Due Process and Police Surveillance of “Rowdy Sheeters”: Commentary on Sunil Kumar @ Silent Sunil v. State of Karnataka

1. Introduction

The judgment of the Karnataka High Court in Sunil Kumar @ Silent Sunil v. State of Karnataka, W.P. No. 18789 of 2019 (GM-Police), decided on 4 December 2025 by Justice R. Nataraj, addresses a recurring and sensitive problem in policing practice: can the police orally summon and detain so‑called “rowdy sheeters” solely because their names appear in Rowdy Registers, when no statutory procedure exists for such summoning?

The Court’s answer establishes an important principle:

In the absence of a “procedure established by law” for securing the presence of a person whose name appears in a Rowdy Register, the police cannot orally summon or detain such a person merely on that basis; doing so violates Article 21 of the Constitution.

At the same time, the Court recognises the State’s legitimate interest in crime prevention and public order, and therefore:

• Clarifies that discreet, non-intrusive surveillance of suspects and rowdy sheeters is permissible; and
• Frames a limited, interim communication mechanism (via SMS/WhatsApp) for the petitioner, until the State enacts a lawful procedure.

The judgment builds on earlier decisions on rowdy sheets, police surveillance, and personal liberty (notably Malak Singh, Sunil Batra, Selvi, Puttaswamy, and the Karnataka High Court’s own decision in B.S. Prakash), and projects them into the new statutory landscape of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) and the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS).

2. Background and Procedural History

2.1 Parties

• Petitioner: Sunil Kumar @ Silent Sunil, resident of Bengaluru.
• Respondents:
  • State of Karnataka, Home Department, by its Secretary.
  • Additional Commissioner of Police (Crime), Bengaluru (Respondent No. 2).

2.2 Petitioner’s status as “rowdy sheeter”

The petitioner’s name was recorded as a rowdy sheeter in Rowdy Registers maintained at multiple police stations in Bengaluru (Subramanyanagar, Yelahanka New Town, Rajajinagar, Amruthahalli). According to the State, 24 criminal cases were registered against him over time, including serious offences (murder, dacoity, etc.).

By the time of the hearing:

• The petitioner had been acquitted in 22 cases involving serious offences.
• In Crime No. 58/2017 (Yelahanka Police Station – Sections 399, 402 IPC and Sections 27, 30 Arms Act; later a KCOCA case in Spl.C.C. No. 414/2017), the proceedings were quashed by a coordinate Bench in W.P. No. 14198/2024 (order dated 07.11.2025) insofar as they concerned the petitioner.
• In Crime No. 173/2024 (Malleshwaram Police Station – offences under Sections 132, 3(5), 352 BNS), the proceedings were also quashed in W.P. No. 33019/2024.
• Only one case was stated to be pending trial.

2.3 Allegations of arbitrary police conduct

The petitioner narrated a pattern of police conduct:

• He was not originally named as an accused in Crime No. 58/2017 but was later implicated, and remained in custody from February 2017 to November 2018 (with KCOCA invoked against him).
• Upon release on bail in November 2018, he was again taken into custody, produced before Central Crime Branch (CCB) officers, and allegedly:
  • Detained till late at night;
  • Threatened with implication in a high-profile murder case if he did not comply with demands to appear;
  • Subjected to “rowdy parades” at the CCB office, including:
    • Publicly assembled with other alleged rowdies;
    • Abuse and physical manhandling by Respondent No. 2;
    • Searches of his home without authority of law (as alleged);
    • Multiple days of compelled attendance and questioning, coupled with threats against initiating legal action.

He asserted that:

• There is no statutory or regulatory procedure (in the Karnataka Police Act, 1963, Karnataka Police Manual, or BNSS/BNS) that authorises the police to orally summon a person merely because his name appears in a Rowdy Register.
• Repeated oral summoning, detention, and public parades:
  • Violate his right to privacy and personal liberty under Article 21;
  • Cause a constant fear of false implication and social stigma; and
  • Are a colourable exercise of power, arbitrary and abusive.

2.4 Reliefs sought and narrowed

Initially, the petitioner sought:

1. Compensation from Respondent No. 2 for allegedly illegal detention for three days.
2. A direction to Respondent No. 2 to desist from threatening him.
3. A general direction to all Karnataka State Police officers to issue a notice to him whenever his appearance is required for enquiry or investigation.

