Dowry and Marriage Gifts as the Divorced Muslim Woman’s Property under Section 3 of the 1986 Act:
A Commentary on Rousanara Begum v. S.K. Salahuddin, 2025 INSC 1375

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I. Introduction

The decision of the Supreme Court of India in Rousanara Begum v. S.K. Salahuddin @ Sk Salauddin & Anr., 2025 INSC 1375 (decided on 2 December 2025), marks an important development in the interpretation of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 (“1986 Act”). The judgment is authored by Justice Sanjay Karol with Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh concurring.

The case concerns a divorced Muslim woman’s right to reclaim, from her former husband, money and gold ornaments given at the time of marriage by her father, some of which were recorded as having been given “to the son-in-law” in the marriage register. The core legal question, as framed by the Court, is:

“whether goods given to a daughter at the time of her marriage by her father, or to the bridegroom, can be by application of law, returned to the daughter, appellant herein, given that their marriage had ended in divorce.” (para 3)

This seemingly narrow issue has wider implications:

• How should Section 3(1)(d) of the 1986 Act, dealing with “all the properties given to her”, be interpreted?
• Do gifts/dowry given by the bride’s family to the groom in connection with marriage fall, in substance, within the category of the woman’s property upon divorce?
• How should courts balance conflicting evidence when such property is claimed back on divorce?
• What role do constitutional values of equality, dignity, and social justice play in interpreting Muslim personal law legislation?

The Supreme Court’s answer is distinctly purposive and gender-just: the 1986 Act is read as a social justice statute aimed at securing the dignity and financial protection of divorced Muslim women, and ambiguous factual situations are to be resolved in that light.

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II. Factual and Procedural Background

1. Marriage, Breakdown, and Divorce

• The appellant, Rousanara Begum, and respondent no. 1, S.K. Salahuddin, were married on 28 August 2005.
• Marital discord soon arose and the appellant left the matrimonial home on 7 May 2009.
• She initiated:
  • Proceedings under Section 125 CrPC (maintenance), and
  • Criminal proceedings under Section 498-A IPC (cruelty by husband/relatives) and Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.
• The marriage ended in divorce on 13 December 2011.

2. Claim under the 1986 Act

After divorce, the appellant filed proceedings under Section 3 of the 1986 Act before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bolpur, (Birbhum district) in Misc. Case No. 149/2011. She claimed a total of ₹17,67,980/- comprising:

• Dower (mahr): ₹1,50,000/-
• Dowry alleged to have been paid: ₹7,00,000/-
• Gold ornaments: 30 bhories, valued at ₹9,00,000/-
• Household items and furniture (fridge, TV, stabilizer, showcase, bed, dressing table, almirah, sofa, dining table, bedding, etc.) aggregating the remaining amount.

3. The Long Journey Through the Subordinate Courts

The matter underwent multiple rounds of adjudication and remand:

1. Order dated 26 June 2014 – CJM:
   • The Chief Judicial Magistrate allowed the application in part, awarding about ₹8.3 lakhs as against the claim of about ₹17.5 lakhs.
2. Revisions and first remand:
   • Both sides filed revision petitions before the Sessions Judge.
   • The Sessions Court remanded the matter for fresh consideration and for recording the evidence of the marriage registrar (Kazi).
3. Order dated 23 February 2015 – Additional Judicial Magistrate:
   • On remand, the APP Court again decreed in favour of the appellant, granting ₹8 lakhs plus 30 bhories of gold ornaments.
4. Revision and second remand (Order dated 21 July 2015 – Additional Sessions Judge):
   • On revision by the respondent, the Additional Sessions Judge allowed the revision,
   • and remanded the case again for fresh trial and additional evidence.
5. Order dated 27 April 2017 – Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bolpur:

   The ACJM framed three issues:

   • Issue 1: Relating to ₹1 lakh as mehr (mahr/dower).
     Finding: This amount had already been paid by the respondent; nothing survived on this issue.
   • Issue 2: Whether the appellant was entitled to recover ₹7 lakhs and 30 bhories of gold, allegedly given at the time of marriage.
   • Issue 3: Whether the appellant had a right to recover the articles/furniture allegedly given to the bridegroom.

