Doctrine of Lis Pendens and the Closed Architecture of Order XXI CPC: Commentary on Danesh Singh v. Har Pyari (2025 INSC 1434)

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court’s decision in Danesh Singh & Ors v. Har Pyari (Dead) through LRs & Ors, 2025 INSC 1434 (Civil Appeal No. 14761 of 2025), is a major restatement and consolidation of Indian law on:

• the doctrine of lis pendens under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (TPA); and
• the integrated remedial scheme of Order XXI CPC (Rules 58, 89–92, 99–104) read with Section 47 CPC, governing challenges to execution sales and third-party rights.

While the factual dispute arose from the sale of mortgaged agricultural land in Faridabad, the judgment functions as a detailed treatise on execution law. The Court not only reverses the concurrent findings of three lower courts but also clarifies when:

• a pendente lite transferee is bound by an execution sale and barred from filing a separate suit, and
• a true third party can still maintain an independent suit challenging a court auction.

The Bench (Pardiwala and Mahadevan, JJ.; opinion authored by Pardiwala J.) ultimately allows the appeal, upholds the court auction in favour of the appellants (judgment-debtor’s nephews), holds the purchasers-plaintiffs to be bound by lis pendens and by the execution, yet awards them Rs. 75 lakhs on equitable grounds considering the lapse of 40 years and intra-family dynamics. A copy of the judgment is directed to be circulated to all High Courts, underscoring its precedential weight.

II. Factual Background in Brief

Mortgage and bank’s suit

• In 1970, Duli Chand mortgaged 116 kanals 13 marlas of agricultural land to New Bank of India (later respondent no. 6 bank) for a tractor loan of Rs 20,000.
• On default, the bank filed a suit (Suit No. 151 of 1982) seeking recovery of Rs 15,529 and, in default, foreclosure and sale of the mortgaged property.
• On 12.11.1984, the suit was decreed ex parte for Rs 22,753 with interest. The decree recorded the existence of the mortgage and was not appealed.

Pendente lite sales to plaintiffs

• On 13.05.1985 and 24.06.1985, one of the judgment-debtors (respondent no. 3, son of Duli Chand) sold 24 kanals 11 marlas (the “suit property”) out of the mortgaged land to Har Pyari and her husband (respondents 1 and 2), for Rs 70,000.
• These sales took place after institution of the bank’s suit; the second sale was also after filing of the execution petition.

Execution and auction sale

• On 08.10.1985, the executing court attached the entire mortgaged property (116 kanals 13 marlas).
• On 20.06.1988, the entire land was auctioned. The highest bidders were the appellants, who are sons of judgment-debtor no. 4 (and therefore nephews of the vendor of the plaintiffs). Their bid of Rs 35,000 for the whole property was accepted.
• On 30.08.1988, the sale was confirmed; on 24.06.1989, possession was delivered to the auction purchasers; execution was closed on 28.07.1989.

Plaintiffs’ suit

• On 05.07.1989, plaintiffs were allegedly prevented from ploughing the land, and on this basis they filed Suit No. 353 of 1989 seeking:
  • a declaration that the court sale, insofar as it covered their 24 kanals 11 marlas, was void and not binding, and
  • consequential injunction and, in the alternative, possession.
• They pleaded that they were innocent purchasers with No Encumbrance Certificates and mutation in their favour, that the bank had concealed their interest, and that the auction was held fraudulently in camera, at a grossly inadequate price, through relatives of the judgment-debtors.

Decisions below

• Trial Court: Held plaintiffs to be owners, declared the auction void as to their share and granted joint possession with auction-purchasers. It assumed that the sale deeds preceded the decree and brushed aside maintainability objections.
• First Appellate Court: Affirmed; held vendor was joint owner and competent to sell.
• High Court (RSA 2518/2004): Dismissed second appeal; condemned the in camera auction and low price; held plaintiffs were representatives of the judgment-debtor (under s.47 CPC) but yet allowed the suit because execution sale was allegedly vitiated by fraud.

The Supreme Court reverses all three, holds the suit not maintainable, but grants substantial monetary relief to the plaintiffs from the auction-purchasers.

