Dismissal for Second Marriage in Disciplined Forces and the Narrow Scope of Judicial Review: Commentary on Union of India v. Pranab Kumar Nath, 2025 INSC 1479

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of India’s decision in Union of India & Ors. v. Pranab Kumar Nath, 2025 INSC 1479, revisits two recurring themes in Indian service jurisprudence:

How far can High Courts, while exercising powers of judicial review under Article 226, interfere with the quantum of punishment imposed in departmental proceedings?
To what extent can service rules in “disciplined forces” regulate the private, marital life of their personnel, and what consequences can follow from a breach of those rules?

The case involved a Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) constable who contracted a second marriage during the subsistence of his first marriage. Departmental proceedings culminated in his dismissal from service, a penalty later softened by the High Court which directed imposition of a lesser punishment. The Union of India appealed.

The Supreme Court:

Allowed the Union’s appeal.
Set aside the orders of the Single Judge and Division Bench of the High Court.
Restored the dismissal imposed by the Disciplinary, Appellate, and Revisional Authorities.

In doing so, the Court reaffirmed the narrow scope of judicial review over disciplinary penalties and underscored that violation of a clear service rule on second marriage in a disciplined force can legitimately attract the extreme penalty of dismissal, even if it appears harsh.

II. Factual Background and Procedural History

A. Parties and Service Context

The respondent, Pranab Kumar Nath, was a constable in the CISF, a Central Armed Police Force tasked with industrial security and disaster response functions. He joined the CISF on 22 July 2006.

The employer, Union of India (through the CISF and its officers), proceeded against him for serious misconduct concerning his marital life.

B. Marital History and Complaint

Key dates and facts emerging from the enquiry:

The respondent married Mrs. Chandana Nath on 13 March 2006.
The marriage relationship was troubled; after initial disputes, the couple began living separately from the husband’s family.
A daughter was born on 19 April 2008.
There were mutual allegations of extra-marital relationships.
While posted with the 3rd NDRF Battalion, Mundali (Odisha), he allegedly married Ms. Parthana Das on 14 March 2016.
On 18 March 2016, Mrs. Chandana Nath lodged a written complaint alleging:
- That her husband had remarried Ms. Das while their marriage subsisted.
- That he physically tortured her and their minor daughter, and forced them to leave the matrimonial home.
She left the matrimonial home on 17 March 2016.
The respondent later sent her some money, partly voluntarily and partly on his superiors’ directions, but the amounts were small and intermittent.

The respondent’s own (rather unusual) version before the Enquiry Officer was that the relationship with Ms. Das was pursued mainly to “show his wife how it felt” when a spouse interacted with someone else; however, the authorities found that a second marriage had in fact been contracted.

C. Charge Memorandum and Departmental Enquiry

A Charge Memorandum dated 7 July 2016 framed two articles of charge:

Article I – Second marriage during subsistence of first marriage
It alleged that:
- While having a spouse living (Mrs. Chandana Nath), the respondent entered into a marriage with Mrs. Parthana Das on 14 March 2016, when posted at 3rd NDRF Battalion, Mundali (Odisha).
- This conduct violated Rule 18(b) of the CISF Rules, 2001.
- The act amounted to grave misconduct and was “highly unbecoming” of a member of a disciplined Central Armed Police Force.
Article II – Neglect and cruelty towards wife and minor daughter
Based on the same complaint, it alleged that:
- The respondent physically tortured his wife and minor daughter and asked them to leave home.
- He thereby failed to maintain a responsible and decent standard of conduct in private life, bringing discredit to the service.
- This too amounted to grave misconduct, serious indiscipline, and conduct highly unbecoming of a member of a disciplined force.

An Enquiry Officer was appointed, who, after recording evidence, submitted a report on 19 May 2017 concluding that the charges were proved.

D. Departmental Decisions

Disciplinary Authority (Senior Commandant, CISF) – by order dated 1 July 2017, imposed the penalty of dismissal from service.
Appellate Authority (Deputy Inspector General, CISF) – by order dated 20 September 2017, upheld the dismissal.
Revisional Authority (Inspector General, CISF) – by order dated 26 July 2018, affirmed the previous orders.

