Doctrine of Pleasure, Article 14 and Law Officer Appointments: Commentary on Sunil S/o Annappa Sank v. State of Karnataka

Constraining the Doctrine of Pleasure in Law Officer Appointments: Commentary on Sunil S/o Annappa Sank v. State of Karnataka (Karnataka High Court, 25 November 2025)

I. Introduction

The decision in Sunil S/o Annappa Sank v. The State of Karnataka, W.P. No.108099 of 2025, decided by the Karnataka High Court, Dharwad Bench, on 25 November 2025 by M. Nagaprasanna J., marks an important doctrinal clarification on the limits of the State’s “pleasure” power in relation to appointments of Government Law Officers under the Karnataka Law Officers (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1977 (“KLO Rules, 1977”).

The judgment addresses a stark and unusual fact situation: the State Government appointed the petitioner as Additional District Government Pleader (“ADGP”) for the XI Additional District and Sessions Court, Belagavi, sitting at Athani, by a notification dated 28.10.2025, and within barely 24 hours, rescinded that very appointment and installed the 3rd respondent in his place by a fresh notification dated 29.10.2025. The case thus became a vehicle to test the constitutional limits of the doctrine of pleasure when used to undo a valid statutory appointment almost instantaneously and without disclosed reasons.

The core issue framed by the Court can be distilled to:

Whether the State’s withdrawal of the petitioner’s appointment as Additional District Government Pleader, within 24 hours and without any disclosed justification, withstands the constitutional prohibition against arbitrariness embedded in Article 14 of the Constitution of India, despite the post being held “at the pleasure” of the Government under the KLO Rules, 1977.

In resolving this, the Court:

  • Drew a sharp doctrinal distinction between appointment under statutory rules and mere nomination to bodies and committees;
  • Applied and extended the reasoning of the Constitution Bench in B.P. Singhal v. Union of India1 to statutory law officer appointments; and
  • Held that even in the domain of “pleasure” appointments of Government Pleaders, Article 14’s prohibition on arbitrariness operates as a substantive constraint.

The Court ultimately quashed the notification appointing the 3rd respondent and restored the petitioner’s appointment, granting him all consequential benefits.

II. Factual Background and Procedural History

1. Establishment of Athani Sessions Court and Need for a Government Pleader

On 06.07.2024, the XI Additional District and Sessions Court, Belagavi, sitting at Athani, was established, largely in response to a longstanding local demand to bring justice closer to litigants of Athani and Kagwad taluks, who earlier had to travel 140–195 kilometres to Chikkodi or Belagavi.

With the upgradation of the court to a Sessions level, there arose a concomitant requirement for a regular Additional District Government Pleader to represent the State in civil and criminal matters before the new court. Pending such appointment, by order dated 19.09.2024, the Government placed the existing Government Pleader for the Senior Civil Court, Athani, on additional charge for the XI Additional District & Sessions Court, Athani.

2. Petitioner’s Application and District Judge’s Recommendation

On 09.10.2024, the petitioner, Sunil S/o Annappa Sank, an advocate practicing at Athani since 1999, submitted a detailed representation to the then Law Minister seeking appointment as Additional District Government Pleader for the XI Additional District and Sessions Court, Athani. The representation:

  • Outlined his experience of over 22–25 years in civil and criminal practice in multiple courts at Athani, Kagwad, Chikkodi, and the XI ADJ Court itself;
  • Referenced his prior engagement as Special Government Counsel in UKP land acquisition matters (order dated 08.09.2014);
  • Emphasised his track record in successfully defending “bogus double petitions” on behalf of the State; and
  • Declared readiness to abide by all rules and instructions of the Government of Karnataka.

A practice certificate appended to the representation confirmed his continuous practice at Athani since 21.11.1999 and membership in the local Bar Association.