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Judgment

Core Holdings

1. Doctrine of lis pendens applies; transfers to plaintiffs are hit by Section 52 TPA.
   The bank’s suit was one in which the right to the mortgaged property was “directly and specifically in question”, despite being styled as a money suit. The plaintiffs purchased during pendency of that suit and were therefore pendente lite transferees bound by the decree and ensuing execution.
2. Plaintiffs are “representatives” of the judgment-debtor under Section 47 CPC.
   As derivative purchasers from a judgment-debtor during the litigation, they step into his shoes. All questions between them, the bank, and the auction-purchasers that relate to execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree had to be decided by the executing court, not via a separate suit.
3. Remedies under Order XXI Rules 89–90 were unavailable or inapplicable.
   The Court explains that:
   • Rule 89 (deposit-based setting aside of sale) is available to “any person claiming an interest” (including pendente lite transferees), but is strictly time-bound (60 days from sale). Plaintiffs discovered the sale only after confirmation, so the window had closed.
   • Rule 90 (material irregularity or fraud in publishing or conducting sale) cannot be used to question saleability or title of the attached property; that is a Rule 58 issue. Plaintiffs’ real grievance—that their land should not have been attached at all—was outside Rule 90. In any case, any Rule 90 application would have been barred by limitation (Art.127, 60 days from sale).
4. The separate suit is barred by Order XXI Rule 92(3) and Section 47 CPC.
   
   • Rule 92(3) bars suits to set aside orders confirming or setting aside sales, when the grounds fall within Rules 89, 90, or 91, or could have been so raised.
   • Section 47 bars separate suits by parties or their representatives on questions relating to execution, discharge, or satisfaction of the decree.
   • Plaintiffs’ suit is therefore doubly barred: they are representatives under Section 47 and their grounds collide with the statutory execution remedies and their limitation regimes.
5. Plaintiffs cannot invoke “third party” status under Order XXI Rule 92(4).
   The Court gives a careful, narrow reading of “third party” in Rule 92(4):
   • It means a person outside the original suit and outside the execution proceedings, whose rights have not and could not have been adjudicated under Rules 58, 97, or 99.
   • It necessarily excludes parties and their representatives as understood under Section 47 CPC.
   Pendente lite transferees like the plaintiffs are therefore not “third parties” entitled to an independent title suit under Rule 92(4).
6. Rule 99 (dispossession remedy) could have been invoked but would not have helped plaintiffs due to Rule 102.
   
   • Plaintiffs were in possession and were dispossessed when warrant of possession was executed; this fits Rule 99 (complaint by dispossessed non-judgment-debtor).
   • However, as pendente lite transferees of a judgment-debtor, they fall under Rule 102, which bars application of Rules 98 and 100 to such transferees. In practical terms, an executing court would refuse to restore possession to them.
   • Even if they had filed under Rule 99, they would not get title/possession; at best, they could pursue the vendor for refund of sale consideration in a separate civil action.
7. Refinement of the scheme: when third parties must go to execution, and when they may sue separately.
   The Court synthesizes the entire Order XXI structure and Law Commission reports into a timeline-based framework:
   • Before confirmation of sale: third parties must primarily use Rule 58 to object to attachment; if still aggrieved after sale, they may, in narrowly defined situations, sue as “third parties” (Rule 92(4)/Rule 58(5)).
   • After confirmation but before dispossession: a true third party in possession who discovers the sale may sue (title suit) rather than wait to be dispossessed.
   • After dispossession: remedy is under Rule 99 (with 30-day limitation under Art.128); if that window closes, no later suit should be entertained on the same execution-related grounds.
8. T. Vijendradas v. M. Subramanian distinguished.
   The Court holds that T. Vijendradas concerned a pre-suit transferee—a genuine third party outside lis pendens and Section 47—and a decree that was arguably a nullity for non-joinder. That plaintiff fell squarely within Rule 92(4); Har Pyari’s case does not.
9. Equitable relief despite legal bar.
   Recognising:
   • the plaintiffs’ 1985 purchases,
   • their familial relationship with the auction-purchasers,
   • the very long lapse of time (40 years), and
   • the practical difficulty of suing the vendor-judgment-debtor now,
   the Court, “to do substantial justice”, directs the appellants (nephews) to pay Rs 75,00,000 to the plaintiffs within six months, failing which interest at 12% p.a. will run. The sale, however, stands intact as a matter of law.