E. High Court Proceedings

Single Judge (W.P. No. 8078 of 2019, 21 July 2022)
- Accepted that the respondent had committed misconduct.
- Held that dismissal was too harsh.
- Directed the Disciplinary Authority to impose a lesser punishment, suggesting that removal from service might be more appropriate.
Division Bench (W.A. No. 357 of 2022, 18 January 2023)
- Agreed that dismissal was the most extreme punishment.
- Opined that although entering into a second marriage was an act of indiscipline, it was not so serious as to warrant dismissal.
- Emphasised the financial hardship that dismissal would cause to the respondent and his family.
- Also remanded the matter to the authority for imposition of a suitable lesser penalty.

The Union of India challenged this intervention by the High Court in the Supreme Court by way of Special Leave, which culminated in Civil Appeal No. 15068 of 2025.

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Judgment

The Supreme Court (Sanjay Karol, J. and Vipul M. Pancholi, J.) allowed the appeal and restored the respondent’s dismissal from service. The key holdings can be summarised as follows:

Scope of Judicial Review under Article 226 is Narrow:
The High Court, in writ jurisdiction, is not an appellate body over departmental authorities. It cannot reappreciate evidence or substitute its own view on the quantum of punishment unless:
- There is violation of statutory rules or principles of natural justice; or
- The findings are perverse or based on no evidence; or
- The penalty is so disproportionate that it “shocks the conscience” of the court.
None of these grounds were available on the facts.
Rule 18(b) of CISF Rules, 2001 is Clear and Must Be Strictly Applied:
Rule 18(b) disqualifies from appointment a person who, having a spouse living, contracts a second marriage (subject to a narrow proviso for cases where personal law permits multiple marriages or the first marriage is void/voidable). This is a service-condition-based prohibition, not a moral censure. There was no ambiguity in the rule’s wording or in its applicability to the respondent’s conduct.
Penal Service Rules Must Be Strictly Construed but Their Clear Text Cannot Be Diluted on Grounds of Hardship:
The Court reiterated that provisions imposing penal consequences must be strictly construed, and if ambiguous, interpreted in favour of the person to be penalised. However, where the language is clear and the conditions are satisfied, courts cannot ignore or soften the rule merely because its application may seem harsh.
“Dura lex sed lex” – The Law May Be Harsh But It Is the Law:
Invoking the maxim dura lex sed lex, the Court held that unpleasant consequences of violating a clear legal rule cannot justify judicial dilution of the rule or of penalties imposed in accordance with it.
Dismissal for Second Marriage Is Not Per Se Shockingly Disproportionate in a Disciplined Force:
Given the institutional need for discipline, integrity, and avoidance of domestic discord and financial vulnerability that can impair operational efficiency, dismissal for contracting a second marriage while the first subsists is not so disproportionate as to warrant High Court interference.

On this basis, the Court:

Set aside the judgments of the Single Judge and Division Bench.
Restored the dismissal imposed by the Disciplinary Authority and confirmed in appeal and revision.
Made no order as to costs.

IV. Statutory Framework and the CISF Bigamy Rule

A. CISF Rules, 2001 and Rule 18(b)

The CISF Rules, 2001 are framed under Section 22 of the Central Industrial Security Force Act, 1968. Chapter IV deals with recruitment conditions, and Rule 18 (quoted in the judgment) provides:

“18. Disqualification – No person, –
(a) who has entered into or contracted a marriage with a person having a spouse living; or
(b) who, having a spouse living, has entered into or contracted a marriage with another person,
shall be eligible for appointment to the Force;
Provided that the Central Government may, if satisfied that such marriage is permissible under the personal law applicable to such person and the other party to the marriage and there are other grounds for so doing, exempt any person from the operation of this rule.”