Following this, the Principal District & Sessions Judge, Belagavi, by letter dated 01.03.2025, responded to a Government query and:

  • Provided data on the number and nature of pending cases at Athani (427 civil cases, 113 cases per pleader, etc.); and
  • Expressly opined that sanction of one post of Additional District Government Pleader for the XI ADJ Court, Athani, was necessary.

3. Appointment of the Petitioner under Rule 26

Consequent to the above process, the Government issued a notification dated 28.10.2025, under Rule 26(2) of the KLO Rules, 1977, appointing the petitioner as:

Additional District Government Pleader and Public Prosecutor for the XI Additional District and Sessions Court, Belagavi, sitting at Athani, for a period of three years from the date he assumes charge, or until further orders, whichever is earlier.

The petitioner immediately assumed charge on 28.10.2025 and appeared as Government Pleader in four to five matters the same day.

4. Sudden Rescission and Appointment of the 3rd Respondent

The “bolt from the blue” came the very next morning. On 29.10.2025, the Government issued a fresh notification which:

  • Cancelled the earlier notification dated 28.10.2025 appointing the petitioner; and
  • Appointed the 3rd respondent, D.B. Thakkannavar, Advocate, as Additional District Government Pleader for the same post and tenure terms.

Both notifications (28.10.2025 and 29.10.2025) explicitly invoked Rule 26(2) of the KLO Rules. The Court was shown the Government’s internal note sheet, which revealed:

  • That the entire processing leading up to the notification dated 28.10.2025 had been done on the petitioner’s representation;
  • That the 3rd respondent’s application, dated 29.04.2025, had not been acted upon until after the petitioner’s appointment; and
  • That the change was triggered exclusively by a “tippani” (endorsement) of the Minister, directing cancellation of the petitioner’s appointment and appointment of the 3rd respondent.

No administrative exigency, legal infirmity or performance-based reason was recorded in the file for this abrupt reversal. This led the petitioner to invoke the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227, seeking a writ of certiorari to quash the notification dated 29.10.2025.

III. Summary of the Judgment

1. Submissions of the Parties

(a) Petitioner

The petitioner contended that:

  • His appointment under Rule 26(2) was the outcome of a proper statutory process: his representation, District Judge’s recommendation, and Governmental decision culminating in a 3-year appointment order;
  • The 3rd respondent had not undergone a comparable process, and his application had remained dormant until the Minister’s intervention;
  • The withdrawal of his appointment within 24 hours, solely to favour the 3rd respondent, was arbitrary, mala fide and politically motivated, in gross violation of Article 14;
  • Even if the post was “at the pleasure” of the Government, such pleasure could not be exercised whimsically or capriciously; and
  • Various precedents (including B.P. Singhal, B.K. Uday Kumar, and others) required that pleasure be exercised for valid, public interest reasons, not to accommodate political preferences.

(b) State (Respondents 1 and 2)

The Additional Advocate General argued that:

  • Appointments of Government Law Officers, particularly Additional District Government Pleaders and Assistant Government Pleaders, are at the pleasure of the State under Rules 26 and 28 of the KLO Rules;
  • The phrase “for three years or until further orders, whichever is earlier” made it clear that no enforceable right to tenure had been conferred;
  • Under the doctrine of pleasure, the Government could withdraw such appointments at any time without liability, and no question of violation of rights arose; and
  • Precedents dealing with pleasure appointments and nominations supported the State’s discretion.

(c) 3rd Respondent (New Appointee)

Counsel for the 3rd respondent argued that:

  • His representation and “proceedings” purportedly pre-dated or independently justified his appointment;
  • Even assuming irregularity, the petitioner’s appointment was at the Government’s pleasure and could be curtailed at any time;
  • Neither the petitioner nor the 3rd respondent could claim a vested right to the post, since all such posts are inherently precarious; and
  • The plea of arbitrariness was unfounded since the doctrine of pleasure encompassed such executive choices.

