Exclusion of Time Between Judgment Pronouncement and Decree Signing Under Section 12(2) of the Indian Limitation Act

Exclusion of Time Between Judgment Pronouncement and Decree Signing Under Section 12(2) of the Indian Limitation Act

Introduction

The case of Jayashankar Mulshankar Mehta v. Shah Mayabhai Lalbhai adjudicated by the Bombay High Court on July 31, 1951, serves as a pivotal reference in interpreting the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, particularly Section 12(2). This case addresses the critical issue of whether the period elapsed between the pronouncement of a judgment and the signing of the corresponding decree should be excluded when calculating the limitation period for filing an appeal. The central parties involved include the appellants, Jayashankar Mulshankar Mehta, and the respondents, Shah Mayabhai Lalbhai, with the case escalating through various levels of the judiciary before reaching a full bench of the Bombay High Court.

Summary of the Judgment

The Bombay High Court was tasked with determining if the 59-day interval between the judgment pronouncement on May 1, 1948, and the decree signing on June 29, 1948, should be excluded under Section 12(2) of the Indian Limitation Act. The appellants contended that this period should be excluded as it was the time required for obtaining a certified copy of the decree. The District Court and Mr. Justice Dixit initially ruled that the appeal was out of time, asserting that the period should not be excluded. However, upon appeal, the High Court reversed this decision, emphasizing that the excluded time should be properly required and not attributable to the appellant's negligence. The High Court held that since the delay was not the appellant's fault, the entire 59-day period should indeed be excluded, rendering the appeal timely.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The judgment extensively references several precedents to substantiate its interpretation:

  • Murlidhar v. Motilal: Established that the time taken to prepare a decree should be excluded if not caused by the appellant's default.
  • Balappa Tammanna Tammannavar v. Dyamappa Bhusappa Mallapur: Reinforced that excluding the period between judgment and decree signing is contingent upon the appellant not being at fault.
  • Bhausaheb Jamburao v. Sonabai: Addressed the conditions under which the exclusion of time is applicable.
  • Keshar Sugar Works v. R.C Sharma: Presented an opposing view, emphasizing the need for appellants to take definite steps to obtain a copy of the decree.
  • Pramatha Nath Roy v. Lee: From the Privy Council, highlighted that the exclusion depends on whether the time was properly required.

These cases collectively influenced the High Court's stance, balancing the need to prevent appellants from being unfairly penalized for judicial delays while ensuring procedural diligence.

Legal Reasoning

The core legal question revolved around the interpretation of Section 12(2) of the Indian Limitation Act, which stipulates that the time required for obtaining a copy of the decree is excluded when computing the limitation period for an appeal. The High Court delved into the semantics of "time requisite" and "obtaining" as used in the statute. It concluded that "time requisite" should encompass the necessary period for the decree's preparation and signing, provided the delay isn't due to the appellant's actions. The Court rejected the notion that the appellant's inaction in applying for a decree copy should influence the exclusion of time, deeming such a connection illogical. The reasoning underscored that the responsibility for decree preparation lies with the court, and any delays therein should not hinder the appellant's right to timely appeals.

Impact

This judgment has significant ramifications for the interpretation of limitation periods in appellate law. By affirming that the entire period between judgment pronouncement and decree signing can be excluded, provided the appellant isn't at fault, the High Court ensures that appellants are not disadvantaged by judicial delays. This promotes fairness and encourages timely appeals without penalizing parties for procedural inefficiencies beyond their control. Future cases will reference this judgment to determine the applicability of Section 12(2), fostering consistency in legal proceedings and limitation period computations across various High Courts.

Complex Concepts Simplified

The judgment delves into nuanced legal terminologies and procedural concepts. Here are clarifications to enhance comprehension:

  • Section 12(2) of the Indian Limitation Act: This provision allows for the exclusion of the time necessary to obtain a copy of the decree when calculating the limitation period for filing an appeal.
  • Time Requisite: Refers to the period that is reasonably necessary to perform a particular action, in this case, obtaining the decree.
  • Decree: An official order issued by a court at the conclusion of a case.
  • Appellant's Fault: Any delay or negligence on the part of the appellant that contributes to the extension of time beyond what is considered reasonable.
  • Limitation Period: The maximum period within which legal action can be initiated, beyond which claims are typically barred.