Although Rule 18 is framed as a disqualification for appointment, in practice and in this case, its breach by serving personnel is treated as grave misconduct attracting disciplinary action. The charge memo specifically invoked Rule 18(b) and characterised the respondent’s second marriage as violative of this rule and “highly unbecoming” of a member of a disciplined force.

B. Court’s Characterisation of Rule 18(b)

The Supreme Court characterises Rule 18(b) as a “clause prescribing penal consequences” for an action. Key points from its treatment of the rule:

Rules such as Rule 18(b) are grounded in an institutional requirement that members of armed/paramilitary forces maintain:
- High standards of discipline;
- Public confidence; and
- Integrity (both personal and professional).
Acts in private life that entail:
- Domestic discord,
- Financial vulnerability, or
- Divided responsibilities within the family,
can adversely affect operational efficacy, as mental and psychological stability is critical for such forces.
These provisions are not moral pronouncements on marriage, but service conditions that an employer is entitled to prescribe, subject to constitutional limits.
The proviso to Rule 18 acknowledges that where:
- Personal law permits polygamy or polyandry, or
- The earlier marriage is void or voidable,
an unqualified prohibition could be overbroad. The Central Government may then grant an exemption.
In the present case, there was:
- No plea that the respondent’s personal law permitted a second marriage; and
- No attempt to seek exemption under the proviso.

The Court thus treats Rule 18(b) as a clear, valid, and enforceable service norm in the CISF context.

V. Scope of Judicial Review in Disciplinary Matters: Precedents and Their Application

A. The Central Issue

The Supreme Court explicitly frames the “crux” of the appeal as concerning the contours of the High Court’s power vis-à-vis disciplinary proceedings under Article 226. There was:

No allegation of procedural irregularity in the enquiry.
No challenge to the competence of the Enquiry or Disciplinary Authorities.
No contention that findings were based on no evidence.

The only real basis of the High Court’s interference was the view that dismissal was too harsh. To address this, the Supreme Court relies on a line of well-established precedents.

B. B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749

B.C. Chaturvedi is a landmark decision on the limits of judicial review in disciplinary proceedings. The Supreme Court in the present case quotes extensively from it, highlighting the following principles:

Judicial review is not an appeal on merits:
It is a review of the decision-making process, not of the decision itself.
Focus on fairness, not correctness:
Courts ensure that the individual receives fair treatment; they do not ensure that the conclusion reached by the authority is “correct” in the court’s view.
Role of the disciplinary authority:
The disciplinary authority (and, where applicable, the appellate authority) is the sole judge of facts and of the adequacy or reliability of evidence.
Grounds for interference:
Courts may interfere where:
- The enquiry is held by an incompetent officer;
- Rules of natural justice are violated;
- Statutory procedure is not followed; or
- The conclusion is one that no reasonable person could reach (i.e., it is perverse or based on no evidence).
Power to mould relief is exceptional:
Even on proportionality, courts generally remit the matter to the authority; they directly substitute punishment only in rare cases where the imposed penalty is shockingly disproportionate and reasons are recorded.

The present judgment draws directly from these principles to conclude that the High Court overstepped by substituting its view on the appropriate punishment.

C. High Court of Judicature at Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil, (2000) 1 SCC 416

In Shashikant Patil, the Court emphasised that:

High Courts must not act as appellate courts in disciplinary matters.
Interference is justified only when:
- There is violation of natural justice or
- Statutory regulations governing the enquiry are breached; or
- The decision is wholly arbitrary or capricious and no reasonable person could have arrived at it; or
- Extraneous considerations or irrelevant factors have vitiated the decision.
So long as the enquiry is “properly conducted” and there is some legal evidence to support the findings, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not open to challenge in writ proceedings.

The Supreme Court in Pranab Kumar Nath echoes this reasoning, noting that the High Court had approached the matter “as though it was an appeal” and thereby exceeded its jurisdiction.