In light of acquittals and quashment of cases, the petitioner gave up the first two reliefs. The surviving relief, and the central issue in this writ petition, was:

Whether the police can insist on the petitioner’s presence for enquiry or investigation based only on his status as a rowdy sheeter, without a written notice or statutory procedure, and whether they should be directed to issue notice whenever his appearance is required.

3. Issues Before the Court

Stripped to essentials, the Court was called upon to address:

1. Legality of oral summoning based on Rowdy Register entries
   Whether, in the absence of any express statutory or rule-based procedure, the police can:
   • Orally summon a person whose name is entered in a Rowdy Register; and
   • Detain him in a police station for hours or days for enquiry, solely on that basis.
2. Article 21 and “procedure established by law”
   Whether such oral practices meet the requirement of “procedure established by law” under Article 21, and if not, whether they violate:
   • Personal liberty;
   • Right to privacy and the “right not to be disturbed” (post‑Puttaswamy).
3. Scope of permissible police surveillance
   How far the police may go in surveilling or interacting with “rowdy sheeters” without infringing constitutional rights, particularly in light of:
   • The Karnataka Police Manual (Orders 1052, 1058, 1059);
   • Standing Orders on rowdies and “rowdy parades”;
   • General powers under the CrPC/BNSS (including Sections 35, 168, 170 BNSS).
4. Appropriate interim safeguards
   Pending any legislative or regulatory framework, what minimal procedural safeguards should govern interaction between police and rowdy sheeters.

4. Summary of the Judgment

4.1 Key holdings

The Court’s core conclusions may be distilled as follows:

1. No oral summoning solely because of Rowdy Register entry
   The Court holds that:

   “So long as there is no procedure established by law, the respondents cannot summon a person whose name appears in the Rowdy Register.”

   Oral summoning and prolonged presence at the police station, based merely on being a rowdy sheeter, violates Article 21.
2. Rowdy Register is an internal tool; it cannot itself justify coercive measures
   Maintaining Rowdy Registers is held to be a valid internal mechanism for surveillance and information, but:
   • They do not themselves constitute a legal basis to compel attendance or restrict liberty;
   • The person recorded in the register retains full fundamental rights (subject only to lawful and proportionate restrictions).
3. Surveillance is permissible, but must be unobtrusive and non-intrusive
   Relying on Malak Singh and related precedents, the Court reiterates:
   • Discreet, unobtrusive surveillance of known bad characters and potential offenders is legitimate;
   • But any surveillance that seriously encroaches on privacy or effectively restricts movement or liberty crosses the constitutional line.
4. Interim procedure for this petitioner
   Recognising the petitioner’s own willingness to cooperate, and balancing public safety, the Court issues an individualised arrangement:
   • The petitioner must furnish a mobile number to all police stations where rowdy sheets on him exist.
   • Police may send an SMS or WhatsApp message asking him to visit the police station for enquiry about his activities.
   • If he does not appear despite such intimation, police may visit his house for enquiry or surveillance.
   Importantly:
   • This is not grounded in a statutory procedure; it is justified by the petitioner’s voluntary commitment to cooperate, by analogy to Selvi (consensual narcoanalysis).
5. Protection is conditional and case-specific
   The final operative directions (for the petitioner) are:
   • So long as the petitioner is not involved in any offence and is not suspected of being involved in a crime, the police shall not summon him orally only because his name appears in the rowdy list.
   • If he becomes involved in any crime, the protection vanishes.
   • The order does not affect the powers of Executive/District/Chief Judicial Magistrates under Chapter IX BNSS (security for keeping the peace/good behaviour).

4.2 Scope of the ruling

Formally, the final directions are confined to the petitioner. However, the Court articulates a broader principle:

In the absence of a legislatively sanctioned procedure for summoning rowdy sheeters, oral summoning and detention based solely on Rowdy Register entries infringes Article 21.

This general articulation is likely to guide lower courts and administrative practice in similar cases, even if another litigant must approach the Court for specific relief.

5. Precedents and Authorities Considered

5.1 Karnataka Police Manual and Standing Orders

5.1.1 Nature and status of the Police Manual

The Court notes that the Karnataka Police Manual:

• Is largely an administrative guide – it “has no statutory backing but has all the traits of a statute”;
• Contains detailed provisions on:
  • History sheets (Orders 1052, 1058);
  • Rowdy sheets and the definition of “rowdy” (Order 1059);
  • Surveillance and related standing orders.