IV. Precedents and Authorities: How They Shape the Decision

1. Section 52 TPA and “any suit / any right” – Extending Lis Pendens

The Court builds on:

• Celir LLP v. Sumati Prasad Bafna, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3727 – six essentials of Section 52, including that transferees pendente lite are bound by the result irrespective of notice.
• Mahesh Prasad v. Mst. Mundar, 1950 SCC OnLine All 16 – right of maintenance charged on immovable property is a “right to immovable property”; lis pendens applies even where the relief is not a conventional title suit.
• Siddagangaiah v. N.K. Giriraja Shetty, (2018) 7 SCC 278 and Nagubai Ammal v. Shama Rao, AIR 1956 SC 593 – when a plaint seeks creation of a charge on specific property, the “right to immovable property” is directly in question from the date of plaint, not decree.
• Annakkili v. Murugan, 2021 SCC OnLine Mad 1673 – Section 52 can apply even in a money suit where there is a specific prayer for attachment/sale of property to secure the claim, and pendency extends through execution until satisfaction.

Using these, the Court rejects the plaintiffs’ argument that the bank’s decree was a “simple money decree” and that the property was not directly in question. The key doctrinal step is:

• Section 52’s phrase “any suit or proceeding … in which any right to immovable property is directly and specifically in question” is read with emphasis on “any right” and “any suit”.
• Once the plaint prays that mortgaged property be sold in default of payment, and the mortgage is described and recognised by the decree, the suit squarely engages the mortgagee’s interest in the property.

Thus, the Court extends lis pendens to precisely this kind of mortgage recovery suit, even if the decree itself does not recite an express direction to sell.

2. Scope of Order XXI Rule 90 – Irregularities vs. Saleability/Title

On Rule 90, the Court leans on:

• Law Commission of India’s 14th and 27th Reports – to explain the insertion of Rule 90(3) and the Explanation; these were to curb frivolous post-sale applications based on defects known earlier.
• G.R. Selvaraj v. K.J. Prakash Kumar, 2025 INSC 1353 – a debtor who had earlier notice cannot later assail the proclamation; Rule 90(3) bars grounds that could have been taken before the proclamation date.
• Satyanarain Bajoria v. Ramnarain Tibrewal, (1993) 4 SCC 414 – clarifies that:
  • mere absence or defect of attachment does not automatically vitiate sale;
  • there must be a causal link between the irregularity (including in attachment) and substantial injury.
• Kadiyala Rama Rao v. G. Kahna Rao, (2000) 3 SCC 87 – crucially holds that “saleable interest” issues are outside Rule 90’s scope; they can be raised only by the purchaser under Rule 91, not by the judgment-debtor under Rule 90.

The Court synthesizes these to reach two clear propositions:

1. Rule 90 is confined to material irregularity or fraud in publishing or conducting the sale, and not to whether the property could lawfully be sold in execution at all.
2. Questions such as whether the judgment-debtor had a valid title or any saleable interest in the attached property are not Rule 90 questions; they belong to Rule 58 (attachment stage) or Rule 91 (purchaser’s challenge).

This is fundamental in rejecting the plaintiffs’ post-facto attempt to frame their title dispute as an irregular auction under Rule 90.

3. Order XXI Rules 58 and 92 – Clarifying “Sold” and the Third-Party Suit

The Court draws heavily from:

• Kancherla Lakshminarayana v. M. Syamala, (2008) 14 SCC 258 – interprets “sold” in Rule 58(1) proviso (a) to mean “complete sale including confirmation under Rule 92”, not mere acceptance of bid.
• 54th Law Commission Report – recommended insertion of Rule 92(4) and (5), to protect auction-purchasers by allowing them to recover money from decree-holders where a third party later establishes title, and to revive execution against the true debtor.

Using these materials, the Court:

• harmonises Rule 58(5) and Rule 92(4): both contemplate a title suit by a true third party after confirmation of sale, when he could not meaningfully approach the executing court earlier; and
• defines “third party” as one outside the original suit and execution, whose title has neither been nor could have been adjudicated under Rules 58, 97 or 99.

