Equal Treatment in Regularization and Seniority of Daily-Rated Employees: Commentary on Shyama Verma v. The State of Madhya Pradesh

1. Introduction

The decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Shyama Verma v. The State of Madhya Pradesh & Others (W.P. No. 5855/2018, decided on 13 November 2025, Jabalpur Bench, per Deepak Khot, J.) is an important addition to Indian service jurisprudence on:

the regularization of daily-rated (daily wage) employees,
the determination of seniority and consequential benefits, and
the limits of administrative discretion under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.

The petitioner, Shyama Verma, was appointed as a daily-rated employee on 9 April 1990. Two private respondents (Respondents No. 4 and 5) were engaged later, on 24 July 1991, also as daily wagers. However, the State regularized the services of these juniors much earlier, on 25 February 1992, while the petitioner’s services were regularized only in 2008, and even then, with a condition that denied her:

seniority benefits, and
arrears of monetary benefits.

The petitioner invoked the writ jurisdiction of the High Court seeking:

quashing of the order dated 30.09.2015 (Annexure P-4), which rejected her claim,
a direction to grant her seniority and consequential benefits at par with Respondents 4 and 5, and
any other appropriate relief.

The core grievance was that she, being senior as a daily-rated employee, was arbitrarily denied regularization and related benefits from the same date as her juniors, despite a prior High Court order in her favour and despite an earlier departmental committee recommendation supporting her claim.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The High Court allowed the writ petition and granted substantial relief to the petitioner. The key directions and findings were:

An earlier order of the High Court in W.P. No. 4803/2011 had already declared that the condition in the petitioner’s regularization order denying her seniority and arrears (Condition No. 8) was unconstitutional, being violative of Articles 14, 16 and 21. That order had attained finality as it was never challenged.
The State was bound to decide the petitioner’s claim for regularization and consequential benefits “at par” with the private respondents, ignoring Condition No. 8.
The State’s subsequent stand that Respondents 4 and 5 had been “directly appointed” on regular posts as early as 24.07.1991, and were only shown as daily wagers for want of sanction, was held to be unsupported by any cogent material and internally inconsistent.
The record showed that:
- the petitioner was appointed as a daily wager earlier (09.04.1990),
- Respondents 4 and 5 were appointed later as daily wagers (24.07.1991), and
- the order dated 25.02.1992 (Annexure R/2) was a fresh order of regular appointment of Respondents 4 and 5, with no reference to any prior regular appointment.
A departmental committee had, in its first meeting, resolved by majority to extend regularization and ancillary benefits to the petitioner at par with Respondents 4 and 5. No satisfactory reason was shown for convening a second meeting, which reversed this position.
The minutes of the second meeting appeared to be initially written by an individual and later altered to present them as a committee decision, raising serious doubts about the integrity of the process.
Such arbitrary and discriminatory conduct failed the test of Articles 14 and 16, as explained by the Supreme Court in Amita v. Union Of India, (2005) 13 SCC 721.

On this reasoning, the Court:

quashed the impugned order dated 30.09.2015 (Annexure P-4), and
directed the authorities to extend the benefit of regularization to the petitioner at par with Respondents 4 and 5.

Though the judgment does not separately spell out “seniority” and “arrears” again in the operative part, the background and the phrase “at par” necessarily encompass parity in:

date of regularization,
seniority fixation, and
consequential monetary benefits,

especially in light of the earlier writ decision which had declared the denial of seniority and arrears unconstitutional.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Factual Matrix and Procedural History

3.1.1 Employment and Regularization

Petitioner: Appointed as a daily-rated employee on 09.04.1990.
Respondents 4 and 5: Appointed later, as daily-rated employees, on 24.07.1991.

The record, including a list issued by the Directorate (Annexure P/1, page 29), clearly showed all three as daily wagers, with the petitioner being senior in terms of date of engagement.

Subsequently:

Respondents 4 and 5 were regularized via an order dated 25.02.1992 (Annexure R/2), which on its face appeared to be a fresh order of appointment on regular posts.
The petitioner’s services were regularized much later by order dated 27.09.2008 (Annexure P/1), and Condition No. 8 of that order stipulated that she:
- would not be entitled to any seniority, and
- would not be entitled to arrears of monetary benefits.

