FIR as Dying Declaration Without Expectation of Death; Asphyxia from Head Injury as Proximate Cause under Section 32 — Commentary on Sita Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh (2025 INSC 359)

Court: Supreme Court of India (Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction)

Bench: J.B. Pardiwala, J.; R. Mahadevan, J.

Date: 6 March 2025

Citation: 2025 INSC 359

Introduction

In Sita Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh, the Supreme Court of India addressed two recurring and practically important questions in criminal trials: (i) when an FIR lodged by the injured who subsequently dies can be treated as a dying declaration under Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872; and (ii) whether an apparent mismatch between the injury recorded (head injury) and the immediate medical cause of death noted in the post-mortem (asphyxia) severs the causal chain necessary for culpable homicide and for the admissibility of the statement as relating to the “cause of death” or the “circumstances of the transaction which resulted in death.”

The case arises from a village altercation over a heap of cow-dung, escalating into an assault in which Sita Ram allegedly struck the deceased, Prem Lal, on the forehead with a darat (sickle), while co-accused, including Onkar Singh, delivered kicks and fists. The deceased himself promptly lodged an FIR. He died nine days later; the post-mortem attributed death to asphyxia, with a fissured skull fracture and gastroenteritis noted during treatment.

The Additional Sessions Judge had acquitted all accused. On State appeal, the High Court reversed, convicting Sita Ram under Section 304 IPC (culpable homicide not amounting to murder), and Onkar Singh under Sections 451 and 323 IPC. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s conviction findings, but substantially reduced sentences in exercise of its appellate discretion.

Summary of the Judgment

Conviction affirmed: The Supreme Court found no perversity in the High Court’s re-appreciation of evidence reversing acquittal. The conviction of Sita Ram under Section 304 IPC and of Onkar Singh under Sections 451 and 323 IPC was upheld.
FIR as dying declaration: The Court held that the FIR lodged by the deceased is admissible as a dying declaration under Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act even though it was not made in the expectation of death and even though the immediate medical cause of death was recorded as asphyxia.
Causation clarified: The Court explained, drawing on medical jurisprudence, that a head injury can trigger a hypoxic cascade and complications (including gastroenteritis and aspiration), culminating in asphyxia. Thus, the head injury was a proximate cause of death and the FIR related to the “circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death.”
Sentencing reduced: Considering mitigating circumstances (age of appellant, long passage of time since incident, short undertrial custody), the Court reduced Sita Ram’s sentence from six years’ RI to one year’s RI (fine maintained), and reduced Onkar Singh’s sentence to the period already undergone with a monetary penalty.

Detailed Analysis

Factual Matrix and Procedural History

Incident: On 16 November 2000, around 10:30 p.m., after a quarrel between Prem Lal and his brother (co-accused Pyare Lal), Sita Ram and Onkar Singh joined and assaulted the deceased. Sita Ram allegedly struck a darat blow to the forehead; others delivered kicks and fists. The deceased’s wife intervened.
FIR by the deceased: On 17 November 2000, Prem Lal personally reported the assault. An MLC noted a sharp weapon injury. The case was initially registered under Sections 451, 324, 504, 506, read with Section 34 IPC.
Medical course and death: The deceased’s condition deteriorated; while under treatment, gastroenteritis set in; he died on 25 November 2000. Post-mortem recorded a fissured skull fracture; cause of death: asphyxia.
Trial and acquittal: The Additional Sessions Judge, Ghumarwin, acquitted all accused (28 May 2005) after examining 11 witnesses and documentary evidence.
High Court reversal: The High Court (13 September 2012) convicted Sita Ram under Section 304 IPC and Onkar Singh under Sections 451 and 323 IPC; imposed terms of incarceration and fines.
Supreme Court appeal: The accused appealed; the State defended the High Court’s judgment. The third accused (Pyare Lal) did not prefer an appeal.

Issues Considered

Whether the FIR lodged by the deceased can be treated as a dying declaration under Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act despite the absence of an expectation of death.
Whether the immediate cause of death (asphyxia) breaks the chain of proximate causation from the original head injury so as to (a) weaken culpability under Section 304 IPC, and (b) render the FIR not “relating to the cause of death” or “circumstances of the transaction.”
Whether the Supreme Court should revisit the High Court’s reversal of acquittal on facts and evidence.
Appropriate sentencing in light of the time elapsed and circumstances of the case.

