Eviction as an Extraordinary but Permissible Remedy under Section 23 of the Senior Citizens Act: Commentary on Smt. Soumya v. Smt. Ratnakumari

1. Introduction

The decision of the Karnataka High Court in Smt. Soumya W/o Late Suresh Rao v. Smt. Ratnakumari W/o S. Baburao & Ors, W.P. No.104795 of 2025, decided on 25 November 2025 by Justice M. Nagaprasanna, is a significant addition to the growing jurisprudence on the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 (“Senior Citizens Act”).

The core issue was whether the Assistant Commissioner-cum-Senior Citizens Tribunal has the jurisdiction to order eviction of a daughter-in-law from premises belonging to a senior citizen while acting under Section 23 of the Act. The Tribunal had directed the petitioner (a widowed daughter-in-law) to vacate the house and hand it over to her mother-in-law, a senior citizen. The petitioner challenged this order on the ground that Section 23 does not authorize eviction.

Against the backdrop of conflicting views across High Courts, and a line of recent Supreme Court authorities, the Karnataka High Court has:

Affirmed that eviction is a permissible, though extraordinary, incidental remedy under the Senior Citizens Act; and
Applied that doctrine to uphold an eviction order where a senior citizen was effectively ousted from her own house and consigned to an outhouse, while the daughter-in-law did not even reside in the premises.

The ruling consolidates the Supreme Court’s evolving approach, particularly in S. Vanitha, Rajeshwar Prasad Roy, Urmila Dixit, and Samtola Devi, and expressly aligns Karnataka with the view of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Anil v. Subhadra that the right to maintenance includes a right to residence, which may necessitate eviction of obstructing relatives.

2. Factual Background

2.1 Parties and Relationships

Petitioner: Smt. Soumya, widow of Late Suresh Rao (son of the first respondent).
First Respondent: Smt. Ratnakumari, a senior citizen and mother-in-law of the petitioner.
Second Respondent: Smt. Aruna, another daughter-in-law of the first respondent.
Third Respondent: Assistant Commissioner & Authority for Senior Citizens Tribunal, Ballari.

All concerned are connected to House No.2, Ward No.23, near Sarvodaya School, Siddarthnagar, Ballari. The first respondent and her husband appear from the record to be the actual owners/builders of the main house (with some additional properties and transactions mentioned in the Kannada complaint).

2.2 Events Leading to the Dispute

After the death of the petitioner’s husband (the son of the senior citizen), the following factual matrix emerges from the materials and complaint:

The petitioner and her children initially resided with the first respondent in the Ballari house.
Relations deteriorated sharply between the widow (petitioner) and her mother-in-law (first respondent).
According to the senior citizen’s detailed complaint:
- She and her husband (both elderly) were shifted to and made to live in an outhouse.
- The petitioner and her children took over the main house and allegedly prevented the senior citizens from entering or using it.
- There were also grievances over certain transactions, including a gift deed in favour of the second respondent concerning another house.
The respondents’ counsel asserted before the High Court that the petitioner had, in fact, moved to Andhra Pradesh after her husband’s death and was not even residing at the disputed premises, though she continued to hold possession and obstructed the senior citizen’s full enjoyment of the property.

2.3 Proceedings before the Senior Citizens Tribunal

On 15 April 2025, the first respondent filed an application under the Senior Citizens Act before the Assistant Commissioner (Senior Citizens Tribunal), Ballari.
She sought:
- Eviction of the petitioner and her children from House No.2, Ward No.23; and
- Cancellation of a gift deed in favour of the second respondent with respect to another house.
The Tribunal sought a report from the competent authorities and, after considering the materials and complaint, passed an order on 17 June 2025, directing:
- The petitioner to vacate the premises within 30 days; and
- To hand over vacant possession to the first respondent senior citizen.

2.4 The Writ Petition

Aggrieved, the petitioner approached the Karnataka High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, seeking a writ of certiorari to quash the Tribunal’s order insofar as it directed eviction against her.