D. Union of India v. K.G. Soni, (2006) 6 SCC 794

K.G. Soni refines the doctrine of judicial restraint by explicitly tying it to the English concept of Wednesbury unreasonableness. The judgment distils the law as follows:

Courts may intervene if the decision:
- Is illogical;
- Suffers from procedural impropriety; or
- Is so shocking to the conscience that it is in “defiance of logic or moral standards.”
The focus of review is on the decision-making process, not the merits of the decision.
Only in exceptional and rare cases may the court itself impose an alternative punishment; ordinarily, if the penalty is shockingly disproportionate, the matter should be remitted back.

In the present case, the Supreme Court finds that the penalty of dismissal for entering into a second marriage, in the backdrop of CISF’s disciplinary framework, does not meet the “shockingly disproportionate” or “defiance of logic” standard. Hence, interference was unwarranted.

E. Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610

P. Gunasekaran is often cited for its structured list of what High Courts can and cannot do in disciplinary judicial review:

The High Court can examine whether:

The enquiry was held by a competent authority;
The procedure prescribed was duly followed;
There was violation of natural justice;
Extraneous or irrelevant considerations influenced the decision;
The findings are wholly arbitrary or such that no reasonable person could arrive at them;
Material evidence was wrongly excluded or inadmissible evidence improperly relied upon; or
The finding is based on no evidence.

The High Court shall not:

Reappreciate evidence as an appellate court would;
Interfere with conclusions if the enquiry was conducted in accordance with law;
Examine the adequacy or reliability of evidence;
Correct errors of fact, however grave;
Go into the proportionality of punishment, unless the punishment shocks its conscience.

The Supreme Court relies on this framework to censure the High Court’s approach in Pranab Kumar Nath, observing that it ventured into reappreciation of both the gravity of the misconduct and the proportionality of the penalty, which Article 226 does not permit.

F. Synthesis in Pranab Kumar Nath

Collectively, these precedents undergird the Court’s conclusion that:

The High Court cannot reduce a penalty such as dismissal simply on the ground that, in its view, a lesser punishment would suffice or be fairer.
Sympathetic considerations like “financial hardship” to the delinquent and his family, however compelling at a human level, cannot override clear service rules and disciplinary findings in writ review.
Unless the punishment is clearly shockingly disproportionate, the High Court must defer to the disciplinary authority’s judgment.

VI. Strict Construction of Penal Service Rules and the Maxim “Dura Lex Sed Lex”

A. Penal Consequences and Strict Interpretation

The Court recognises Rule 18(b) as a provision that has penal consequences in service law terms: contracting a second marriage while a spouse is living can lead to loss of employment. It reiterates two classical interpretive principles:

Strict construction of penal provisions:
Rules that impose penalties must be construed strictly. The conditions triggering such consequences must “flow from the words employed” in the provision.
Ambiguity resolved in favour of the delinquent:
If the provision is ambiguous, the interpretation that favours the person sought to be penalised should be preferred.

However, the Court emphasises that in this case no ambiguity exists in Rule 18(b). The rule clearly covers:

A person who has a spouse living; and
Who then enters into or contracts a marriage with another person.

The enquiry findings – not challenged on procedural or evidentiary grounds – established that the respondent did exactly this. Once those factual findings stand, the rule’s operation is straightforward.

B. “Dura Lex Sed Lex” Applied

Invoking the Latin maxim dura lex sed lex (“the law is hard, but it is the law”), the Court makes a principled statement:

“Inconvenience or unpleasant consequences of violation of law cannot detract from the prescription of the law.”

In context, this means:

The harshness of dismissal, including the financial and personal hardship to the respondent and his dependants, cannot justify:
- Reading down a clear service rule; or
- Judicial substitution of a lighter penalty in routine exercise of writ jurisdiction.
Equitable or sympathetic considerations cannot defeat a clear statutory or rule-based mandate.

This is a reaffirmation of the primacy of the rule of law over subjective assessments of fairness in individual cases, at least at the level of judicial review of administrative discipline.

