Expansive Powers of Maintenance Tribunals to Protect Abandoned Senior Citizens and Their Property: Commentary on The Bandra Holy Family Hospital Society and Anr v. State of Maharashtra and Ors

I. Introduction

This writ petition before the Bombay High Court (Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction), decided on 17 November 2025 by a Division Bench of A.S. Gadkari and Ranjitsinha Raja Bhonsale JJ., arises from a deeply troubling factual situation: a 76‑year‑old mother, Mrs. Mohini Puri, allegedly abandoned by her only son (Respondent No. 3, Amit Puri) in an intensive care unit (ICU) of a charitable hospital, with mounting unpaid bills and a dispute over alleged medical negligence.

The petitioners are:

• Petitioner No. 1: The Bandra Holy Family Hospital Society – a public charitable trust running the hospital; and
• Petitioner No. 2: The Bandra Holy Family Hospital – the treating institution.

They approached the High Court not to enforce their monetary claim, but as self‑described “temporary guardians on good Samaritan basis” of the patient, seeking:

• Directions to the police (Respondent No. 1) to take charge of the patient and shift her to her residence; and
• Directions to the Senior Citizens Tribunal (Respondent No. 2) to act under the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 (“Senior Citizens Act” or “Welfare Act, 2007”).

Against the backdrop of:

• a senior citizen in long‑term ICU care;
• a son refusing discharge, disputing the line of treatment, and declining to pay around ₹16 lakh in outstanding dues; and
• perceived inaction by the police and the Senior Citizen Tribunal,

the Court was forced to address not only the immediate problem of the patient’s care, but also systemic issues about:

• the State’s constitutional duty to ensure health care;
• the statutory duties of children to maintain their parents;
• the scope of powers of Maintenance Tribunals under Section 23 of the Senior Citizens Act, particularly over property; and
• the possible interplay with the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 and the Maharashtra Medicare Service Persons and Institutions (Prevention of Violence and Damage or Loss to Property) Act, 2010.

This judgment thus serves both as a sharp factual intervention in a case of alleged abandonment and as an important doctrinal development on the interpretation of welfare legislation, especially the Senior Citizens Act.

II. Summary of the Judgment

1. Factual Findings

Key factual findings from the Court’s narration include:

• Mrs. Mohini Puri, aged 76, was admitted on 24 August 2025 to Holy Family Hospital with serious neurological issues and in a malnourished state (45 kg at 5 ft height).
• She was treated in ICU, stabilised, and by 4 October 2025 was medically fit for discharge and home care.
• Respondent No. 3 (her son), after paying ₹4,25,000, disputed the line of treatment on alleged grounds of medical negligence, refused to clear the outstanding (~₹16,00,000), refused to sign consents, obstructed treatment at times, and ultimately refused to take discharge or take his mother home.
• The hospital repeatedly warned him about the risks of prolonged ICU stay and potential hospital‑acquired infection.
• The hospital complained to the police and to the Senior Citizen Tribunal about what it considered to be abandonment and requested State intervention. Both authorities largely failed to act.
• When the Court explored a solution, the son:
  • said he could not pay more than ₹1 lakh (which he deposited without prejudice);
  • insisted on 15 days to obtain a second opinion; and
  • refused to give any undertaking to the Court to care for his mother, and then left the Court premises.

The Bench described the son’s conduct as “unpardonable”, prima facie amounting to abandonment within the meaning of Sections 24 and 25 of the Senior Citizens Act, and noted that he lived in a flat standing in his mother’s name.