   As regards Issue 2, the court examined Exhibit 7 and Exhibit 8, two entries in the marriage register (qabilnamas):

   • Exhibit 8 (original entry): recorded that the bride’s father gave ₹7 lakhs and 30 bhories of gold to the son-in-law.
   • Exhibit 7 (another copy of the certificate): referred to the same amounts, but did not specify that they were given to the bridegroom.

   The marriage registrar admitted the discrepancy but explained it. The ACJM, viewing the entries and considering that the respondent failed to disprove the original entry, held the respondent liable to return ₹7 lakhs and 30 bhories of gold to the appellant.

   For Issue 3, the ACJM held that in the absence of any entry in the marriage-related documents about the furniture, the appellant was not entitled to recover those articles.

6. Order dated 15 December 2018 – Sessions Court (Criminal Revision No. 21/2017):
   • The Sessions Court dismissed the respondent’s revision,
   • holding that there was no irregularity or impropriety in the ACJM’s order.

4. High Court Proceedings under Article 227

The respondent then approached the Calcutta High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution, challenging the concurrent orders. The High Court allowed the petition and set aside the benefit granted to the appellant under the 1986 Act.

The High Court’s reasoning, in essence, was:

• There was a discrepancy between Exhibits 7 and 8 as to whether the amounts and gold were given to the husband or not.
• The father of the appellant, in earlier proceedings under Section 498-A IPC and the Dowry Prohibition Act, had categorically stated that he gave ₹7 lakhs and 30 bhories of gold to the respondent.
• Since the father was the person who actually paid these amounts, the High Court treated his statement as more reliable than the marriage registrar’s explanation.
• On this footing, the High Court effectively concluded that the disputed money and gold were gifts to the groom, not “properties given to her” within the meaning of Section 3(1)(d) of the 1986 Act.
• The High Court also reiterated that Article 227 confers a power of superintendence in judicial matters, which includes preventing abuse of process of law.

Aggrieved by the High Court’s interference, the appellant approached the Supreme Court by way of special leave. Delay was condoned and leave was granted. The resulting criminal appeal culminated in the present judgment.

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III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Judgment

1. Statutory Provision: Section 3(1) of the 1986 Act

The Court reproduces Section 3(1) of the 1986 Act in extenso and highlights clause (d), which entitles a divorced Muslim woman to:

“all the properties given to her before or at the time of marriage or after her marriage by her relatives or friends or the husband or any relatives of the husband or his friends.” (emphasis supplied)

The provision is introduced by a non obstante clause, making it prevail over other laws. The Court recalls the Constitution Bench judgment in Daniel Latifi v. Union of India, (2001) 7 SCC 740, to emphasize that:

• Section 3 creates substantive entitlements for a divorced woman (reasonable and fair provision and maintenance, mahr, and delivery of properties falling under clause (d)); and
• She may approach a Magistrate for orders if such payments or deliveries have not been made on divorce.

2. Disagreement with the High Court’s Approach

The Supreme Court holds that it is “difficult to agree” with the High Court’s reasoning (para 8). The High Court had preferred the father’s statement over the marriage registrar’s testimony. The Supreme Court points out:

• The father’s statement was made in proceedings under Section 498-A IPC and the Dowry Prohibition Act, where the respondent was acquitted.
• Despite the “direct statement” by the father in those proceedings, the criminal court did not accept it as sufficient to convict.
• Thus, it cannot be assumed that the father’s statement has greater evidentiary value than the testimony of the marriage registrar in the present proceedings.
• The marriage registrar proved the entry, including the overwriting, by producing the original register. Once accepted as authentic, there was no valid basis to accept only part of his testimony and discard the rest, especially on vague suspicions about overwriting.

