Mr. M.L Agarwala, for the appellant:—Mr. Shamnath Mushran, for the respondents:—The application for execution, is not barred by limitation. The application made by Joti Prasad and Rati Ram to be substituted on the record for the original decree-holder was one to take a step in aid of execution and gave rise to a fresh period of limitation in their favour. On the date of that application Rati Ram was a minor, and so they were entitled to the benefit of section 6 of the Limitation Act, notwithstanding the fact that Joti Prasad, one of the decree-holders, was of age; Jiwan Ram v. Ram Sarup Ram(2), Zamir Hasan v. Sundar(3), Govindram v. Tatia(4). Section 7 of the Limitation Act does not stand in my way, inasmuch as it does not control section 6; the two sections do not overlap, and are independent of each other. The provisions of section 7 have no application to this case. The words “jointly entitled” mean something more than “interested in common,” and the case of two or more sons succeeding a father who held a decree is not one connoted, by the section. It is intended to provide for cases where the decree can only be executed by all the decree-holders jointly; for example, in a case like that of Farsand v. Abdullah(5). Joti Prasad acting as next friend of his minor brother, could not have given a discharge himself, without obtaining the leave of the court; Order XXXII, rule 6, of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 7 does not apply under such circumstances; Jagarnath Singh v. Mahabir Das(6). The application by Joti Prasad did not purport to be made by him in the capacity of a manager of a joint Hindu family. There is no definite finding of the lower appellate court that he was in fact such manager. That court presumed it from the circumstance that he was the elder brother. It would not necessarily follow that he was the de facto manager. I am strongly supported by the case of Ganga Dayal v. Mani Ram. The case of Acchaibar Singh v. Ram Sarup Sahu proceeds on the assumption that the person receiving the money was in fact the manager of the joint family. It does not advance the point any farther than the case of Ganga Dayal v. Mani Ram, which said that it was a question of fact for determination in each case as to whether the major member really acted as manager of the family. The words “without the concurrence of such person” bisection 7 of the Limitation Act must be given some meaning. Joti Prasad could not give a discharge without the concurrence of his brother. Order XXI, rule 15, of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that it is for the court to give the necessary directions for protecting the interest of the co-decree-holder, and it is the court which supplies the concurrence on behalf of the minor decree-holder. Payment to one decree-holder out of court would not ipso facto discharge a decree. And payment through the court could only be obtained by Joti Prasad with the leave or sanction of the court. The “ability to give a discharge,” as contemplated by the section, is one which is independent of any leave or sanction of the court; as was held in the Bombay case cited already. The lower appellate court has relied on a Madras case, namely, the case of Doraiswami Sastrial v. Venkatarama Iyer. But the view taken there is the logical result of that consistently taken by the Madras High Court, namely, that section 6 of the Limitation Act applies only where all and not some of the persons jointly entitled are under a legal disability; Ahinsa Bibi v. Abdul Kader Saheb, Periasami v. Krishna Ayyan. As has been shown above, the other High Courts have not taken that view. Secondly, the application to bring on the record the legal representatives of the deceased Munshi Lal was not actually dismissed and should not have been dismissed. The court should have proceeded, on the death of Joti Prasad, under order XXII, rule 2, stayed the proceedings and waited for a further application to be made. The present application should be regarded as one in continuation of that application, which has not been disposed of by a proper order. In that view the present application is not barred by time. On the death of Joti Prasad, a fresh period accrued in favour of the minor, Rati Ram, to carry on the previous application.There is no basis for the contention that the present application is one to renew the former application. It is a fresh application, and cannot be deemed to be in continuation of the former one. That one was struck off, and rightly struck off, as it had become quite infructuous on Joti Prasad's death. The court could not possibly have done anything else or passed any other order. Order XXII, rule 2, had no application to the case, because on the death of Joti Prasad there was no other decree-holder who was already on the record, or properly before the court. Unless there are any co-plaintiffs or co-decree-holders already on the record, the court cannot proceed under order XXII, rule 2. Rati Ram had neither been brought on the record nor had any next friend been appointed for him. The present application is not one asking the court to do what was asked for in the former application and what, to a large extent, has now become impossible of performance.[He was not heard on the point relating to sections 6 and 7 of the Limitation Act.]Mr. M.L Agarwala, in reply, cited further the case of Moti Ram v. Hannu Prasad, .