2. Core Legal Conclusions

The Court reaches several inter‑linked conclusions:

1. Right to health is part of Article 21: The State has a constitutional duty to ensure necessary medical care and cannot plead financial constraints when life and health are at stake.
2. Children have a statutory and social obligation to maintain parents: This obligation under the Senior Citizens Act is unconditional and arises by virtue of the parent‑child relationship itself, independent of any property transfer.
3. Liberal interpretation of welfare legislation: The Senior Citizens Act and Disabilities Act must be construed purposively to further their social and protective objects. Narrow readings are disfavoured.
4. Section 23(2) Senior Citizens Act is to be read widely:
   • It is not confined to voiding transfers of property coupled with maintenance conditions (which is the subject of Section 23(1)).
   • It enables Maintenance Tribunals to issue protective orders over senior citizens’ property (including injunctions, restraint orders and eviction) as an incident of enforcing the right to maintenance and welfare.
5. Maintenance Tribunal’s suo motu powers are robust: Under Section 5(1)(c) read with Sections 22(2), 23(2)-(3), the Tribunal can and should act on its own where there is evidence of neglect or abandonment, including to secure and preserve the senior citizen’s movable and immovable properties.
6. Police and Tribunal failed in their statutory duties: The Court expressly condemns the inaction and misdirected efforts of both, describing it as “complete dereliction” and “deliberate omission” to perform their duties.
7. Potential application of Disabilities Act: The Court leaves it open to the State to consider whether the patient qualifies as a “person with disability” under Section 2(s) of the Disabilities Act and whether protections against abuse, neglect and exploitation under Sections 6, 7, 12, 13 should be invoked.

3. Operative Directions

To resolve the immediate situation while also protecting the senior citizen’s rights, the Court issues detailed directions, including:

• Transfer to a Government Hospital:
  • Respondent No. 3 must, before 9:00 a.m. on 18 November 2025, ensure discharge of his mother from Holy Family Hospital and her shifting to the ICU of Bhabha Hospital, Bandra, under his consent and supervision and with Bhabha’s medical team.
  • He must bear the cost of shifting, medicines and treatment at Bhabha, as per weaker‑section/charity or CGHS rates, whichever is lower.
  • If he fails to comply, the State Government is directed to take over: the State must shift her (after examination by a government medical team and with medical supervision in transit) to Bhabha or another government hospital and provide all required treatment at State expense.
• Directions to Police (Respondent No. 1):
  • To take immediate action on the hospital’s complaint dated 4 October 2025 and letters of 22 and 29 October 2025 “in accordance with law”.
• Directions to Senior Citizen Tribunal (Respondent No. 2):
  • To consider the hospital’s representation dated 22 October 2025;
  • To take all necessary steps under the Senior Citizens Act, particularly Sections 5 and 23;
  • To protect the property and interests of the patient/senior citizen for her well‑being and care.
• Money already deposited:
  • The ₹1,00,000 deposited in Court by the son is to be transferred to the Maintenance Tribunal, which will pass orders regarding its application in accordance with law.
• Interim property protection:
  • The son is restrained from dealing with any property of Mrs. Mohini Puri, including the Bandra flat, without prior leave of the Court.
  • Within a week, he must file an affidavit disclosing all movable and immovable properties of his mother and any such properties in his use/possession/occupation or knowledge.
• Hospital’s civil remedies preserved:
  • The hospital is expressly given liberty to pursue appropriate legal remedies to recover its monetary claims against the son.
  • The Court clarifies that it is not adjudicating the issue of medical negligence or bill recovery in this writ.
• Monitoring:
  • The matter is listed for reporting compliance on 24 November 2025.

III. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. Paschim Banga Khet Mazdoor Samity v. State of West Bengal (1996) 4 SCC 37

This landmark decision established that the right to timely medical treatment is part of Article 21. The Supreme Court held that:

“it is the constitutional obligation of the State to provide adequate medical services to the people… [and] failure on the part of a government hospital to provide timely medical treatment… results in a violation of his right to life guaranteed under Article 21.”

The Bombay High Court invokes this case (para 10) to:

• Reaffirm that health and medical facilities are integral to the right to life; and
• Anchor its direction that the State must take over the patient’s care if the son fails, and cannot justify inaction on grounds of financial constraints.

2. Common Cause v. Union of India (2018) 5 SCC 1

Though primarily concerned with advance directives and passive euthanasia, this case is cited (para 10.1) for its general approach: fundamental rights, especially Article 21, must be interpreted liberally, dynamically and expansively, keeping in view the dignity of life.