4. Rules 97–104 and Section 47 – Execution as a Self-Contained Code

The Court reaffirms a line of decisions emphasising that post-1976 Order XXI is a self-contained code for execution disputes:

• Noorduddin v. K.L. Anand, (1995) 1 SCC 242 – after 1976, disputes of right/title in execution are to be finally adjudicated in execution itself; the old Rule 103 suit has been abolished.
• Babulal v. Raj Kumar, (1996) 3 SCC 154 – Rules 98–103 constitute a complete code; executing court must decide all issues.
• Silverline Forum v. Rajiv Trust, (1998) 3 SCC 723 – even a transferee pendente lite may be heard under Rule 97; but if Rule 102 applies, adjudication is confined to establishing that status, whereupon his resistance fails.
• N.S.S. Narayana Sarma v. Goldstone Exports, (2002) 1 SCC 662 – the amendments were designed to end multiple proceedings and enable decree-holders to realise decrees without years of collateral litigation; Rule 101 empowers executing courts to decide “all questions”.
• Sameer Singh v. Abdul Rab, (2015) 1 SCC 379 – reiterates that proceedings under Rules 97/99 are in substance like a suit; the order is a deemed decree.

On Section 47 CPC, the Court relies on established authorities (e.g. Harnandrai Badridas, N.S.S. Narayana Sarma, Shamsher Singh v. Nahar Singh) to underline that:

• all questions between parties or their representatives relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction must be determined by the executing court, “and not by a separate suit”;
• auction-purchasers are deemed parties; representatives include transferees pendente lite.

This jurisprudential foundation is then used to show that the plaintiffs’ challenge to the execution sale should have been raised, if at all, within the execution framework, not via a separate declaratory suit.

5. Section 47 and Third Parties – Ameena Bi v. Kuppuswami Naidu

The Court cites Ameena Bi v. Kuppuswami Naidu, (1993) 2 SCC 405 to make an important distinction:

• If the decree creates a liability only against an individual, not against the estate, and a non-party heir’s property is sold in execution, that heir is not a representative under Section 47 and may maintain a separate suit to declare the sale a nullity.

In contrast, Har Pyari and her husband derive their title directly from a judgment-debtor during the pendency of the mortgage suit; they plainly are his “representatives” within the meaning of Section 47. Hence, Ameena Bi supports, rather than undermines, the bar to their suit.

6. Distinguishing T. Vijendradas

The High Court had leaned on T. Vijendradas v. M. Subramanian, (2007) 8 SCC 751, where the Supreme Court allowed a third party’s suit to prevail over a municipal tax execution sale tainted by fraud and non-joinder.

The present judgment carefully separates that case:

• The plaintiff there was a pre-suit transferee from the owner, not bound by lis pendens.
• She was never impleaded in the tax suit; the decree itself was, vis-à-vis her, a nullity.
• She was therefore a genuine “third party” under Rule 92(4), not a representative under Section 47.

In contrast, Har Pyari stands squarely within lis pendens and Section 47; her suit was not saved by Vijendradas. The Court emphasises that its use of Article 142-type equity in Vijendradas (to overcome non-impleadment of the municipality) cannot be transposed to override clear statutory bars in the present context.

V. Legal Reasoning and Doctrinal Contributions

1. Extending Lis Pendens to Mortgage Recovery Suits

A central doctrinal move is to treat the bank’s suit not as a purely personal money claim but as one in which the mortgagee’s right in the specific property was directly at stake. The Court reasons:

• The plaint prayed not only for money but also for foreclosure and sale of specifically described mortgaged land in default.
• The ex parte decree recited the existence of the mortgage and contemplated realisation of the decretal amount through the mortgaged property.
• Under the 1929 amendment to Section 52 TPA, “any suit” and “any right to immovable property” are broadly worded; it is enough that an interest in immovable property forms part of the subject-matter.

Consequently:

• The date of commencement of lis pendens is the date of the plaint in 1982.
• Pendency continues through execution until “complete satisfaction or discharge” of the decree (Section 52 Explanation).
• The plaintiffs’ purchases in May–June 1985 were squarely pendente lite; as a matter of public policy they are bound by the decree and the execution sale, regardless of good faith or lack of actual knowledge.

This is a significant clarification: even where the decree does not explicitly order sale, if the plaint invoked the mortgaged property as security for the claim, lis pendens attaches.

2. Separating Title Objections from Auction Irregularities

The Court draws a sharp conceptual line between:

1. Objections to whether a property could be attached/sold at all – essentially, title or “saleable interest” questions (Rule 58, or purchaser’s Rule 91).
2. Objections to how the sale was conducted – irregularities/fraud in publication, proclamation, mode, or bidding (Rule 90).

