Equitable Compensation in Lieu of Specific Performance Necessarily Entails Surrender of Possession: Commentary on Prem Aggarwal v. Mohan Singh (2025 INSC 1214)

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I. Introduction

The judgment of the Supreme Court of India in Prem Aggarwal v. Mohan Singh & Ors., 2025 INSC 1214, is a strong and clear reaffirmation of several intertwined principles:

• Equity will not permit unjust enrichment or a double benefit to a litigant.
• Where a court moulds relief and awards extraordinary monetary compensation in lieu of specific performance, the recipient cannot, in equity, retain possession of the very property in respect of which such compensation has been awarded.
• Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (part performance) cannot be invoked to perpetuate possession after the agreement has been refused specific performance and claims arising out of it have failed.
• The executing court’s duty is to give full effect to the judgment and to prevent the process of execution from being converted into an instrument to underwrite windfalls.
• The maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit (an act of the court shall prejudice none) empowers the court to correct its own inadvertent omission so that no party suffers.

The Court, speaking through Vikram Nath, J. (with Sandeep Mehta, J. concurring), adopts unusually forthright language to condemn the appellant’s conduct, describing this litigation as a “cautionary tale about how the pursuit of a windfall can turn the process of law against those who seek to exploit it” and observing that “the appellant has shot himself in the foot and in the same breath dug his own grave.”

This commentary examines the factual and procedural background, explains the ruling, analyses the legal reasoning and precedents, and discusses its broader impact on property law, civil procedure, execution proceedings, and equitable jurisprudence.

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II. Factual Background and Procedural History

1. The Agreement to Sell and Delivery of Possession (1989)

• Date and nature of transaction: On 12.06.1989, the defendants (later respondents) executed an agreement to sell the suit property to the plaintiff (later appellant), Prem Aggarwal, for a consideration of ₹14,50,000.
• Earnest money: The plaintiff paid an advance/earnest money of ₹25,000.
• Nature of property and possession:
  • The property had two floors.
  • The first floor had two tenants.
  • The ground floor was vacant. Possession of the ground floor was handed over to the plaintiff pursuant to the agreement to sell.
• Crucially, as later emphasised by the Supreme Court, the plaintiff was not a tenant, licensee or lessee; his possession stemmed purely from the agreement to sell.

2. First Suit: Permanent Injunction (Civil Suit No. 44 of 1990)

• In February 1990, the plaintiff filed a suit for a simple permanent injunction, seeking to restrain the defendants from:
  • alienating the suit property; and
  • dispossessing the plaintiff from the suit property.
• The plaintiff’s apprehension stemmed from an advertisement published by the defendants on 07.01.1990 in The Tribune, suggesting an intention to sell.
• This suit was dismissed as withdrawn on 15.06.1990 and “attained finality.” The Supreme Court later treats this as an important factor in:
  • the bar under Order II Rule 2 CPC (in the earlier April 1, 2025 judgment), and
  • the appellant’s lack of right to continue possession in the present execution-related dispute.

3. Second Suit: Specific Performance (Civil Suit No. 55 of 1990)

• In June 1990, the plaintiff instituted a suit for specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 12.06.1989.
• Trial Court: The suit was decreed on 11.12.2009 in favour of the plaintiff.
• First Appeal: The defendants’ first appeal was dismissed on 19.09.2013.
• Second Appeal & Review before the High Court:
  • Second appeal dismissed on 13.05.2022.
  • Review petition dismissed on 19.08.2022.
  • The High Court dealt with Order II Rule 2 CPC but, in the Supreme Court’s later view, erred in holding that the two suits (injunction and specific performance) were based on different causes of action.

4. Supreme Court’s Earlier Judgment (01.04.2025) – Dismissal of Specific Performance but Award of ₹2 Crores

• The defendants challenged the concurrent decrees of specific performance in:
  Civil Appeal Nos. 4647–4648 of 2025, Mohan Singh & Ors. v. Prem Aggarwal.
• On 01.04.2025, the Supreme Court:
  • Allowed the appeals.
  • Set aside the decrees of specific performance.
  • Dismissed the suit for specific performance, primarily on the ground that it was barred by Order II Rule 2 CPC because both the injunction suit and the specific performance suit arose from the same cause of action: the 07.01.1990 advertisement in The Tribune.
• However, in an exercise of its equitable jurisdiction to mould relief, the Court directed that:

  the defendants pay an amount of ₹2,00,00,000 (Rupees Two Crores) to the plaintiff within three months in lieu of the earnest money of ₹25,000 paid in 1989.