2. Issues Framed and Approach

The Court narrowed the controversy to a single “imperative question”:

Does the impugned action (rescinding the petitioner’s appointment within 24 hours and appointing the 3rd respondent) withstand the constitutional prohibition against arbitrariness?

To answer this, the Court:

  • Examined the text and scheme of Rules 26 and 28 of the KLO Rules;
  • Considered the doctrine of pleasure in Indian constitutional law, especially post B.P. Singhal;
  • Analysed a long line of decisions—of the Supreme Court, Karnataka High Court and Bombay High Court—on pleasure, nominations, fixed tenures and arbitrariness; and
  • Drew a decisive line between nomination cases and the present statutory appointment case.

3. Holding and Final Order

The Court held that:

  • The petitioner’s appointment under Rule 26(2), following due process and District Judge’s recommendation, was valid and lawful;
  • The subsequent rescission within 24 hours, without any recorded justification other than the Minister’s tippani favouring the 3rd respondent, constituted a quintessential case of executive arbitrariness;
  • Even if the appointment was at the pleasure of the Government, the pleasure power is “hemmed in” by Article 14 and cannot be used whimsically or capriciously;
  • The case was distinguished from earlier decisions involving nominations and other pleasure posts where either (a) no fixed statutory tenure existed, or (b) the removal was not as egregiously arbitrary in timing and manner; and
  • The impugned notification could not survive Article 14 scrutiny.

Accordingly, the Court ordered:

  1. The writ petition is allowed;
  2. The notification dated 29.10.2025 appointing the 3rd respondent as Additional District Government Pleader is obliterated (quashed);
  3. The petitioner’s appointment under the notification dated 28.10.2025 is restored; and
  4. The petitioner is entitled to all consequential benefits flowing from the restoration of his appointment.

IV. Legal Analysis

A. Statutory Framework: KLO Rules, 1977 – Rule 26 and Rule 28

1. Rule 26 – Appointment of District Government Pleaders, ADGPs and AGPs

Rule 26 of the KLO Rules, 1977, lies at the heart of the dispute. In essence:

  • Rule 26(1) specifies the sanctioned posts of District Government Pleaders, Additional District Government Pleaders and Assistant Government Pleaders;.
  • Rule 26(2) prescribes a structured procedure:
    • The Deputy Commissioner, “whenever required by the Government”, must invite applications from eligible practising advocates of the concerned place;
    • He forwards applications with remarks on suitability to the District Judge;
    • The District Judge appends his own remarks on each candidate’s suitability and forwards the file to the Government in the Department of Law and Parliamentary Affairs; and
    • The Government then makes appointments “having regard to” the remarks of both the District Judge and Deputy Commissioner.
  • Rule 26(3) (non obstante sub-rule (2)) allows the Government, in cases of urgency, to appoint any advocate as District Government Pleader or Additional District Government Pleader for a period not exceeding one year, in consultation with the District Judge.

In the present case, the notifications explicitly invoked Rule 26(2), and the record showed that:

  • The petitioner’s candidature was specifically processed under the statutory mechanism;
  • The District Judge’s communication supported the need for an ADGP post at Athani and facilitated the process; and
  • The appointment order granted a 3-year tenure, subject to the Government’s power to issue “further orders”.

2. Rule 28 – Additional District Government Pleaders and Assistant Government Pleaders

Rule 28 empowers the Government to appoint as many Additional District Government Pleaders and Assistant Government Pleaders “as are considered necessary” and describes:

  • Their working under the control and supervision of District Government Pleaders; and
  • Their duties and limits of jurisdiction.

While Rule 28 acknowledges the Government’s wide discretion in deciding how many ADGPs/AGPs to appoint and where, the appointment power itself remains subject to the procedural and constitutional constraints embedded in Rule 26 and the Constitution.