VII. Application of Principles to the Present Case

Against this doctrinal background, the Supreme Court’s application to the facts is straightforward:

The respondent, while having a spouse living, entered into a second marriage.
This conduct:
- Falls squarely within Rule 18(b) of the CISF Rules; and
- Is treated by the service as grave misconduct and conduct “highly unbecoming” of a member of a disciplined force.
No procedural infirmity in the enquiry, no violation of natural justice, and no “no evidence” situation were alleged.
The Disciplinary, Appellate, and Revisional Authorities all independently found the charges proved and concluded that dismissal was the appropriate penalty.

The High Court’s interference rested purely on:

A re-characterisation of the gravity of the misconduct (treating second marriage as not so serious as to warrant dismissal); and
Consideration of financial hardship to the respondent and his family.

Under Article 226, such interference:

Amounts to reappreciation of the facts and the service’s own standards of discipline; and
Is inconsistent with the limited grounds of judicial review articulated in B.C. Chaturvedi, Shashikant Patil, K.G. Soni, and P. Gunasekaran.

The Supreme Court therefore:

Holds that the High Court “erred in exercising its power as settled principles of law.”
Sets aside the High Court’s directions for imposing a lesser punishment.
Restores the disciplinary authorities’ decision to dismiss the respondent from service.

VIII. Impact and Implications

A. For Judicial Review in Service Law

The decision strongly reinforces the idea that in service jurisprudence:

High Courts must resist the temptation to act as “super-Disciplinary Authorities.”
Except in the narrow zone where:
- Procedural unfairness,
- Lack of jurisdiction,
- Violation of statutory rules,
- Perversity/no evidence, or
- “Shocking” disproportionality
can be shown, the Court’s hands are tied.
Sympathy, equity, or individual hardship are not independent grounds for judicial interference in punishments lawfully imposed.

Practically, this judgment will:

Be cited by the Union and public employers in resisting writ petitions that seek reduction of punishment on purely sympathetic grounds.
Encourage High Courts to structure their analysis along the checklists laid down in P. Gunasekaran and reiterated here.

B. For Members of Disciplined Forces (CAPFs, Police, Armed Forces)

For personnel in the CISF and similar forces (CRPF, BSF, ITBP, SSB, RPF, state armed police, etc.), the judgment sends a clear signal:

Private life is not entirely private in the context of service discipline. Conduct relating to marriage, family responsibilities, and domestic harmony can have service consequences.
Contracting a second marriage during the subsistence of the first, in violation of service rules, can legitimately attract the highest penalty of dismissal.
The fact that personal law might allow certain marital arrangements must be channelled through the exemption mechanism in rules like Rule 18’s proviso; unilateral non-compliance invites disciplinary action.

Given the Court’s endorsement of the rationale that domestic discord and financial vulnerability can impair operational efficacy, service authorities may feel further encouraged to:

Treat bigamy and serious domestic misconduct as major offences warranting severe penalties.
Resist internal pressures to mitigate penalties purely on compassionate grounds.

C. On Proportionality and “Shocking the Conscience”

Indian administrative law has gradually integrated the concept of proportionality, but in service matters, the Court continues to favour a high threshold (“shocking to the conscience”) for interference with punishment. This case:

Aligns with earlier authority that the court’s role is narrow and exception-driven.
Signals that, at least for disciplined forces, severe penalties for bigamy and similar misconduct will not easily be seen as shockingly disproportionate.

This has a stabilising effect on disciplinary systems but also narrows the room for courts to humanise outcomes on a case-by-case basis.

D. Intersection with Personal Autonomy and Privacy

Although the judgment does not expressly invoke constitutional privacy or autonomy jurisprudence (e.g., K.S. Puttaswamy), it implicitly takes a position that:

Within the employment relationship, particularly in uniformed or armed forces, certain aspects of personal life may legitimately be regulated by service rules.
So long as such regulations:
- Are not arbitrary or discriminatory,
- Serve a rational service objective (discipline, integrity, operational readiness), and
- Contain appropriate exceptions (as in Rule 18’s proviso),
they withstand scrutiny.