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1) State Of Haryana v. Mange Ram (2003) 1 SCC 637

The Court reaffirmed Mange Ram’s clear position that, under Indian law, a dying declaration is admissible under Section 32(1) irrespective of whether it was made under the expectation of death. This directly answered the appellant’s argument that the FIR could not be treated as a dying declaration because the deceased did not apprehend impending death when he lodged it.

2) Kans Raj v. State Of Punjab (2000) 5 SCC 207

Kans Raj emphasizes that a statement under Section 32(1) must have a proximate connection to the cause of death or the circumstances of the transaction leading to death. The Supreme Court in Sita Ram used this proximity test to hold that the head injury (described in the FIR) set in motion a chain culminating in asphyxia; hence the FIR related to the transaction resulting in death.

3) Irfan @ Naka v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2023 INSC 758)

Irfan reiterates that if a dying declaration is found credible, it can form the sole basis of conviction without the need for corroboration. The Court invoked this principle to clarify that once satisfied about credibility, the absence of oath or cross-examination does not diminish the probative value of the dying declaration.

Comparative note: The Court contrasted English law—which demands that the maker be under a “settled, hopeless expectation of death”—with Indian law, which does not incorporate that requirement in Section 32(1). This reaffirms the long-settled divergence and signals continued adherence to the Indian statutory text.

Legal Reasoning

A. Admissibility of the FIR as a Dying Declaration under Section 32(1)

No requirement of expectation of death: The Court quoted Section 32(1) and, following Mange Ram, held that the statutory text contains no requirement that the declarant be under the apprehension of imminent death. Therefore, the deceased’s FIR was not excluded merely because it was lodged the day after the assault, before his condition deteriorated fatally.
Proximity to the fatal transaction: Applying Kans Raj, the Court found the FIR related to the circumstances of the fatal transaction—the assault, including the head blow with a sharp instrument—satisfying the proximity requirement. The later medical profile did not disconnect the transaction from the death.
Credibility: There was no suggestion of tutoring or fabrication. The statement was promptly lodged by the injured himself, shortly after medical examination recorded a sharp weapon injury. On these facts, the Court found no reason to doubt credibility.

B. Causation: Reconciling Head Injury with Immediate Cause of Death (Asphyxia)

A core defense plank was that the post-mortem recorded asphyxia, not head injury, as the cause of death nine days later; therefore, the FIR narrative about a head blow did not relate to the actual cause of death. The Court rejected this as medically and legally unsound, explaining:

Medical pathway (hypoxic cascade): A significant head injury can cause brain swelling, damage to brainstem respiratory centers, impaired cerebral perfusion, seizures, vomiting, aspiration, and systemic derangements. These can deprive the brain of oxygen (hypoxia/anoxia), ultimately producing asphyxia.
Complications during treatment: The record noted gastroenteritis. The Court described a recognized phenomenon where severe head trauma can precipitate stress-related gastrointestinal complications; aspiration of gastric contents may obstruct effective respiration, leading to asphyxia.
Proximate cause in medico-legal terms: Although the immediate cause was asphyxia, the head injury was a proximate and operating cause that set in motion the fatal chain. Thus, the statement in the FIR about the head blow properly “related to the cause of death” and the “circumstances of the transaction which resulted in death” within Section 32(1).

C. Scope of Appellate Interference with High Court’s Reversal of Acquittal

The Supreme Court declined to re-appreciate the entire body of evidence again, noting that the High Court had already thoroughly reassessed it and found the trial court’s acquittal erroneous. Finding no legal error or perversity in the High Court’s reasoning, the Supreme Court respected the conviction findings. This aligns with the Court’s cautious approach to revisiting concurrent factual determinations or well-reasoned reversals unless shown to be perverse or manifestly illegal.

D. Sentencing

While upholding the convictions, the Court calibrated punishment. For Sita Ram, the sentence under Section 304 IPC was reduced from six years’ rigorous imprisonment to one year’s rigorous imprisonment, with the fine maintained, considering:

the incident’s vintage (2000),
the appellant’s age (about 63),
his rural background, and
undertrial custody of about three months.

For Onkar Singh, the sentence was reduced to the period already undergone, with a monetary penalty (and default imprisonment if unpaid).