B. The Doctrine of Pleasure and Its Constitutional Limits

1. The Constitution Bench in B.P. Singhal v. Union of India

The Court extensively quoted and relied on the Constitution Bench decision in B.P. Singhal v. Union of India1, which examined the doctrine of pleasure in the context of removal of Governors under Article 156(1).

Key propositions distilled from B.P. Singhal, and expressly adopted here, include:

  • The doctrine of pleasure, originating in English common law, permitted the Crown to dismiss servants at will, but UK Parliament could legislate to curb that prerogative.
  • In India, absolute pleasure does not exist; the Constitution curtails it in several ways (Articles 310–311; impeachment procedures for constitutional offices, etc.).
  • Even where the Constitution does not specify restrictions (e.g., Governors, Ministers), the pleasure power is subject to the “fundamentals of constitutionalism”.

Most crucially, the Constitution Bench declared:

“The doctrine of pleasure, however, is not a licence to act with unfettered discretion to act arbitrarily, whimsically, or capriciously. It does not dispense with the need for a cause for withdrawal of the pleasure. … The withdrawal of pleasure cannot be at the sweet will, whim and fancy of the authority, but can only be for valid reasons.”1

This formulation is central to the present judgment. The High Court transposes this reasoning from the constitutional office of Governor to statutory posts of Government Pleaders, underscoring that public power—whatever its textual form—cannot escape Article 14.

2. Karnataka High Court: B.K. Uday Kumar v. State of Karnataka

The Division Bench in B.K. Uday Kumar v. State of Karnataka2 had earlier applied B.P. Singhal in the context of the State Government’s power, under Articles of Association of a public sector company (BESCOM), to remove and appoint directors “at any time”.

The Division Bench held that:

  • Even if the Articles confer power to remove a director at pleasure, that power must be exercised for “good and compelling reasons”;
  • Executive satisfaction must be discernible from the record (proposal file or order);
  • Use of pleasure power without recording reasons amounts to arbitrary exercise and is amenable to judicial review; and
  • An order removing a director without any stated or evident reason was set aside as arbitrary.

Nagaprasanna J. draws directly from this reasoning to conclude that:

“One situation can be that the proposal contains valid reasons and the Hon’ble Chief Minister approves the reasons. … The other contingency can be that even the proposal contains no reasons, but the order of the Hon’ble Chief Minister reflects the reasons. In this case, both the things are absent.”

Transposed to the present case: the note sheet shows only the Minister’s bare tippani seeking substitution of the candidate; no public interest or legality-based cause is recorded. Thus, the State’s act is arbitrary.

3. Bombay High Court: Dnyaneshwar Digamber Kamble

The Court also referenced the Bombay High Court Division Bench judgment in Dnyaneshwar Digamber Kamble v. State of Maharashtra3, which had applied B.P. Singhal to the removal of the Chairman of the Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation.

Bombay High Court held that:

  • Withdrawal of pleasure cannot be at the sweet will, whim, and fancy of the State; and
  • It must be exercised reasonably and only for public good.

The Karnataka High Court adopts this articulation, reinforcing the notion that pleasure doctrine, as applied to statutory or quasi-statutory posts, is constitutionally “domesticated” by Article 14.

C. Line of Cases on Nominations vs Appointments

A critical step in the Court’s reasoning is to anatomise and distinguish a long series of cases concerning nominated members of various bodies—university senates, syndicates, boards, and committees—from the present case of a statutory appointment under the KLO Rules.