• This sum is 800 times the original earnest money. The present judgment under comment characterises this as a “whopping amount” and an “exorbitant” or “extraordinary” compensation.
• Notably, in that April 2025 judgment, the Supreme Court did not expressly record that the plaintiff was in possession, nor did it expressly direct surrender of possession; this omission becomes a focal point in the present litigation.

5. Execution Proceedings and Plaintiff’s Resistance

• The defendants attempted to pay the ₹2 crores, but the plaintiff refused to accept the tender.
• Execution proceedings were then initiated by the defendants.
  • In execution, the defendants deposited the amount of ₹2 crores by way of Fixed Deposits in the name of the plaintiff.
• The Executing Court ordered the plaintiff to accept the amount and hand over possession. When the plaintiff did not comply, the defendants applied for warrants of possession.

6. Orders of the Executing Court (07.08.2025 and 12.08.2025)

Order dated 07.08.2025:

• The Executing Court noted the deposit of ₹2 crores via Fixed Deposit Receipts (FDRs) in the plaintiff’s name.
• As the plaintiff had not received them, the Court:
  • Directed return of those FDs, and
  • Ordered fresh FDs to be issued in the name of the Court.
• The Court directed issue of warrant of possession and fixed 12.08.2025 for further proceedings.

Order dated 12.08.2025:

• The bailiff reported resistance and sought police assistance for executing the warrant.
• The plaintiff filed objections and an application to recall the warrant of possession.
• After hearing both sides, the Executing Court:
  • Rejected the plaintiff’s objections.
  • Directed the concerned SHO to provide police aid for execution.
  • Granted the plaintiff 4 days’ time to receive the amount, making it clear that warrants would be executed after 4 days if the plaintiff still failed to accept the amount and hand over possession.

7. High Court’s Civil Revision (11.09.2025)

• The plaintiff challenged the orders dated 07.08.2025 and 12.08.2025 before the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Civil Revision No. 5810 of 2025.
• The High Court dismissed the revision on 11.09.2025, affirming the actions of the Executing Court.

8. Present Appeal before the Supreme Court (07.10.2025 Judgment)

• The plaintiff, now appellant, approached the Supreme Court by way of special leave, challenging the High Court’s refusal to interfere with the execution process.
• The Supreme Court granted leave and proceeded to examine:
  • whether the Executing Court correctly issued warrants of possession and ordered police aid; and
  • whether the appellant could insist on retaining possession and force the respondents to file a fresh suit for possession.

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III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Judgment (07.10.2025)

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal with heavy costs, upholding the orders of the Executing Court and the High Court. Its core holdings may be summarised as follows:

1. Appellant’s conduct condemned: The Court held that the appellant had been “unnecessarily delaying and causing obstruction in the execution of the decree,” and characterised him as an “unscrupulous litigant” trying to exploit the process to secure a windfall.
2. No default by respondents: The respondents complied with the Supreme Court’s earlier direction by tendering the amount of ₹2 crores within the prescribed three months, via FDs and by moving the Executing Court on 26.06.2025.
3. Equitable compensation necessarily implies surrender of possession: The Court clarified that the award of ₹2 crores – vastly exceeding any reasonable interest on ₹25,000 – was intended to:
   • ensure that the property remains with the original owners (respondents); and
   • “balance the equities” by adequately compensating the appellant for:
     • the earnest money; and
     • the long lapse of time and prior favourable decrees.
   The appellant cannot both retain possession and receive this extraordinary amount.
4. No independent right to possession: The appellant’s possession was grounded solely in the agreement to sell. He was neither tenant nor licensee. Having lost:
   • the injunction suit, and
   • the specific performance suit (finally in the Supreme Court),
   the appellant had no locus to insist on continued possession.
5. Section 53-A TPA defence rejected: The Court rejected the appellant’s plea that, under Section 53-A, he could retain possession until evicted through a separate possession suit. Once the suit for specific performance failed and extraordinary compensation was awarded, continuing to hold possession would amount to unjust enrichment.
6. Reliance on S hrimant Shamrao Suryavanshi distinguished: The precedent of S hrimant Shamrao Suryavanshi v. Pralhad Bhairoba Suryavanshi (2002) 3 SCC 676 was found to be inapplicable, given the distinct factual and legal matrix in the present case.
7. Application of actus curiae neminem gravabit: The omission in the earlier April 2025 judgment to explicitly direct surrender of possession was treated as an inadvertent lapse of the Court. The Court invoked the maxim that “the act of the Court shall prejudice no one” to justify clarifying that the ₹2 crores were payable in lieu of both earnest money and possession.
8. Execution court and High Court upheld: The Supreme Court held that the Executing Court and High Court were correct in:
   • ordering issuance of warrants of possession, and
   • directing police assistance to overcome resistance.
9. Costs imposed: The appeal was dismissed with costs of ₹10,00,000, payable by the appellant to the respondents within 4 weeks, failing which 12% per annum interest would apply.

