction (30.03.2013): The prosecutrix returned to the police station and described movements with co-accused Pavan Pal; no allegation against the appellant was made.
- Section 164 CrPC statement (01.04.2013): For the first time, she mentioned prior consensual relations with the appellant; no dates were specified; she denied relations with the co-accused.
- Deposition as PW-1 (18.11.2013): She specified dates (circa Holi 2011 and 17.03.2011) and reiterated consensual relations on assurance of marriage.
- Mother’s testimony (PW-2): She said the child’s birth certificate (issued by MCD) was submitted at school admission but did not support key incriminating assertions attributed to the daughter.
- School record (PW-3): Admission form and copy of birth certificate were produced; recorded date of birth was 15.02.1996.
- Registrar, Births & Deaths (09.04.2014 proceedings): The certificate bearing number 1234 dated 19.02.1996 did not exist in the official register; the document on record was forged.
- Medical evidence: The prosecutrix refused internal examination; no FSL samples were collected; the State argued her testimony alone sufficed.
Legal Reasoning
The High Court’s reasoning proceeded in clear, cumulative steps:
- Minority is a constituent fact: In prosecutions premised on statutory rape (where consent is legally irrelevant only if the girl is below the prescribed age), minority is a constituent ingredient of the offence which must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
- School record loses probative value if the source document is forged: The school admission record derived from an MCD birth certificate stood impeached when the Registrar produced the 1996 birth register and confirmed no such certificate existed. The school record, being secondary and derivative, could not be relied upon once the foundational municipal record was discredited.
- No alternate or corroborative age proof: The prosecutrix’s oral assertion of a different date of birth (16.10.1995) was uncorroborated. No ossification test was conducted. The prosecution did not place any independent primary record (e.g., contemporaneous hospital record, genuine municipal entry) to establish age.
- Consent versus statutory rape: The prosecutrix consistently stated that the relations with the appellant in 2011 were consensual. In the absence of proven minority, the statutory nullification of consent was inapplicable, and the essential element of lack of consent for rape under Section 376 IPC was not established.
- Material improvements undermine reliability: The appellant’s name did not figure in the earliest version (30.03.2013). The introduction of the appellant in the next statement (01.04.2013) without dates, and the later specification of dates for the first time at trial, were material improvements. These went to the root of the prosecution’s version about occurrence and timing, reducing the evidentiary weight of the later, embellished narrative.
- Trial court’s reliance on impeached document was manifest error: Having noted in proceedings that the MCD certificate was forged, the trial court nonetheless convicted on the same basis. The High Court characterised this as a manifest error that collapsed the edifice of the prosecution case.
Precedents and Jurisprudential Context
The judgment does not cite case law by name. Nonetheless, its approach resonates with established Supreme Court jurisprudence on age determination and evidentiary standards:
- School records are relevant but not conclusive: Courts have consistently held that entries in school registers or certificates are admissible as public documents but cannot be treated as conclusive unless the basis for the entry is proved and the source is trustworthy. Where the underlying municipal record is impeached, derived school records carry little to no probative value.
- Methodology for age determination: The layered approach often applied in age disputes prioritises reliable birth records (hospital or municipal) and, where unavailable or suspect, turns to ossification or medical age assessment. Failure to take medical recourse when documentary evidence is doubtful can be fatal in cases where minority is an element of the offence.
- Material improvements: The law distinguishes between minor discrepancies and material improvements that strike at the core of the prosecution’s case. Introducing an accused later, supplying critical dates for the first time at trial, or shifting narratives on core facts are treated as material improvements which erode credibility.
- Testimony of prosecutrix: While a conviction can be sustained on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix if it inspires confidence, that principle presupposes that her testimony, taken at its highest, satisfies every legal element of the offence charged. Where the prosecutrix herself asserts consent and minority is not proved, the legal ingredients of rape are not met.
Thus, the High Court’s ruling is aligned with the broader doctrinal thread: proof of age must be reliable; forged or unproved certificates cannot be the foundation of conviction; and improvements on material particulars cast doubt on the prosecution’s version.
Impact and Significance
This decision has several practical and doctrinal implications:
- Heightened diligence on age proof: Investigators and prosecutors must verify the authenticity of municipal birth certificates placed on record, especially when the entire case hinges on minority. If authenticity is questioned, immediate resort to medical ossification tests and retrieval of primary municipal/hospital records is essential.
