Expiry of Arbitral Mandate and Mandatory Substitution under Section 29A(6):
Commentary on Mohan Lal Fatehpuria v. M/s Bharat Textiles & Ors., 2025 INSC 1409

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court’s decision in Mohan Lal Fatehpuria v. M/s Bharat Textiles & Ors., 2025 INSC 1409, is a significant addition to Indian arbitration jurisprudence on the operation and consequences of Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“the Act”). It crystallises the consequences of the expiry of an arbitrator’s mandate for failure to make an award within the time limit, clarifies the court’s powers and duties under Section 29A(6), and separates the remedy under Section 29A from challenges under Sections 14 and 15.

The case arises from a long-running partnership dispute in which a sole arbitrator, appointed by the Delhi High Court, failed to render an award within the statutory time limit (computed after excluding the COVID-19 suspension period). The key controversy was whether the High Court could simply extend the same arbitrator’s mandate under Section 29A(6), or whether the expiry of his mandate by operation of law required his substitution.

The Supreme Court holds that once the maximum permissible time under Section 29A has lapsed without a court-ordered extension, the arbitrator becomes functus officio and his continuation is “impermissible”. In that situation, the Court reads Section 29A(6) as not merely permissive but as both empowering and obligating the court to substitute the arbitrator so that the arbitration can continue from the stage already reached.

Equally important, the Court reiterates that:

Section 29A is remedial and applies to all arbitrations pending as on 30.08.2019.
The COVID-19 limitation extension orders in Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, In re (2022) 3 SCC 117 apply when computing the timelines under Section 29A.
Rejection of an earlier challenge to the arbitrator under Sections 14 and 15 does not bar a later application under Section 29A once the statutory time limit expires.

The decision, therefore, has implications for arbitrators, parties, and courts alike, especially on the management of timelines, the consequences of delay, and the circumstances in which substitution of the arbitrator becomes the norm rather than the exception.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

1. The parties and the arbitration clause

The appellants (husband and wife) and respondent nos. 2 to 4 were partners under a partnership deed dated 18.05.1992, which contained an arbitration clause. Respondent no. 1, M/s Bharat Textiles, was registered as a partnership firm on 05.01.2007. Disputes arose among the partners, leading to invocation of the arbitration clause.

2. Appointment of the sole arbitrator and fee direction

By a common order dated 13.03.2020, the Delhi High Court, in two arbitration petitions filed by the appellants, appointed Mr. Anjum Javed, Advocate, as the sole arbitrator. The High Court expressly directed that:

The arbitrator’s fee was to be charged in accordance with the Fourth Schedule to the Act (which prescribes a model fee schedule).

The sole arbitrator entered reference on 20.05.2020. This date is crucial because Section 23(4) of the Act prescribes a six-month period from this point for completion of pleadings, and Section 29A hinges upon the completion of pleadings.

3. Directions on administrative expenses and the first round of litigation (Sections 14 and 15)

After entering reference, the arbitrator issued directions on multiple dates—03.06.2020, 21.10.2020, 09.01.2021 and 15.06.2021—calling upon the parties to deposit various amounts towards “administrative expenses”.

Respondent nos. 2 and 3 objected to these demands. They moved applications under:

Section 14 – seeking termination of the arbitrator’s mandate on the ground that he was de jure or de facto unable to perform his functions; and
Section 15 – seeking substitution of the arbitrator following such termination.

The Delhi High Court, by a common order dated 28.01.2022, dismissed those applications. It held that:

Administrative expenses are to be paid on actuals.
Respondent nos. 2 and 3 could approach the arbitral tribunal for accounting of those expenses.
The sole arbitrator was neither de jure nor de facto ineligible to act.

Thus, at that stage, the arbitrator’s mandate continued unaffected; no termination or substitution occurred.

4. Continued demands, adjournment sine die, and the Section 29A petitions

The sole arbitrator continued to require deposits towards administrative expenses by orders dated 09.07.2022, 06.01.2023 and 14.08.2023. On 31.08.2023, the appellants informed the arbitrator that they intended to move the High Court under Section 29A(4) of the Act and sought time. The arbitrator then adjourned the proceedings sine die on the same date.