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IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Central Legal Issues

The judgment primarily addresses three interrelated issues:

1. Whether a purchaser in possession under an agreement to sell, whose suit for specific performance is dismissed but who is granted huge compensation, can retain possession and insist that the original owner file a fresh suit for possession.
2. Whether Section 53-A TPA can provide a defence to continued possession after specific performance is refused and equitable compensation is granted.
3. Whether the omission of an express direction regarding surrender of possession in the earlier Supreme Court judgment (01.04.2025) precludes the executing court from ordering delivery of possession, or whether the maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit allows the Court to clarify and complete the relief now.

B. Precedents and Doctrinal Foundations

1. Jang Singh v. Brij Lal and the Maxim Actus Curiae Neminem Gravabit

The Court’s principal doctrinal foundation is the equitable maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit, meaning “the act of the court shall prejudice no one.” This is an old and deeply rooted principle in Indian jurisprudence.

The judgment cites and quotes a three-Judge Bench decision in Jang Singh v. Brij Lal, 1963 SCC OnLine SC 219. In Jang Singh, the Supreme Court held:

“There is no higher principle for the guidance of the Court than the one that no act of Courts should harm a litigant, and it is the bounden duty of Courts to see that if a person is harmed by a mistake of the Court he should be restored to the position he would have occupied but for that mistake. This is aptly summed up in the maxim: ‘Actus curiae neminem gravabit’.”

In Prem Aggarwal, this maxim is invoked to address the fact that the Supreme Court’s earlier (01.04.2025) judgment:

• dismissed the specific performance suit as barred by Order II Rule 2 CPC;
• awarded ₹2 crores as equitable compensation in lieu of ₹25,000 earnest money; but
• did not expressly state that the appellant must surrender possession upon receipt of such compensation.

The Court now treats that omission as its own “inadvertent lapse” and clarifies that the compensation was intended not only for the earnest money but also on the implicit understanding that the property would revert to the respondent-owners.

The maxim operates in this case in a somewhat unusual but important way: the Court uses it to prevent hardship to the respondents, who would otherwise be unfairly prejudiced by the Court’s earlier omission if the appellant were allowed to cling to it and retain both compensation and possession.

2. S hrimant Shamrao Suryavanshi v. Pralhad Bhairoba Suryavanshi and Section 53-A TPA

The appellant relied on S hrimant Shamrao Suryavanshi and another v. Pralhad Bhairoba Suryavanshi (dead) by LRs and others, (2002) 3 SCC 676, to contend that:

• Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act confers a protective right upon a transferee who has taken possession in part performance of a contract and is willing to perform his part.
• Such a person can defend his possession and continue to remain in possession until duly evicted through appropriate proceedings.
• Therefore, the respondents, having not sought possession in the earlier appeal, could only now file a separate suit for possession; they could not use execution proceedings to dispossess the appellant.

The Supreme Court in Prem Aggarwal distinguishes S hrimant Shamrao on facts and legal context:

• The factual scenario is “quite different and distinct.”
• In the present case:
  • The appellant’s injunction suit failed.
  • The appellant’s specific performance suit has now failed, on an Order II Rule 2 bar.
  • An extraordinary amount of ₹2 crores has been awarded in substitution of any equitable or contractual rights arising from the agreement to sell.
• In such a scenario, continuing to allow the appellant to rely on Section 53-A would:
  • allow him to enjoy possession and receive disproportionate monetary compensation, and
  • thereby lead to unjust enrichment, which equity abhors.