The High Court leverages this interpretive approach to:

• Justify reading the Senior Citizens Act and Disabilities Act in an expansive, purposive manner; and
• Bolster its view that the right to a dignified and healthy life for senior citizens must inform statutory interpretation.

3. Vijaya Manohar Arbat v. Kashirao Rajaram Sawai (1987) 2 SCC 278

This decision emphasised that the obligation to maintain parents extends equally to daughters and sons and is a social obligation. The Bombay High Court cites it (para 10.2) to underline that:

• Children, irrespective of gender, have a social and now statutory duty to maintain their parents.
• The son’s conduct here is a gross abdication of that duty.

4. Badshah v. Urmila Badshah Godse (2014) 1 SCC 188 and Rajnesh v. Neha (2021) 2 SCC 324

These decisions reiterate that maintenance jurisprudence should be guided by social justice, especially for vulnerable groups like wives, children and parents.

The High Court references them (para 10.3) to affirm:

• Courts must advance social justice for marginalised persons, including elderly parents abandoned by their children; and
• This perspective justifies a pro‑beneficiary approach in construing the Senior Citizens Act.

5. S. Vanitha v. Deputy Commissioner, Bengaluru Urban District (2021) 15 SCC 730

In S. Vanitha, the Supreme Court analysed the Senior Citizens Act vis‑à‑vis the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act. It reproduced the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Senior Citizens Act (quoted in para 10.4 of the present judgment), emphasizing:

• the breakdown of the joint family system;
• the vulnerability of older persons, especially widows;
• the need for simple, inexpensive and speedy maintenance mechanisms.

Later, the High Court relies on Vanitha (para 26) for the proposition that:

“Tribunals under the Act may order eviction if it is necessary and expedient to ensure the protection of the senior citizen.”

This becomes a crucial stepping stone for the Court to:

• Recognise that protective and eviction orders are within the powers of the Maintenance Tribunal under Section 23; and
• Justify its broader reading of Section 23(2) to include property‑preservation orders as part of enforcing the senior citizen’s right to maintenance and dignified life.

6. K.H. Nazar v. Mathew K. Jacob (2020) 14 SCC 126

This case is cited (para 11.1) for general principles of interpreting beneficial or welfare statutes:

• They must receive a liberal, purpose‑oriented construction.
• Literal interpretation should be avoided if it undermines the legislative intention.
• Exclusionary or exemption clauses must be construed strictly, so that the main protective scheme is not diluted.

By relying on Nazar (and the chain of cases cited therein), the High Court legitimises:

• its decision to read the Senior Citizens Act broadly in favour of senior citizens; and
• its conclusion that the Maintenance Tribunal’s powers under Sections 5, 22 and 23 must be construed widely to enable property protection and eviction where needed.

IV. Legal Reasoning and Doctrinal Analysis

1. Right to Health as an Aspect of Article 21

The Court begins by reiterating that:

• Article 21 is not confined to mere animal existence; it includes the right to live with dignity, which in turn encompasses health and access to medical care.
• Following Paschim Banga, the State cannot rely on financial constraints to shirk its obligation to provide adequate medical facilities.

This constitutional foundation is then linked to:

• the duty of the State to step in when private family support collapses or is actively withheld; and
• the Court’s direction that, upon the son’s default, the government must immediately take charge of the patient’s treatment at its own cost.

2. Nature and Scope of Children’s Duty under the Senior Citizens Act

The Court carefully parses the statutory definitions in Section 2 of the Senior Citizens Act:

• “Children” (Section 2(a)) – includes sons, daughters, grandsons and granddaughters.
• “Maintenance” (Section 2(b)) – includes food, clothing, residence, medical attendance and treatment.
• “Parent” (Section 2(d)) – includes biological, adoptive and step-parents.
• “Senior citizen” (Section 2(h)) – any citizen aged 60 or above.
• “Welfare” (Section 2(k)) – includes provisions for health care, recreation and other amenities.