Subsequently, the appellants filed petitions under Section 29A(6) before the Delhi High Court. They sought:

Substitution of the sole arbitrator; and
Extension of the time period for the substitute arbitrator to make the award.

5. The Delhi High Court’s order dated 22.04.2025

By the impugned order dated 22.04.2025, the High Court:

Directed that the arbitrator’s fee must be charged strictly in accordance with the Fourth Schedule.
Directed that administrative expenses must be charged only on actuals, with disclosure to the parties.
Declined to substitute the arbitrator.
Extended the arbitrator’s mandate under Section 29A(6) for a further four months to conclude the arbitration.

Thus, the High Court partly allowed the Section 29A petitions (by extending time) but refused the prayer for substitution. This refusal triggered the present appeals.

III. Issues Before the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court was required to address, in substance, four interlinked issues:

Whether the sole arbitrator’s mandate had already terminated by operation of Section 29A(4) before the High Court extended time on 22.04.2025.
If so, whether his continuation as arbitrator was legally permissible, or whether a substitute arbitrator had to be appointed under Section 29A(6).
Whether the remedy under Section 29A(6) is independent of, and not constrained by, earlier proceedings under Sections 14 and 15 (which had been dismissed on 28.01.2022).
How the COVID-19 limitation extension orders affect computation of the Section 29A timelines.

IV. Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court allowed the appeals and set aside the Delhi High Court’s order. Its principal conclusions are:

The sole arbitrator entered reference on 20.05.2020. The six-month period for completion of pleadings under Section 23(4) expired on 19.11.2020.
Owing to the COVID-19 pandemic and the Supreme Court’s orders in Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, In re (2022) 3 SCC 117, the period from 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 had to be excluded when computing relevant limitation/statutory periods.
Accordingly, under Section 29A(1), the arbitrator was obliged to make an award within one year from 01.03.2022, i.e., by 28.02.2023.
No award was made by 28.02.2023 and the parties did not obtain an extension from the court during that period. Hence, under Section 29A(4), the arbitrator’s mandate stood terminated by operation of law and he became functus officio.
Once the mandate had so expired, the arbitrator’s continuation was “impermissible”. Section 29A(6) empowers and, in such a situation, obligates the court to substitute the arbitrator, with the proceedings continuing from the stage already reached.
The earlier dismissal of applications under Sections 14 and 15 on 28.01.2022—when the arbitrator’s mandate had not yet expired—does not affect the maintainability or merits of a later petition under Section 29A filed after the mandate’s expiry.
The Delhi High Court erred in merely extending the arbitrator’s mandate without substituting him after his mandate had ceased to exist.
The Court terminated the mandate of the existing arbitrator and appointed Justice Najmi Waziri, former Judge of the Delhi High Court, as the substitute sole arbitrator, directing that:
- The proceedings shall resume from the stage already attained.
- The arbitration shall be concluded within six months from receipt of the order.

V. Statutory Framework and Precedents

1. Section 29A: Time limit for arbitral award

Section 29A was introduced by the 2015 amendments (Act 3 of 2016) and modified by the 2019 amendments (Act 33 of 2019). In its post-2019 form, central to this case, Section 29A provides:

Section 29A(1): The award in domestic (non-international commercial) arbitration shall be made within 12 months from the date of completion of pleadings under Section 23(4).
Section 29A(3): Parties may, by consent, extend this period by up to six months.
Section 29A(4): If no award is made within this time (original plus consensual extension), the arbitrator’s mandate terminates unless the court, either before or after expiry, extends the period.
- First proviso: If delay is attributable to the tribunal, the court may reduce the arbitrator’s fees.
- Second proviso: If an application under Section 29A(5) is pending, the arbitrator’s mandate continues until disposal of that application.
Section 29A(5): Extension can be granted only for sufficient cause and on such terms as the court may impose.
Section 29A(6): While extending time, the court may substitute one or all of the arbitrators; in such case, proceedings continue from the stage already reached, and the new arbitrator is deemed to have received all existing evidence and material.
Section 29A(7): The reconstituted tribunal is deemed to be a continuation of the earlier tribunal.
Section 29A(8): The court may impose actual or exemplary costs.