Implicitly, this judgment reaffirms that Section 53-A is a defensive equity which:

• presupposes a subsisting contract capable of specific performance or at least not extinguished by a final adjudication;
• cannot survive where the contract-based claim (specific performance) is conclusively refused and substituted by equitable compensation; and
• cannot be stretched to confer a permanent, windfall-like right to possession contrary to final judicial determinations.

C. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Characterisation of the Relief of ₹2 Crores

Central to the Court’s reasoning is its characterisation of the ₹2 crores as:

• an extraordinary, exorbitant, or whopping amount, granted in substitution of any claim under the agreement to sell; and
• a deliberate attempt to “balance the equities” between the parties.

The Court highlights that even if very high rates of interest (9%, 18%, 24%, 36%) were applied to ₹25,000 over 36 years, the total interest would be minuscule compared to ₹2 crores:

• At 9% p.a.: ₹81,000
• At 18% p.a.: ₹1,62,000
• At 24% p.a.: ₹2,16,000
• At 36% p.a.: ₹3,24,000

By contrast, the Court had awarded ₹2,00,00,000, which dwarfs any normal compensatory figure and is not proportionate interest in any conventional sense. The judgment explains that this relief served two purposes:

1. Preservation of ownership and possession for the vendors (respondents): The Court wanted the property to “continue with them” – i.e., to remain with its original owners.
2. Compensation and finality for the purchaser (appellant): The appellant had:
   • secured decrees in his favour from three courts; and
   • been litigating for over 36 years since the agreement.
   The large sum was meant to adequately compensate him and bring a quietus to the litigation.

Thus, the Court emphasizes that the earlier equitable award was not a windfall but a carefully calibrated attempt to:

• deny specific performance for legal reasons (Order II Rule 2), but
• still render substantial justice by substantially compensating the purchaser.

2. No Independent Right to Possession and Rejection of Section 53-A

The Court makes three key findings about the basis and fate of the appellant’s possession:

1. The appellant’s possession of the ground floor existed only because of the agreement to sell, not by way of tenancy, license or lease.
2. The earlier suit for permanent injunction (filed to protect this possession and restrain alienation) was dismissed and attained finality.
3. The later suit for specific performance has been dismissed by the Supreme Court, and the appellant has been given an extraordinary monetary substitute.

On this basis, the Court concludes:

“The appellant had lost in the suit for permanent injunction and now having lost in the suit for specific performance of contract cannot claim to hold on to the possession or insist that the defendants should file a separate suit for possession.”

Therefore, Section 53-A cannot be invoked:

• to perpetuate possession after the foundational agreement-based claims have failed; and
• to demand that the owners must start fresh litigation (a possession suit) despite a final Supreme Court determination and the grant of huge compensation.

3. Role of the Executing Court: Executions are to Enforce Judgments, Not Underwrite Windfalls

The Court reiterates the basic but often tested principle that the purpose of execution proceedings is to:

• “give effect to judgments” and not to “underwrite windfalls.”

In this case:

• The respondents adhered to the April 2025 judgment by:
  • initiating execution within time; and
  • tendering the ₹2 crores via FDs in the appellant’s name.
• The appellant refused to accept the money and sought to use the execution stage itself as a platform to re-litigate and extract further advantage.

The Executing Court responded correctly by:

• redirecting the FDs into the name of the Court when the appellant refused them;
• ordering warrants of possession; and
• ultimately granting police aid to overcome resistance on the ground.

By endorsing these steps, the Supreme Court signals strong institutional support for:

• assertive execution of decrees; and
• use of police assistance when court orders meet physical obstruction.

4. Application of Actus Curiae Neminem Gravabit to Cure Omissions

One of the most significant legal contributions of this judgment is its use of actus curiae neminem gravabit to:

• acknowledge that the earlier April 2025 judgment did not record the fact of appellant’s possession or explicitly direct surrender of possession; but
• clarify that this was an inadvertent omission and that the earlier monetary relief must now be read as being granted in lieu of both the earnest money and any claim to possession.

The Court is clear that:

“After all, to err is human, and when an inadvertent omission is brought to the Court’s attention, it becomes the Court’s solemn duty to ensure that no party suffers on account of such mistake.”