Her attack was narrow and jurisdictional: she did not primarily dispute all facts but contended that the Assistant Commissioner lacked power under Section 23 of the Senior Citizens Act to order eviction.

3. Issues before the High Court

The principal issue was:

Whether, while exercising powers under Section 23 of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007, the Assistant Commissioner (Senior Citizens Tribunal) can validly direct eviction of a daughter-in-law from the house belonging to a senior citizen.

Embedded within this were two sub-questions:

Scope of Section 23: Does Section 23 authorize the Tribunal to go beyond declaring a transfer void and to order eviction of persons in occupation?
Threshold for Eviction: Even if such power exists, is it meant to be exercised routinely, or only under exceptional, well-justified circumstances to protect the senior citizen’s rights and dignity?

4. Summary of the Judgment

Justice Nagaprasanna dismissed the writ petition, holding that:

On a correct reading of Section 23, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in S. Vanitha, Rajeshwar Prasad Roy, Urmila Dixit, and Samtola Devi, the Tribunal does have jurisdiction to order eviction as an incident of enforcing the senior citizen’s right to maintenance, residence and protection.
Eviction is not a routine or automatic remedy under the Act; it is an extraordinary power to be invoked only when necessary and expedient to secure the welfare, protection, and dignity of the senior citizen.
On the facts of this case:
- The senior citizen was relegated to an outhouse, effectively denied dignified access to her own house.
- The petitioner was not even residing in the premises, having shifted to Andhra Pradesh, yet continued to hold on to possession and obstructions.
- In such a situation, the Tribunal’s order directing eviction was justified, within jurisdiction, and not perverse or infirm.
The High Court expressly concurred with the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Anil v. Subhadra that the right to maintenance under the Act includes the right to residence, and eviction of unauthorized occupants may be necessary to secure that right.

Accordingly, the writ petition was dismissed.

5. Detailed Legal Analysis

5.1 Statutory Framework: Section 23 and Maintenance

Section 23 of the Senior Citizens Act, central to this case, provides:

Section 23. Transfer of property to be void in certain circumstances.
(1) Where any senior citizen who, after the commencement of this Act, has transferred by way of gift or otherwise, his property, subject to the condition that the transferee shall provide the basic amenities and basic physical needs to the transferor and such transferee refuses or fails to provide such amenities and physical needs, the said transfer of property shall be deemed to have been made by fraud or coercion or under undue influence and shall at the option of the transferor be declared void by the Tribunal.

(2) Where any senior citizen has a right to receive maintenance out of an estate and such estate or part thereof is transferred, the right to receive maintenance may be enforced against the transferee if the transferee has notice of the right, or if the transfer is gratuitous; but not against the transferee for consideration and without notice of right.

(3) If, any senior citizen is incapable of enforcing the rights under sub-sections (1) and (2), action may be taken on his behalf by any of the organisation referred to in Explanation to sub-section (1) of section 5.

Key points:

Section 23(1) deals with cases where a senior citizen transfers property with an express condition of being maintained. If that condition is breached, the transfer may be declared void on a legal “deeming” of fraud/undue influence.
Section 23(2) covers cases where the senior citizen has a pre-existing right to receive maintenance from an estate, and the estate (or part of it) is transferred. The senior citizen’s right to maintenance can then be enforced against certain transferees.
The Act elsewhere (Section 2(b)) clarifies that “maintenance” includes provision for food, clothing, residence and medical care. This broad understanding is crucial to the present judgment.

The question, therefore, is whether – and when – these provisions allow the Tribunal not only to invalidate transfers or enforce a maintenance charge, but also to direct eviction of persons in occupation.

