Exceptional-Circumstances Threshold for Suspension of Sentence in Murder Convictions under Section 302/149 IPC: A Commentary on Rajesh Upadhayay v. State of Bihar

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of India in Rajesh Upadhayay v. State of Bihar & Anr., 2025 INSC 1468 (decided on 18 December 2025), has delivered an important ruling on the standards for suspension of sentence and grant of bail to life convicts under Section 302 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

The decision arises from a brutal murder of a village priest, Pandit Krishna Behari Upadhyay, inside a temple, allegedly due to local disputes and perceived “politicking” by the priest. Two separate, but factually identical, criminal appeals were before the Supreme Court:

• One concerning Sheo Narayan Mahto (father of one of the co-accused), where the order is reportable.
• Another concerning his son Rajesh Mahto @ Rajesh Kumar Mahto, where the order is non-reportable but expressly applies the same reasoning.

In both cases, the Patna High Court had suspended the sentence under Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) and released the convicts on bail pending their appeals. The complainant–appellant (son of the deceased, and in the second case also the uncle of the respondent) challenged these orders before the Supreme Court.

The judgment does two things of doctrinal importance:

1. It reaffirms and sharpens the rigorous standard applicable to suspension of sentence in murder cases, especially where a life sentence has been imposed under Section 302/149 IPC.
2. It clarifies that minor procedural irregularities (such as brief delay in forwarding the FIR to the Magistrate or non-production of the original inquest report) and perceived “lesser role” (like instigation) cannot, by themselves, justify suspension of sentence where conviction is based on consistent ocular and medical evidence.

Collectively, these rulings significantly constrain High Courts’ discretion under Section 389 CrPC in serious offences and strengthen the post-conviction custody regime, particularly in cases of murder with common object liability under Section 149 IPC.

II. Summary of the Judgment

1. Factual Background

On 11 December 2021, at about 4:30 p.m., the complainant (PW2) and his father, Pandit Krishna Behari Upadhyay, went to the Mahavir temple in their village to light lamps and perform aarti. At that time:

• A group of co-villagers—Bashishthha alias Munna Singh, Ajit Singh, Naga Kumar, Raghunandan Kumar, and in the first case Sheo Narayan Mahto, and in the second case his son Rajesh Mahto—arrived at the temple armed with weapons.
• They allegedly abused the deceased and accused him of not performing puja properly and engaging in politics.
• When the priest tried to close the main gate of the temple, the accused forcibly pushed the gate and entered.
• Ajit Singh and Raghunandan allegedly caught hold of the deceased, and Munna Singh fired at him with a revolver.
• Both Sheo Narayan Mahto and Rajesh Mahto (in their respective cases) were alleged to be armed with country-made pistols and to have repeatedly shouted that the priest should be killed.

The victim fell inside the temple premises, bleeding profusely, and was declared dead at the hospital. The complainant fled, informed family members, and later gave a fardbeyan, upon which FIR No. 96/2021 was registered for offences under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 342, 504, 506, 302, 120B IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act against six persons, including both respondents here.

2. Trial and Conviction

The Additional District and Sessions Judge, Rohtas (19th Court), in Sessions Trial No. 101 of 2022:

• Convicted both Sheo Narayan Mahto and Rajesh Mahto for:
  • Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC – life imprisonment and fine of ₹20,000;
  • Sections 342/149 IPC – 1 year RI and fine;
  • Sections 147 and 504/149 IPC – 1 year RI for each, and fines;
  • Section 148 IPC – 2 years RI and fine;
  • Section 27 Arms Act – 4 years RI and fine.
• Relied on eye-witness testimony, including PW2 and PW1 (a neighbouring priest), and on medical evidence from PW6, the doctor who performed the post-mortem.

3. High Court Orders

On appeal, the Patna High Court passed two separate but interlinked orders:

• 28.08.2024 – Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 542 of 2024 (Sheo Narayan Mahto):
  • Suspended the sentence under Section 389 CrPC and released him on bail.
  • Reasoned that:
    • The respondent’s role was primarily of instigation, not of actual firing.
    • The FIR reached the Magistrate after a delay of three days.
    • The original inquest report was not produced.
• 16.01.2025 – Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 536 of 2024 (Rajesh Mahto):
  • Suspended his sentence and released him on bail.
  • Held that:
    • The role attributed to him was similar to that of his father, Sheo Narayan Mahto.
    • The same reasoning applied, as his role was also of instigation with a country-made pistol.