- Limits to reliance on school records: Where school records are based on parental disclosures or on documents later found to be forged, they cannot be the basis to establish age. Prosecution must lead independent and reliable primary evidence.
- Guidance on statutory rape prosecutions: The ruling reaffirms that consent becomes immaterial only if minority is proved. If minority is not proved and there is no allegation of force, a conviction under Section 376 IPC cannot be sustained purely on the premise of an alleged promise of marriage.
- Trial management and prosecutorial discretion: The case flags a serious procedural lapse: despite the Registrar’s categorical statement about the forged birth certificate, the trial proceeded to conviction by relying on it. Trial courts must, upon learning that a foundational document is forged, re-assess the evidentiary landscape and, if necessary, call for further proof or decline to rely on tainted material.
- Ripple effects on POCSO-era cases: While the alleged acts date to 2011 (pre-POCSO), the principle is of direct relevance to POCSO prosecutions, where age is often the fulcrum. The judgment underscores that the burden to prove age rests firmly on the prosecution and must be discharged with authentic records or credible medical evidence.
- Investigative leads on forgery: The proceedings reflect directions to the Investigating Officer to explain the source of the forged certificate. Although the High Court did not issue further directions in this judgment, it implicitly signals the necessity for parallel action when forgery of public records is suspected.
Complex Concepts Simplified
- Section 376 IPC (Rape): At the time relevant to this case (2011), rape required lack of consent unless the girl was below the statutory age threshold. If the girl is a minor, her consent is legally immaterial (statutory rape). If she is not a minor, the prosecution must prove lack of consent, force, or coercion.
- Statutory rape: Sexual intercourse with a person below the legally defined age of consent constitutes rape regardless of actual consent. This makes proof of age a constituent element when the prosecution relies on minority.
- Section 161 and Section 164 CrPC:
- Section 161: Statement made to police during investigation; not substantive evidence; used primarily for contradictions.
- Section 164: Statement recorded by a Magistrate; has higher reliability given the safeguards; still, it is not substantive evidence per se but carries weight for corroboration/contradiction at trial.
- Material improvement: When a witness adds crucial facts (like naming an accused or specific dates) for the first time in court, absent earlier mention in prior statements, such additions are called material improvements. They can undermine credibility because they alter the core narrative.
- Ossification test: A medical procedure that estimates age by examining bone development. While not exact, it is a recognised aid where documentary proof of age is unavailable or suspect.
- School records and birth certificates: School admission records are relevant but typically reflect information supplied by parents or supported by certificates. A municipal birth certificate is valuable only if genuine; if shown to be forged, the school record founded upon it loses probative value.
- Section 428 CrPC (set-off): Allows an accused to set off the period of detention undergone during investigation and trial against the term of imprisonment on conviction.
- RI and SI: Rigorous Imprisonment (RI) involves hard labour; Simple Imprisonment (SI) does not.
- Child Welfare Committee (CWC): A statutory body under the juvenile justice framework responsible for the care, protection, and rehabilitation of children in need; here, it handled the prosecutrix’s custody when she refused to return home.
Key Takeaways
- Age must be proved beyond reasonable doubt when statutory rape is alleged; uncertainty or reliance on a forged document is fatal.
- School records are not self-proving for age if the underlying municipal certificate is impeached; courts should seek primary evidence or medical assessment.
- Consent matters if minority is not proved. A prosecutrix’s clear statements of consent and absence of force cannot support a rape conviction in law.
- Material improvements and delayed naming of the accused seriously weaken the prosecution’s case.
- Trial courts must not rely on tainted documents, especially after a competent authority (Registrar, Births & Deaths) has flagged forgery.
Conclusion
Arjun v. State (NCT of Delhi) is a careful restatement of a basic but critical evidentiary principle: when a sexual offence case turns on whether the prosecutrix was a minor, the prosecution must establish age through authentic, trustworthy evidence. A forged birth certificate cannot be the anchor for a conviction, nor can derived school records salvage such a case. In the absence of proven minority and any allegation of force, the prosecutrix’s admission of consent precludes a rape conviction. The High Court’s judgment strengthens the procedural and evidentiary discipline required in sexual offence prosecutions, and serves as an important reminder for investigators, prosecutors, and trial courts: verify age documents, avoid reliance on impeached records, and treat material improvements with appropriate circumspection.
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