Doctrine of Abandonment of Article 226 Remedy on Withdrawal Without Liberty: A Commentary on Rahul Modi v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 MPHC-JBP 62634

1. Introduction

The decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Rahul Modi v. State of Madhya Pradesh, W.P. No. 43781/2025, decided on 2 December 2025, is a significant reiteration of the limits on the maintainability of successive writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

While the factual backdrop involves the alleged financial irregularities of Adarsh Credit Co-operative Society Limited (ACCSL) and multiple FIRs registered in different cities of Madhya Pradesh, the judgment does not decide the substantive question of clubbing FIRs. Instead, it turns entirely on a procedural and jurisdictional point:

Can a petitioner, who has earlier withdrawn a writ petition under Article 226 without express liberty to file a fresh one on the same cause of action, maintain a second writ petition seeking identical reliefs?

The Court, per Justice Himanshu Joshi, answers this in the negative, invoking and applying the Supreme Court’s ruling in Sarguja Transport Service v. S.T.A.T., (1987) 1 SCC 5. The judgment also imposes costs to curb what it terms as an abuse of the writ jurisdiction.

2. Factual and Procedural Background

2.1 The Adarsh Credit Co-operative Society Ltd. (ACCSL) context

The petitioner, Rahul Modi, and others approached the Court in the context of alleged large-scale financial irregularities by Adarsh Credit Co-operative Society Limited (ACCSL):

ACCSL was originally registered under the Rajasthan Co-operative Societies Act with its headquarters at Sirohi, Rajasthan.
It was later converted into a Multi-State Co-operative Society under the Multi-State Co-operative Societies Act, 2002, enabling it to operate across multiple States and Union Territories.
According to the petitioners, ACCSL established about 800 branches in around 23 States/UTs, attracting a vast number of depositors.
Amounts allegedly deposited were not returned, resulting in numerous FIRs across various States. Within Madhya Pradesh, at least seven FIRs were registered in different cities.

These FIRs invoked provisions relating to cheating, misappropriation, criminal breach of trust, conspiracy and allied offences.

2.2 Relief sought in the present writ petition

In Writ Petition No. 43781/2025, the petitioners sought:

A direction to club, merge and consolidate all FIRs registered in Madhya Pradesh against ACCSL with Crime No. 563/2019 dated 19.10.2019 at Police Station Thatipur, District Gwalior, treating that FIR as the principal FIR;
And a consequential direction that there be a single, consolidated investigation and a unified trial for all such cases in Madhya Pradesh.

In support, the petitioners invoked the general legal principle against multiple FIRs for the same incident or transaction, citing several Supreme Court decisions on that subject.

2.3 The earlier writ petition: W.P. No. 16685/2025

A critical aspect of this case is the petitioners’ admission that:

They had earlier filed W.P. No. 16685/2025 seeking the same or substantially similar reliefs relating to clubbing and consolidation of FIRs.
That writ petition was withdrawn on 28.10.2025 on the ground that it had become infructuous (the relief was said to have become “not correct” due to changed circumstances).
While permitting withdrawal, the High Court granted a limited liberty “to assail the subsequent order in appropriate proceedings”.
No general liberty was granted to file a fresh writ petition on the same cause of action.

2.4 The State’s objection to maintainability

In the present petition, the State, represented by the Government Advocate, raised a preliminary objection:

The present writ petition is not maintainable because:
- It is a repeat petition seeking the same relief as W.P. No. 16685/2025; and
- The earlier petition was withdrawn without a liberty to file a fresh writ petition on the same cause of action.
The limited liberty “to assail the subsequent order” could not be stretched to permit a fresh, independent writ petition re-agitating the same core grievance.
No “subsequent order” had been pointed out which could generate a fresh cause of action.

The Court, therefore, first had to decide the threshold question of maintainability before it could examine any substantive argument on the legality of multiple FIRs or the need for consolidation.

3. Issues Before the Court

Although the petition nominally raised issues about multiple FIRs and consolidated investigation, the real, determinative issues before the Court were:

Maintainability of successive writ petitions: Whether, after withdrawing W.P. No. 16685/2025 without express liberty to file a fresh writ petition on the same cause of action, the petitioner could maintain W.P. No. 43781/2025 seeking identical reliefs.
Scope of limited liberty: Whether the limited liberty granted earlier “to assail the subsequent order in appropriate proceedings” could be interpreted as a general liberty to reapproach the Court with a fresh writ petition on the same subject matter.
Abuse of process and imposition of costs: Whether the filing of this second petition amounted to an abuse of the writ jurisdiction justifying the imposition of costs.