The legislative intent is explicit: to ensure time-bound, efficient arbitral proceedings and to give courts a supervisory role to prevent arbitrations from languishing indefinitely.

2. Section 23(4): Completion of pleadings

Section 23(4), inserted in 2019, requires that the statement of claim and defence be completed within six months from the date the arbitrator receives notice of appointment. This date of completion of pleadings is the starting point for the 12-month clock under Section 29A(1).

3. Sections 14 and 15: Termination of mandate and substitution on other grounds

Section 14 covers situations where an arbitrator becomes de jure (legally) or de facto (factually) unable to perform his functions, or fails to act without undue delay. In such cases, a party may seek termination of the mandate.
Section 15 provides that, upon such termination, a substitute arbitrator shall be appointed under the rules that applied to the appointment of the original arbitrator.

These provisions deal with qualitatively different grounds (ineligibility, incapacity, improper conduct, etc.) from the purely temporal ground addressed by Section 29A.

4. Precedents Cited and Their Role

(a) Tata Sons Pvt. Ltd. v. Siva Industries & Holdings Ltd., (2023) 5 SCC 421

The Supreme Court in Tata Sons held that:

Section 29A is remedial in nature, aimed at curing the mischief of delays in arbitration.
It is applicable to all pending arbitral proceedings as on 30.08.2019 (the date when the 2019 amendments came into force).

In the present judgment, the Court cites Tata Sons to reaffirm the remedial character and retrospective application of Section 29A to ongoing arbitrations, thereby rejecting any contention that Section 29A is inapplicable due to the commencement date of the arbitration.

(b) Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, In re, (2022) 3 SCC 117

In this suo motu proceeding, the Supreme Court extended limitation periods for various judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings in view of the COVID-19 pandemic. It directed exclusion of certain periods (including 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022) from computation of limitation.

In Mohan Lal Fatehpuria, the Court applies these directions to Section 29A calculations. It explicitly holds that:

The period from 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 “deserves to be excluded on account of the pandemic”,
Thus recalibrating the deadline for making the award to 28.02.2023.

This is doctrinally important because it confirms that the COVID limitation extensions are relevant to the computation of statutory time limits in arbitration, including those under Section 29A.

(c) ROHAN BUILDERS (INDIA) PVT. LTD. v. BERGER PAINTS INDIA LTD., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2494

A two-judge Bench in Rohan Builders interpreted the term “terminate” in Section 29A(4), addressing whether an application to extend time for making an award is maintainable even after expiry of the 12-month (plus consensual extension) period.

The Supreme Court in the present case summarises Rohan Builders as follows:

On expiry of the prescribed period, the arbitral tribunal becomes functus officio, but not in absolute terms.
The “termination” of the mandate is conditional upon the filing of an application for extension and cannot be treated as termination stricto sensu.
The use of the word “terminate” in Section 29A(4) seeks to enforce the principle of party autonomy yet leaves room for court intervention through a Section 29A(5) application.

At the same time, Mohan Lal Fatehpuria emphasises that, at the moment of expiry:

The arbitrator cannot continue proceedings on his own and becomes functus officio “subject to an order which may be passed by the Court” under Section 29A(4).

Thus, Rohan Builders is used to affirm two ideas:

Expiry under Section 29A(4) is not necessarily irrevocable—mandate may be effectively continued/revived by judicial order on a Section 29A(5) application.
But until such an order is passed, the arbitrator has no authority to act.

The present judgment then goes a step further by treating substitution under Section 29A(6) as the correct and obligatory response once the mandate has already terminated by operation of law and there was no timely extension.

VI. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. Computation of Timelines and Expiry of Mandate

Entry into reference and completion of pleadings:
- The arbitrator entered reference on 20.05.2020.
- Under Section 23(4), the six-month period for completion of pleadings expired on 19.11.2020.
Exclusion of COVID-19 period:
- Relying on Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, In re, the Court holds that the period 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 must be excluded in computing timelines.
Recalibrated deadline under Section 29A(1):
- Section 29A(1) requires the award to be made within twelve months from completion of pleadings.
- After excluding the pandemic period, the Court concludes that the arbitrator was obligated to pass the award within one year from 01.03.2022, i.e., by 28.02.2023.
No award, no extension, automatic termination:
- No award was made by 28.02.2023.
- No application for extension was made by the parties and no extension was granted by a court during that period.
- Consequently, under Section 29A(4), “the mandate of the sole arbitrator had terminated on 28.02.2023” and he became functus officio “in view of [the] mandate contained in Section 29A(4)”.