5.2 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

5.2.1 S. Vanitha v. Deputy Commissioner, Bengaluru Urban District (2021) 15 SCC 730

The High Court relied heavily on S. Vanitha, where the Supreme Court undertook a detailed exposition of Section 23:

The Court distinguished between:
- Section 23(1): Transfer by senior citizen subject to a condition of maintenance. Breach creates a deeming fiction of fraud/coercion/undue influence, allowing the transfer to be declared void.
- Section 23(2): Enforcement of a pre-existing right to maintenance out of an estate, irrespective of whether the transfer is by the senior citizen or a third party, against certain transferees (gratuitous or with notice).
The Court clarified that “transfer” must be interpreted broadly to include transfer of any right or interest in property, consistent with Section 2(f)’s inclusive definition of “property”.
Crucially, the Supreme Court held that:
“The Tribunal under the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 may have the authority to order an eviction, if it is necessary and expedient to ensure the maintenance and protection of the senior citizen or parent. Eviction, in other words, would be an incident of the enforcement of the right to maintenance and protection. However, this remedy can be granted only after adverting to the competing claims in the dispute.”

This passage is the cornerstone for recognizing implied eviction powers in proceedings under Section 23(2), treated as incidental to enforcing the right to maintenance and protection.

5.2.2 Rajeshwar Prasad Roy v. State of Bihar & Ors, SLP (Civil) No.7675 of 2024 (decided 30.01.2025)

In Rajeshwar Prasad Roy, the Supreme Court applied S. Vanitha to uphold an eviction order passed by a Maintenance Tribunal against a son and daughter-in-law:

The subject property was held to be the self-acquired property of the senior citizen, not ancestral, undermining the children’s adverse claim.
The behavior of the son and daughter-in-law towards the elderly father was found to be abusive and harassing, including criminal complaints and interference with his use of the property.
Relying on S. Vanitha, the Court reiterated that:
“The Tribunal under the Act has the authority to order eviction to ensure the maintenance and protection of the senior citizens.”
It also invoked the Bihar Senior Citizens Rules, which impose a positive duty on the District Magistrate to protect the life and property of senior citizens.

This case strengthened the proposition that, in appropriate circumstances, eviction is a legitimate and practical tool to enforce the senior citizen’s rights under the Act.

5.2.3 URMILA DIXIT V. SUNIL Sharan Dixit (2025) 2 SCC 787 and SUDESH CHHIKARA v. RAMTI DEVI (2024) 14 SCC 225

While Urmila Dixit primarily dealt with Section 23(1) (conditional transfers by the senior citizen), it clarified two key ideas:

Conditions under Section 23(1) must be pleaded and proved:
- Sudesh Chhikara held that for Section 23(1) to apply, it must be shown that:
  - The transfer was made subject to a condition that the transferee shall provide basic amenities and physical needs; and
  - The transferee failed to fulfil such condition.
- The Court cautioned that many gifts or transfers are made “out of love and affection” without such conditions, and Section 23(1) is not automatically attracted.
Tribunal’s competence to hand over possession:
- Urmila Dixit explicitly affirms S. Vanitha on this point:
  “Tribunals under the Act may order eviction if it is necessary and expedient to ensure the protection of the senior citizen. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Tribunals constituted under the Act, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 23, cannot order possession to be transferred.”
- The Court also emphasized that Section 23 is not a stand-alone provision, but is directly connected with the Act’s objective: ensuring that elderly citizens, who are sometimes not being looked after, can promptly secure their rights when they transfer property conditionally.

Thus, Urmila Dixit consolidates both the requirement of a condition (for Section 23(1)) and the legitimacy of eviction/possession orders as part of the tribunal’s remedial arsenal.

5.2.4 SAMTOLA DEVI V. STATE OF UTTAR Pradesh 2025 SCC OnLine SC 669

Samtola Devi is important for calibrating the limits of the eviction power:

The Court acknowledged that the Senior Citizens Act does not explicitly provide for eviction proceedings in its text.
Nonetheless, following S. Vanitha and Urmila Dixit, it accepted that:
“… the Tribunal under the Senior Citizens Act may also order eviction if it is necessary and expedient to ensure the protection of the senior citizens. The Tribunal thus had acquired jurisdiction to pass orders of eviction while exercising jurisdiction under Section 23…”
However, the Court cautioned that:
- Eviction is neither automatic nor mandatory in every case.
- The Appellate Tribunal in that case had not recorded reasons explaining why eviction was necessary and expedient to protect the senior citizen, and its order was therefore vulnerable.