Future challenges might attempt to reconcile such service rules with evolving fundamental rights doctrines, but Pranab Kumar Nath clearly favours the primacy of service discipline in this sector.

IX. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

The judgment uses several technical legal concepts. The following brief explanations may assist in understanding them:

1. Dismissal vs. Removal

Dismissal (in service law):
- A punitive termination for misconduct.
- Typically carries a stigma and may bar future employment under the government or affect pensionary benefits, depending on rules.
Removal:
- Also a punitive termination for misconduct.
- Generally regarded as somewhat less severe; may not automatically disqualify from future government employment.

The Single Judge’s reference to “removal” reflected an attempt to reduce the long-term consequences while still recognising misconduct. The Supreme Court, however, held that this choice lay with the disciplinary authority, not the Court.

2. Judicial Review vs. Appeal

An appeal allows a higher authority/court to:
- Re-examine facts;
- Reassess evidence; and
- Substitute its own view on both guilt and punishment.
Judicial review under Article 226 (writ jurisdiction) is much narrower:
- It reviews the fairness and legality of the procedure and decision-making process.
- It does not normally revisit factual findings or the choice of penalty where these are within legal bounds.

3. “Shock the Conscience” and Wednesbury Unreasonableness

Wednesbury unreasonableness (from English law) refers to decisions so unreasonable that no sensible person, properly directing themselves on the law and facts, could have reached them.
When applied to punishment, “shock the conscience” means:
- The penalty is so outrageously severe, in relation to the misconduct, that a judge’s moral sense is offended.

4. Penal Consequences and Strict Construction

A rule has penal consequences when its breach leads to punishment (e.g., fine, imprisonment, or in service law, loss of job).
Strict construction means:
- The rule must not be extended by implication beyond its clear terms.
- Ambiguities should normally benefit the person alleged to have violated it.

5. “Non-Reportable” Judgment

Supreme Court judgments are marked “REPORTABLE” or “NON-REPORTABLE.”
“Non-reportable” usually means:
- The Court does not consider the judgment to lay down a new binding precedent of general importance.
- However, it still decides the case between the parties and can be persuasive in appropriate future cases.

X. Conclusion: Key Takeaways and Broader Significance

The decision in Union of India v. Pranab Kumar Nath is, on one level, a straightforward application of settled principles. Yet it is significant for the clarity with which it restates and applies them in a sensitive area of service jurisprudence.

Key takeaways include:

High Courts’ powers in service disciplinary matters are tightly circumscribed.
They are not appellate bodies, cannot reweigh evidence, and cannot lightly interfere with punishment. Their role is limited to ensuring legality, fairness, and rationality at a high threshold.
Clear service rules, especially in disciplined forces, must be enforced even when outcomes appear harsh.
Rule 18(b) of the CISF Rules, which bars second marriage during the subsistence of the first (subject to narrow exceptions), is a valid and enforceable service condition. Breach thereof can attract dismissal, and courts will not dilute this merely on compassionate grounds.
Bigamy by members of disciplined forces is “grave misconduct” justifying severe penalties.
The Court’s reasoning, grounded in the need to prevent domestic discord and financial vulnerability that could undermine operational effectiveness, underscores that private conduct can have public service ramifications.
Penal service provisions are to be strictly construed, but where unambiguous, courts must apply them as written.
The maxim dura lex sed lex encapsulates the Court’s approach: the severity of lawful consequences is no reason for a court to ignore or soften the clear mandate of a rule.

In the broader legal context, Pranab Kumar Nath stands as a firm reminder that:

Judicial review is a tool for controlling administrative unfairness and illegality, not for second-guessing legitimate administrative judgment on discipline.
Members of armed and paramilitary forces are held to particularly high standards in both professional and private spheres, where their personal conduct may reflect on the force’s discipline and effectiveness.

Future courts dealing with challenges to disciplinary penalties—especially in cases involving personal misconduct like bigamy, domestic violence, or financial irresponsibility—are likely to rely on this judgment to emphasise deference to disciplinary authorities and the limited remit of writ courts under Article 226.