Yet, as the Additional Government Advocate candidly admitted:

“…it is an admitted fact that as on today there is no procedure contemplated either in the Police Act, 1963 or in the Police Manual, to summon a rowdy sheeter for inquiry.”

This admission is crucial. It means that:

• While maintaining rowdy sheets and conducting surveillance have some administrative foundation,
• The specific practice of summoning rowdy sheeters to the police station merely because of their rowdy status is wholly extra‑legal.

5.1.2 Definition of “rowdy” (Order 1059)

Order 1059(1) defines a “rowdy”:

“A rowdy may be defined as a goonda and includes a hooligan, tough, vagabond or any person who is dangerous to the public peace and tranquility.”

The “main forms of rowdyism” include indecent remarks to women, intimidation, forcible collection of subscriptions, taking sides in petty quarrels with threats, disorderly conduct, rioting, and robbery/snatching.

The Court accepts that:

• Such classification aids policing and public order;
• But it does not, by itself, authorise coercive deprivation of liberty in the absence of specific legal procedure.

5.1.3 Standing Orders and B.S. Prakash

The State invoked:

• Standing Order No. 157 (1955) – regarding rowdy sheets and procedures for entering names;
• Orders 1058 and 1059 – on rowdyism and surveillance;
• Standing Order No. 1003 (2013) – for controlling and managing rowdies;
• A circular dated 30.07.2025 issued in light of the coordinate Bench decision in B.S. Prakash v. State of Karnataka (W.P. No. 4504/2021 and connected matters, decided on 22.04.2022).

In B.S. Prakash, a coordinate Bench had already infused procedural safeguards into the entry of names in Rowdy Registers by mandating a “proposal notice”:

“A brief proposal notice shall be sent to the individual concerned in a sealed cover with an option to submit his representation within two weeks as to why his name should not be registered as a rowdy … In exceptional cases notice may be dispensed with for the reasons to be recorded.”

This judgment:

• Opened a “window of hope” for persons at risk of being labelled rowdies;
• Was incorporated by the DGP’s 2025 circular laying down procedures for entering names in the Rowdy Register.

Justice Nataraj’s decision thus builds upon and extends B.S. Prakash: if entry into the Rowdy Register requires some due process, then coercive action taken because of such entry must equally rest on proper legal procedure.

5.2 Supreme Court precedents on surveillance, privacy, and liberty

5.2.1 Malak Singh v. State of Punjab & Haryana (1981) 1 SCC 420

Malak Singh dealt with the legality of police surveillance (history sheets / surveillance registers). The Supreme Court:

• Recognised that prevention of crime is a prime purpose of the police;
• Held that discreet surveillance of habitual offenders and suspects is permissible;
• But emphasised that:

  “Permissible surveillance is only to the extent of a close watch over the movements of the person under surveillance and no more.”

• Warned that surveillance must not “so seriously encroach on the privacy of a citizen as to infringe his fundamental right to personal liberty.”

Justice Nataraj quotes this extensively, including its reference to Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, to underline that:

• Preventive policing is legitimate;
• But privacy and liberty impose real and enforceable limits on intrusive state action, even when aimed at crime prevention.

5.2.2 Kharak Singh v. State Of U.P. (AIR 1963 SC 1295) and Gobind v. State of M.P. (1975) 2 SCC 148

These early cases dealt with:

• Night visits, domiciliary visits, and other forms of surveillance;
• The nascent recognition of a right to privacy and its linkage to Article 21.

The State relied on Gobind and Malak Singh to justify surveillance; the Court accepts discreet, unobtrusive surveillance as valid, but distinguishes it from:

• Compulsory attendance at police stations,
• Prolonged detention and public parades, which are of a different, and more intrusive, order.

5.2.3 K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 641

In Puttaswamy, a nine-judge Bench affirmed that:

• Privacy is a fundamental right under Article 21;
• It includes a “right to be let alone” or “right not to be disturbed”;
• Any State intrusion must:
  • Have a law (legality);
  • Pursue a legitimate aim (e.g., crime prevention);
  • Be proportionate; and
  • Have procedural safeguards.