In other words, the arbitrator’s legal authority ceased by operation of law on 28.02.2023. The later adjournment sine die on 31.08.2023 underscores that neither the arbitrator nor the parties considered there to be any subsisting mandate once a Section 29A application was being contemplated.

B. Interaction with Rohan Builders and the Notion of “Functus Officio”

The Court carefully acknowledges Rohan Builders, reaffirming that:

On expiry of the Section 29A period, an arbitrator becomes functus officio, albeit not in absolute terms, because the court can extend the period on an application under Section 29A(5).
The termination is therefore “conditional” in the sense that it is subject to court orders under Section 29A(4) and (5).

However, the Court stresses that:

“the fact remains that on expiry of initial period or extended period, the arbitrator cannot proceed with the arbitration proceeding and his mandate terminates, subject to an order which may be passed by the Court in a proceeding under Section 29A(4) of the Act.”

Thus, until the court passes an extension order, the arbitrator is without authority. In the present case, there was:

No pending Section 29A(5) application at the time of expiry on 28.02.2023; and
No court order extending time before that date.

Accordingly, the termination of the mandate is treated as having fully occurred as of 28.02.2023.

C. Section 29A(6): Power and Duty to Substitute the Arbitrator

Section 29A(6) reads:

“While extending the period referred to in sub-section (4), it shall be open to the Court to substitute one or all of the arbitrators…”

On a literal reading, this appears to confer a discretionary power (“shall be open to the Court”) to substitute the arbitrator while extending time. However, in the context of a mandate that has already terminated by operation of law due to time expiry, the Court in Mohan Lal Fatehpuria interprets this provision more robustly.

The Court observes:

“When mandate of arbitrator has expired, his continuation is impermissible. Section 29A(6) empowers and obligates the Court to substitute the Arbitrator.”

Two key points emerge:

Continuation of the same arbitrator after expiry is impermissible: Once the statutory time limit has lapsed and no court order has extended it, the arbitrator’s mandate ceases and cannot simply be “revived” by allowing him to continue as before. The Court suggests that the proper course is substitution rather than mere extension of the same arbitrator’s tenure in these circumstances.
Section 29A(6) is treated as having a mandatory flavour when the mandate has expired: While the text says “it shall be open to the Court”, the Court effectively treats this power as a duty in a case where the mandate has lapsed and an application to extend time is made after that lapse. Substitution becomes the default mechanism to restart or continue the arbitration from the same stage.

This is a notable development. It pushes the interpretation of Section 29A(6) beyond a purely discretionary provision, at least where:

The statutory time under Section 29A(1) and (3) has fully expired;
No prior extension was granted by the court; and
The arbitrator’s mandate has, by that point, terminated by operation of law.

D. Independence of Section 29A from Sections 14 and 15

The respondents argued that their earlier applications under Sections 14 and 15 had been dismissed on 24.01.2022 (the judgment later refers to 28.01.2022), and therefore a substitute arbitrator could not be appointed under Section 29A(6).

The Supreme Court firmly rejects this contention:

The Act provides separate and distinct remedies under Sections 14, 15 and 29A:
- Sections 14 and 15 address situations where the arbitrator is unable to act de jure or de facto, or where there is some disqualifying circumstance.
- Section 29A addresses the distinct question of time-bound completion of the arbitration.
On 24.01.2022 / 28.01.2022, when the Section 14/15 petitions were decided, the arbitrator’s mandate had not yet expired under Section 29A; therefore, that order has “no impact” on the later Section 29A proceedings.

The Court emphasises:

“The Act provides separate remedies in the circumstances mentioned in Sections 14, 15 and 29A of the Act. In any case, on 24.01.2022, the mandate of the sole arbitrator was not terminated. Therefore, the order dated 24.01.2022 does not have any impact on the decision of the petition under Section 29A…”

Thus, an unsuccessful Section 14/15 challenge does not preclude a successful Section 29A application if, subsequently, the statutory time limit expires and no award is made.