In both appeals, the complainant approached the Supreme Court seeking cancellation of bail and restoration of custody.

4. Supreme Court’s Decision

The Supreme Court:

• Allowed both appeals.
• Set aside the High Court’s orders suspending the sentence and granting bail to both convicts.
• Directed each respondent to surrender within 10 days, with a direction to the police to ensure he is taken into custody if he fails to surrender.
• Clarified that its observations are limited to the question of suspension of sentence/bail and are not to influence the final decision on the pending criminal appeals.

Doctrinally, the Court reasserted that:

• For convicts under Section 302/149 IPC with life sentences, post-conviction suspension of sentence is an exceptional remedy.
• The High Court had committed a clear error by:
  • treating the role of armed instigation as trivial; and
  • relying on minor procedural lapses and re-appreciating evidence at the Section 389 CrPC stage.

III. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The Court’s reasoning is firmly anchored in prior Supreme Court decisions, which cumulatively construct a stringent framework for suspension of sentence in serious offences, especially murder.

1. State of Haryana v. Hasmat (2004) 6 SCC 175

This case dealt with Section 389 CrPC directly. Key principles reaffirmed in the present decision:

• The appellate court must record proper reasons in writing while ordering suspension of sentence.
• Such orders should not be passed as a matter of routine.
• The court must exercise careful consideration of all relevant aspects before suspending execution of sentence.

In Rajesh Upadhayay, these principles were invoked to criticise the High Court for relying on:

• a three-day delay in forwarding the FIR to the Magistrate, and
• non-production of the original inquest report,

neither of which, in the Supreme Court’s view, were rational or substantial bases to suspend a life sentence for murder when the conviction rested on cogent evidence.

2. Shakuntala Shukla v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2021) 20 SCC 818

The Court here focused on suspension of sentence/bail for convicts under Sections 302/149 and 201 read with 120-B IPC. The present bench quoted this case to reiterate that:

“Once the accused have been convicted by the learned trial court, there shall not be any presumption of innocence thereafter. Therefore, the High Court shall be very slow in granting bail to the accused pending appeal who are convicted for the serious offences…”

This precedent is fundamental to the present ruling. The Court emphasised the shift in presumption: after conviction, the accused is no longer presumed innocent, and the balance tilts in favour of upholding the judgment unless a strong prima facie case is shown.

3. Omprakash Sahni v. Jai Shankar Chaudhary (2023) 6 SCC 123, relying on Bhagwan Rama Shinde Gosai v. State of Gujarat (1999) 4 SCC 421

These decisions are central to the doctrinal framework on suspension of sentence:

• They distinguish between:
  • Fixed-term sentences – where suspension can be considered more liberally, subject to statutory constraints.
  • Life imprisonment – where a different, stricter approach is warranted.
• They stress that suspension of sentence in murder cases (Section 302 IPC) must be an exception, not the rule.
• They require consideration of factors like:
  • Nature of accusation,
  • Manner of commission of the crime,
  • Gravity and seriousness of the offence.

The present judgment faithfully applies these standards, underlining that:

• Life convicts under Section 302/149 IPC should not ordinarily have their sentences suspended.
• The Court must look at the overall crime scenario and individual roles rather than isolated technicalities.

4. Chhotelal Yadav v. State of Jharkhand (Criminal Appeal No. 4804 of 2025, decided on 10.11.2025)

Though a very recent case (and hence quoted with limited detail in the judgment), it is quoted for a crucial refinement:

“…in respect of plea of suspension of sentence where the sentence is of life imprisonment, such relief has to [be] informed by a gross and apparent error in the judgment of the Trial Court.”

The Court further noted:

“The only consideration that should weigh with the appellate court while considering the plea for suspension of sentence of life imprisonment is that the convict should be in a position to point out something very palpable or a very gross error in the judgment of the Trial Court…”

This is a key doctrinal development: it converts the general “exceptional circumstances” test into a more precise requirement—a palpable or gross error in the trial court’s judgment must be demonstrated to justify suspension for life convicts.

The Supreme Court in Rajesh Upadhayay adopts this standard and implicitly holds that:

• Alleged delay in forwarding FIR to Magistrate, and
• Non-production of original inquest report,

do not amount to such gross or palpable error, particularly in the face of consistent eyewitness and medical evidence.