The High Court invokes this to say:

• The right “not to be disturbed” is part of Article 21;
• Rowdy Registers may be maintained quietly for internal reference, but:

  “The Rowdy Register shall always be maintained as a reference to keep track of the activities of the person without intruding his private space, as right not to be disturbed is now a part of the right of privacy…”

5.2.4 Sunil Batra (Ii) v. Delhi Administration (1978) 4 SCC 494

Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer’s celebrated opinion in Sunil Batra (II) is quoted to emphasise:

• Even prisoners, and even those under death sentence, retain fundamental rights;
• Article 21 (“procedure established by law”), read with Articles 14 and 19, has effectively been infused with “due process” after R.C. Cooper and Maneka Gandhi;
• Punitive or administratively oppressive measures that are “outrageous, scandalisingly unusual or cruel” are unreasonable and violate these Articles.

Justice Nataraj uses this to reinforce that:

• If even convicts retain a core of non‑negotiable human rights,
• Then a person whose only additional characteristic is entry in a Rowdy Register cannot be treated as having ceded his constitutional protections.

5.2.5 Selvi v. State of Karnataka (2010) 7 SCC 263

Selvi held that:

• Compulsory narcoanalysis, polygraph tests, and brain-mapping violate Article 20(3) (right against self-incrimination) and Article 21;
• They cannot be justified even for grave offences or offences against the State;
• Articles 20 and 21 are non‑derogable; courts cannot carve out judicial exceptions.

However, the Supreme Court recognised a narrow space:

• If an individual voluntarily and with informed consent agrees to undergo such a test, it may be administered.

Justice Nataraj draws a functional analogy:

• There is no statutory procedure allowing police to compel the petitioner’s presence merely as a rowdy sheeter; thus compulsory attendance is impermissible.
• But since the petitioner volunteers to appear when given prior intimation, the Court tailors an arrangement whereby his attendance is invited via SMS/WhatsApp rather than compelled orally or coercively.

5.2.6 M.A. Khaliq & Ors. v. Ashok Kumar & Anr., 2021 SCC OnLine SC 3107

The Supreme Court in M.A. Khaliq held:

“The mere fact that no crime was registered, could not be a defence, nor would it be an escape from the rigour of the decisions rendered by this Court. As a matter of fact, summoning the person without there being any crime registered against him and detaining him would itself be violative of basic principles.”

This principle directly supports the petitioner:

• Oral summoning and detention of a person when no crime is registered (and no other statutory procedure applies) is itself a violation of basic constitutional norms.

5.3 Statutory framework: BNSS and BNS

The Court refers to the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), the successor to the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS), the successor to the Indian Penal Code.

• Section 168 BNSS – Obliges every police officer to prevent the commission of any cognizable offence.
• Section 170 BNSS – Permits arrest without warrant of a person suspected of involvement in a cognizable offence.
• Section 35 BNSS – The counterpart to former Section 41-A CrPC:
  • If arrest is not required under Section 35(1), the police officer shall issue a notice of appearance to a person against whom:
    • a reasonable complaint is made; or
    • credible information is received; or
    • a reasonable suspicion exists that he has committed a cognizable offence.
  • Compliance with such notice is mandatory for the addressee.
• Chapter IX BNSS – Powers of Executive/District/Chief Judicial Magistrate to require security for keeping the peace and for good behaviour (successor to Chapter VIII CrPC).

The Court uses these to:

• Clarify that where a rowdy sheeter is suspected of an actual cognizable offence, the police have clear statutory pathways:
  • Issue a Section 35 notice (notice of appearance); or
  • Arrest without warrant under Section 170, if conditions warrant; or
  • Initiate preventive proceedings under Chapter IX BNSS via Magistrates.
• Underscore that none of these provisions authorises oral, extra‑legal summoning or prolonged non‑statutory detention merely because of a rowdy sheet entry.

5.4 Other precedents cited by the petitioner

The petitioner relied on a range of decisions (D.K. Basu, Mohd. Quadeer, Sunkara Satyanarayana, Mehmood Nayyar Azam, Rini Johar, several High Court decisions on rowdy sheets, etc.). While Justice Nataraj does not discuss each in detail, their broad thrust supports:

• Compensation for illegal detention and custodial humiliation (D.K. Basu, Mehmood Nayyar Azam, Rini Johar);
• Limits on rowdy sheets, rowdy parades, and public shaming; and
• The need for procedural safeguards in surveillance practices (various Andhra Pradesh, Telangana, and Madras High Court decisions on rowdy sheets).

These cases collectively form a jurisprudential backdrop against which the Karnataka High Court locates its own pronouncement.