Consequently:

• The Court refuses to allow its own inadvertence to be turned into an instrument of injustice.
• The appellant cannot “take undue advantage of an omission in the judgment dated 01.04.2025.”
• The Court uses its inherent jurisdiction and equitable power to clarify the scope of the earlier decree and ensure fair implementation through execution.

5. Deterrence Against Abusive Litigation: Costs and Strong Language

The Court’s rhetoric in this case is strikingly robust. It makes several pointed observations about the appellant’s conduct:

• “Some litigants, it seems, cannot take yes for an answer.”
• The process has become “a cautionary tale about how the pursuit of a windfall can turn the process of law against those who seek to exploit it.”
• The appellant “has shot himself in the foot and in the same breath dug his own grave.”
• The appellant is an “unscrupulous litigant” resisting delivery of possession to obtain unjust enrichment.

To reinforce this disapproval and deter similar conduct, the Court:

• Dismisses the appeal; and
• Imposes exemplary costs of ₹10 lakhs, with 12% p.a. interest in case of default in payment within 4 weeks.

This approach serves a dual function:

1. It compensates the respondents for prolonged and obstructive litigation.
2. It signals that abuse of process at the execution stage will be met with financial and reputational consequences.

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V. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Order II Rule 2, Code of Civil Procedure (CPC)

What it says (in essence):

Order II Rule 2 CPC requires a plaintiff to include in one suit all claims arising from the same cause of action. If a part of the claim is omitted or abandoned, the plaintiff is generally barred from later suing for that omitted part.

In this case:

• The plaintiff first filed a suit for injunction (to protect possession and restrain alienation) based on the fear created by the 07.01.1990 advertisement.
• Later, he filed a suit for specific performance based on the same factual matrix, without having properly clubbed claims or reserved rights.
• The Supreme Court in the April 2025 judgment held that the second suit was barred by Order II Rule 2 because both suits arose from the same cause of action: the threatened breach reflected in the advertisement.

2. Section 53-A, Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (Doctrine of Part Performance)

Basic idea:

• If:
  • there is a written agreement to transfer immovable property;
  • the transferee has taken possession in part performance; and
  • the transferee is and has been ready and willing to perform his part;
• then the transferor (owner) is prevented from evicting the transferee in contravention of the contract, even if a formal conveyance has not been executed.
• However, Section 53-A is a shield, not a sword—it allows the transferee to defend possession, not to obtain a positive decree of title.

Why it fails for the appellant here:

• The appellant’s claim to enforce the contract (through specific performance) has been finally rejected due to Order II Rule 2.
• The Supreme Court has instead provided a substitute monetary relief (₹2 crores), effectively closing the door on contractual enforcement.
• Allowing the appellant to still invoke Section 53-A would:
  • contradict the final adjudication; and
  • provide a double benefit (money plus possession).
• Hence, the Court rightly holds that the appellant cannot enjoy possession and at the same time receive ₹2 crores.

3. Unjust Enrichment and Equitable Relief

Unjust enrichment occurs when one person unfairly benefits at another’s expense, and the law steps in to restore balance.

In this case:

• ₹25,000 paid as earnest money in 1989 could, under ordinary principles, entitle the plaintiff to a refund with reasonable interest.
• The Supreme Court, instead, awarded ₹2 crores – far beyond any market or interest-based measure – as an equitable gesture.
• If the plaintiff were allowed to:
  • receive or be entitled to ₹2 crores, and
  • retain possession indefinitely,
  that would be a clear case of unjust enrichment at the respondents’ expense.

Equity, as the Court stresses, “will not allow unjust enrichment.” This underpins:

• the rejection of the Section 53-A defence; and
• the insistence that the appellant must “yield possession” when endowed with such generous monetary compensation.

4. Execution Proceedings, Warrants of Possession, and Police Aid

Execution proceedings begin after a decree is passed, with the purpose of actually enforcing the decree’s terms. An Executing Court cannot go behind the decree or question its correctness but can interpret and implement it.

Warrant of possession is a specific execution order authorising the court’s officers (bailiffs, etc.) to take possession of immovable property from the judgment-debtor and deliver it to the decree-holder.

If the judgment-debtor resists physically, the executing court can:

• seek and order police assistance to overcome resistance; and
• ensure that its orders are not rendered nugatory by force or obstruction on the ground.