Applied to the case:

• Plaintiffs’ core complaint is that the suit land had already been sold to them before attachment and therefore could not lawfully be attached as judgment-debtor’s property. That is a Rule 58–type objection, not a Rule 90 irregularity in “publishing or conducting” the sale.
• Allegations about in camera auction, low price, and relationship between JDs and auction-purchasers are, at best, Rule 90 grounds. However:
  • they never invoked Rule 90;
  • any such application is now time-barred (Art.127); and
  • even on merits, they failed to plead and prove substantial injury caused by those irregularities (as distinct from the injury caused simply because their property was sold).

The judgment thus limits the scope of “fraud vitiates everything” in the execution context: fraud or irregularities connected to the conduct of sale must be pursued under Rule 90 within statutory limits, and cannot be repackaged later as a general plea to annul concluded execution sales.

3. The Tight Ring-Fence Around Execution Remedies and Limitation

A key theme is preventing litigants from using creative suits or Section 47 applications to sidestep the short limitation periods governing execution remedies:

• Article 127 (60 days from date of sale) for applications under Rules 89–91.
• Article 128 (30 days from dispossession) for applications under Rule 99.

The Court emphasises:

• The limitation runs from the date of sale or date of dispossession, not from the date when grounds or knowledge of grounds are acquired.
• Allowing a separate suit on grounds that could have been raised under Rules 89, 90, 91, or 99 would “render the limitation period under Article 127/128 meaningless.”
• Section 47 cannot be used as a back-door to reopen issues reserved for those time-bound rules once the sale has been confirmed under Rule 92(1).

This is most visible in the Court’s three illustrations under Rule 92(3), distinguishing between:

1. a Rule 90 application dismissed on merits as no substantial injury;
2. a Rule 90 application dismissed as time-barred; and
3. a “misconceived” Rule 90 application rejected because the ground (e.g. no saleable interest) falls outside Rule 90’s scope.

Only in the third scenario, and only for a true third party not bound by Section 47, might a limited title suit still be maintainable.

4. Defining “Third Party” Under Rule 92(4) Narrowly

The Court’s definition of “third party” for Rule 92(4) is doctrinally important:

• It is not every person who asserts an “independent” title; rather, it is one who:
  • was not a party to the original suit or execution; and
  • is not a representative of any party under Section 47 (including transferees pendente lite); and
  • has had no real opportunity to have his right adjudicated under Rules 58, 97, or 99 within the execution.
• Typical examples are pre-suit purchasers whose names are not on record or non-family owners whose land is wrongly included in execution.

Accordingly:

• Plaintiffs, as pendente lite transferees of a judgment-debtor, cannot invoke Rule 92(4); they are “representatives” within Section 47 and must live with the decree and execution as he must.

5. Integrated Timeline of Third-Party Remedies

Perhaps the most practical part of the judgment is its schematic “Scenario 1” and “Scenario 2”, which can be simplified as follows (for a third-party owner of attached property):

(a) Third party not yet dispossessed

1. After attachment but before confirmation of sale:
   • File Rule 58 claim/objection to attachment (title or non-liability grounds).
2. After confirmation of sale (Rule 92(1)), but before dispossession:
   • If a true third party (not Section 47 representative) and could not realistically move under Rule 58, may bring a title suit under Rule 92(4), impleading auction-purchaser, decree-holder, and judgment-debtor.

(b) Third party who has been dispossessed

1. Within 30 days of dispossession:
   • File Rule 99 application (Art.128); executing court decides right/title under Rule 101 and may restore possession under Rule 100.
2. After expiry of 30 days:
   • No further remedy in execution; and, per this judgment, no separate suit to bypass the Rule 99 limitation in respect of execution-related dispossession.

In short, third parties cannot keep execution in perpetual suspense by alternating between execution applications and collateral suits. The Court insists on use-it-or-lose-it within the designed architecture.