The Supreme Court therefore restores the trial court’s approach of placing reliance on the qabilnama (marriage register) as explained by the marriage registrar, and of holding the respondent liable to return ₹7 lakhs and 30 bhories of gold to the appellant.

3. Purposive and Social-Justice-Oriented Interpretation

The Court then clarifies why intervention is justified even though, on one view, two interpretations of the evidence were possible. It notes (para 9):

• Ordinarily, under Article 136 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court does not interfere with the High Court’s findings merely because two views are possible.
• However, in this case, the High Court “missed the purposive construction goalpost” and treated the matter “purely as a civil dispute” rather than one involving social justice adjudication.
• The 1986 Act aims at securing the “dignity and financial protection” of a divorced Muslim woman, aligning with her Article 21 rights (right to life and personal liberty, including dignity).
• Any construction of the 1986 Act must keep at the forefront equality, dignity, and autonomy, and must be informed by the “lived experiences of women”, especially where “in smaller towns and rural areas, inherent patriarchal discrimination is still the order of the day.”

On this normative basis, the Supreme Court answers the main question (para 10) in favour of the appellant, sets aside the Calcutta High Court’s judgment, and confirms her entitlement to the disputed money and gold under Section 3 of the 1986 Act.

4. Directions

The Court issues concrete directions:

• The appellant’s counsel is to supply bank and relevant details to the respondent’s counsel within three working days.
• The respondent must directly remit the amount into the appellant’s bank account.
• The respondent must file an affidavit of compliance in the Supreme Court Registry within six weeks.
• If the respondent fails to comply, he will be liable to pay interest at 9% per annum on the amount.

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IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedent Cited: Daniel Latifi v. Union of India

The only case expressly cited in the judgment is the Constitution Bench decision in Daniel Latifi v. Union of India, (2001) 7 SCC 740. In Daniel Latifi, the constitutional validity of the 1986 Act was challenged on the ground that it curtailed Muslim women’s post-divorce rights as recognized in Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum.

The Constitution Bench upheld the 1986 Act, but only by adopting a beneficial and expansive interpretation:

• It held that under Section 3, the husband is obligated to make a “reasonable and fair provision and maintenance” for the divorced wife, which is not confined merely to the iddat period, even though it must be paid within that period.
• It also recognized that Section 3 entitles a divorced woman to:
  • the mahr or dower agreed upon; and
  • delivery of properties described in Section 3(1)(d) (i.e., all properties given to her by her relatives or friends, or by the husband, his relatives, or friends).
• If these are not paid/delivered, she can approach a Magistrate under Section 3(3) for appropriate orders.

In Rousanara Begum, the Supreme Court quotes Daniel Latifi particularly to establish:

• That Section 3 begins with a non obstante clause, overriding other laws, signalling its primacy in defining the divorced woman’s entitlements;
• That delivery of properties under Section 3(1)(d) is a statutory right, enforceable through a Magistrate;
• That the 1986 Act is meant to be read as a welfare-statute-like measure ensuring substantive protection of divorced Muslim women.

Thus, Daniel Latifi furnishes the interpretive framework: any ambiguity in the reach of Section 3 must be resolved in favour of expanding, not restricting, the divorced woman’s material protection. This principle is central to how the Court answers the question whether gifts/dowry ostensibly given to the groom can be reclaimed by the divorced woman.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Interpretation of Section 3(1)(d): “All the Properties Given to Her”

Section 3(1)(d) entitles a divorced Muslim woman to:

“all the properties given to her before or at the time of marriage or after her marriage by her relatives or friends or the husband or any relatives of the husband or his friends.”

The key expression is “given to her”. In practice, many marriage-related transfers occur in forms that are:

• recorded as given “to the groom”,
• physically handed over to the groom or his family, or
• made in the name of the groom but intended for the newly formed household.