From these, the Court reasons (paras 23–24):

• The Act casts an unconditional statutory obligation on children to maintain their parents.
• While a “relative” is obliged to maintain only if in possession of or entitled to inherit property, a child’s duty is not contingent on property; it is “cast by birth and is unconditional”, apart from being a moral and pious duty.
• Maintenance includes medical attendance and treatment, so refusing to care for a parent in critical medical need directly violates this statutory duty.

In the instant case:

• Respondent No. 3 is an earning son.
• He resides in a flat owned by his mother.
• He refuses both to pay for her ongoing care (beyond a token ₹1 lakh) and to take discharge and arrange alternate treatment.

On these facts, the Court holds that his conduct prima facie amounts to “exposure and abandonment” of a senior citizen within the meaning of Section 24, attracting the penal regime under Section 25.

3. Interpretation of Welfare Statutes: The Beneficial Construction Principle

The Court dedicates a critical portion of its reasoning (paras 11–12, 24–25) to statutory interpretation:

• Welfare/social/beneficial legislation, such as the Senior Citizens Act and Disabilities Act, must receive a liberal, elastic and broad interpretation.
• Courts must adopt an interpretation that furthers the aims and objects of such statutes, not one that undermines them.
• Exclusionary provisions must be construed strictly, ensuring that the protective core remains broad.

Applying this to the Senior Citizens Act, the Court says (para 25.4):

“the Welfare Act, 2007, being a welfare legislation must be interpreted in a liberal manner to advance the aims and objects of the Act… in a liberal manner, and to the advantage of the Senior Citizens so as to ensure that it furthers the very social purpose and welfare of the parents and senior citizens.”

This interpretive stance is then concretely applied to Section 23, a provision often litigated and typically associated with voiding conditional transfers of property.

4. Expanded Reading of Section 23 Senior Citizens Act: From Void Transfers to Property Protection

(a) The conventional reading

Traditionally, Section 23 is read as follows:

• Section 23(1): deals with situations where a senior citizen has, after the Act came into force, transferred property (by gift or otherwise) subject to the condition that the transferee will provide basic amenities and needs. If the transferee fails, the transfer is deemed to have been procured by fraud/coercion/undue influence and may be declared void at the option of the transferor.
• Section 23(2): deals with enforcement of a senior citizen’s right to receive maintenance out of an estate that has been transferred; such right can be enforced against the transferee who had notice of the right or if the transfer is gratuitous.

Many cases have focused on undoing transfers or granting eviction where parents had gifted property in expectation of maintenance.

(b) The Court’s broader construction

The Bombay High Court accepts that Section 23(1) does not apply on the facts (no pleaded post‑Act conditional transfer), but then turns to Section 23(2).

Key interpretive moves:

• The Act’s definition of “property” (Section 2(f)) includes rights and interests in property, not just the physical asset itself.
• The expression “transfer” is not defined; therefore, in line with beneficial interpretation, it must be read broadly, not in a narrow technical sense.
• Section 23(2) deals with the enforcement of a “right to receive maintenance out of an estate”; this right, the Court says, is “complete and comprehensive in its nature”.

From this, the Court derives an important legal principle (paras 25.2–25.3, 26–28):

• To effectively enforce the right to maintenance, the Tribunal must be able to protect the underlying property from misuse or dissipation by children/relatives who are in breach of their duty.
• Therefore, the Tribunal’s powers under Section 23(2) and 23(3), read with Section 22(2), include:
  • issuing restraint/injunction orders against dealing with senior citizens’ properties;
  • passing eviction orders where necessary for the safety and economic security of the senior citizen; and
  • taking other protective steps to secure movable and immovable assets, ensuring they are available to fund the senior citizen’s maintenance and medical needs.
• Such orders are not incidental or peripheral; they are “intrinsically linked” to the statute’s objective of providing simple, speedy and effective relief to elderly persons.