6. Pendente Lite Transferees: The Hard Line

For pendente lite transferees from a judgment-debtor (like the plaintiffs), the Court’s stance is particularly strict:

• They are bound by lis pendens and cannot acquire better title than the judgment-debtor.
• They are representatives under Section 47 and cannot sue separately to challenge execution.
• They may in principle:
  • apply under Rule 89 (if within 60 days of sale);
  • apply under Rule 99 (if dispossessed and within 30 days) – but relief under Rule 100 is then blocked by Rule 102; or
  • join execution proceedings via substitution provisions (Order XXII Rule 10, Order I Rule 10), if vigilant.
• They cannot use Rule 92(4) “third-party” suits; nor can they expect to undo auction sales by declaratory suits after the fact.

The practical consequence is that purchasers of litigated property must perform enhanced due diligence; reliance on revenue entries or encumbrance certificates alone is insufficient protection against pending litigation.

7. Equitable Relief Without Disturbing the Legal Structure

Having closed every doctrinal door to the plaintiffs’ claim to title or possession, the Court nevertheless feels the equities weigh against leaving them entirely remediless:

• They paid Rs 70,000 in 1985 for a 24-kanal piece constituting only 1/4th of the mortgaged land, whereas the entire 116 kanals 13 marlas were later auctioned for Rs 35,000.
• They had registered deeds and mutations and were allowed to remain in possession for years.
• The auction-purchasers are close relatives (nephews) of their vendor-judgment-debtor, creating a sense of unfair enrichment.

The Court thus orders the appellants to pay Rs 75,00,000 (substantial present-day value) to the plaintiffs within six months, with 12% interest on default, while leaving the auction title undisturbed. This decouples:

• legal entitlement (none, for pendente lite transferees against the auction) from
• equitable compensation (through the Court’s extraordinary powers, effectively spreading the loss between intra-family parties rather than on the bank or the execution system).

VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Doctrine of Lis Pendens (Section 52 TPA)

Simple idea: If a piece of immovable property is in dispute in a court case, you cannot buy it during the case and then say you are not bound by the outcome.

Key points from this judgment:

• “Any suit” in which “any right to immovable property” is directly in question includes:
  • mortgage suits where the plaint prays that the property be sold in default, and
  • money suits where a specific property is sought to be charged or attached for recovery.
• Pendency starts with presentation of plaint and lasts until complete satisfaction/discharge of the decree (including through execution).
• A buyer during this period is a pendente lite transferee and is bound by the decree and the execution sale, even if he:
  • had no actual notice of the suit; or
  • obtained an encumbrance certificate showing no charge.

2. Difference Between Rule 58, Rule 90 and “Nullity” Challenges

• Rule 58 (Attachment Stage):
  • Used when any person says “this property should not have been attached at all; it’s not liable to attachment.”
  • Typical grounds: I am the true owner; property is exempt; judgment-debtor has no title.
  • Must be raised before confirmation of sale.
• Rule 90 (Auction Conduct Stage):
  • Used to say “the sale process was flawed” – e.g., no proper proclamation, wrong description, in camera auction, collusion, fraudulent under-valuation and substantial injury as a result.
  • Cannot be used to say “judgment-debtor had no title” or “this property was wrongly included” – those are Rule 58 issues.
  • Must be filed within 60 days from date of sale (Art.127).
• “Nullity” challenges (Section 47 / separate suit):
  • Rare situations where the entire execution and sale are jurisdictionally void – e.g., property never belonged to judgment-debtor or his estate and a third party had no opportunity to object.
  • If the challenger is a party or representative, remedy is under Section 47; no separate suit.
  • If a true third party (not Section 47 representative), may sue under Rule 92(4)/Rule 58(5) framework.

3. Who is a “Representative” and Who is a “Third Party”?

• Representative (Section 47 CPC):
  • Includes legal heirs, assignees, and crucially, transferees pendente lite from a party.
  • They stand in the shoes of the judgment-debtor or decree-holder for purposes of execution.
  • Cannot file a separate suit about execution; must move before the executing court.
• Third Party (Order XXI Rule 92(4)):
  • A person outside the original suit and execution whose rights were never and could not reasonably be adjudicated under Rules 58, 97, or 99.
  • Typically pre-suit purchasers not impleaded, or strangers whose land was mistakenly sold.
  • Can bring a title suit post-confirmation; must implead the auction-purchaser, decree-holder, and judgment-debtor.

4. Possession and Dispossession (Rule 99)

Rule 99 is not only about being physically thrown out. For open, vacant land, “possession” often means:

• having the power to exclude others and to use the land (e.g., ploughing, planting).