The Supreme Court’s framing of the question—“goods given to a daughter … or to the bridegroom” (para 3)—makes clear that it intends to address this structural ambiguity. The Court does not treat the phrase “given to her” in a narrow, literalistic, or purely formal way. Rather, by the end of the judgment, when it states that:

“The question framed above is answered accordingly.” (para 10)

and proceeds to direct restitution of money and gold, the Court is effectively holding that:

• Where the evidence (such as the marriage register and explanation of the marriage registrar) supports the conclusion that the money and ornaments were part of the marriage arrangement in which the bride’s family made substantial transfers for the benefit of the marriage,
• such assets fall within the expression “properties given to her” under Section 3(1)(d), even if some records describe them as given to the groom.

In other words, the Court adopts a substance-over-form approach: if, in reality, these properties are part of what the woman’s family brings to the marriage (dowry or gifts), then, on divorce, she is entitled to claim them back from the husband under the 1986 Act.

2. Evaluation of Conflicting Evidence

The case presented a clash between two pieces of evidence:

• Marriage registrar (Kazi)’s testimony and marriage register (Exhibits 7 and 8):
  • Ex. 8 showed the amounts and gold as given to the son-in-law.
  • Ex. 7 showed the same figures but without specifying “to the groom”.
  • The registrar explained this discrepancy and admitted overwriting/error in the entry.
• Father’s statement in a prior criminal case (Section 498-A IPC/Dowry Prohibition Act):
  • He stated that he had given ₹7 lakhs and 30 bhories of gold to the respondent (groom).
  • The High Court relied heavily on this, treating it as determinative of the nature of the transfer.

The Supreme Court assesses these as follows:

• The father’s statement from the earlier criminal case:
  • Belonged to a different proceeding (criminal case under Section 498-A IPC and Dowry Prohibition Act).
  • In that case, the respondent was acquitted despite this “direct statement”.
  • This undermines the assertion that the statement was so conclusive as to override the marriage registrar’s testimony.
  • Its evidentiary value in the present quasi-civil/quasi-criminal proceeding under the 1986 Act is therefore not higher than that of the marriage registrar’s evidence (para 8).
• The marriage registrar’s evidence:
  • He produced the original marriage register and admitted the overwriting and the mistake as to the words indicating the recipient (husband).
  • The High Court itself recorded that he had proved his statement by producing the register.
  • Once this is treated as properly proved, there was no reason to accept only part of his testimony and reject the explanation as to the error.
  • The Supreme Court holds that mere suspicion about his conduct due to overwriting is insufficient to discard his testimony (para 8).

By according weight to the contemporaneous documentary record and to the Kazi’s explanation, the Court preserves the trial court’s finding that:

• the respondent failed to disprove the entry that the money and gold formed part of the marriage consideration coming from the bride’s side; and
• hence he is liable to return ₹7 lakhs and 30 bhories of gold to the appellant.

3. Correcting the High Court’s “Civil Dispute” Lens

A crucial aspect of the reasoning lies in para 9, where the Court explains why, despite its usual restraint under Article 136, it interferes with the High Court’s view:

• The Court acknowledges the general rule: it does not interfere with a High Court’s findings of fact merely because two views are possible.
• However, the present case is treated as an exception, not because the High Court’s view is simply another view of facts, but because the High Court misapplied the legal framework governing the case.
• The High Court proceeded to adjudicate the dispute “purely as a civil dispute” and “missed the purposive construction goalpost”.

Why is this problematic? Because the dispute is not just about ownership of money and gold in a vacuum: it arises under a special, beneficial statute – the 1986 Act – whose explicit purpose is to provide dignity, equality, and financial security to divorced Muslim women.

The Supreme Court underscores:

“The Constitution of India prescribes an aspiration for all, i.e. equality which is, obviously, yet to be achieved. Courts, in doing their bit to this end must ground their reasoning in social justice adjudication.” (para 9)

and further:

“the scope and object of 1986 Act is concerned with securing the dignity and financial protection of a Muslim women post her divorce which aligns with the rights of a women under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The construction of this Act, therefore, must keep at the forefront equality, dignity and autonomy and must be done in the light of lived experiences of women where particularly in smaller towns and rural areas, inherent patriarchal discrimination is still the order of the day.” (para 9)

Thus, social context and constitutional values are treated as integral to the interpretation of Section 3. The High Court’s failure lay not merely in fact-finding but in overlooking this constitutionalized, purposive interpretation mandated for the 1986 Act.