6. Legal Reasoning

6.1 Nature and function of Rowdy Registers

The Court first clarifies what a Rowdy Register is, and what it is not.

• It is an internal document composed of three parts (Part A, B, C), listing:
  • Confirmed rowdies resident in the station jurisdiction;
  • Confirmed rowdies operating within but not residing in the jurisdiction, and homeless rowdies;
  • “Novices” or budding goondas.
• Entries and deletions require prior orders from a Superintendent of Police or Sub‑Divisional Police Officer.

The Court acknowledges that:

• These registers are a practical and historical tool (existing “since the days of the British Raj”) to:
  • Keep watch on persons exhibiting a tendency to indulge in offences;
  • Serve as a “ready reckoner” for newly posted officers.

However, two vital limitations are emphasised:

1. No hearing prescribed before entry
   Historically, the Manual provided no opportunity to be heard before entry; only B.S. Prakash introduced a “proposal notice”. Thus Rowdy Registers are not, in themselves, the product of any adjudicatory process.
2. No statutory consequence attached to entry
   The Manual and Standing Orders do not (and legally cannot, absent statutory backing) stipulate that:
   • Mere entry in the Rowdy Register automatically justifies:
     • Compulsory attendance at the police station;
     • Detention;
     • Public parades;
     • Coercive questioning.

Thus, Rowdy Registers are information tools, not independent sources of coercive power.

6.2 Article 21 and “procedure established by law”

Article 21 provides that:

“No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.”

Drawing on Maneka Gandhi, Sunil Batra, and later cases, the Court adopts the now-settled position that:

• The “procedure” must be:
  • Prescribed by “law” as defined in Article 13 (statute, rules, regulations, etc. with legal force);
  • Fair, just and reasonable, not arbitrary, fanciful, or oppressive (the “due process” reading of Article 21).

The Court explicitly notes, relying on Shabnam v. Union of India (2015) 6 SCC 702, that:

“The procedure established by law which controls Article 21 should be ‘due procedure’ and not fanciful, arbitrary or oppressive.”

In the present case:

• There is no “law” (in the Article 13 sense) – no statute, rule, regulation, or notification – that authorises:
  • Oral summoning of rowdy sheeters to police stations merely because their names appear in Rowdy Registers; or
  • Detention and interrogation in such circumstances.
• The practice rests only on administrative habit or “practice”; even the Police Manual is silent on summoning rowdy sheeters.

Therefore, the practice:

• Lacks the “legality” component; and
• Is also inherently arbitrary and oppressive, given its open-ended nature (no time limits, no record, no grounds communicated).

Such a practice fails both limbs of the Article 21 test and is unconstitutional.

6.3 Distinguishing surveillance from coercion

The Court draws a clear line between:

• Permissible surveillance, and
• Impermissible coercion.

From Malak Singh and other precedents:

• Police are allowed to:
  • Keep discreet watch over suspects’ movements;
  • Collect intelligence from various sources about their activities, associates, and businesses;
  • Maintain history sheets and Rowdy Registers internally.
• They are not allowed to:
  • Intrusively shadow or harass individuals members of the public;
  • Summon individuals repeatedly without legal basis;
  • Subject them to public parades, humiliation, or physical abuse.

Thus:

“Surveillance” is acceptable only so long as it remains an unobtrusive watch. The moment it morphs into compelled attendance, prolonged station presence, or physical interference, it ceases to be surveillance and becomes unconstitutional coercion.

6.4 Availability of lawful mechanisms under BNSS/BNS

The Court stresses that when police have:

• Reasonable information or suspicion that an identifiable cognizable offence may be committed or has been committed, they are not helpless – they must:
  • Register a case (FIR, or now, an equivalent under BNSS); and
  • Invoke:
    • Section 35 BNSS (notice of appearance in lieu of arrest), or
    • Section 170 BNSS (arrest without warrant in appropriate cases), or
    • Chapter IX BNSS (security for keeping the peace/behaviour).

The key implication is:

• Where there is a real, individualised suspicion relating to specific offences, statutory tools suffice.
• Where there is only a general apprehension

6.5 Balancing public interest and individual rights

The Court is careful not to discount public safety. It acknowledges:

• Bengaluru City has about 6540 rowdies on record;
• Policing is inherently “a tough job” and crucial for public order;
• There is a duty under Section 149 CrPC (and now BNSS 168) to prevent cognizable offences.

