Facilitation Equals Participation: Section 149 IPC Liability for Transporting Assailants and Immobilizing Victims; Appellate Reversal of Acquittal on Misappreciation of Evidence

Introduction

In Haribhau @ Bhausaheb Dinkar Kharuse v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 INSC 1266 (Supreme Court of India, 29 October 2025), the Supreme Court dismissed criminal appeals filed by accused nos. 3, 4 and 6, thereby affirming the Bombay High Court’s decision to convict them under Sections 302 and 307 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The case arises out of a brutal assault on 27 April 1999 following an earlier altercation during a series of family weddings in village Kari (Pune District). Two motorcycles carrying accused persons intercepted a jeep, immobilized it by removing the key, dragged the occupants out, and launched a coordinated assault with knives and a sattur, killing Ankush Gholap on the spot and grievously injuring two others (PW-7 and PW-9).

The VIII Additional Sessions Judge, Pune, had convicted accused nos. 1 and 2 for murder and attempt to murder, convicted accused no. 6 for attempt to murder, and acquitted accused nos. 3, 4 and 5. On State appeal, the High Court reversed the acquittal of accused nos. 3 and 4 and also convicted accused no. 6 for murder via Section 149 IPC, holding accused nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6 guilty of offences under Sections 147, 148, 149, 302 and 307 IPC. The central issues before the Supreme Court included:

Whether the prosecution established an “unlawful assembly” with a common object to commit murder under Section 149 IPC, particularly as regards facilitators who did not inflict fatal blows.
Whether the High Court was justified in reversing a trial court acquittal and convicting accused nos. 3 and 4, and enhancing accused no. 6’s culpability to murder with the aid of Section 149 IPC.
Whether alleged contradictions, lack of recoveries against some accused, and identification-related criticisms undermined the prosecution’s case.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s convictions of accused nos. 3, 4 and 6 under Sections 302 and 307 read with Section 149 IPC and dismissed all appeals. The Court held that:

The ocular testimony of PW-1 (complainant) and injured eyewitnesses PW-7 and PW-9 was natural, cogent, consistent, and mutually corroborative on material particulars, including identification, the sequence of events, and the roles of each accused.
Medical evidence (PW-16, PW-19 and PW-21) perfectly corroborated the ocular account, confirming multiple sharp-weapon injuries sufficient in the ordinary course to cause death and demonstrating grievous injuries to the surviving victims.
Accused nos. 3 and 4 actively facilitated the crime by transporting armed assailants to the scene, immobilizing the jeep (removing the key), surrounding the victims, and holding the deceased while co-accused inflicted fatal blows. Accused no. 6 directly inflicted grievous injuries on PW-7. These acts established their membership in an unlawful assembly sharing the common object of murder and grievous assault, attracting vicarious liability under Section 149 IPC.
The trial court’s acquittal of accused nos. 3 and 4 reflected misappreciation of evidence; the High Court rightly exercised its appellate power to reappraise the record and reverse the acquittal.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415: The Court reiterated that an appellate court may fully reappreciate evidence leading to an acquittal and reverse it where the trial court’s view is not reasonably sustainable. This standard justified the High Court’s intervention, as the trial court had downplayed consistent injured-witness testimony and overlooked the legal effect of coordinated, weaponised conduct by all accused.
Masalti v. State of U.P., AIR 1965 SC 202, and Lalji v. State of U.P., (1989) 1 SCC 437: These foundational authorities on Section 149 IPC emphasize that individual overt acts are not indispensable; membership of an unlawful assembly and proof that the offence was committed in prosecution of its common object suffices for vicarious liability. The Supreme Court applied this principle to hold that facilitators—who transported armed co-accused, immobilized the vehicle, surrounded victims, and held the deceased—were equally liable under Section 149.
Murugesan v. State, (2012) 10 SCC 383; Siju Kurian v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 14 SCC 63: Cited by the defence to caution against easy reversal of acquittal, these decisions underscore that appellate interference is warranted only if the trial court’s view is perverse or unreasonable. The Supreme Court found that threshold met here due to the trial court’s fundamental misappreciation of strong ocular and medical evidence.
Daya Kishan v. State Of Haryana, (2010) 5 SCC 81; Naresh v. State of Haryana, (2023) 10 SCC 134: Relied on by appellants for the proposition that mere presence in an assembly is insufficient for Section 149 liability. The Supreme Court distinguished the present case factually: the appellants performed clear facilitative acts demonstrating shared object and active participation, far beyond “mere presence.”
Shivaji Sahabrao Bobde v. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793: Emphasizes the need for proof beyond reasonable doubt. The Court held that the consistent, corroborated testimony of injured witnesses, buttressed by precise medical corroboration, comfortably met that standard.
Chellappa v. State, (2020) 5 SCC 160; M.C. Ali v. State of Kerala, (2010) 4 SCC 573: Invoked by appellants to argue benefit of doubt and the “two views” rule. The Court rejected this line by finding the trial court’s view implausible on the record and the High Court’s appreciation cogent, thus negating the premise for deference to the acquittal.

Legal Reasoning

The Supreme Court’s reasoning moves on three interlocking axes: (i) the strength of the injured-witness accounts, (ii) the seamless match between ocular and medical evidence, and (iii) the correct application of Section 149 IPC to facilitative conduct within a coordinated group attack.