4. Evidentiary Use of Prior Criminal Proceedings

The judgment implicitly raises, and partially addresses, the question: how far can statements made in a different criminal proceeding (here, under Section 498-A IPC/Dowry Prohibition Act) be treated as determinative in a subsequent proceeding under the 1986 Act?

While the Court does not lay down a comprehensive evidentiary rule, it makes two critical points:

• The earlier proceedings resulted in an acquittal of the respondent.
• Therefore, a statement from those proceedings, even if direct, cannot be given an evidentiary status superior to the contemporaneous and properly proved documentary evidence in the present proceeding.

The broader implication is that:

• Courts must be cautious in transplanting evidence from one criminal case into another context as if it were conclusive of property rights or statutory entitlements.
• Each proceeding must evaluate the evidence in its own statutory and factual context, especially where beneficial rights of women are at stake.

5. Constitutional Values and “Social Justice Adjudication”

The Court’s references to equality, dignity, autonomy and the “lived experiences of women” (particularly in rural and small-town settings) are not mere rhetorical flourishes; they are deployed as operative interpretive tools.

Several strands of constitutional reasoning are visible:

• Article 21 (Right to life and personal liberty):
  • The Court expressly links the 1986 Act’s objective of securing the “dignity and financial protection” of divorced Muslim women to the guarantees under Article 21.
  • Dignity is understood in a concrete, economic sense: without financial security, a divorced woman’s capacity to live with dignity is severely impaired.
• Equality as an aspiration and obligation:
  • The Court notes that equality is an “aspiration” prescribed by the Constitution, but “yet to be achieved”.
  • This acknowledges systemic, structural inequality, particularly gender-based and community-specific (here, Muslim women).
  • Courts are called upon to “do their bit” by grounding their reasoning in “social justice adjudication” – that is, adjudication attentive to power imbalances and social realities.
• Patriarchal discrimination as interpretive context:
  • The Court explicitly references “inherent patriarchal discrimination” in smaller towns and rural areas as a continuing reality.
  • This recognition justifies reading the 1986 Act expansively in favour of divorced women, rather than in a manner that entrenches patriarchal control over assets given at marriage.

This approach is fully consistent with the interpretive method adopted in Daniel Latifi: wherever a provision is ambiguous, the Court prefers an interpretation that promotes gender justice and aligns personal law legislation with constitutional guarantees.

6. Scope of Interference under Article 136

The Court acknowledges its typical restraint under Article 136: it does not normally reappreciate concurrent findings of fact or interfere just because two views are possible. Yet, it departs from that norm here.

The reason is narrow but significant:

• The High Court’s view did not merely choose one of two factual interpretations but failed to apply the correct legal principle,
• namely, that the 1986 Act must be construed as a beneficial, rights-conferring statute for divorced Muslim women, guided by constitutional values.

Thus, the Court’s interference is justified as a correction of a legal error in the interpretive approach, not as a simple reweighing of evidence. This signals that where High Courts treat protective statutes affecting women as ordinary civil disputes and ignore their social-justice orientation, the Supreme Court will be willing to step in.

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V. Impact of the Judgment

1. On the Interpretation of the 1986 Act

The most direct impact of the judgment is on how Section 3(1)(d) is to be understood in future cases:

• Broad construction of “properties given to her”:
  • Courts should look at the substance of marriage-related transfers, not just the form of the entry (e.g., “given to groom”).
  • If the property originates from the woman’s relatives or friends for the marriage, it will generally fall within the ambit of “properties given to her”, especially on divorce.
• Dowry/gifts as part of the woman’s economic security:
  • Money, gold, and other valuable items provided by the bride’s side can be treated as economic resources of the woman, not simply the husband’s absolute property.
  • On divorce, she is entitled to claim their return from the husband under the 1986 Act.
• Non obstante clause and overriding effect:
  • Even if other personal-law or property-law doctrines (or formal titles) might suggest that the groom is the owner of the assets, Section 3(1)(d), read with its non obstante clause, gives the divorced woman the right to recover such properties from him.