However, it equally stresses:

• Fundamental rights, especially under Articles 20 and 21, are non‑derogable (Selvi);
• Police cannot claim a blanket exemption from constitutional discipline.

This leads to a “triangulation” approach:

“After all, it must be borne in mind that it is not only the right of privacy of an individual or his right not to be disturbed that is at stake but it is the triangulation of the interests of other citizens and their family, the erring citizen and the public at large that is at stake.”

The Court’s method of balancing:

• Upholds the rule that no oral summoning is permissible absent a legal procedure;
• Reserves police powers under BNSS/BNS when there is actual suspicion about specific offences;
• Carves out a voluntary, SMS/WhatsApp based communication channel for this petitioner to accommodate ongoing concerns about his activities.

6.6 The role of the Court as “sentinel qui vive”

Justice Nataraj explicitly describes the Court as a “sentinel qui vive” (vigilant guardian) of fundamental rights:

“Till the State passes any law prescribing the manner of summoning a person whose name is found in the rowdy register, this Court as a sentinel qui vive of fundamental rights of not only rowdy sheeters but also the public at large, considers it appropriate to balance the interest of the rowdy sheeters as well as the State and the Public.”

This expresses:

• The Court’s willingness to fill a normative gap (lack of legislation) by setting minimum procedural standards, while
• Leaving the ultimate task of framing detailed rules squarely with the Legislature/Executive.

7. Complex Concepts Simplified

7.1 “Rowdy sheeter” and Rowdy Register

• A rowdy sheeter is a person whose name appears in a police station’s Rowdy Register, classified as a “rowdy” under Order 1059 of the Karnataka Police Manual.
• The register:
  • Lists persons the police consider dangerous or habitually involved in certain kinds of misbehaviour or crime;
  • Is for internal use only – to track and monitor potential trouble‑makers.

7.2 “Rowdy parade”

• Though not formally defined, a “rowdy parade” refers to:
  • Police practice of assembling alleged rowdies at a police station or public venue;
  • Making them line up, sometimes for identification or intimidation purposes;
  • Often in full view of others or even the media.
• Such parades can cause public humiliation and stigma, and if not backed by law, amount to a violation of dignity and privacy.

7.3 “History sheet” and “surveillance register”

• A history sheet is a record maintained by police of a person’s:
  • Past criminal cases;
  • Known associates;
  • Habits and movements.
• It is a traditional tool for preventive policing; but entry in such a sheet does not, by itself, authorise coercive measures.

7.4 “Procedure established by law” vs “due process”

• Article 21 uses the phrase “procedure established by law” (not “due process of law”).
• Initially, this was read narrowly to mean any procedure laid down by a validly enacted law, even if unfair.
• After Maneka Gandhi and subsequent cases:
  • The Supreme Court held that such procedure must be fair, just and reasonable;
  • In effect, this imports a “due process” standard into Article 21, even without using those words.

  7.5 BNSS Section 35 (notice of appearance)

  • When a police officer receives:
    • a reasonable complaint, or
    • credible information, or
    • a reasonable suspicion
    that a person has committed a cognizable offence, but:
    • Arrest is not necessary under the statutory criteria,
    the officer must:
    • Issue a written notice of appearance to the person;
    • Require him to appear at a specified place and time.
  • This:
    • Creates a traceable, documented requirement to appear;
    • Is a lawful way to secure presence without immediate arrest.

  7.6 “Sentinel qui vive”

  • A Latin expression meaning “an ever‑vigilant guard”.
  • Used by courts to describe their constitutional role as guardians of fundamental rights, particularly against State excess.

  8. Impact and Significance

  8.1 On police practice in Karnataka

  The judgment has direct implications for policing:

  • Oral summons to rowdy sheeters solely because of their rowdy status is now clearly impermissible under Article 21, at least within the Karnataka High Court’s jurisdiction.
  • Police must:
    • Either:
      • Have a specific legal basis (e.g., Section 35 BNSS notice, arrest in a registered case, Magistrate’s order) to compel attendance; or
      • Limit themselves to discreet surveillance that does not intrude into liberty or privacy.
  • Routine, undocumented, oral calls to the station, keeping persons for long hours without case registration, and using threats of future implication as leverage are exposed as constitutionally vulnerable.