E. Error of the High Court

Given the above, the Court finds that:

The sole arbitrator’s mandate had already terminated by operation of law on 28.02.2023.
His “continuation” as arbitrator, by mere extension of time without substitution, was impermissible once the mandate had ceased.
The High Court “erred in granting an extension when the mandate of the sole arbitrator had ceased to exist.”

Accordingly, the Supreme Court:

Quashes the High Court’s order dated 22.04.2025.
Declares that the mandate of the sole arbitrator “stands terminated by operation of law”.
Appoints a new sole arbitrator (a former High Court judge) as the substitute arbitrator.

F. Relief Granted and Continuity of Proceedings

In exercise of its powers, the Court:

Appoints Justice Najmi Waziri (Retd.) as the substitute sole arbitrator.
Directs that:
- The arbitral proceedings “shall resume from the stage already attained”.
- The arbitration must be concluded within six months from the date the new arbitrator receives a copy of the order.

This direction is grounded in Section 29A(6) and (7), which ensure that substitution of an arbitrator does not invalidate earlier steps in the proceedings and that the reconstituted tribunal is deemed a continuation of the previous one.

Interestingly, while much of the parties’ argument revolved around alleged overcharging of fees and administrative expenses in violation of the earlier High Court orders, the Supreme Court resolves the matter entirely on the Section 29A/time-limit axis. It does not need to decide the factual controversies over fees; instead, it holds that the statutory consequence of expiry of mandate is sufficient to require substitution.

VII. Simplifying the Key Legal Concepts

1. “Functus Officio”

“Functus officio” is a Latin term meaning “having performed his office”. In arbitration, once an arbitrator has:

Rendered the final award; or
Lost legal authority (for example, due to time expiry under Section 29A without extension),

the arbitrator becomes functus officio, i.e., he has no further power to act in that arbitration save for limited post-award functions (like correcting typographical errors).

In this case, the Court holds that the arbitrator became functus officio on 28.02.2023 due to the expiry of the Section 29A timeline without a valid court extension.

2. Party Autonomy and Section 29A

“Party autonomy” is a foundational principle of arbitration: parties are generally free to choose:

Their arbitrator(s);
The procedural rules; and
The seat and place of arbitration.

Section 29A tempers this autonomy by imposing a mandatory time limit for making the award. As explained in Rohan Builders and acknowledged here:

The term “terminate” in Section 29A(4) enforces the parties’ initial choice to have a speedy resolution, but
The ability to apply to court under Section 29A(5) preserves a controlled avenue for extension when justified.

Thus, party autonomy is preserved within a statutory framework that prioritises timeliness.

3. Distinction Between Sections 14/15 and Section 29A

It is crucial to differentiate:

Sections 14 and 15:
- Deal with qualitative problems with an arbitrator (ineligibility, bias, incapacity, unjustified delay).
- Lead to termination of mandate and substitution because the arbitrator is not fit or able to continue.
Section 29A:
- Deals with a temporal problem—delay in making the award beyond fixed periods.
- Even a competent and impartial arbitrator loses his mandate if he does not make the award in time and no extension is granted.

They are distinct paths; losing on one (e.g., inability to prove bias under Section 14) does not bar a party from relying on the other (e.g., expiry of the time limit under Section 29A).

4. Arbitrator’s Fees vs Administrative Expenses

The dispute here also touched upon:

Arbitrator’s fee, which must be in line with the Fourth Schedule where applicable; and
Administrative expenses, which can be charged on actuals but should be transparent and reasonable.

While the Delhi High Court directed compliance with the Fourth Schedule and transparency in administrative expenses, the Supreme Court chose to decide the appeal solely on the expiry-of-mandate issue, leaving the detailed fee dispute largely academic once the arbitrator was substituted.

5. COVID-19 Extension Orders and Arbitration Timelines

The Supreme Court’s COVID-19 orders, culminating in Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, In re (2022) 3 SCC 117, directed that specified periods during the pandemic be excluded in computing limitation/periods prescribed under general and special laws.