“Dispossession” occurs when that effective control is lost – for example, after the bailiff executes a warrant of delivery of possession, or when the decree-holder/auction-purchaser assumes control such that the previous possessor can no longer use the land.

In this case:

• The bailiff’s report and trial court finding that plaintiffs were no longer in possession show that dispossession took place on 24.06.1989.
• Hence, the 30-day clock under Article 128 for Rule 99 started then; after that, both Rule 99 and any analogous suit are closed as avenues for execution-related relief.

VII. Impact and Significance

1. Execution Law: A Consolidated Framework

This judgment will likely become a leading authority on execution law and third-party rights. Its contributions include:

• Unifying the reading of Orders XXI Rules 58, 89–92, and 99–104 with Section 47 and Sections 52 TPA.
• Rejecting ad hoc “fraud” based suits to re-open old executions when Rule 90 or Rule 99 could have been, but were not, used.
• Providing a clear remedies timeline and emphasising finality of court auctions after the statutory windows close.

2. Property Transactions During Litigation

For conveyancing and banking practice, the message is stark:

• Purchasers of property must not rely solely on No Encumbrance Certificates, revenue entries, or mortgage clearances.
• They must check for pending suits and executions (e.g., via court record searches, public notices, etc.).
• Pendente lite purchasers of a litigated/mortgaged property must assume that they take subject to the eventual decree and its execution and may never be able to upset a court auction, however inequitable it may appear.

3. Strategy for Decree-holders and Auction-purchasers

• Decree-holders and banks gain greater certainty that properly conducted and confirmed sales will not be easily unravelled years later.
• Auction-purchasers are reassured that challenges must come within Rule 89–90–99 timelines, or not at all (save rare nullity cases). This should encourage healthy bidding and better prices in execution sales.

4. Guidance for Courts and Lawyers

The Court’s detailed doctrinal analysis is a roadmap for:

• Trial courts and executing courts: to insist that all execution-related disputes be brought under appropriate Order XXI rules, decided comprehensively there, and not allowed to spill into new suits.
• High Courts: to avoid broad-brush reliance on maxims like “fraud vitiates everything” at the cost of statutory structure and limitation.
• Lawyers: to advise clients promptly on Rule 58/89/90/99 remedies and carefully consider the consequences of pendente lite transactions. Delay or procedural missteps can be fatal.

5. Subtle Legislative Suggestions

The Court implicitly invites legislative attention by:

• suggesting that in Rule 99 proceedings where an auction-purchaser is dispossessor, the decree-holder should be mandatorily impleaded so that if the third party prevails, the purchaser’s refund rights against the decree-holder can be worked out akin to Rule 92(5); and
• flagging the need for better harmonization between the various remedial pockets in Order XXI.

VIII. Conclusion

Danesh Singh v. Har Pyari is far more than a reversal of a particular declaratory decree. It is a systematic restatement of:

• how lis pendens operates in mortgage and money suits involving immovable property;
• how the remedial architecture of Order XXI CPC is meant to function as a closed, time-bound code for execution disputes; and
• how to properly distinguish between:
  • parties/representatives bound to stay within execution (Section 47), and
  • true third parties who may, in limited circumstances, sue independently under Rule 92(4)/Rule 58(5).

Its key takeaways are:

1. Once a property is implicated in a pending suit for enforcement of a mortgage or charge, any subsequent transferee buys at peril; lis pendens applies until decree satisfaction.
2. Execution remedies (Rules 58, 89–92, 99–104) are to be exhausted within strict limitation periods. Collateral suits to re-litigate those issues, or to circumvent limitation, are barred.
3. Pendente lite transferees are representatives of the judgment-debtor, not third parties; they cannot invoke “independent” suit remedies to undo confirmed court auctions.
4. “Fraud” in the conduct of sale is to be handled under Rule 90, not as a free-floating ground to obliterate execution structure and limitation.
5. Yet, courts retain a residual equitable power to mitigate hardship—here, through a substantial monetary award—without compromising statutory finality of execution sales.

By ordering circulation of this judgment to all High Courts, the Supreme Court signals that execution law, often neglected but critical to the effectiveness of civil justice, must now be administered with the precision and discipline reflected in this decision.