In the words of the Court (para 27):

“It is well within and in furtherance of the aims and objectives of the Welfare Act, 2007 to protect the property of the senior citizen when they are abandoned by their own loved near and dear ones… In doing so the State will only ensure securing and enforcing to its fullest the fundamental right to life including health as guaranteed under the Constitution of India.”

Applied to the present case:

• The patient’s Bandra flat is in her name.
• The son is in occupation but has, prima facie, abandoned her in hospital.
• The Court triggers the protective logic of Section 23(2) by:
  • restraining the son from dealing with any of her properties without leave; and
  • directing the Tribunal to consider issuing further protective orders over her movable and immovable assets.
• The Court underscores (para 28) that while section 23(1) is inapplicable, section 23(2) read with 22(2) can and should be invoked to secure and protect the patient’s interests.

5. Suo Motu Powers of the Maintenance Tribunal

Section 5(1)(c) of the Senior Citizens Act authorises the Tribunal to take cognizance suo motu of cases requiring maintenance orders. The Court stresses that:

• Once put on notice (such as via the hospital’s complaint), the Tribunal must not remain passive.
• It has a statutory duty to act proactively in furtherance of the Act’s objects, particularly when there is a prima facie case of neglect or abandonment and the senior citizen may be unable to approach the Tribunal themselves.

The Court is unsparing in its criticism of Respondent No. 2 (the Tribunal) for failing to respond even to written complaints:

• It calls this “complete dereliction and abduction of their duties”, and a “deliberate omission” (para 16).
• It emphasises that such inaction defeats the very purpose and object of the Act.

By directing the Tribunal to act on the hospital’s representation and the deposited ₹1 lakh, the Court is operationalising the Tribunal’s suo motu and remedial jurisdiction under Sections 5, 22 and 23.

6. Police Duties and Penal Consequences for Abandonment

Sections 24 and 25 of the Senior Citizens Act:

• Make “exposure and abandonment” of a senior citizen an offence; and
• Declare all offences under the Act to be cognizable and bailable, triable summarily.

The Court holds that once the State steps in to care for the patient because the son fails to do so (as contemplated in its directions), his conduct would “automatically” fall within the ambit of Sections 24 and 25 (para 32).

It criticises the Senior Inspector of Bandra Police Station for:

• treating the matter as a mere dispute between hospital and son, rather than an urgent issue of a senior citizen’s right to life;
• failing to take effective measures to shift the patient to a Government hospital and initiate legal action; and
• responding inadequately despite detailed complaints from the hospital.

Consequently, the police are directed to take “immediate steps in accordance with law” on the hospital’s complaints.

7. Interplay with the Disabilities Act and the Medicare Service Act

(a) Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016

The petitioners argued that, given the patient’s medical condition, she qualifies as a “person with disability” under Section 2(s) of the Disabilities Act and is thus entitled to:

• protection from cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment (Section 6);
• protection from abuse, violence and exploitation, and provision of legal remedies against such incidents (Section 7);
• access to justice (Section 12); and
• full legal capacity to own, inherit and control property and financial affairs (Section 13).

The Court adopts a cautious stance (para 29):

• It acknowledges that the Disabilities Act is also a welfare law, to be interpreted liberally.
• It notes a “possible view” that abandonment in such circumstances can amount to “inhuman and degrading treatment”, falling within the protections of Sections 6 and 7.
• However, it refrains from conclusively applying the Act, instead leaving it to the State Government to consider whether the patient qualifies and what steps should be taken.

What is important doctrinally is that the Court:

• Recognises neglect and abandonment as forms of abuse and exploitation of persons with disabilities; and
• Reminds the State of its duty to take cognizance of such incidents and provide legal remedies.

(b) Maharashtra Medicare Service Persons and Service Institutions Act, 2010

This State statute criminalises violence against healthcare personnel and damage to hospital property, and provides a mechanism to aid victims of medical negligence. The Court notes (para 30) that:

• It offers recourse to victims of medical negligence under Section 7; and
• Parties remain free to invoke it as advised.