Because the Court held the petition non-maintainable on these grounds, the substantive question of clubbing FIRs was left unexamined on merits.

4. Summary of the Judgment

The Madhya Pradesh High Court dismissed the writ petition on the ground of non-maintainability, holding that:

The petitioners had earlier filed W.P. No. 16685/2025 on the same cause of action seeking the same reliefs.
That petition was withdrawn at their instance as infructuous; the Court had granted only a specific, limited liberty to assail any subsequent order in appropriate proceedings.
The present petition:
- Does not challenge any subsequent order;
- Does not disclose any new cause of action;
- Seeks identical reliefs as the earlier petition.
In such circumstances, relying on Sarguja Transport Service v. S.T.A.T., the Court held that:
- Once a writ petition is withdrawn without liberty to file a fresh petition, the remedy under Article 226 on that cause of action is deemed to have been abandoned.
- A second writ petition on the same cause of action is barred, not on res judicata but on grounds of public policy.

The Court further observed that:

Filing a second writ petition in such circumstances amounts to a clear abuse of the process of Court and results in wastage of judicial time.
To deter such conduct, it imposed a cost of ₹5,000/- on the petitioner.
The amount is to be deposited within 15 days with the Registry and utilized for the upliftment of the crèche facility within the High Court premises at Jabalpur.

Accordingly, the writ petition was dismissed as not maintainable.

5. Detailed Analysis

5.1 Precedents Cited and Their Role

5.1.1 Multiple-FIR jurisprudence relied on by the petitioners

The petitioners invoked several Supreme Court decisions to contend that multiple FIRs on the same incident/transaction are impermissible and that consolidation of FIRs and investigation is therefore required. Amongst the cited cases were:

T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala, (2001) 6 SCC 181
This is a landmark judgment where the Supreme Court held that there can ordinarily be only one FIR in respect of an occurrence. Subsequent complaints arising out of the same incident are to be treated as statements under Section 161 CrPC and not as fresh FIRs, subject to the caveat that genuinely distinct incidents or offences may justify separate FIRs.
Y. Abraham Ajith v. Inspector Of Police, Chennai, (2004) 8 SCC 100
The case deals with jurisdiction and cause of action in the context of criminal complaints. It emphasizes that where the essential part of the cause of action does not arise within the territorial jurisdiction of a court, that court cannot entertain the complaint.
Manish Ratan v. State of M.P., (2007) 1 SCC 262
The Court discussed the principles of territorial jurisdiction and the place of commission of the offence, reinforcing that the proper court is where the alleged offence, wholly or partly, occurred.
Amarendu Jyoti v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2014) 12 SCC 362
This decision reiterated the circumscribed scope of multiple FIRs and the concept of “same transaction”, in the context of multiple complaints and criminal proceedings.
Abhishek Singh Chauhan v. Union of India, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1936
Although the judgment text is not reproduced here, it forms part of the evolving jurisprudence on registration of multiple FIRs originating from a common fact situation and the permissible contours of such parallel proceedings.
Ravi Shankar Tiwari @ Ravi v. State of M.P. (W.P. decided on 09.10.2025 by the M.P. High Court)
This was a High Court ruling (cited by the petitioners) which, on their case, applied or followed the Supreme Court’s principle that multiple FIRs in respect of the same incident are impermissible.

Collectively, these precedents support the substantive argument that:

Where multiple FIRs are based on the same incident or transaction, they are usually impermissible;
Law favours either a single FIR or a consolidated investigation and trial, particularly where the facts are substantially similar and interconnected.

However, in the present case, the High Court does not engage with these authorities on merits. They become legally irrelevant at this stage because the Court disposes of the petition purely on the threshold issue of maintainability arising from the earlier withdrawn writ petition.

5.1.2 The controlling precedent: Sarguja Transport Service v. S.T.A.T.

The Court relies heavily on Sarguja Transport Service v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, (1987) 1 SCC 5. In that case, the Supreme Court considered:

Whether a petitioner who has withdrawn a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, without permission to file a fresh petition, can maintain a second writ petition on the same cause of action.

