Executive Policy Cannot Supplant Statutory Recruitment Rules or Derail Ongoing Selections: The Supreme Court’s Tripura Trilogy

Case: Partha Das & Ors. v. State of Tripura & Ors. (with connected appeals) — 2025 INSC 1049

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: J.K. Maheshwari, J.; Rajesh Bindal, J.

Date: 28 August 2025

Introduction

This set of appeals required the Supreme Court to decide whether a newly adopted executive recruitment policy in Tripura—framed after a change of government—could be used to pause and then cancel ongoing selection processes that had been substantially conducted under statutory recruitment frameworks.

Three distinct recruitment streams were affected:

Enrolled Followers (Class-IV/Group-D) in Tripura State Rifles, governed by the Tripura State Rifles Act, 1983 and the Tripura State Rifles (Recruitment) Rules, 1984.
Tripura Civil Service (TCS) Grade-II and Tripura Police Service (TPS) Grade-II (Group-A, Gazetted), governed by rules framed under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution and regulations framed by the Governor in consultation with the Tripura Public Service Commission (TPSC).
Inspector of Boilers (Group-A, Gazetted), a technical post governed by a central statutory regime—the Boilers Act, 1923—read with central rules and Tripura’s recruitment rules framed under Section 29 and Article 309.

Central to all cases was Tripura’s “New Recruitment Policy” (NRP) dated 5 June 2018 and two executive memoranda—the Abeyance Memorandum (14 March 2018) keeping ongoing recruitments in suspension pending review, and the Cancellation Memorandum (20 August 2018) cancelling all ongoing recruitment processes other than the Tripura Judicial Service.

The Supreme Court addressed key issues:

Can an executive policy override statutory recruitment rules or change a selection process already underway?
Is a general assertion of “larger public interest” sufficient to justify cancelling a nearly-complete, statutorily-conducted selection?
What is the status of candidates’ rights when ongoing selections are halted—do they have a legitimate expectation of completion?
Does the NRP’s prospective clause allow retrospective application to ongoing recruitments?

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court allowed the appeals of candidates in all three streams and rejected the State’s reliance on the NRP to cancel ongoing selection processes:

Enrolled Followers (Tripura State Rifles): The Court quashed the Abeyance and Cancellation Memoranda as applied to this recruitment and directed the State to complete the process under the TSR Act and Rules within two months.
TCS/TPS: The State’s appeals were dismissed. The Court upheld High Court directions to declare main exam results and conduct personality tests under the statutory rules/regulations within four months.
Inspector of Boilers: The State’s appeal was dismissed. The Court directed completion of the process within two months under the Boilers Act and applicable rules.

Key holdings that unify the trilogy:

Executive instructions (NRP) cannot supplant statutory rules framed under an Act or under the proviso to Article 309; they may at best supplement gaps if the rules are silent.
No change of the “rules of the game” after the game has begun. A new policy cannot be imposed midstream on ongoing recruitments—especially to undo steps already completed (e.g., interview) or to rewrite marks/weightage fixed by rules.
Prospective application of the NRP (as expressly stated in clause (2)) bars its use against recruitment processes already underway.
“Larger public interest” must be evidenced. Mere incantation is insufficient; the State must place objective material showing why the ongoing, statutorily-conducted process is unfair or non-transparent. Tripura failed to do so.
Legitimate expectation of candidates to a fair, consistent, and predictable completion of recruitment was upheld, even though no indefeasible right to appointment arises merely from participation or provisional selection.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and How They Shaped the Decision