3.1.2 First Round of Litigation: W.P. No. 4803/2011

Being aggrieved by this discriminatory condition, the petitioner approached the High Court in W.P. No. 4803/2011. In that earlier writ:

The Court categorically held that a condition denying seniority and arrears in a regularization order “can never be imposed” and is hit by Articles 14, 16, and 21 of the Constitution.
The Court directed the authorities to:
- strike off Condition No. 8, and
- decide the petitioner’s representation for regularization “at par with the private respondents”.
No appeal or challenge was filed against this order; hence it attained finality and rendered Condition No. 8 inoperative.

3.1.3 Committee Proceedings and the Impugned Order

In compliance with the High Court’s direction, a departmental committee was constituted to examine the petitioner’s claim. The developments were:

First Committee Meeting: On 30.11.2013, the committee, by a majority decision (as per internal page 21 of File No. 42/11), resolved to give the petitioner the benefit of regularization and ancillary benefits at par with Respondents 4 and 5.
Second Committee Meeting: A second meeting was convened on 09.09.2015 (Annexure P/6). In this meeting, the committee reversed its earlier stance and opined that the petitioner was not entitled to benefits at par with Respondents 4 and 5. The recorded reason was that Respondents 4 and 5 had been directly appointed on regular posts on 24.07.1991 and were only made to work as daily wagers due to the absence of administrative sanction.
Impugned Order: Based on this second meeting’s minutes, the authority passed the order dated 30.09.2015 (Annexure P/4), rejecting the petitioner’s claim. That order was challenged in the present writ petition (W.P. No. 5855/2018).

Critically, the State’s return in the present writ did not explain:

why a second meeting was convened,
why the earlier majority decision was ignored, or
how the second set of minutes overrode the first.

3.2 Issues Before the Court

The principal legal issues were:

Whether the State could lawfully deny the petitioner regularization, seniority, and other consequential benefits at par with her juniors (Respondents 4 and 5), despite:
- her earlier date of appointment as a daily-rated employee, and
- an earlier High Court order striking down the adverse condition and directing parity consideration.
Whether the departmental authorities had acted arbitrarily and discriminatorily in relying on a second committee meeting to defeat the petitioner’s claim, in violation of Articles 14 and 16.
Whether the reasoning advanced in the impugned order dated 30.09.2015 was supported by evidence and met the standard of “reasonableness” mandated by Article 14.

3.3 Precedents and Authorities Cited

3.3.1 Amita v. Union Of India, (2005) 13 SCC 721

The High Court placed significant reliance on the Supreme Court’s exposition of Article 14 in Amita v. Union Of India. In paragraph 11 of that judgment, the Supreme Court held:

“Article 14 of the Constitution guarantees to every citizen of India the right to equality before the law or the equal protection of law. The first expression ‘equality before the law’ which is taken from the English common law, is a declaration of equality of all persons within the territory of India, implying thereby the absence of any special privilege in favour of any individual. It also means that amongst the equals the law should be equal and should be equally administered and that likes should be treated alike. Thus, what it forbids is discrimination between persons who are substantially in similar circumstances or conditions. It does not forbid different treatment of unequals. Article 14 of the Constitution is both a negative and positive right. Negative in the sense that no one can be discriminated against: anybody and everyone should be treated as equals. The latter is the core and essence of the right to equality and the State has the obligation to take necessary steps so that every individual is given equal respect and concern which he is entitled to as a human being. Therefore, Article 14 contemplates reasonableness in State action, the absence of which would entail the violation of Article 14 of the Constitution.”

The High Court relied on the following key elements of this passage:

“Likes should be treated alike”: The State cannot differentiate between persons who are similarly situated in all relevant respects.
Article 14 as a negative and positive right:
- Negative: Prohibits discrimination.
- Positive: Imposes a duty on the State to act reasonably and to give equal respect and concern to all individuals.
Reasonableness as a constitutional requirement: Every State action must be reasonable; unreasonableness itself can amount to a violation of Article 14.

These principles squarely applied to the petitioner’s claim, as she was:

similarly situated to Respondents 4 and 5 (all being daily-rated employees regularized by the same department), and
even senior to them in terms of initial engagement.

Yet, she was treated worse off than her juniors without any rational justification, which is precisely the type of discrimination Article 14 prohibits.