The Supreme Court held:

The principles underlying Order XXIII Rule 1 CPC (withdrawal and abandonment of suits) should be extended to writ proceedings under Article 226, not on the strict ground of res judicata, but on public policy.
If a writ petition is withdrawn without liberty to file a fresh one:
- The petitioner should be taken to have abandoned the remedy under Article 226 with respect to that cause of action.
- A second writ petition on the same cause of action is not maintainable.
This rule helps to:
- Prevent “bench-hunting” — the practice of withdrawing a petition before one Bench to file it afresh before another Bench in the hope of a more favourable outcome.
- Protect the finality of litigation and avoid multiplicity of proceedings.
However, the Supreme Court made an exception for cases involving personal liberty, particularly habeas corpus petitions and enforcement of Article 21 rights, explicitly leaving those questions open.

The Madhya Pradesh High Court quotes paragraph 9 of Sarguja Transport and straightforwardly applies it. The core ratio applied here is:

“…while the withdrawal of a writ petition… without permission to file a fresh writ petition may not bar other remedies like a suit… the remedy under Article 226… should be deemed to have been abandoned by the petitioner in respect of the cause of action relied on in the writ petition when he withdraws it without such permission.”

By invoking this, the Court concludes that the petitioner cannot fall back upon Article 226 to re-urge the same subject-matter after having once withdrawn his earlier writ petition without the requisite liberty.

5.2 Legal Reasoning of the Court

5.2.1 Identical reliefs and same cause of action

The Court’s reasoning progresses in a structured manner:

The petitioner had earlier sought the very same reliefs regarding clubbing/merger of FIRs and unified investigation/trial in W.P. No. 16685/2025.
The earlier writ was withdrawn by the petitioner on 28.10.2025 on the ground that it had become infructuous.
The order of withdrawal granted only a restricted liberty:
“to assail the subsequent order in appropriate proceedings.”
In the present writ petition:
- No “subsequent order” (post 28.10.2025) has been identified or challenged.
- No new or distinct cause of action arising from any later event is pleaded.
- The core relief of clubbing all FIRs with Crime No. 563/2019 at Thatipur, Gwalior and seeking unified investigation and trial is simply repeated.

Thus, the Court determines that W.P. No. 43781/2025 is a second petition on the same cause of action with identical reliefs, clearly falling within the prohibition laid down in Sarguja Transport.

5.2.2 Strict construction of the “liberty” clause

A central feature of the Court’s reasoning is the strict interpretation of the liberty granted in the earlier order:

The liberty was specifically confined to:
“to assail the subsequent order in appropriate proceedings, if so advised.”
This, according to the Court, cannot be read as:
- A general liberty to refile a fresh writ petition under Article 226 on the same foundational facts; or
- A blanket right to re-agitate the original grievance concerning consolidation of FIRs.
The expression “subsequent order” presupposes:
- An identifiable order or decision passed after the original writ was withdrawn; and
- A fresh cause of action arising out of such an order, which could be separately challenged.

Because the petitioner did not point to any such subsequent order, the Court held that the petition fell outside the limited liberty earlier granted and therefore became barred.

5.2.3 Finality of litigation and public policy

The Court reinforces the notion that:

Litigation under Article 226 must have a measure of finality.
Permitting petitioners to withdraw and then repeatedly refile petitions on the same subject would:
- Cause endless litigation;
- Burden the judicial system; and
- “Undermine the sanctity of judicial orders.”
There is a strong public policy component in preventing:
- Repeated invocation of extraordinary jurisdiction on the same cause of action; and
- Bench-hunting and strategic litigation behaviour.

Here, the Court adopts the Sarguja reasoning that, though res judicata (strictly understood) does not apply when a case is withdrawn without adjudication, the remedy under Article 226 is nevertheless abandoned and cannot be “revived” by filing a fresh petition.