5. Other Precedents on Bail in Murder Cases

The Court also cites:

• Vijay Kumar v. Narender (2002) 9 SCC 364;
• Ramji Prasad v. Rattan Kumar Jaiswal (2005) 5 SCC 281;
• Vasant Tukaram Pawar v. State of Maharashtra (citation incomplete in extract, but recognised as a bail decision);
• Gomti v. Thakurdas (2007) 11 SCC 160.

Collectively, these decisions stress that in Section 302 IPC cases, the Court must consider:

• Nature and gravity of accusations,
• Manner of commission of the offence (e.g., premeditated, in a sacred place, armed assault),
• Seriousness and societal impact of the crime.

The present judgment applies these criteria to underline the particular gravity of:

• A temple murder of a priest,
• Involving an armed unlawful assembly,
• With both respondents armed with pistols and instigating the firing.

IV. Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Conceptual Distinction: Bail vs. Suspension of Sentence

The Court begins by clarifying that:

• Bail is the release of a person from custody, with or without conditions, during investigation, trial, or appeal.
• Suspension of sentence under Section 389 CrPC is a specific post-conviction power whereby the appellate court temporarily stays the execution of the sentence (e.g., life imprisonment), typically coupled with releasing the convict on bail.

This distinction matters because:

• Pre-conviction bail operates in a context where the accused retains a full presumption of innocence.
• Post-conviction suspension of sentence occurs after a court has found guilt beyond reasonable doubt; thus, the presumption of innocence no longer operates.

Therefore, suspension of sentence requires a much higher threshold, especially for heinous offences like murder.

2. Presumption of Innocence After Conviction

Relying on Shakuntala Shukla, the Court reiterates:

“Once the accused have been convicted by the learned trial court, there shall not be any presumption of innocence thereafter.”

This has two doctrinal consequences:

• The burden shifts to the convict to show why suspension of sentence is justified.
• The appellate court must be slow and circumspect in granting bail to convicts in serious offences such as Section 302/149 IPC.

3. Limits on Re-Appreciation of Evidence at the Section 389 Stage

The Court emphasises that, while hearing an application under Section 389 CrPC:

• The appellate court should not engage in a detailed re-appreciation of evidence, hunting for lacunae in the prosecution’s case.
• Minor inconsistencies, technical objections, or partial reevaluation are not an appropriate basis to suspend a sentence.
• The proper stage for full reassessment of evidence is in the final hearing of the appeal, not at the interim stage of suspension.

In this case, the Supreme Court held that the High Court had overstepped these limits by effectively treating:

• the three-day delay in forwarding the FIR and
• non-production of the original inquest report

as if they substantially undermined the conviction even though:

• the trial court had already considered all the evidence and convicted, and
• the prosecution case was supported by both ocular and medical evidence.

4. “Exceptional Cases” Requirement in Life Imprisonment for Murder

Synthesising earlier precedents, the Court restates and tightens the norm:

• Suspension of sentence for life convicts under Section 302 IPC is permissible only in exceptional cases.
• “Exceptional” is concretised—following Chhotelal Yadav—as cases where the convict can prima facie show a very palpable or gross error in the trial court’s judgment, strong enough that on that ground alone the appeal might succeed.

The Court in Rajesh Upadhayay finds no such gross error:

• There is consistent eye-witness testimony placing both respondents at the scene, armed with country-made pistols and instigating the murder.
• PW1, a priest from the neighbouring Hanuman temple, corroborates the presence and flight of the accused.
• PW6’s medical evidence confirms gunshot injuries consistent with the prosecution narrative:
  • “Lacerated & burn & charring 1" X ½" muscle deep on left side of face, wound of entry…”
  • Bullet lodged in the parietal region of the brain.
  • Cause of death: haemorrhage and shock due to firearm injuries.

Thus, any minor procedural lapses did not amount to the kind of gross error required to justify suspension of sentence for a life convict.

5. Assessment of the Respondents’ Role Under Section 149 IPC

The High Court had proceeded on the assumption that the respondents’ role was merely one of “instigation”, suggesting their participation was less direct and hence fit for suspension of sentence.

The Supreme Court decisively rejects this approach:

• It notes that:
  • Both respondents were armed with country-made pistols.
  • They entered the temple by force with the other accused.
  • They actively encouraged the killing by shouting “kill him”.
  • They were seen fleeing the temple with the other assailants immediately after the firing.
• Under Section 149 IPC:
  • Membership in an unlawful assembly, with a common object to commit murder or knowledge that such murder is likely, renders each member constructively liable, even if they did not fire the fatal shot.
  • An “instigator” who is armed and part of that assembly is playing a grave, not marginal, role.