Sant Ram Sharma v. State of Rajasthan (1967): A Constitution Bench held that while executive instructions can fill gaps where statutory rules are silent, they cannot amend or override rules. This foundational principle framed the Court’s treatment of the NRP as an executive policy incapable of displacing statutory regimes governing each recruitment.
State of Haryana v. Shamsher Jang Bahadur (1972): Reiterated that executive instructions cannot add to or alter qualifications prescribed under rules framed under Article 309. The Court applied this to reject the State’s attempt to rewrite interview weightage/structure set by rules/regulations.
S.B. Patwardhan v. State of Maharashtra (1977) and P.D. Aggarwal v. State of U.P. (1987): Clarified that executive instructions—even if issued “by order and in the name of the Governor”—remain executive in character and cannot amend statutory rules. Used to characterise the NRP and related memoranda as executive directions under Article 166, not law.
K. Kuppusamy v. State Of T.N. (1998): The Tribunal erred in giving effect to a yet-to-be-amended policy contrary to rules. Until rules are amended, they bind. This directly undermined Tripura’s plea to apply NRP without amending the governing rules/regulations.
Ajaya Kumar Das v. State of Orissa (2011): Rules under Article 309 cannot be “tinkered” with by circulars; executive instructions cannot override statutory provisions. The Court invoked this to keep the recruitment anchored in the existing rules.
Bank of Baroda v. G. Palani (2022): Executive notes (“joint note”) cannot cut down rights under statutory regulations. Applied by analogy: NRP cannot take away procedures/rights embedded in statutory recruitment rules/regulations.
R. Ranjith Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu (2025): Executive orders providing reservations/seniority rules without amending statutory rules were invalid. The Court used this to emphasise that executive directions may supplement but cannot supplant statutory rules.
Tej Prakash Pathak v. Rajasthan High Court (Constitution Bench, 2025): Two core guideposts were drawn:
- Recruiting authorities may devise procedures or benchmarks only if rules are silent, and they must do so before the relevant stage begins; benchmarks cannot be set after a stage is completed—no changing rules mid-game (affirming K. Manjusree).
- Administrative instructions can supplement, not supplant, rules; rules must be obeyed where they occupy the field.
Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India (1991): No indefeasible right to appointment arises from inclusion in a select list; the State may decide not to fill all vacancies provided it acts non-arbitrarily. The Court balanced this with legitimate expectation.
Sivanandan C.T. v. High Court of Kerala (Constitution Bench, 2024): Fortified the doctrine of legitimate expectation rooted in good administration—consistency, transparency, predictability. To defeat a legitimate expectation, the State must place objective material showing public interest. Tripura’s broad claims failed this standard.

Legal Reasoning

1) Executive Policy vs Statutory Rules: The Occupied Field

In each stream, the selection process rested on statutory foundations:

TSR recruitment: The TSR Act, 1983 and TSR Rules, 1984 (with the DGP-authorised test sequence under Rule 24(e)).
TCS/TPS recruitment: Rules under Article 309, and Governor’s Regulations under Rule 6, setting the exam architecture—Prelims (200), Mains (800), Personality Test (100).
Inspector of Boilers: Central regime under the Boilers Act, 1923 and Central Rules on qualifications; State Rules under Section 29 read with Article 309 governing recruitment via TPSC.

The NRP and memoranda, issued under Article 166 (executive power), could not legally overwrite or nullify these statutory frameworks. The Court underscored the “supplement-not-supplant” rule: where rules are comprehensive on a subject, executive policy cannot contradict or displace them. Any change must come by amending the rules/regulations.

2) Prospective Application of the NRP

Clause (2) of the NRP expressly made it prospective. The State’s attempt to apply it to ongoing recruitments was thus self-defeating—even apart from the executive-vs-statutory hierarchy. The Court read the clause straightforwardly: the policy could govern future recruitments or recruitments initiated after amendments aligning rules with the NRP, but not ongoing processes.

3) No Changing Rules Midstream

Applying the NRP to ongoing processes would have:

Abolished the interview for Group-D Enrolled Followers even after interviews were held; or
Reduced the interview weightage to 10% for TCS/TPS despite rules/regulations fixing specific marks and stages; or
Recast the assessment structure for Inspector of Boilers after written tests and interviews were complete.

This violated the “no change mid-game” principle reaffirmed in Tej Prakash Pathak and K. Manjusree. The rules/regulations had already “occupied the field” with structured stages and weightages; executive policy could not retroactively undo completed stages or rewrite criteria post facto.

4) “Larger Public Interest” Requires Proof

Tripura asserted that cancellation would promote transparency and fairness by reducing interview weightage/abolishing interviews (for Group-D), the very objective of the NRP. The Court held:

Where ongoing selections were already conducted under statutory rules, the State had to show concrete reasons why those processes were unfair or tainted.
No objective material was produced; mere assertions were made.
Therefore, the State failed the Sivanandan standard for defeating legitimate expectations, and the actions were arbitrary under Articles 14 and 16.

5) Legitimate Expectation vs Indefeasible Right

The Court carefully balanced two doctrines:

No indefeasible right to appointment accrues from participation or provisional selection (Shankarsan Dash remains good law).
Legitimate expectation persists that the State will complete the process fairly and consistently with declared rules and past practice, unless objectively justified public interest demands otherwise (Sivanandan).

Here, the legitimate expectation was upheld; cancellation without cogent justification was set aside, and completion under extant rules was directed.

Application to Each Recruitment

A) Enrolled Followers (Tripura State Rifles)

Recruitment progressed through physical/endurance tests, written tests, and interviews (as authorised under Rule 24(e) and DGP approvals).
Provisional merit panels were prepared; character verification had commenced.
NRP would have abolished interviews for Group-D posts; but interviews had already been held, and rules had not been amended.
Held: Executive memoranda could not cancel the recruitment; NRP could not apply retroactively; completion within 2 months mandated under TSR Act/Rules.