In this case, the Court’s approval of police aid underscores that:

• execution is an integral part of “doing justice,” not a separate, secondary process; and
• resistance to lawful execution orders can and will be met with the state’s coercive power.

5. The Maxim Actus Curiae Neminem Gravabit

Meaning: “The act of the Court shall prejudice no one.”

Practical meaning:

• If a party suffers because the Court made an error, delayed, or omitted something, the Court must, where possible, rectify the situation.

In this case:

• The omission to record possession and explicitly direct surrender of possession in the April 2025 judgment might have disadvantaged the respondents.
• The Court now acknowledges that omission and clarifies the earlier decree to ensure the respondents are not harmed by that judicial lapse.

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VI. Impact and Significance

1. On Property and Contract Law

• The judgment reinforces that a transferee in possession under an agreement to sell has no independent, indefinite right to possession, especially when:
  • his suit for specific performance fails; and
  • he is granted equitable compensation in lieu of such performance.
• It underscores the limits of Section 53-A TPA: it cannot:
  • survive after a final judicial determination extinguishing contractual claims; or
  • be used to claim a windfall.
• It clarifies that where courts exercise equitable powers to compensate a would-be purchaser:
  • such compensation is usually meant to close the litigation, not to create a new hybrid status (money + possession) for the purchaser.

2. On Civil Procedure and Execution Law

• The decision strengthens the authority of executing courts to:
  • interpret and give full effect to higher court judgments; and
  • issue warrants of possession and direct police assistance where necessary.
• It confirms that litigants cannot use the execution stage as a new arena to:
  • reopen settled rights; or
  • extract leverage by physical occupation and resistance.
• By reading the earlier Supreme Court decree in light of its purpose and context, the judgment encourages:
  • a purposive interpretation of decrees; and
  • discourages hyper-technical obstructionist tactics.

3. On Equitable Jurisdiction and Judicial Responsibility

• The case is an important illustration of the Supreme Court’s willingness to:
  • acknowledge its own inadvertent omission; and
  • correct it under the principle that the Court’s acts should not harm any party.
• It sends a message that equitable relief is a two-way street:
  • a party who receives extraordinary equity (₹2 crores in lieu of ₹25,000) must also accept the corresponding burdens (surrender of possession);
  • equity will not be permitted to become an instrument of unjust enrichment.

4. On Litigation Strategy and Ethics

• From a practitioner’s perspective, the judgment is a cautionary reminder:
  • to avoid splitting causes of action contrary to Order II Rule 2 CPC;
  • to ensure that all necessary reliefs and facts (such as possession) are brought to the court’s attention at the earliest;
  • to recognise that exploiting technical omissions can backfire, especially when equity is already strongly in one’s favour.
• Ethically, the Court’s strong language is a warning against:
  • turning litigation into a quest for windfall beyond what justice warrants; and
  • using physical possession and procedural objections to frustrate clear judicial intent.

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VII. Conclusion

Prem Aggarwal v. Mohan Singh (2025 INSC 1214) stands out as a robust reaffirmation that:

• Courts’ equitable powers to award compensation in lieu of specific performance carry an implicit expectation of finality and fairness to both sides.
• A purchaser who has:
  • lost his injunction and specific performance suits; and
  • been offered extraordinary monetary compensation far exceeding any normal entitlement,
  cannot legitimately insist on continuing in possession under Section 53-A or otherwise.
• Execution proceedings are not to be subverted into tools for extracting windfalls or prolonging disputes.
• The maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit empowers courts to cure their own inadvertent omissions so that no party is prejudiced by judicial error.

By upholding the execution court’s warrant of possession, rejecting the Section 53-A defence, and clarifying the scope of its earlier decree, the Supreme Court reinforces a coherent message: equity will not underwrite unjust enrichment, and the process of law cannot be hijacked to secure a windfall.

This judgment will likely serve as a significant precedent in disputes involving:

• agreements to sell where possession has been delivered;
• substitution of specific performance with equitable monetary compensation; and
• the use and limits of Section 53-A in the face of final judicial determinations.

In the broader legal landscape, Prem Aggarwal affirms that when a litigant has been granted exceptional equitable relief, the courts will not permit that party simultaneously to retain property, resist execution, and prolong litigation for tactical advantage. The message is simple yet powerful: a party who has been generously compensated must also yield possession.