3.3.2 Earlier High Court Order in W.P. No. 4803/2011

Though not a “precedent” in the classical sense (as it is part of the same litigation history), the earlier order in W.P. No. 4803/2011 had binding force on the parties and was central to the High Court’s reasoning:

The Court had expressly held that the condition denying seniority and arrears to the petitioner was unconstitutional and violative of Articles 14, 16, and 21.
It directed that Condition No. 8 in the petitioner’s regularization order be rendered inoperative and that the petitioner’s case be considered at par with the private respondents.
No appeal or review was filed; thus the State was legally bound to comply both in letter and in spirit.

In the present judgment, the Court emphasizes that once this earlier order attained finality, the administrative authorities could not:

reinstate the effect of the struck-down condition indirectly, or
defeat the direction for parity by inventing unjustified distinctions.

3.4 Court’s Legal Reasoning

3.4.1 Effect of the Earlier High Court Order: Condition No. 8 Becomes Inoperative

The starting point of the Court’s reasoning is that in the earlier writ:

“According to me, such conditions can never be imposed and they are hit by Article 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India.”

The Court in the present writ:

recognized that this earlier finding was final and binding, and
treated Condition No. 8 as legally inoperative.

Consequently, there was no legal bar to:

granting seniority and arrears to the petitioner, and
considering her claim “at par” with Respondents 4 and 5.

The administrative authorities were bound not only to consider her case afresh but to do so without giving any effect, direct or indirect, to the invalidated condition.

3.4.2 Inconsistencies and Lack of Cogent Material in the State’s Justification

The State’s principal justification for treating the petitioner differently was:

Respondents 4 and 5 were allegedly appointed “directly” on regular posts on 24.07.1991, but due to lack of formal administrative sanction, they were made to work as daily wagers until 25.02.1992.
The petitioner, on the other hand, was merely a daily-rated employee.

The Court found this explanation unsustainable for several reasons:

No documentary support: The State did not produce any order reflecting a regular appointment of Respondents 4 and 5 on 24.07.1991:
- Such an order was neither provided to the petitioner, nor filed before the Court.
- The impugned order’s recital about this alleged prior appointment was thus unsupported by any “cogent material”.
Contradictions within the impugned order:
- On one hand, the order claimed that Respondents 4 and 5 were regularly appointed on 24.07.1991 but made to work as daily wagers due to lack of sanction.
- On the other hand, it stated that they were again appointed in the regular establishment after a departmental process (including interviews) on 25.02.1992.
The Court reasoned that if they had already been regularly appointed on 24.07.1991, there was no need for a fresh selection process on 25.02.1992. At most, the State could have obtained administrative sanction and given effect to the earlier appointment.
Nature of the 25.02.1992 order (Annexure R/2):
- On examination, this order did not contain any reference to a prior regular appointment.
- It bore all the hallmarks of a fresh order of regular appointment.
Directorate list (Annexure P/1):
- The Directorate’s own list showed:
  - the petitioner as a daily wager from 09.04.1990, and
  - Respondents 4 and 5 as daily wagers from 24.07.1991.
- This official document directly contradicted the State’s narrative that Respondents 4 and 5 were somehow “different” in category.

The Court concluded that the State’s explanation was neither plausible nor logical, and thus could not be accepted as a valid basis for differentiating between the petitioner and the private respondents.

3.4.3 Arbitrary Reversal of the Committee’s Majority Decision

A particularly striking feature of the case was the manner in which the departmental committee’s recommendations were handled:

First meeting (30.11.2013): The committee decided by majority to give the petitioner regularization benefits and ancillary benefits at par with Respondents 4 and 5.
Second meeting (09.09.2015): A later meeting reversed this view, now holding that the petitioner was not entitled to such parity.

The High Court noted:

The State’s return was completely silent as to:
- why the second meeting was convened, and
- why the earlier majority view was reconsidered.
The minutes of the second meeting (Annexure P/6, internal page 35) appeared to have been initially drafted by an individual, and later altered to present the opinion as that of the committee as a whole.
The second set of minutes did not engage with, or even discuss, the earlier majority decision, nor did it offer any reasons for departing from it.

On this basis, the Court inferred that:

“the authority just to deprive the petitioner from her legitimate right has convened the second meeting for no reason.”

The Court therefore treated the second meeting and its outcome as indicative of arbitrary and possibly mala fide conduct, inconsistent with fair administrative procedure.