Samtola Devi thus refines the doctrine: eviction is a case-specific, reason-dependent remedy, not a default outcome of every Section 23 proceeding.

5.2.5 Anil v. Subhadra, 2023 SCC OnLine MP 6893

The Karnataka High Court also drew support from the Madhya Pradesh High Court’s decision in Anil v. Subhadra, which held:

The definition of “maintenance” under Section 2(b) of the Act includes residence.
Therefore, when the Tribunal provides for maintenance under Sections 4 and 5, it can legitimately direct dispossession/eviction of persons in unauthorized possession if necessary to secure the parent’s/senior citizen’s right of residence.
The Court emphasized that this is not “eviction” in the rigid, common-law sense of an ejectment suit, but a limited, functional direction to secure the senior citizen’s statutory right to reside in dignity.

Justice Nagaprasanna expressly stated that he is in respectful agreement with this reasoning, thereby incorporating it into Karnataka’s jurisprudence.

5.3 The Court’s Legal Reasoning in Soumya v. Ratnakumari

5.3.1 Recognition of Tribunal’s Eviction Power

Having surveyed the Supreme Court precedents and the Madhya Pradesh authority, the Court distilled the following propositions:

The Senior Citizens Act does not, in express terms, provide for a general, standalone eviction power.
Nevertheless, as held in S. Vanitha, Rajeshwar Prasad Roy, and Urmila Dixit, the Tribunal does possess incidental power to order eviction:
- Where it is necessary and expedient to ensure the maintenance, protection, and dignity of the senior citizen; and
- Where such an order is supported by the factual matrix of the case.
Samtola Devi further clarifies that:
- This power is extraordinary in nature; and
- Eviction cannot be claimed or granted as a matter of routine or automatic consequence of every Section 23 application.

The High Court therefore squarely rejected the petitioner’s contention that the Assistant Commissioner lacked jurisdiction to order eviction under Section 23.

5.3.2 Characterizing Eviction as an “Extraordinary” Remedy

Justice Nagaprasanna underscored that:

The jurisdiction to order eviction is extraordinary, not ordinary.
It is to be invoked in cases where:
- The senior citizen’s life, property, or dignity is seriously compromised;
- Lesser remedies (like mere declaration of void transfer or monetary maintenance) would not sufficiently protect the senior citizen’s rights; and
- The factual circumstances are compelling.

By framing the power in this way, the Court aligns with Samtola Devi and guards against overuse or mechanical eviction orders.

5.3.3 Application to the Facts: Dignified Access and Non-Resident Occupant

On the application of these legal standards to the case at hand, the Court noted:

The first respondent senior citizen was relegated to an outhouse, while the petitioner and her children occupied the main house.
The senior citizen was prevented from entering and using her own home, thereby being deprived of her right to dignified residence.
Crucially, the respondents demonstrated through documents (produced with a memo) that:
- After the husband’s death, the petitioner and her children were residing in Andhra Pradesh, not in the Ballari house.
- Thus, the petitioner was not using the premises as a matrimonial home or place of necessity, but merely holding onto possession, effectively obstructing the senior citizen’s enjoyment of her property.

In this situation, the Court reasoned that:

The senior citizen’s right to maintenance (including residence) under the Act was being actively defeated.
No competing, weighty right of the petitioner (e.g., an ongoing, good-faith claim to matrimonial residence, as in S. Vanitha) was compelling enough to override the senior citizen’s right, especially since the petitioner had shifted residence elsewhere.
Therefore, an eviction order was both necessary and expedient to restore the senior citizen’s dignified access to her own home.