B) TCS/TPS Grade-II (Group-A, Gazetted)

Statutory regime prescribed Prelims (200), Mains (800), Personality Test (100); two stages were complete; only personality tests remained.
NRP aimed to cap interviews at 10% of total marks; but that change required rule/regulation amendment, and NRP was prospective.
Held: State’s appeals dismissed. The selection must be completed under existing rules/regulations; main exam results to be declared and personality tests conducted within 4 months.

C) Inspector of Boilers (Group-A, Gazetted)

Central statutory framework (Boilers Act, 1923) governs qualifications; State recruitment via TPSC under rules framed under Article 309.
Written screening test and interview were completed; only result remained.
Held: NRP cannot retroactively alter selection architecture; completion ordered within 2 months under the Boilers Act and applicable rules.

Impact

Across India: State governments cannot use new executive policies to halt or recast ongoing recruitments that are governed by statutory rules/regulations. Any change requires formal amendment of rules and will ordinarily be prospective.
Post-election transitions: Cabinets often review recruitment practices after elections. This judgment squarely warns against “abeyance-cancellation” cycles that lack statutory footing and objective justification.
Recruitment architecture: Where interviews and weightages are embedded in rules/regulations, a policy preference to alter them must be implemented through rule-making, with transitional provisions for ongoing processes.
Administrative discipline: TPSC, Police Headquarters, and similar bodies must resist executive nudges to deviate from statutory prescripts midstream. They should insist on formal rule amendments before changing procedures.
Candidate rights: While no right to appointment arises, candidates can invoke legitimate expectation to compel fair completion of statutory processes and resist arbitrary cancellations cloaked in vague “public interest.”

Complex Concepts Simplified

Executive instructions: Orders, policies, or memoranda issued under Article 166 by the government. They are not law and cannot override statutes or rules.
Statutory rules: Rules made under an Act (e.g., TSR Act) or under the proviso to Article 309. They are “subordinate legislation” and legally binding.
Occupied field doctrine: When a statute/rule comprehensively covers a subject, executive policy cannot contradict it; at most, it can fill gaps if the rules are silent.
Prospective effect: A policy applies to future cases, not to ongoing processes already begun under earlier rules—unless the policy or amended rule clearly and lawfully provides otherwise.
Change of rules of the game: Changing selection criteria (e.g., stages, weightages, cut-offs) after a stage has been completed is impermissible; benchmarks must be set before that stage begins.
Indefeasible right: A guarantee to appointment. Candidates generally do not have this merely by being selected or placed on a list.
Legitimate expectation: A public law expectation that the State will act fairly, consistently, and predictably by finishing a selection under the rules announced—unless the State proves a compelling public interest for not doing so.
Larger public interest: Not a magic phrase. The State must produce concrete, objective reasons showing why a departure from the norm is necessary and lawful.

Guidance for Governments and Recruiting Bodies

If policy changes are desired (e.g., interview abolition or weightage caps), amend the relevant statutory rules/regulations first—after due consultation with bodies like TPSC where required.
Draft transitional provisions, expressly preserving ongoing recruitments under the old rules; apply new rules prospectively.
Avoid blanket “abeyance” and “cancellation” of ongoing recruitments; if unavoidable, record detailed reasons and evidence (e.g., systemic irregularities) and tailor remedies to the particular process.
Respect the stage-completion principle: do not insert or remove selection stages, benchmarks, or weightages after the stage is over.
Maintain audit-ready records to demonstrate fairness and transparency; this becomes crucial if a “public interest” justification is later asserted in court.

Conclusion and Key Takeaways

Core rule: Executive policy cannot override or undo statutory recruitment frameworks, especially midstream. Amend the rules; apply them prospectively.
Prospective clause binds: Where a policy says it operates prospectively (as Tripura’s NRP did), it cannot be invoked against ongoing processes.
No mid-game changes: Interview abolition or weightage changes cannot be imposed after interviews are conducted or where rules fix the selection architecture.
Public interest must be proven: Courts will not accept broad, unsubstantiated claims. The State bears a heavy burden to justify cancellation.
Candidate expectations protected: While there is no guaranteed right to appointment, candidates are entitled to the completion of selection in a fair, non-arbitrary, and predictable manner conforming to existing rules.

By quashing Tripura’s abeyance and cancellation measures (as applied to these recruitments) and directing completion under extant rules, the Supreme Court has re-anchored public recruitment in the rule of law, reinforced doctrinal clarity on the relationship between executive policy and statutory rules, and fortified the principle that fairness in public appointments is not merely aspirational—it is enforceable.