3.4.4 Application of Articles 14 and 16: Equality and Non-Arbitrariness

Building on these factual findings, the Court applied the equality principles enshrined in Articles 14 and 16:

Equality before law and equal protection: The petitioner and Respondents 4 and 5 were in identical (or better) positions in terms of:
- nature of initial appointment (daily-rated employees),
- department and cadre, and
- ultimate regularization.
The only difference was that the petitioner was engaged earlier.
Discrimination against equals: Despite being senior, the petitioner was denied:
- timely regularization, and
- seniority and arrears,
whereas her juniors were given all these benefits. There was no rational or legally acceptable reason for this differential treatment.
Article 14 as a guarantee of reasonableness: Referring to Amita, the Court emphasized that Article 14 is violated not merely by explicit discrimination but also by unreasonable State action. The shifting stands of the State and the manipulation of committee proceedings clearly failed the test of reasonableness.
Article 16 and equality of opportunity in public employment: Although the judgment primarily invokes Article 14, the context is public employment, and therefore Article 16(1) (equality of opportunity) and 16(2) (non-discrimination) are directly engaged. Denying a senior employee parity with juniors without justification undermines equality of opportunity and fair treatment in service matters.

The Court further noted that:

“Unreasonableness, discrimination and favouratism pollute the administrative process. ... No discrimination whatsoever can be done by the authorities by colourable exercise of power.”

The phrase “colourable exercise of power” signifies that the authority may be ostensibly acting within its powers but is in reality using those powers for an improper purpose (here, to deprive the petitioner of her legitimate rights).

3.4.5 Quashing of the Impugned Order and Direction for Parity

After subjecting the impugned order (dated 30.09.2015, Annexure P-4) to the anvil of Articles 14 and 16 and the law laid down in Amita, the Court concluded that it:

“does not pass the judicious scrutiny of this Court.”

Accordingly, the Court:

quashed the impugned order, and
directed the authorities “to extend the benefit of regularization to the petitioner at par with the respondent Nos. 4 and 5.”

Given the earlier finding that denial of seniority and arrears was unconstitutional, this direction necessarily means:

the petitioner must be treated as regularized from a date comparable to Respondents 4 and 5,
her seniority must be fixed accordingly, and
she is entitled to consequential monetary benefits that flow from such fixation, subject to any applicable rules and limitations.

3.5 Complex Concepts Simplified

3.5.1 Writ of Certiorari

A “writ of certiorari” is a judicial order by a higher court (such as a High Court) to quash an order or decision of a lower authority or tribunal when:

that authority has acted without jurisdiction,
has violated principles of natural justice, or
has passed an order that is arbitrary, unreasonable, or contrary to law.

In this case, the petitioner sought a writ of certiorari to quash the impugned order dated 30.09.2015, which the Court found to be arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 16.

3.5.2 Daily-Rated Employee and Regularization

Daily-rated (or daily-wage) employee: A person engaged on a day-to-day basis, typically without:
- a regular post,
- long-term security of tenure, or
- the full set of service benefits (pension, promotions, etc.).
Regularization: The process by which such an employee is brought onto the regular establishment (i.e., a sanctioned post) with:
- a formal appointment order,
- a defined pay scale, and
- entitlement to standard service benefits.

Post-Umadevi (2006), courts have generally been cautious in granting regularization as a matter of right. However, once the State itself decides to regularize an employee, the issue often shifts from “whether” to “on what terms” and “from what date,” which is where equality principles like those applied in this case become crucial.

3.5.3 Seniority and Consequential Benefits

Seniority: The relative position of employees in a cadre, usually determined by:
- date of appointment, or
- date of regularization, depending on the governing rules.
Seniority matters for:
- promotion,
- transfer preferences,
- selection to higher posts, and
- other service benefits.
Consequential benefits: Benefits that “flow” from a given decision on seniority or date of appointment, such as:
- arrears of pay,
- revision of pay fixation,
- eligibility for earlier promotions, etc.

In this case, equality “at par” with juniors means the petitioner’s seniority and monetary entitlements must be aligned with those of Respondents 4 and 5, subject to applicable service rules.

3.5.4 Articles 14 and 16 – Key Ideas

Article 14: Guarantees:
- “equality before the law”, and
- “equal protection of the laws”.
It is violated when:
- similarly situated persons are treated unequally without a reasonable basis, or
- State action is arbitrary, irrational, or unreasonable.
Article 16: Applies the equality principle specifically to public employment:
- Article 16(1): Equality of opportunity in matters of public employment.
- Article 16(2): Prohibits discrimination on grounds like religion, race, caste, sex, etc.
In practice, Article 16 is often read with Article 14 to ensure fairness in recruitment, promotion, and other service conditions.