2. On Evidentiary Assessment in Matrimonial Property Claims

The decision clarifies how courts should assess evidence in proceedings under the 1986 Act:

• Weight of contemporaneous marriage records:
  • Marriage registers and certificates (e.g., nikahnama, qabilnama) maintained by the Kazi or registrar carry significant weight as formal records of what was agreed/given at the time of marriage.
  • Minor overwriting or clerical errors, if adequately explained by the registrar, should not be treated as sufficient to discard the whole entry or testimony.
• Caution in relying on statements from prior criminal cases:
  • Statements made in Section 498-A IPC / Dowry Prohibition Act cases that ended in acquittal cannot be mechanically treated as conclusive in later property/restitution proceedings.
  • Their evidentiary value is context-specific and cannot override properly proved documentary evidence.

3. On High Court Supervision under Article 227

While the Supreme Court does not disturb the High Court’s general statement that Article 227 extends to judicial matters, it implicitly cautions against:

• using Article 227 primarily to reweigh evidence in a case governed by a beneficial statute, and
• downplaying the social-justice dimension of statutes like the 1986 Act.

This judgment, therefore, serves as a reminder to High Courts that:

• Article 227 is not an appellate jurisdiction; and
• when invoked in matters concerning vulnerable classes (such as divorced Muslim women), the supervision must remain aligned with the protective purpose of the underlying statute.

4. On Gender Justice and Personal Law

The judgment further consolidates a trend in Supreme Court jurisprudence: reading personal law-related statutes through the lens of constitutional rights, especially those of women.

• By linking the 1986 Act’s objectives to Article 21 and to the broader aspiration of equality, the Court reinforces that personal law legislation cannot be interpreted in isolation from constitutional morality and gender justice.
• This supports an ongoing shift towards a transformative constitutionalism approach in family law, where the rights and lived realities of women are foregrounded.

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VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Mahr (Mehr/Dower)

Mahr (also spelt “mehr”) is a mandatory sum of money or property that the husband agrees to give the wife at the time of marriage, under Muslim law. It may be:

• Prompt (payable immediately on demand), and/or
• Deferred (payable upon dissolution of marriage, death, or other specified events).

Under Section 3(1)(c) of the 1986 Act, a divorced Muslim woman is entitled to receive “an amount equal to the sum of mahr or dower agreed to be paid to her”. In this case, the trial court found that a portion of the mahr (₹1 lakh) had already been paid, so that part of the claim did not survive.

2. Iddat

Iddat is a waiting period under Muslim personal law after a divorce or the husband’s death, during which the woman cannot remarry. Its duration varies depending on circumstances (typically three menstrual cycles after divorce).

Under the 1986 Act, while the husband must make and pay the “reasonable and fair provision and maintenance” within the iddat period, the Supreme Court in Daniel Latifi clarified that the provision itself is meant to take care of her future needs beyond iddat.

3. Dowry and Marriage Gifts

In everyday usage, “dowry” refers to any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given directly or indirectly:

• by the bride’s family to the groom or his family; or
• by the groom’s family to the bride or her family;

in connection with the marriage. The Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 penalizes the giving and taking of dowry.

However, in many communities, the bride’s family also provides “gifts” or “presentation” (money, jewellery, furniture, appliances) that are socially expected, even if not demanded as dowry. The 1986 Act does not use the word “dowry” in Section 3(1)(d), but broadly refers to “all the properties given to her” by relatives, friends, husband, or husband’s relatives. The Supreme Court’s construction in this case effectively includes such dowry/gifts within the woman’s recoverable property on divorce.