1. Cases Emphasising the Precarious Nature of Nominations

The judgment surveys multiple decisions where courts have treated nominations as purely pleasure-based, carrying no vested right to continue. These include:

  • State of U.P. v. U.P. State Law Officers Association4 – appointments of Government Law Officers in U.P. (seen as professional engagements susceptible to the “spoils system”);
  • State of Karnataka v. Dr. Deepthi Bhava5 – nomination to Senate/Syndicate of Rajiv Gandhi University of Health Sciences; no vested right; doctrine of pleasure applied; natural justice not required;
  • Pallavi Vastrad v. State of Karnataka6 – nominations to Visvesvaraya Technological University Executive Council, where the Court:
    • Read Sections 16 and 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 into the VTU Act;
    • Held that the power to nominate includes power to rescind nomination; and
    • Reiterated that nominated members have no vested right to tenure and hold office solely at the Government’s pleasure.
  • Prof. Y.S. Siddegowda v. State of Karnataka7 – dealing with the Vice-Chairman of a state council, again emphasising that:
    • The Vice-Chairman (a non-official member) holds office “subject to the pleasure of the Government”; and
    • Even if a statutory tenure exists, the pleasure clause prevails for such nominations.
  • Dr. C. Jagadeesh v. State of Karnataka8 – nominees to a Central Relief Committee; Court held a nominee “cannot have an indefeasible right to continue”; nomination remains at Government’s pleasure.

In these cases, the Government’s act of rescinding nominations has been upheld as legitimate, subject only to minimal scrutiny for manifest arbitrariness or mala fides.

2. K.C. Shankare Gowda – Fixed Statutory Tenure and Appointment/Nomination Distinction

In K.C. Shankare Gowda v. State of Karnataka9, the Court dealt with nominations to the Board of Management of the Karnataka Veterinary, Animal and Fisheries Sciences University. Although initially nominated by the Chancellor, the power was later shifted to the Government. The statute, however, provided a fixed three-year tenure.

The Court held:

  • Members nominated under the statutory provision acquired a right to hold office for three years, absent grounds of removal under the Act;
  • The Government could not prematurely nominate fresh members to the same category before expiry of that term, as it would defeat the statutorily assured tenure; and
  • This was distinct from cases where the statute explicitly made the tenure subject to pleasure or where no fixed term existed.

Though Shankare Gowda involved “nominations”, the presence of a fixed statutory tenure triggered more rigorous protection. This idea—that statutory structure matters, not just the label “nomination” or “appointment”—underlies the present Court’s distinction.

3. Synthesis: Why This Case is Different

Having surveyed this jurisprudence, Nagaprasanna J. distils a key distinction:

“On a blend of the judgments … what would unmistakably emerge is a nominee qua his nomination cannot have an indefeasible right to continue when it is at the pleasure of the Government, which can be withdrawn at any time.

But the Court immediately adds that the present case is “starkly different”, because:

  • The petitioner is not a mere nominee to a committee or council; he is appointed as Additional District Government Pleader under a specific statutory rule (Rule 26);
  • A structured process was followed (application, judicial recommendation, formal Government order); and
  • The appointment order carried a three-year tenure “or until further orders”, signifying a quasi-tenured appointment, not a casual nomination.

Thus, the Court treats Government Pleader appointments under Rule 26 as belonging conceptually closer to the class of structured statutory appointments (as in B.K. Uday Kumar or Shankare Gowda), than to bare nominations (as in Deepthi Bhava or Pallavi Vastrad).

D. Application to the Facts: Why the Court Found Arbitrariness

1. Validity of the Petitioner’s Appointment

The Court finds no illegality or impropriety in the petitioner’s appointment:

  • His application was timely (09.10.2024), well before the 3rd respondent’s (29.04.2025);
  • The District Judge’s communication supported sanction of the post and indirectly the need for such an appointment;
  • The Government’s order of 28.10.2025 was in clear conformity with Rule 26(2), granting a three-year term; and
  • The petitioner actually assumed charge and functioned as ADGP on the day of appointment.

Thus, the starting point is a lawful, regular appointment, not an ad hoc or illegal engagement.

2. Nature of the State’s Subsequent Action

The impugned notification of 29.10.2025:

  • Cancelled the petitioner’s appointment;
  • Appointed the 3rd respondent as ADGP, under the same Rule 26(2) and for the same standard tenure; and
  • Was issued within 24 hours of the petitioner’s assumption of charge.