3.5.5 Colourable Exercise of Power

A “colourable exercise of power” occurs when:

an authority appears to act within its legal powers, but
in substance, uses those powers for an improper or extraneous purpose.

In this judgment, convening a second committee meeting without reason, ignoring an earlier majority decision, and relying on unsubstantiated facts were seen as indicators that the authority was using its formal powers to achieve an unfair result—depriving the petitioner of her lawful rights.

3.6 Impact and Implications

3.6.1 Reinforcement of Equality in Service Regularization

This decision reinforces a crucial post-Umadevi principle: while there is no blanket right to regularization, once the State has undertaken a regularization exercise:

it must treat similarly situated employees, especially seniors and juniors in the same category, in a non-discriminatory manner;
artificially favouring juniors while disadvantaging seniors without rational basis will be struck down as unconstitutional.

For daily-rated employees in Madhya Pradesh (and potentially elsewhere as a persuasive precedent), the case underscores that:

arbitrary conditions depriving seniority and arrears at the time of regularization are open to challenge, and
courts will examine whether similarly situated persons were treated more favourably.

3.6.2 Judicial Scrutiny of Administrative Committees and File-Notings

The judgment is notable for its close scrutiny of:

the internal minutes of departmental committees, and
the apparent manipulation of those minutes.

By:

taking note of the original file’s internal pages, and
observing how individual notes were retrospectively converted into “committee decisions”,

the Court sends a strong message that:

administrative decision-making processes are not immune from judicial review, and
courts will go behind the surface of formal resolutions to detect arbitrariness and bad faith.

3.6.3 Finality of Court Orders and Administrative Compliance

The case also emphasizes that:

once a High Court has declared a service condition invalid and unchallenged, the executive is bound by that ruling;
administrative bodies cannot indirectly restore the effect of an invalidated condition by resorting to fresh “interpretations” or by constituting new committees.

This contributes to the broader doctrine of the “rule of law” and the finality of judicial decisions, preventing executive defiance or circumvention of court orders.

3.6.4 Strengthening the Positive Dimension of Article 14

By quoting Amita and focusing on Article 14 not only as a non-discrimination clause but as imposing a duty of reasonable and respectful treatment, the judgment:

advances the understanding of Article 14 as a positive obligation on the State,
confirms that service matters are not mere questions of administrative convenience but of constitutional rights, and
signals that the courts will not tolerate “favouritism” or arbitrary distinctions in public employment.

3.6.5 Practical Consequences for Departments

For government departments and public employers, this judgment has practical lessons:

Record-keeping: Any claim of differential treatment must be supported by clear, contemporaneous documentary evidence.
Consistency: Internal inconsistencies in orders (e.g., claiming both prior regular appointment and fresh recruitment) will be viewed as undermining credibility.
Committee decisions: Once a committee has reached a reasoned majority decision, reconsideration must be:
- exceptional,
- transparent, and
- well-reasoned,
failing which courts may see it as arbitrary.
Equality check: Before issuing orders on regularization or seniority, authorities should systematically check whether any senior employee is being unfairly placed below a junior without justification.

4. Conclusion

The decision in Shyama Verma v. The State of Madhya Pradesh is a firmly reasoned reaffirmation of the constitutional guarantees of equality and fairness in public employment. It establishes that:

a senior daily-rated employee cannot be deprived of regularization benefits that have been accorded to her juniors without a clear, rational, and well-documented justification;
administrative authorities cannot manipulate committee processes or rely on unsubstantiated narratives to defeat an employee’s legitimate claims; and
conditions that deny seniority and arrears on regularization, when similarly placed employees enjoy those benefits, are violative of Articles 14 and 16.

By quashing the impugned order and directing parity in regularization, the High Court underscores that equality is not a mere formality but a substantive guarantee, demanding reasonableness, non-discrimination, and good faith in every step of the administrative process. The ruling will likely serve as a persuasive guide in future service disputes concerning regularization, seniority, and the integrity of departmental decision-making.

Equal Treatment in Regularization and Seniority of Daily-Rated Employees: Commentary on Shyama Verma v. State of Madhya Pradesh