The Court, therefore, characterises the participation of both respondents as serious and integral to the offence, which “could not have been discounted for its seriousness” when deciding on suspension of sentence.

6. Irrelevance of Delay in Forwarding FIR and Non-production of Original Inquest Report

The Supreme Court is particularly critical of the High Court’s reliance on:

• Delay of three days in sending a copy of the FIR to the Magistrate’s court; and
• Non-production of the original inquest report (only a copy being available).

It terms these considerations as “illogical” for this stage:

• Such procedural aspects, by themselves, do not undermine the credibility of the prosecution once the trial court has already assessed all the evidence.
• They might be raised in the main appeal for a full evidentiary reappraisal, but not as a sufficient basis to override a life sentence through suspension.

This sends a broader doctrinal message: mere technical or procedural irregularities, without more, are insufficient to justify suspension of sentence for life convicts in serious offences.

7. Parity Between Father and Son (Two Connected Appeals)

In the second appeal (non-reportable order), the Court applies the same reasoning to Rajesh Mahto:

• The High Court had expressly relied on its earlier order in favour of Sheo Narayan Mahto and treated the son’s case as identical, since his role—armed presence and instigation—was similar.
• The Supreme Court, having already set aside the order in favour of the father in the reportable judgment (SLP (Crl.) No. 8736 of 2025), holds that the same reasons apply with equal force to the son.

The Court therefore cancels the son’s bail and sets aside suspension of his sentence, repeating that his role, too, is grave and not negligible.

V. Impact of the Judgment

1. Stricter Standards for High Courts Under Section 389 CrPC

The judgment strengthens the jurisprudential trend that:

• High Courts must exercise heightened restraint in suspending sentences for:
  • Convicts under Section 302/149 IPC,
  • Those sentenced to life imprisonment.
• Orders under Section 389 CrPC must:
  • Be reasoned,
  • Avoid re-appreciation of evidence at an interim stage, and
  • Not rely on minor procedural irregularities as decisive.

The decision is likely to make High Courts more cautious about granting post-conviction bail in murder cases, especially where:

• The convict has undergone relatively short periods of incarceration (here, about three years), and
• The appeal is still pending without an inordinate delay.

2. Clarification of the “Exceptional Circumstances” Test

By drawing on Chhotelal Yadav, the Court:

• Refines “exceptional circumstances” to mean that the convict should demonstrate a:
  • Very palpable error, or
  • Gross and apparent defect in the trial court’s judgment,
• Strong enough that, if ultimately accepted, could itself warrant acquittal or substantial alteration of the conviction.

This narrows the door for suspension of sentence in life imprisonment cases, making it more a remedy for obvious miscarriages or glaring anomalies, rather than a broad discretionary power.

3. Reinforcement of Victim/Complainant Participation

Procedurally, the case also highlights:

• The right and practical efficacy of a complainant/victim to challenge suspension of sentence and bail orders granted by High Courts.
• That the Supreme Court is prepared to step in, even at the instance of a private complainant, to correct what it views as a legally flawed exercise of appellate discretion in serious offences.

4. Common Object & Role-Based Arguments in Section 149 IPC Cases

The judgment sends a clear message for future Section 149 IPC cases:

• Court will not readily accept arguments that a person’s role was “only instigation” where:
  • He was present and armed at the scene,
  • Participated in the forcible entry into the crime scene, and
  • Actively encouraged the fatal attack.
• Such roles can be significant enough to sustain both:
  • Conviction under Section 302/149 IPC, and
  • Refusal to suspend sentence under Section 389 CrPC.

This is likely to reduce the scope of “lesser role” arguments being used to secure post-conviction bail in unlawful assembly murder cases.

5. Systemic Considerations: Appeals Backlog vs. Sentence Suspension

In many jurisdictions, long delays in disposal of criminal appeals have sometimes led courts to suspend sentences or grant bail after long periods of incarceration (e.g., 10–14 years) to mitigate undue hardship.

By contrast, in this case:

• The respondents had undergone around three years of incarceration.
• The Supreme Court does not treat this as sufficient, by itself, to justify suspension.