In this case, by applying those orders to Section 29A’s timelines, the Court effectively:

Shifted the 12-month deadline,
Ensured that parties and arbitrators were not prejudiced by delays directly attributable to the pandemic, and
Still enforced the post-pandemic time limit strictly once normalcy resumed.

6. Substitution and Continuation of Proceedings

Many parties fear that substituting an arbitrator may force the arbitration to restart. Section 29A(6) and (7), and the Court’s directions here, dispel that concern:

The new arbitrator steps into the shoes of the old one.
The proceedings continue from “the stage already reached”.
All existing evidence and material are deemed to have been received by the new arbitrator.

This mechanism balances the need to address time expiry and loss of confidence with the need to avoid duplication of effort and cost.

VIII. Impact and Implications

1. For Arbitrators

Arbitrators must be acutely aware of Section 29A timelines; failure to deliver an award within time, without obtaining extension, now clearly results in loss of mandate.
Once the mandate has expired and no Section 29A(5) application is pending, arbitrators cannot take further steps in the proceedings on their own initiative.
Where parties apply for extension after expiry, courts are now more likely—and, following this judgment, arguably bound—to substitute the arbitrator rather than merely extending his tenure.

2. For Parties and Counsel

They must track:
- The date the arbitral tribunal enters reference;
- The six-month pleadings period under Section 23(4);
- The 12-month period under Section 29A(1); and
- Any consensual extension under Section 29A(3).
Applications under Section 29A(5) should ideally be made before expiry. Waiting until after expiry risks automatic termination of mandate and replacement of the chosen arbitrator.
Even if earlier attempts to remove the arbitrator under Sections 14 and 15 have failed, parties can rely on Section 29A if the time limit is eventually breached.

3. For Courts

The judgment nudges courts towards an understanding that:
- Once the mandate has expired, their role under Section 29A(6) is not merely to rubber-stamp an extension.
- Substitution, in such cases, is the default mechanism for giving effect to the legislative intent of speedy, efficient arbitration.
Courts must carefully consider:
- Whether the delay is attributable to the tribunal or the parties;
- Whether continuing with the same arbitrator is compatible with expedition and fairness; and
- Whether substitution better serves justice and the Act’s objectives.

4. On the Broader Arbitration Landscape

This decision reinforces several trends in Indian arbitration law:

Time discipline: The Supreme Court is willing to enforce Section 29A strictly, including by terminating mandates and compelling substitution.
Judicial oversight with pro-arbitration intent: While respecting party autonomy, courts will intervene to prevent arbitrations from drifting indefinitely, thereby promoting investor confidence and India’s position as an arbitration-friendly jurisdiction.
COVID-19 as a finite buffer: The pandemic period is recognised and excluded, but once that special period is over, the statutory timelines resume full force.

IX. Conclusion

Mohan Lal Fatehpuria v. M/s Bharat Textiles & Ors. provides clear guidance on the consequences of failing to adhere to the statutorily prescribed timelines for arbitration under Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The Supreme Court:

Confirms that once the Section 29A period (as recalculated after excluding the COVID-19 suspension) expires without a court-ordered extension, the arbitrator’s mandate terminates by operation of law and he becomes functus officio.
Treats Section 29A(6) as imposing, in such a scenario, not merely a power but a duty on the court to substitute the arbitrator, rather than allowing an arbitrator with an expired mandate to continue.
Clarifies that Section 29A is a standalone remedial provision, unaffected by earlier unsuccessful challenges under Sections 14 and 15.
Applies the COVID-19 limitation extension jurisprudence to arbitration timelines, striking a balance between fairness during extraordinary times and strict time-bound resolution thereafter.

In the broader legal context, this judgment underscores the Supreme Court’s commitment to ensuring that arbitration in India remains not only party-driven but also time-efficient. It signals to arbitrators and parties alike that the statutory clock under Section 29A is real, enforceable, and has concrete consequences, including the automatic termination of mandate and mandatory substitution when the limit is breached. As such, it will likely shape future judicial responses to delays in arbitration and influence how arbitrations are managed, monitored, and conducted across the country.

Expiry of Arbitral Mandate and Mandatory Substitution under Section 29A(6): Commentary on Mohan Lal Fatehpuria v. M/s Bharat Textiles & Ors., 2025 INSC 1409