The internal note sheet disclosed that:

  • There had been a ministerial direction to “quietly” substitute the petitioner with the 3rd respondent, purportedly based on a representation (e.g., from Athani MLA or local interests);
  • No administrative exigency (e.g., abolition of post, reorganisation, complaints against performance) was cited; and
  • No legal infirmity in the petitioner’s appointment was identified, nor any allegation of misconduct.

On this, the Court remarks emphatically:

“The appointment made after due process was extinguished the very next day, not for administrative exigency, not for legal infirmity, but solely on account of a sudden change of mind, resting on a tippani from the Minister.”

3. The 24-Hour Reversal as the Quintessence of Arbitrariness

The Court’s language is notably strong and evocative. It characterises the State’s behaviour as:

  • “gross arbitrary exercise of power”;
  • “executive freewheeling” which the Court cannot endorse; and
  • violative of the “delicate balance between executive prerogative and constitutional discipline”.

The Court sees the 24-hour time-frame as especially telling:

“When State action shifts this swiftly and without explanation, the vital question is, is this discretion or is it arbitrariness, and an unequivocal and emphatic answer is ‘the action is arbitrary’.”

The Court even notes that this may be the first case where such extreme abruptness in reversing a statutory appointment is brought under judicial review, describing it as “perhaps the first case in the annals of judicial review of such gross arbitrary exercise of power; in 24 hours the State changes its own orders, to its whim.”

4. Distinguishing Shantreddy and Other “Pleasure” Cases

Counsel for the 3rd respondent relied heavily on a coordinate Bench decision in Shantreddy v. State of Karnataka (W.P. No.202928/2023, decided on 21.12.2023), where an ADGP removed after seven months of service failed to secure relief.

Nagaprasanna J. distinguishes Shantreddy on two principal grounds:

  • Temporal difference: in Shantreddy, the petitioner had served for several months, not merely 24 hours; the change, though debatable, was not as patently capricious in timing;
  • Contextual difference: the present case involved a wholly unreasoned substitution within a day, driven solely by one candidate’s political or personal backing, with no administrative or legal reason.

Similarly, the State’s reliance on various nomination cases and spoils-system cases (e.g., State of U.P. v. U.P. State Law Officers Association) was rejected as inapposite because those cases involved either:

  • Professional engagements akin to contracts, without structured statutory appointment procedures; or
  • Mere nominations to bodies where the statute or general clauses allowed withdrawal at pleasure.

E. The Central Doctrinal Move: Appointment vs Nomination and Article 14

The judgment’s core doctrinal contribution lies in its explicit differentiation between:

  1. “Nomination” cases, where:
    • There is no elaborate selection process prescribed by statute;
    • The role is often honorary or representational;
    • Removal is contemplated by statute or read in via the General Clauses Act; and
    • Courts have consistently held that nominees enjoy no vested right to a fixed tenure and are subject to the State’s pleasure, subject only to review against extreme arbitrariness.
  2. “Appointment” cases, where:
    • A specific statutory rule prescribes a structured procedure (applications, consultation with judicial officers, etc.);
    • A tenure (e.g., three years) is expressly indicated in the appointment order, albeit “or until further orders”;
    • The appointee assumes a public law office with defined duties and responsibilities; and
    • The entire scheme indicates that, while terminable at pleasure, the decision to appoint (and to terminate) must be rational, non-arbitrary and guided by public interest considerations.

By placing Government Pleader appointments under Rule 26 squarely in the second category, the Court subjects them to a more exacting Article 14 scrutiny than that traditionally applied to nominations.

In effect, the Court recognises that:

  • The appointment order may be terminable at pleasure, but the exercise of pleasure must remain tethered to rationality, fairness and public interest; and
  • Where the Government cannot show any such basis—particularly in a case of virtually instantaneous reversal—judicial intervention is not only permissible but necessary.