4. Qabilnama / Marriage Register Entries and “Bhori”

A qabilnama is a record of marriage, usually maintained by a Kazi or marriage registrar in Muslim marriages. It generally records:

• the names of parties,
• amount of mahr,
• and sometimes details of property or gifts exchanged.

In this case, Exhibits 7 and 8 were such entries with slight discrepancies in how recipient of money/gold was described.

A bhori is a local weight unit used for gold (in some regions equivalent or close to a “vori” or a “tola”), so “30 bhories of gold” signifies a substantial quantum of gold ornaments.

5. Non Obstante Clause

A non obstante clause typically begins with the words “Notwithstanding anything contained in…”. It indicates that the provision in which it appears will override any conflicting provisions in other laws.

Section 3(1) of the 1986 Act opens with such a clause:

“Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, a divorced woman shall be entitled to…”

This means that the rights conferred on divorced Muslim women under Section 3 will prevail even if other legal rules, personal law doctrines, or procedural statutes appear to point in a different direction.

6. Purposive Interpretation and Beneficial Legislation

Purposive interpretation is a method of reading statutes that focuses on the purpose or object the law intends to achieve, rather than sticking rigidly to a literal reading of the text.

A statute like the 1986 Act is characterized as beneficial legislation because:

• It aims to confer protection and benefits upon a vulnerable class—in this case, divorced Muslim women.
• Courts therefore interpret it broadly in favour of the beneficiaries, and not narrowly in favour of those against whom obligations are imposed.

The Supreme Court in this case specifically criticizes the High Court for failing to adopt a purposive, social-justice-oriented interpretation, and for treating the matter as an ordinary civil dispute instead.

7. Article 136 and Article 227

Article 136 of the Constitution gives the Supreme Court a wide, discretionary power to grant special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, or order of any court or tribunal. The Court usually exercises restraint and does not interfere merely to re-assess facts.

Article 227 gives High Courts a power of “superintendence” over all subordinate courts and tribunals in the territory. This is:

• not a regular appellate jurisdiction, but
• a supervisory jurisdiction used to correct jurisdictional errors, grave injustice, and abuse of process.

In this case:

• The High Court invoked Article 227 to set aside concurrent findings in favour of the appellant.
• The Supreme Court, under Article 136, restores the trial court’s decision because the High Court’s approach did not align with the social justice purpose of the 1986 Act.

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VII. Conclusion

The decision in Rousanara Begum v. S.K. Salahuddin is significant on multiple levels. On the surface, it resolves a dispute over whether ₹7 lakhs and 30 bhories of gold, given at the time of marriage, are recoverable by a divorced Muslim woman from her former husband under Section 3 of the 1986 Act. In doing so, the Supreme Court:

• Rejects a narrow, formalistic reading of “properties given to her” under Section 3(1)(d);
• Holds that where marriage-related transfers originate from the bride’s side for the purposes of the marriage, they fall within the woman’s recoverable property, even if some records describe them as given to the groom;
• Reaffirms the beneficial, rights-conferring character of the 1986 Act, following Daniel Latifi;
• Links the Act’s object to constitutional guarantees of equality, dignity, and autonomy under Article 21;
• Insists on social justice adjudication, particularly attentive to the lived experiences of women in patriarchal settings; and
• Corrects a High Court that treated the matter as a mere civil property dispute, overlooking the protective purpose of the statute.

The judgment therefore strengthens the position of divorced Muslim women by:

• Ensuring that dower, dowry, and marriage gifts from their families are treated as part of their economic security post-divorce; and
• Sending a clear message to subordinate courts and High Courts that statutory protections for women must be interpreted in light of constitutional commitments to gender justice and substantive equality.

In substantive terms, the precedent established is that—in disputed cases about marriage-related transfers under Section 3 of the 1986 Act, courts must favour interpretations that recognize such property as belonging to the divorced woman and enforce her right to reclaim it from her former husband. This furthers both the letter and spirit of the 1986 Act and affirms the judiciary’s role in advancing the constitutional project of equality and dignity for all women.