The High Court found “no perversity or infirmity” in the Assistant Commissioner’s reasoning or conclusion and refused to interfere under writ jurisdiction.

6. Complex Concepts Simplified

6.1 What Does Section 23 Really Do?

Section 23 is often misunderstood as a pure property-cancellation provision. In reality, it functions as a protective mechanism for senior citizens:

It covers cases where elderly persons transfer property on the understanding that they will be looked after. If that understanding is violated, the law treats the transfer as tainted by fraud/undue influence and allows it to be declared void.
It also covers cases where a senior citizen has a pre-existing right to be maintained from a property and that property is transferred away. The law allows the senior citizen to enforce that right against certain transferees.

The key policy idea is this: the law will not allow children or relatives to take property and then abandon the parent. If they do, the law can undo the deal or override the transfer to protect the senior citizen.

6.2 What Is a “Deeming Fiction”?

Section 23(1) says that if a transfer subject to a maintenance condition is violated, the transfer is “deemed to have been made by fraud or coercion or under undue influence”.

In law, a “deeming fiction” means that the law treats something as true, even if it might not actually be so, for the purpose of achieving a particular policy goal.
Here, instead of requiring the elderly person to prove actual fraud or coercion (which is difficult, especially given age and dependency), the law says:
“If you gave property on condition of being looked after, and that condition is broken, we will legally treat the transfer as if it was induced by fraud/undue influence, so that you can get the property back.”

6.3 Why Is “Maintenance” More Than Just Money?

Under the Senior Citizens Act, “maintenance” is a broad concept. It includes:

Food
Clothing
Residence (a place to live)
Medical care and treatment

This is crucial because it means:

Ensuring a senior citizen’s maintenance is not just about monthly monetary allowance.
If a senior citizen owns a house but is denied access to it by children or in-laws, the Tribunal can step in to secure their right of residence.
This is why courts like the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Anil v. Subhadra, and now the Karnataka High Court, accept that eviction of obstructing relatives may be necessary to enforce the right to residence.

6.4 “Necessary and Expedient”: A Balancing Test

The Supreme Court has used the phrase “necessary and expedient” to describe the circumstances in which eviction can be ordered under the Act:

Necessary: There is no other effective way to protect the senior citizen’s rights (e.g., declaring a transfer void alone will not help if someone is still blocking access to the house).
Expedient: It is appropriate, practical, and justified in the specific situation, after considering all sides, including:
- Rights of daughters-in-law to reside in the matrimonial home under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act.
- Any genuine, good-faith claims of the children/relatives.

In Soumya v. Ratnakumari, the fact that:

The petitioner was not even residing in the house; and
The senior citizen was physically kept out of her own home and relegated to an outhouse

made it relatively straightforward for the Court to say that eviction was indeed “necessary and expedient”.

7. Impact and Implications

7.1 Consolidation of Eviction Jurisprudence in Karnataka

This judgment firmly aligns Karnataka with the line of Supreme Court authority endorsing limited but real eviction powers under the Senior Citizens Act. For future cases in Karnataka:

Senior Citizens Tribunals can be confident that eviction is within their jurisdiction when justified under Section 23.
Writ challenges on the bare ground of “no jurisdiction to evict” are likely to fail.
The focus will instead shift to:
- Whether the facts justify such an exceptional remedy; and
- Whether the Tribunal has recorded adequate reasons demonstrating necessity and expediency, in line with Samtola Devi.

7.2 Strengthening Protection of Senior Citizens’ Right to Residence

By explicitly endorsing the Madhya Pradesh view and emphasising “dignified access to her own home”, the Court:

Recognizes that residence is central to an elderly person’s dignity and psychological well‑being.
Makes clear that relegating parents to outhouses or inferior spaces while children occupy the main house can amount to deprivation of their right to maintenance and residence.
Signals to Tribunals that they can and should act decisively against such arrangements when supported by the record.