Ocular Evidence: PW-1, PW-7 and PW-9 provided mutually consistent accounts. Each identified all accused (including the appellants), described the two motorcycles arriving together, the removal of weapons from the motorcycles’ diccies, the removal of the jeep’s key by accused no. 3, the dragging of victims out of the jeep, and the sequence of attacks. The alleged contradictions highlighted by defence were not material; the core narrative—group arrival with lethal weapons, immobilization of the vehicle, surrounding and holding the victims, and a coordinated stabbing—remained intact across witnesses.
Medical Corroboration: PW-16’s post-mortem confirmed multiple incised and penetrating injuries on vital organs sufficient to cause death by haemorrhagic shock; PW-19 and PW-21 confirmed grievous injuries to PW-9 and PW-7, respectively, congruent with sharp weapons like a sattur and knives. The anatomical locations, multiplicity, and severity of injuries fit the ocular timeline and the weapons described.
Section 149 IPC Applied to Facilitative Acts: The Court emphasized that common object can be inferred from the nature of the assembly’s armament, the manner of arrival, and coordinated execution. Accused nos. 3 and 4 transported armed assailants, immobilized the jeep (accused no. 3), surrounded the victims, and accused no. 3 held the deceased to enable the fatal blows. Accused no. 6 directly stabbed PW-7. This conduct evidenced shared knowledge and the common object to commit murder (and grievous assault), squarely engaging Section 149’s vicarious liability even for those not inflicting the fatal wounds.
Numerosity under Section 141 IPC: The defence argued that with one co-accused acquitted, the unlawful assembly fell below five. The Court’s factual conclusion—that accused nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6 acted in concert—satisfied the minimum of five persons. Accordingly, Section 149 was fully attracted.
Appellate Interference with Acquittal: Relying on Chandrappa, the Court endorsed the High Court’s reversal, finding the trial court’s view unsustainable in the face of compelling, corroborated evidence and a misapplication of the law on common object and vicarious liability.

Impact and Prospective Significance

Clarifying the Reach of Section 149 IPC: The decision reinforces that facilitative conduct—such as transporting armed co-accused to the scene, immobilizing the victims’ vehicle, and surrounding or holding the victims—constitutes active participation toward the assembly’s common object. This has substantial implications for group assaults: non-strikers can no longer credibly argue “mere presence” where their conduct operationally enables the fatal assault.
Weight of Injured-Witness Testimony: The Court’s reliance on injured eyewitnesses, in tandem with tight medical corroboration, strengthens prosecutorial confidence in such evidence combinations and cautions trial courts against discounting them on minor discrepancies.
Appellate Standards in Acquittal Reversals: The ruling is a robust reminder that High Courts may (and should) reverse acquittals where the trial court’s appreciation is perverse, ignores material evidence, or misapplies legal standards under Sections 141/149 IPC.
Identification Concerns in Known-Accused Cases: Although the defence criticized identification procedures, the Court’s framework indicates that where accused persons are known to eyewitnesses and are categorically identified in court, and where ocular and medical evidence cohere, weaknesses in test identification procedures may recede in significance.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Unlawful Assembly (Section 141 IPC): An assembly of five or more persons with a “common object” to commit certain enumerated offences or to achieve a purpose by criminal force. The minimum number is five.
Common Object vs. Common Intention: “Common object” (Section 149) is a shared purpose of the assembly; it does not require prior concert or a plan as strict as “common intention” under Section 34. Common object can crystallize on the spot and be inferred from conduct, weapons, and the manner of the assault.
Vicarious Liability under Section 149 IPC: If an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object (or one that the members knew was likely), every member is guilty of that offence. An individual “overt act” (like delivering a blow) is not essential if membership and shared object are proved.
Sections 302 and 307 read with 149 IPC: Section 302 punishes murder; Section 307 punishes attempt to murder. When read with Section 149, every member of the unlawful assembly becomes liable for the murder/attempt if those offences were in prosecution of the common object or were known to be likely.
Appellate Interference with Acquittal: Appellate courts may reappreciate evidence and reverse acquittals where the trial court’s view is perverse, ignores material evidence, or is not reasonably sustainable—while respecting the general caution against lightly overturning acquittals.
Injured Eyewitness Credibility: Courts accord high probative value to injured witnesses: being victims themselves reduces the likelihood of false implication and often yields more reliable narratives of the incident.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s decision in Haribhau @ Bhausaheb Dinkar Kharuse v. State of Maharashtra crystallizes two important principles. First, for group crimes, facilitation can equal participation: transporting armed assailants, immobilizing the victim’s vehicle, surrounding and holding the victim during a coordinated assault are all potent indicia of a common object to murder, attracting Section 149 IPC liability even if the facilitator did not deliver the fatal blow. Second, High Courts are not powerless against erroneous acquittals; where trial courts misappreciate consistent injured-witness testimony corroborated by medical evidence and misapply Section 149, appellate reversal is not just permissible but necessary.

The ruling therefore strengthens the law on unlawful assembly and vicarious liability, guides trial courts on the proper weight of injured-witness and medical evidence, and provides clear appellate standards for correcting implausible acquittals. In operational terms, it significantly narrows the gap through which non-striking but operationally crucial participants in group violence could previously escape accountability.

Key Takeaways

Active facilitation at the scene—transporting, immobilizing, surrounding, holding—establishes common object for Section 149 IPC.
Overt acts are unnecessary under Section 149 if membership and common object are proved.
Injured eyewitness testimony, when coherent and medically corroborated, is highly persuasive.
High Courts can reverse acquittals where the trial court’s view is unreasonable or perverse on the record.
Numerosity for unlawful assembly was satisfied by five proven participants (accused nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6), sustaining Section 149 liability.