Significantly, the Court refuses to treat the son’s allegation of medical negligence as a justification for non‑payment or abandonment. It separates:

• his right to pursue remedies for alleged negligence through appropriate forums; from
• his non‑delegable duty to care for his mother and pay at least admitted dues or make alternate arrangements.

8. Hospital as “Temporary Guardian” and Good Samaritan

A striking feature of this case is the posture of the hospital:

• It came to Court not primarily to recover its dues, but to secure the patient’s welfare and discharge.
• It styled itself as a temporary guardian on a “good Samaritan basis” (paras 5.22, 15.1, 31).

The Court:

• Expressly notes that the hospital has continued to care for the patient despite unpaid dues and allegations of negligence (para 15.1);
• States that, on the limited medical record, it can see no fault prima facie with the treatment provided (while reserving the issue of negligence for proper adjudication elsewhere); and
• Accepts the hospital’s standing to move the writ petition in the interest of the patient’s right to life and health.

Doctrinally, this implicitly recognises that:

• Hospitals, especially charitable institutions, may in appropriate cases act as provisional guardians ad litem for incapacitated patients; and
• Courts can and should respond flexibly to such “good Samaritan” approaches when State machinery and family have failed.

V. Simplifying Complex Legal Concepts

1. “Welfare” or “Beneficial” Legislation

A welfare or beneficial law is one that is designed mainly to protect and improve the position of a vulnerable group – here, elderly parents and senior citizens, and possibly persons with disabilities.

Courts treat such laws differently from ordinary commercial or penal statutes:

• When in doubt, they prefer an interpretation that helps the protected group.
• They avoid narrow, literal readings that would defeat the statute’s social purpose.
• Exceptions or exclusions (for example, clauses that take certain cases outside the law) are read strictly, so that the law’s general protection remains broad.

2. “Abandonment” of a Senior Citizen

Under Section 24 of the Senior Citizens Act, abandonment occurs when:

• a person who has the care or protection of a senior citizen;
• leaves the senior citizen at any place;
• with the intention of wholly abandoning the senior citizen.

The judgment illustrates this in a hospital setting:

• The son admitted his mother, but then refused to take her home or arrange alternate care even when she was medically fit for discharge.
• He would not undertake before the Court to care for her in future, and left the Court.
• This, combined with refusal to pay and prolonged absence, is treated as a prima facie case of abandonment.

3. Suo Motu Cognizance

“Suo motu” means “on its own motion”. When a statute gives a Tribunal the power to act suo motu, it means:

• The Tribunal does not have to wait for a formal complaint by the affected person.
• If it becomes aware (through letters, media, complaints by third parties, or otherwise) that a senior citizen is being neglected or abandoned, it can:
  • initiate proceedings on its own;
  • summon the persons responsible; and
  • grant relief such as maintenance or protection orders.

Section 5(1)(c) of the Senior Citizens Act recognises this power. The Court holds that failing to use it in a case like this is a dereliction of duty.

4. “Deeming Fiction” in Section 23(1)

The Court refers to Section 23(1) creating a “deeming fiction”. This means:

• In law, when certain facts occur (e.g., a senior citizen transfers property conditional on maintenance, and maintenance is not provided), the law treats that transfer as if it was obtained by fraud, coercion or undue influence, even if no such wrongdoing is actually proven.
• The Tribunal can then declare the transfer void at the senior citizen’s option, without having to examine traditional property or contract law doctrines in detail.

While Section 23(1) was not directly applicable in this case, understanding this device helps explain why the Court was willing to interpret Section 23(2) expansively in favour of protecting property for maintenance.

VI. Impact and Future Significance

1. Strengthening Senior Citizens’ Rights and Remedies

This judgment has several important implications for the rights of senior citizens:

• It confirms that abandonment in a hospital setting can attract penal consequences under Sections 24 and 25.
• It underscores that the State’s duty under Article 21 is triggered when family support collapses, especially in life‑threatening health situations.
• It clarifies that legal recourse is not confined to maintenance orders; property‑protection orders (injunctions, restraints, eviction) are also within the Tribunal’s remit.