  8.2 On the jurisprudence of rowdy sheets and preventive policing

  This decision is part of a broader shift:

  • B.S. Prakash – introduced procedural safeguards (notice & opportunity) before entering names in Rowdy Registers;
  • Sunil Kumar @ Silent Sunil – now:
    • Repudiates extra‑legal practices of summoning based on those entries; and
    • Insists on “procedure established by law” for any interference with liberty.

  Together, these judgments:

  • Press the State to regularise and rationalise the system of rowdy sheets and history sheets;
  • Mark a movement away from informal, police‑created powers towards defined, legislatively authorised frameworks.

  8.3 On privacy and the “right not to be disturbed”

  By explicitly invoking the right “not to be disturbed” as part of privacy under Article 21, the Court:

  • Extends Puttaswamy’s privacy reasoning into the realm of preventive policing;
  • Signals that:
    • Law‑abiding or acquitted former suspects are entitled to rebuild their lives without constant fear or disruption;
    • Even persons with chequered pasts (“every saint has a past and every sinner a future”) must be afforded a chance to reform and live with dignity.

  8.4 On legislative and executive action

  The Court consciously stops short of either:

  • Striking down any provision of the Karnataka Police Manual; or
  • Drafting a complete code of rules.

  Instead, it:

  • Leaves room for the State to frame appropriate rules/regulations under the Karnataka Police Act or other enabling statutes; and
  • Hints (via the State’s own submission) that “at the most, this Court may direct the State of Karnataka to frame rules and regulations.”

  Legislative or executive rule‑making is now clearly called for to:

  • Define:
    • When and how rowdy sheeters may be summoned;
    • What safeguards and documentation are required;
    • How long they can be required to stay; and
    • What remedies exist for abuse.

  8.5 On other States and future litigation

  Though binding primarily in Karnataka, the reasoning:

  • Resonates with similar practices across India (rowdy sheets/history sheets are common in many States);
  • Provides a template for challenges to:
    • Rowdy parades;
    • Oral summons and informal detentions; and
    • Other preventive measures lacking statutory footing.

  Courts elsewhere may draw on this judgment, alongside Malak Singh, Selvi, and Puttaswamy, to re‑examine their own States’ surveillance and rowdy sheet practices.

  9. Conclusion

  Sunil Kumar @ Silent Sunil v. State of Karnataka is a significant step in aligning preventive policing with constitutional guarantees of liberty and privacy. It does three crucial things:

  1. Declares extra‑legal police practices unconstitutional
     It squarely holds that:
     • In the absence of a legislatively sanctioned procedure, the police cannot:
       • Orally summon rowdy sheeters; or
       • Detain them for enquiry merely because their names appear in a Rowdy Register.
     • Such practices violate Article 21’s requirement of “procedure established by law” and invade privacy and dignity.
  2. Affirms the legitimacy, but limits, of surveillance
     The Court:
     • Recognises Rowdy Registers and surveillance as valid internal tools for crime prevention;
     • But insists that:
       • They must remain discreet and non‑intrusive; and
       • Cannot themselves form the basis for coercive measures without a specific legal procedure.
  3. Balances public interest with individual rights through interim safeguards
     While protecting the petitioner from arbitrary oral summoning when he is not suspected in any offence, the Court:
     • Preserves police powers under BNSS/BNS for genuine suspects;
     • Allows a voluntary, traceable communication mechanism (SMS/WhatsApp) to secure the petitioner’s cooperation;
     • Leaves intact the Magistrates’ preventive jurisdiction under Chapter IX BNSS.

  Substantively, the judgment reinforces the idea that:

  Police efficiency and public safety cannot be pursued by bypassing the Constitution; they must be achieved through fair, reasonable, and legally grounded procedures that respect even the rights of those with a criminal past.

  In doctrinal terms, the decision is an important node in the evolving law on:

  • Due process under Article 21 in the context of preventive policing;
  • Privacy and the right not to be disturbed post‑Puttaswamy;
  • Judicial oversight of non‑statutory police instructions like manuals and standing orders.

  In practical terms, it offers a roadmap for:

  • Reforming rowdy sheet and surveillance practices in Karnataka; and
  • Guiding similar reforms in other jurisdictions where analogous practices exist.

  Ultimately, Silent Sunil stands for the proposition that even in the shadowy zones of preventive policing, the Constitution remains fully alive, and courts remain vigilant sentinels guarding the balance between security and freedom.