5.3 Costs and Deterrence Against Abuse of Process

The Court goes beyond merely dismissing the petition, and addresses the consequences of abuse of process:

The Court characterizes the present petition as a:
- “clear abuse of the process of Court”;
- One causing “unwarranted wastage of the Court's precious time”.
To deter such conduct:
- A cost of ₹5,000/- is imposed on the petitioner.
- The cost is to be deposited with the Registry within 15 days.
- Uniquely, the Court directs that the amount be utilized for the upliftment of the crèche facility functioning within the premises of the High Court at Jabalpur.

This has both a symbolic and practical dimension:

Symbolically, it signals that writ jurisdiction is not to be lightly or repeatedly invoked.
Practically, it channels costs towards a beneficial institutional purpose, underlining that misuse of judicial time can and will attract financial repercussions.

5.4 Interaction with Multiple-FIR Jurisprudence

An important aspect, from a doctrinal perspective, is that the Court does not enter into the merits of the plea regarding multiple FIRs, despite extensive citations by the petitioner. The judgment implicitly conveys that:

No matter how strong or well-founded the substantive legal argument might be (e.g., against multiple FIRs),
The Court will first insist on procedural discipline:
- If the petition is procedurally barred (e.g., due to an earlier withdrawal without liberty),
- The substantive merits will not be examined at all.

This preserves the integrity of two parallel lines of jurisprudence:

Substantive criminal/constitutional law, regarding:
- Multiple FIRs;
- Consolidation of investigations;
- Protection against double jeopardy and harassment.
Procedural and jurisdictional discipline in the exercise of Article 226 powers:
- Finality of withdrawn petitions;
- Bar on successive petitions; and
- Doctrine of abandonment of remedy.

The judgment primarily strengthens the second line, without disturbing the first. Future litigants seeking clubbing of FIRs in Madhya Pradesh will still be able to rely on the Supreme Court’s multiple-FIR jurisprudence, provided their petitions are procedurally maintainable.

6. Complex Concepts Simplified

For clarity, some key legal concepts used in the judgment are explained below in simpler terms.

6.1 Article 226 and writ jurisdiction

Article 226 of the Constitution empowers High Courts to issue writs (such as habeas corpus, mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto) to protect legal and fundamental rights. Features:

It is a discretionary remedy (not automatic).
It is usually invoked where:
- There is a violation of fundamental or legal rights by the State or its agencies; and
- No equally effective alternative remedy exists, or exceptional circumstances justify its use.

6.2 “Cause of action”

“Cause of action” refers to:

The bundle of facts which, if proved, give the petitioner the right to relief from a court.
It is not any single fact but the entire factual scenario which, taken together, constitutes the petitioner’s grievance.

In this case, the cause of action was essentially:

The existence of multiple FIRs against ACCSL across Madhya Pradesh; and
The demand for their consolidation and a unified investigation/trial.

6.3 Withdrawal of a writ petition and “liberty” to refile

When a petitioner withdraws a writ petition:

He may request the Court to grant liberty to file a fresh petition on the same cause of action.
If such liberty is:
- Expressly granted — a fresh writ petition on the same cause may be maintainable (subject to any conditions).
- Not granted — as per Sarguja Transport, the remedy under Article 226 on that cause of action is deemed abandoned.

A limited liberty, such as “to assail the subsequent order,” allows only:

Challenges to future decisions/orders related to the matter; and
Does not revive the original cause of action for a fresh writ on the same grievance.

6.4 Res judicata vs. bar based on public policy

Res judicata is a doctrine that prevents the same issue between the same parties from being litigated again once it has been finally decided by a competent court.

In Sarguja Transport, the Supreme Court clarified that:

When a writ petition is withdrawn without adjudication, there is no res judicata in the strict sense.
Nonetheless, as a matter of public policy, a fresh writ petition under Article 226 on the same cause of action is barred — to prevent:
- Multiplicities of proceedings;
- Bench-hunting; and
- Abuse of the judicial process.

6.5 Bench-hunting

“Bench-hunting” refers to a litigant’s attempt to manoeuvre their case so it is heard by a particular judge or bench perceived as more favourable. Techniques may include:

Withdrawing a case from one Bench to refiling with a slight variation before another;
Filing multiple, overlapping petitions in different courts.

Courts strongly disapprove of such tactics as they undermine judicial impartiality, waste resources, and erode public confidence.

6.6 Abuse of process

“Abuse of process” occurs when the legal system is used:

For an improper purpose; or
In a manner clearly contrary to the fair administration of justice.