Conclusion

The Bombay High Court's judgment in Jayashankar Mulshankar Mehta v. Shah Mayabhai Lalbhai significantly clarifies the application of Section 12(2) of the Indian Limitation Act. By establishing that the time between judgment pronouncement and decree signing should be excluded from the limitation period—provided the delay isn't attributable to the appellant—the Court upholds the principle of equity in legal proceedings. This decision not only safeguards appellants from procedural delays beyond their control but also reinforces the judiciary's commitment to fair trial practices. Consequently, this judgment serves as a crucial reference point for future litigants and courts in navigating the complexities of limitation periods and appellate procedures.

Case Details

Year: 1951
Court: Bombay High Court

Judge(s)

Mr. M.C Chagla, C.J Mr. Coyajee Mr. Gajendragadkar, JJ.

Advocates

B.J Diwan, with B.G Thakore, for the appellants.N.C Shah, for the respondent.B.J Diwan.This is a case from mofussil where the parties have not to play any part in the framing of the decrees. Admittedly, therefore, none of the delay in signing the decree was caused by any default on the part of the appellants. The only question for decision is whether the appellant is entitled to whole of the time taken up in signing the decree although he had not applied for a copy of it within thirty days which was the prescribed period of limitation. My submission is that he was entitled to wait until the original decree came into existence because till then there was no point in his making any application. This principle has been accepted by our High Court in Murlidhar v. Motilal [(1936) 39 Bom. L.R 32 (F.B)] Balappa v. Dyamappa [(1940) 42 Bom. L.R 872] and Vedu Hiraman v. Jaikisan Rambilas [S.A No. 1001 of 1946, decided by Macklin and Dixit JJ., on November 19, 1946 (Unrep.)].Bhausaheb v. Sonabai [(1945) 48 Bom. L.R 97] is wrongly decided because in that case their Lordships have proceeded to find out whether the period between the signing of the decree and the application for certified copies was reasonable or not. That obviously is wrong because that period is not to be excluded in any event.All the High Courts except the Allahabad have taken the view which I am contending for. See The Secretary of State for India in Council v. Parijat Debee [(1932) 59 Cal. 1215 (F.B)]; Sarat Chandra v. Rati Kanta [A.I.R 1939 Cal. 711]; Gabriel Christian v. Chandra Mohan Missir [(1935) 15 Pat. 284 (F.B)] Umda v. Rupchand [A.I.R 1927 Nag. 1 (F.B]; and Jadhubir Singh v. Sheo Naresh Singh [(1943) 19 Luck. 456].On the plain construction of s. 12 of the Limitation Act, the time taken for preparing the original of the decree must also be taken as the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree. The emphasis is on the word “requisite”. The Allahabad High Court lays emphasis on the word “obtaining”. See Keshar Sugar Works v. R.C Sharma [A.I.R 1951 All. 122 (F.B)].N.C Shah. Murlidhar v. Motilal [(1936) 39 Bom. L.R 32 (F.B)] was a case from the Original Side of the High Court. On the Original Side the parties themselves have to move the Court for drawing up the decree and that was done by the appellant in that case within the prescribed period. In mofussil the practice is different and this difference has been noted by Beaumont C.J at page 42 of the report.My submission is that s. 12 of the Limitation Act correlates to O. XX, r. 7 of the Civil Procedure Code, and as soon as the judgment is delivered the decree also comes into existence notionally. That being so some overt act by the party must precede the starting of time requisite for obtaining a copy. The words in the section are “time requisite for obtaining a copy” and not “time requisite for giving a copy” and, therefore, the parties are not entitled to any time taken up by the Court before the application. The party must take some action before he can say that the particular time was required for obtaining the copies. I submit that the Allahabad view is decree.In the present case the appellants did not wait till the signing of the decree before they applied for copies. That shows that no part of the time was required for studying the decree.B.J Diwan, was not called upon in reply.

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