Principles Distilled

FIR as dying declaration: An FIR authored by the deceased is admissible as a dying declaration if it relates to the cause of death or the circumstances of the transaction resulting in death. Expectation of death at the time of making the statement is not a precondition under Section 32(1).
Proximate cause is a chain, not a snapshot: A medically plausible chain—from head injury to hypoxia/asphyxia via neurological and systemic complications—satisfies the proximity requirement under Section 32(1) and sustains culpable homicide findings.
Credibility governs weight: Once a dying declaration is found credible, it can, in law, sustain conviction without corroboration.
Appellate restraint on facts: The Supreme Court will ordinarily avoid re-appreciating facts already thoroughly examined by the High Court, absent perversity or palpable error.
Sentencing discretion: Long passage of time, age, socio-economic background, and limited undertrial custody can be relevant mitigating factors justifying sentence reduction, even where conviction is affirmed.

Impact and Implications

Evidence strategy in violent-crime cases: Prosecutors can confidently rely on promptly lodged FIRs by victims who later succumb, as substantive evidence under Section 32(1), provided proximity to the fatal transaction is established.
Handling apparent cause-of-death mismatches: Defense arguments that a different immediate medical cause (e.g., asphyxia) severs causation with a prior assault will face a higher burden; courts will look to whether the earlier injury plausibly initiated the fatal cascade.
Medical-legal synthesis: The judgment encourages the production and evaluation of medical pathways linking trauma to death, incorporating post-injury complications. Trial courts may increasingly require expert testimony clarifying such chains.
Dying declarations without “imminent death”: The judgment reiterates and strengthens the settled Indian departure from English law. This reinforces the admissibility of contemporaneous victim statements (including FIRs) irrespective of the declarant’s prognosis at the time.
Sentencing moderation in long-pending matters: The Court’s reliance on temporal and personal mitigation reflects a balancing of retribution, deterrence, and fairness where cases have protracted over decades.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Dying Declaration (Section 32(1), Evidence Act)

What it is: A statement by a person who has died, relating to the cause of their death or the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in their death.
Key features in India:
- No requirement that the maker expected death to be imminent.
- If credible, it can be the sole basis of conviction; corroboration is not a rule of law, only of prudence where credibility is doubtful.
- “Circumstances of the transaction” means facts closely and sufficiently connected with the fatal occurrence—not remote background details.

Asphyxia, Hypoxia, and Head Injury

Asphyxia: Death or coma due to insufficient oxygen and excess carbon dioxide in blood/tissues; can follow airway obstruction, aspiration, or neurological failure.
Hypoxia/Anoxia: Reduced/no oxygen delivery to brain; may result from head injuries causing brain swelling, damage to respiratory centers, seizures, vomiting, aspiration, or impaired blood flow.
Legal takeaway: A head injury can be a proximate cause of death by initiating a chain leading to asphyxia. The law looks at the whole cascade, not just the final medical event.

Relevant IPC Provisions (brief)

Section 304: Culpable homicide not amounting to murder (punishment varies based on intention/knowledge). Here, conviction under Section 304 was affirmed for the head injury inflicted with a sharp instrument.
Section 451: House-trespass to commit an offence; the conviction of Onkar indicates unlawful entry in furtherance of the assault.
Section 323/324: Voluntarily causing hurt (323: simple hurt; 324: hurt by dangerous weapons). The case involved a darat, a sharp agricultural implement; Onkar’s conviction under 323 reflects non-weapon assault by fists/kicks.

Appellate Interference with Acquittal

Trial acquittal overturned by High Court: Permissible on re-appreciation of evidence.
Supreme Court stance: It typically refrains from re-weighing evidence a third time unless High Court findings are perverse or legally flawed.

Conclusion

Sita Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh consolidates and clarifies critical aspects of Indian criminal evidence law:

First, an FIR authored by an injured who later dies is admissible as a dying declaration under Section 32(1) if it bears a proximate connection to the fatal transaction; expectation of death at the time of the statement is not required.
Second, an apparent divergence between immediate medical cause of death (asphyxia) and the original assault (head injury) does not negate causation where medical science recognizes a hypoxic pathway from trauma to death.
Third, once a dying declaration is found credible, it may sustain conviction without corroboration.
Fourth, the Supreme Court maintained deference to the High Court’s reversal of acquittal, reserving interference for cases of palpable error or perversity, while exercising sentencing moderation in light of mitigation.

In practical terms, the judgment is likely to influence trial courts to more readily accept contemporaneous statements by deceased victims (including FIRs) as substantive evidence under Section 32(1), and to assess causation holistically with the aid of medical jurisprudence. It also augurs a measured, restorative approach to sentencing in long-pending matters. Overall, the decision fortifies the evidentiary framework for prosecuting violent offences where death ensues through medically complex pathways, ensuring that substance prevails over superficial discrepancies in clinical labels.