7.3 Effect on Daughters-in-law and Matrimonial Home Claims

This area is particularly sensitive because daughters-in-law often invoke the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (“DV Act”) to claim a right to reside in the shared household or matrimonial home.

The Supreme Court in S. Vanitha emphasised that:

Tribunals under the Senior Citizens Act must consider competing claims, including DV Act rights.
Eviction orders must not be passed in a manner that tramples upon statutory protections of women.

In Soumya v. Ratnakumari, however, the competing right was weak because:

The petitioner was not actually using the premises as her residence (she was living in Andhra Pradesh); and
Her occupation was essentially constructive or obstructive, rather than for her own shelter or survival.

The case thus illustrates the likely trend:

Where a daughter-in-law is actually residing in the premises and has no alternate shelter, courts and tribunals will have to engage in a much more delicate balancing exercise.
Where she is not residing there or is using property claims primarily to block the senior citizen, eviction orders are more likely to be upheld.

7.4 Procedural and Practical Consequences

Some broader systemic implications include:

Speedier relief for seniors: Instead of protracted civil suits for eviction or partition, senior citizens can obtain faster, more flexible remedies before the Maintenance Tribunal.
Higher expectations from Tribunals: Given the extraordinary nature of eviction:
- Tribunals must record clear, reasoned findings on why eviction is necessary in each case.
- Failure to do so will expose orders to judicial review, especially in light of Samtola Devi.
Risk of misuse and need for balance:
- There is a potential risk that some litigants may weaponize the Senior Citizens Act to oust daughters-in-law in ongoing matrimonial disputes.
- The Courts’ repeated insistence on considering competing claims and rights under other statutes acts as an important safeguard against such misuse.

8. Conclusion and Key Takeaways

8.1 Overall Significance

Smt. Soumya v. Smt. Ratnakumari confirms and applies an important doctrinal position: Senior Citizens Tribunals do have jurisdiction to order eviction as an incidental, extraordinary remedy under Section 23 of the Senior Citizens Act, where such eviction is necessary and expedient to protect the senior citizen’s right to maintenance, residence, and dignity.

The judgment:

Faithfully follows and consolidates Supreme Court precedents (S. Vanitha, Rajeshwar Prasad Roy, Urmila Dixit, Samtola Devi);
Expressly endorses the Madhya Pradesh view in Anil v. Subhadra that maintenance necessarily includes residence and can justify eviction of obstructing relatives; and
Applies these principles to uphold an eviction order where a non-resident daughter-in-law was blocking the senior citizen’s dignified enjoyment of her own house.

8.2 Key Legal Takeaways

Eviction Power Exists, but Is Incidental: Tribunals under the Senior Citizens Act may order eviction incidentally to enforce rights under Section 23; the Act’s silence on eviction is not determinative.
Extraordinary, Not Routine: Eviction is an extraordinary remedy. It is not automatic in every Section 23 case and must be justified by reasons showing that it is necessary and expedient to protect the senior citizen.
Maintenance Includes Residence: The right to maintenance under the Act comprehensively includes a right to residence. Denial of dignified access to one’s own home can amount to denial of maintenance.
Fact-Sensitive Balancing: Tribunals and courts must consider competing rights (e.g., DV Act protections for women) and may decline eviction in cases where the daughter-in-law genuinely resides in and depends on the property as her matrimonial home.
Non-Resident Obstruction Will Not Be Protected: Where a relative, such as a daughter-in-law, does not reside in the premises but maintains possession to the detriment of the senior citizen, eviction is more likely to be upheld.

In sum, the judgment advances the legislative objective of the Senior Citizens Act—ensuring that elderly persons can live with security, dignity, and peace—by confirming that courts and tribunals are not powerless spectators when senior citizens are ousted from their own homes by their descendants or in-laws.

Eviction as an Extraordinary but Permissible Remedy under Section 23 of the Senior Citizens Act: Commentary on Soumya v. Ratnakumari