In this case, filing a second writ petition seeking the same reliefs after voluntarily withdrawing the first without liberty was viewed as such an abuse, justifying the imposition of costs.

7. Likely Impact and Future Implications

7.1 On litigants and legal strategy in writ petitions

This decision has practical consequences for how litigants and counsel approach writ petitions:

Careful use of withdrawal: Petitioners must think carefully before withdrawing a writ petition. If they anticipate the need to re-approach the Court, they must:
- Expressly seek liberty to file a fresh petition on the same cause of action; and
- Ensure that the Court records such liberty in its order.
Drafting of liberty clauses: Counsel must:
- Phrase requests for liberty clearly and unambiguously;
- Understand that a limited liberty (e.g., “to assail subsequent orders”) cannot later be expanded into a general right to refile.
Discouragement of repetitive petitions: The imposition of costs for filing a successive writ petition on the same cause of action is a clear signal that:
- Re-petitioning without fresh cause will likely attract adverse consequences, including financial penalties.

7.2 On High Court docket management and judicial discipline

The judgment strengthens judicial tools for:

Managing burgeoning dockets in High Courts by denying repeat petitions that do not comply with procedural requirements.
Reinforcing the idea that extraordinary jurisdiction is not an inexhaustible resource; it is to be invoked responsibly and once.

By explicitly characterizing repetitive petitions as a “wastage of the Court's precious time,” the Court emphasizes that judicial time is scarce and must be preserved for matters of genuine urgency and substance.

7.3 On the law regarding multiple FIRs and economic offences

While the Court did not decide the multiple-FIR issue, this judgment has indirect implications:

Future litigants in economic offence cases, especially multi-State financial scams like ACCSL, who seek:
- Consolidation of FIRs;
- Single investigation/trial; or
- Relief against multiple proceedings;

must ensure that:

Their petitions are not procedurally barred by any earlier withdrawal;
Any earlier liberty granted is correctly invoked and does, in fact, cover the reliefs now sought.

Substantively, the door remains open for invoking T.T. Antony and related precedents in suitable, maintainable cases. But this judgment shows that the procedural gateway of maintainability under Article 226 will be strictly policed.

7.4 On the doctrine of abandonment of Article 226 remedy

The judgment is a clear reaffirmation of the doctrine that:

Withdrawal of a writ petition without liberty operates as an abandonment of the Article 226 remedy for that cause of action.
This is independent of:
- Whether the earlier case reached a decision on merits; or
- Whether other legal remedies (e.g., a civil suit, or even Article 32 petition) might still be available.

For Madhya Pradesh, this decision tightens adherence to Sarguja Transport and will likely be cited in future whenever successive writ petitions are filed on the same foundational set of facts.

8. Conclusion

Rahul Modi v. State of Madhya Pradesh is not a decision on the substantive legality of multiple FIRs in large-scale financial fraud cases. Instead, it is a procedural and jurisdictional milestone for writ practice in the Madhya Pradesh High Court.

The key takeaways are:

Once a writ petition under Article 226 is withdrawn without liberty to file afresh, the remedy under Article 226 on that cause of action is deemed to be abandoned.
A second writ petition on the same cause of action, seeking identical reliefs, is not maintainable, even if the earlier petition was not decided on merits.
Liberty clauses in withdrawal orders are to be construed strictly. A limited liberty “to assail subsequent orders” does not entitle a petitioner to resurrect the original writ petition or re-agitate the same reliefs.
Filing repetitive petitions in such circumstances amounts to an abuse of the process of Court and can justifiably attract costs, as was done here.

In the broader legal context, the judgment:

Reinforces the doctrine of abandonment of remedy under Article 226;
Strengthens judicial control over successive writ petitions and discourages litigants from engaging in bench-hunting or strategic withdrawals; and
Ensures that the High Court’s extraordinary jurisdiction is preserved for genuine, procedurally sound grievances.

Accordingly, while the case arose out of complex multi-State economic offences involving ACCSL, its enduring significance lies in its robust affirmation of Sarguja Transport and the strict adherence to principles governing the maintainability of successive writ petitions in constitutional litigation.

Doctrine of Abandonment of Article 226 Remedy on Withdrawal Without Liberty: Rahul Modi v. State of Madhya Pradesh