The decision therefore implicitly suggests that, absent excessive delay or other compelling factors, mere pendency of appeal for a few years is not adequate ground to suspend a life sentence for murder.

VI. Complex Legal Concepts Simplified

1. Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC

• Section 302 IPC – Punishes murder, usually with death or life imprisonment.
• Section 149 IPC – Deals with unlawful assembly:
  • If an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of that assembly, or
  • If the members knew such an offence was likely to be committed,
  then every person who is a member of that assembly is equally guilty of that offence.

In simple terms: all members of a group can be held liable for murder if the murder was part of their common plan or something they knew was likely to happen, even if only one person pulled the trigger.

2. Section 389 CrPC – Suspension of Sentence Pending Appeal

Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure allows an appellate court to:

• Order that the execution of a sentence be suspended while an appeal is being heard; and
• Release the convict on bail during that period.

But this power is subject to certain constraints:

• The court must record reasons in writing.
• In serious offences (especially murder), this should be done only in exceptional circumstances.
• The convict must show at least a strong prima facie case that the conviction suffers from some glaring or obvious error.

3. Presumption of Innocence and Its Limits

• Before conviction, every accused is presumed innocent and is entitled to the full benefit of doubt.
• After a trial court convicts a person, this presumption of innocence disappears.
• The appellate process is a further chance to correct errors, but it does not restore the presumption to the same level as before conviction.

Therefore, it is much harder for a convicted person to obtain suspension of sentence than for an undertrial to obtain bail.

4. “Exceptional Circumstances” and “Gross Error”

The Court uses phrases like “exceptional circumstances” and “very palpable or gross error”.

• Exceptional circumstances could include:
  • Very long incarceration without progress in appeal,
  • Extremely weak evidence on record that is obvious at a glance,
  • Clear legal errors that fundamentally undermine the conviction (e.g., lack of jurisdiction, manifest violation of mandatory procedures), or
  • Serious health conditions or humanitarian grounds in rare cases.
• Very palpable or gross error means:
  • An error so obvious and serious that even a preliminary reading shows the conviction is on shaky ground.
  • Not minor discrepancies or technical lapses like small delays or missing original documents where copies and corroborative evidence exist.

5. Fardbeyan, Inquest Report, and Delay in Forwarding FIR

• Fardbeyan: A statement given by the informant (often in Bihar/Jharkhand practice) that forms the basis for registering an FIR.
• Inquest report: Prepared by the police when a body is found, documenting the apparent cause of death and visible injuries before post-mortem.
• Delay in forwarding FIR to Magistrate: Law requires that the FIR be sent promptly to the Magistrate. Some delay may raise suspicion of fabrication or afterthought, but:
  • Small delays, if reasonably explained or in the presence of strong corroborative evidence, usually do not undermine the entire prosecution case.

The Supreme Court in this case made clear that such aspects, standing alone, cannot justify suspending a life sentence when conviction is otherwise supported by solid evidence.

VII. Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s decision in Rajesh Upadhayay v. State of Bihar (2025 INSC 1468) marks an important reaffirmation and refinement of the law on suspension of sentence pending appeal in serious criminal cases, particularly murder under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC.

The key takeaways are:

• Post-conviction bail and suspension of sentence for life convicts in murder cases are to remain truly exceptional.
• High Courts must avoid re-appraising evidence or relying on minor procedural irregularities when deciding applications under Section 389 CrPC.
• The presumption of innocence ceases after conviction, and appellate courts must be slow to grant bail to convicts under Section 302/149 IPC.
• For life imprisonment, the convict must demonstrate a very palpable or gross error in the trial court’s judgment to justify suspension of sentence.
• In unlawful assembly cases under Section 149 IPC, armed instigation and active participation constitute a grave role, not a peripheral one, and cannot be minimised to justify release.

By cancelling the High Court’s suspension orders for both Sheo Narayan Mahto and Rajesh Mahto, the Supreme Court has sent a clear signal that:

• Discretion under Section 389 CrPC must be exercised with rigorous legal discipline,
• Victims’ concerns and societal interest in enforcing serious sentences must be given due weight, and
• Convicts in grave offences cannot secure de facto liberty by pointing to marginal procedural lapses absent any substantial infirmity in conviction.

In the broader criminal justice landscape, the judgment fortifies the integrity of convictions in serious offences during the pendency of appeals and narrows the space for unjustified suspension of sentences in murder cases, thereby shaping future bail and suspension jurisprudence across High Courts in India.