2. Expanded Role of Maintenance Tribunals

The decision materially strengthens the functioning mandate of Maintenance Tribunals:

• They are expected to act proactively, even suo motu, when reliable information of neglect/abandonment arises.
• They may:
  • freeze or restrain dealings with senior citizens’ assets;
  • order eviction of defaulting children/relatives if necessary to secure the senior citizen’s residence and financial stability; and
  • use deposited monies (such as the ₹1 lakh here) for the senior citizen’s immediate maintenance and care.
• This moves the Tribunal’s role from a narrow “maintenance‑fixing body” to a more holistic protector of senior citizens’ economic and personal security.

3. Accountability of Police and Administrative Authorities

The Court’s criticism of:

• the Senior Inspector (for misdirected and inadequate action); and
• the Senior Citizen Tribunal (for total inaction),

sends a strong institutional message:

• Welfare statutes are not optional or decorative; they impose enforceable duties on enforcement agencies.
• Failure to act in cases of abandonment can itself amount to constitutional and statutory dereliction.

4. Guidance for Hospitals and Healthcare Institutions

For hospitals, particularly charitable hospitals, the judgment:

• Confirms that they can approach High Courts as “good Samaritans” when a patient is effectively abandoned and State mechanisms fail to respond.
• Clarifies that disputes over medical negligence or billing do not justify indefinite ICU occupancy without payment when the patient is fit for discharge.
• Encourages hospitals to:
  • document abandonment or neglect carefully;
  • promptly inform police and Maintenance Tribunals; and
  • seek directions to shift patients to government hospitals if private care is no longer sustainable and family refuses responsibility.

5. Interaction with Disabilities and Human Rights Frameworks

While leaving detailed application open, the judgment:

• Connects elder abandonment with abuse and exploitation of persons with disabilities, where illness has rendered the senior citizen functionally disabled.
• Signals that the Disabilities Act’s provisions on protection from inhuman treatment, access to justice and legal capacity in property and financial matters may be invoked in similar cases.
• Reminds authorities like police and tribunals that they may also fall within the ambit of “local authorities” obliged to act under that Act.

VII. Conclusion: Key Takeaways

The judgment in The Bandra Holy Family Hospital Society and Anr v. State of Maharashtra and Ors is significant on multiple levels.

At the human level, it responds to the stark reality of a frail, 76‑year‑old woman left in an ICU by her only son, who denies financial and emotional support while litigating alleged medical negligence. The Court’s unequivocal moral condemnation underscores that filial duties are not merely sentimental expectations but legal obligations.

At the doctrinal level, the Court:

• Reaffirms the right to health and medical care as part of Article 21.
• Clarifies the unconditional duty of children under the Senior Citizens Act to maintain their parents, including medical care.
• Adopts a strong beneficial‑construction approach to welfare statutes, especially the Senior Citizens Act and, potentially, the Disabilities Act.
• Broadens the understanding of Section 23(2) of the Senior Citizens Act, affirming that Maintenance Tribunals can and should:
  • protect and preserve senior citizens’ property;
  • issue injunctions and eviction orders where necessary; and
  • act suo motu to secure their welfare and financial security.
• Holds police and tribunals to account for dereliction of statutory duties in cases of elder abandonment.

At the remedial level, the Court:

• Ensures continuity of medical care by directing transfer to a government hospital at the son’s or State’s cost;
• Imposes interim restraints on the son’s dealings with the mother’s property; and
• Channels the son’s token deposit to the Maintenance Tribunal for appropriate use.

Taken together, this judgment marks an important precedent in Indian elder law. It signals that when children fail in their duty to care for their aged parents, the law will not hesitate to:

• intervene to secure medical care through the State;
• treat such failure as a potential criminal offence of abandonment; and
• mobilise property‑protection powers so that the senior citizen’s own assets can be preserved and marshalled for their welfare.

In doing so, the Court reinforces the promise of the Constitution that the twilight years of citizens will not be left entirely at the mercy of family goodwill, but will be undergirded by enforceable legal rights and responsive institutions.