V. Impact and Significance

A. For Government Law Officer Appointments in Karnataka

The judgment has immediate and practical implications for how the State appoints and removes Government Law Officers, particularly:

  • District Government Pleaders and Additional District Government Pleaders under Rule 26;
  • Assistant Government Pleaders under Rule 28; and potentially
  • Other law officers governed by similar “pleasure” clauses in their appointment orders.

Key takeaways include:

  • The State retains the power to appoint and remove such officers at pleasure; however, this is not an unfettered, unreviewable discretion;
  • Where an officer has been validly appointed after following the prescribed procedure, and especially where a fixed tenure (e.g., three years) is indicated, the Government must have at least a rational, public-interest reason for premature termination, even if such reasons are not statutorily required to be communicated;
  • Purely political preferences or post-facto endorsements favouring a rival candidate, unaccompanied by any legitimate ground, will expose the decision to being struck down as arbitrary under Article 14;
  • The decision sends a clear message against “overnight reshuffling” of law officers simply to accommodate new political equations, particularly where one officer has already taken charge and begun discharging duties; and
  • Administrative practice will likely move towards:
    • Better-documented reasons in files for removals or substitutions; and
    • More cautious use of the pleasure power, especially soon after initial appointments.

B. For Administrative Law and the Doctrine of Pleasure

Conceptually, the decision:

  • Reinforces and localises the B.P. Singhal doctrine within Karnataka’s context, applying it to statutory posts below constitutional rank;
  • Clarifies that Article 14’s anti-arbitrariness mandate pervades all State action, including those formally couched in “pleasure” language;
  • Demonstrates how a high court can calibrate the intensity of review by reference to the nature of the post, the statutory framework and the procedural context; and
  • Deepens the distinction between:
    • Purely discretionary or political nominations with no structured selection process, and
    • Appointments made after a structured, quasi-competitive process under statutory rules.

In that sense, the case contributes to the ongoing evolution of Indian administrative law, where the “pleasure doctrine” is steadily re-scripted within the architecture of constitutionalism and rule of law.

C. For the Legal Profession and Public Interest

From the perspective of the legal profession and public interest:

  • The decision enhances the institutional security and independence of Government Law Officers, signalling that they are not mere political appointees who can be shuffled at will without cause;
  • It encourages merit-based selections and discourages last-minute reversals purely to accommodate political pressure; and
  • By insisting on non-arbitrary government conduct, the judgment indirectly promotes continuity and professionalism in State representation before courts, which in turn serves the public interest in effective administration of justice.

VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Doctrine of Pleasure

The “doctrine of pleasure” means that certain public offices are held “during the pleasure” of the appointing authority (e.g., President, Governor, Government), so that:

  • The office-holder normally can be removed without notice and without formal proceedings such as departmental inquiries;
  • The tenure is not contractually protected in the way ordinary employment might be.

However, as clarified by the Constitution and case law:

  • This does not mean the authority can act for no reason or for bad reasons (e.g., personal hostility, political vendetta);
  • The exercise of pleasure is still subject to the Constitution—especially Article 14 (equality and non-arbitrariness); and
  • Certain posts (e.g., civil servants, judges, President, Governors) have additional protections or procedures built into the Constitution itself.

2. Article 14 and Arbitrariness

Article 14 guarantees equality before the law and equal protection of the laws. Over time, courts have interpreted it to mean:

  • The State cannot act arbitrarily—its decisions must have a rational basis;
  • Even when a law or rule gives wide discretion (like “at pleasure”), the way the discretion is used must still be reasonable and non-discriminatory;
  • Courts can strike down State actions that are:
    • whimsical;
    • capricious;
    • unreasoned; or
    • motivated by irrelevant or improper considerations.

3. Appointment vs Nomination

Though both “appointment” and “nomination” involve choosing a person for a position:

  • Appointment usually refers to a post filled after some defined procedure under a statute or rule (applications, qualifications, recommendations, etc.), often with defined functions and tenure;
  • Nomination generally refers to being chosen to represent a category (e.g., experts, graduates, interest groups) on a committee or council, usually without a detailed statutory selection process or competitive criteria.

In Indian case law:

  • Nominated members generally have no vested right to complete any term, as their position is largely at the pleasure of the nominating authority;
  • Appointees under a structured statutory regime enjoy stronger protection against arbitrary removal, especially where a tenure is prescribed or clearly contemplated.

4. Writ of Certiorari (Articles 226 and 227)

A writ of certiorari is a judicial order used by higher courts (like High Courts) to:

  • Review decisions of lower courts, tribunals, or public authorities; and
  • Quash such decisions if they are illegal, arbitrary, or made without jurisdiction.

In this case, the High Court exercised its power under Articles 226 and 227 to quash the Government’s notification rescinding the petitioner’s appointment, on the ground of arbitrariness and violation of Article 14.

5. Consequential Benefits

When a court restores an appointment that was unlawfully taken away, “consequential benefits” ordinarily include:

  • Recognition that the appointee is deemed to have continued in office from the date of original appointment;
  • Entitlement to fees, honorarium, or other emoluments that would have accrued for the relevant period;
  • Restoration of seniority or status, as applicable; and
  • Any other benefits (e.g., professional recognition, case allotment) incident to the post.

VII. Conclusion

Sunil S/o Annappa Sank v. State of Karnataka is a significant reaffirmation—and contextual elaboration—of a fundamental constitutional proposition: no State action is above Article 14, not even when clothed in the language of “pleasure”.

By:

  • Recognising the petitioner’s appointment under Rule 26 as a lawful, process-based statutory appointment;
  • Rejecting the notion that such appointments can be reversed overnight at the whim of changing political preferences; and
  • Quashing the 24-hour rescission as a paradigm instance of arbitrariness,

the Karnataka High Court has drawn a clear boundary around the Government’s discretion in appointing and removing law officers. The judgment carefully harmonises executive prerogative with constitutional discipline, ensuring that “pleasure” does not degenerate into “power without reason”.

In doctrinal terms, the decision:

  • Deepens the application of B.P. Singhal to statutory appointments beyond the constitutional offices originally considered;
  • Clarifies the differential treatment of nominations and appointments in the context of the pleasure doctrine; and
  • Strengthens the rule-of-law based expectation that public offices, especially those central to the justice system like Government Pleaders, are filled and vacated in accordance with rational, transparent and non-arbitrary criteria.

In policy terms, it sends a strong signal that last-minute political interventions cannot casually upend duly made appointments, and that the courts stand ready to enforce constitutional boundaries where executive enthusiasm threatens to override reason.

1. B.P. Singhal v. Union of India, (2010) 6 SCC 331.
2. B.K. Uday Kumar v. State of Karnataka, 2020 SCC OnLine Kar 43.
3. Dnyaneshwar Digamber Kamble v. State of Maharashtra, (2016) 1 Mah LJ 602.
4. State of U.P. v. U.P. State Law Officers Association, (1994) 2 SCC 204.
5. State of Karnataka v. Dr. Deepthi Bhava, W.A. No.617/2021, decided 25.09.2021 (Karnataka HC).
6. Pallavi Vastrad v. State of Karnataka, W.P. No.11958/2023, decided 08.11.2023 (Karnataka HC).
7. Prof. Y.S. Siddegowda v. State of Karnataka, W.P. No.22090/2023, decided 05.12.2023 (Karnataka HC).
8. Dr. C. Jagadeesh v. State of Karnataka, W.P. No.10837/2023 & connected matters, decided 05.04.2024 (Karnataka HC).
9. K.C. Shankare Gowda v. State of Karnataka, ILR 2017 KAR 2439.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Karnataka High Court

Judge(s)

M.NAGAPRASANNA

Advocates

PRASHANT S KADADEVAR

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