Diatom and CDR Evidence Require Corroboration; Digital “Last Seen” Plus Section 27 Discovery Sustain Murder Conviction; Death Penalty Requires Proved Irreformability — State of HP v. Chander Sharma @ Kaku

Introduction

This death reference and connected criminal appeal arise from the abduction and murder of four-year-old Yug Gupta from the Dwarkagarh building, Shimla, on 14 June 2014. The learned Sessions Judge convicted three accused — Chander Sharma @ Kaku, Tejinder (Tajinder) Pal Singh @ Lijju, and Vikrant Bakshi — under Sections 302, 364-A, 347, 201, 506 read with 120-B IPC, and sentenced all three to death for the offences under Sections 302 and 364-A IPC. The Trial Court found that the child was confined at Flat No. 22, Housing Board Colony, Jakhu, photographed and videographed there, and later thrown into a municipal water tank at Keleston. The case rested on circumstantial evidence buttressed by digital forensics, joint disclosure-based recoveries under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, and DNA profiling.

On reference and appeal, the High Court re-examined each link in the chain with notable depth on modern forensic evidence (CDR-based location, device extractions, diatom testing), the evidentiary value of joint disclosure statements, and capital sentencing law after the Supreme Court’s decision in Manoj v. State of M.P. (2023).

Key Issues

• Whether the chain of circumstantial evidence unerringly established kidnapping and murder by the accused.
• Reliability and probative value of:
  • Call Detail Record (CDR) tower-location mapping and private mapping tools;
  • Handwriting expert opinions on ransom letters;
  • Diatom testing to prove drowning while alive;
  • Digital extractions (photographs/videos) from a memory card found in an accused’s phone.
• Admissibility and sufficiency of joint disclosure statements under Section 27 of the Evidence Act for recoveries from a public place (municipal tank).
• Whether ingredients of Section 364-A IPC (kidnapping for ransom) and Section 347 IPC (wrongful confinement to extort property) were proved.
• Whether this was a “rarest of rare” case justifying the death penalty under the Bachan Singh framework as refined in Manoj (2023).

Summary of the Judgment

• Convictions modified:
  • Chander Sharma and Vikrant Bakshi — Convictions for murder under Section 302 IPC and for causing disappearance of evidence under Section 201 IPC sustained. Acquitted of Sections 364-A and 347 IPC. Conspiracy overlay (120-B) ceased to matter once 364-A/347 failed, but the core guilt for 302/201 stood on their individual acts and circumstances.
  • Tejinder (Tajinder) Pal Singh — Acquitted. The only significant incriminating material was his disclosure statement; conviction cannot rest on Section 27 statements alone without corroborative evidence.
• Capital sentencing: Death sentences on Chander Sharma and Vikrant Bakshi were commuted to life imprisonment for the remainder of their natural life (per Swamy Shraddananda (2)), applying Manoj (2023). The State failed to show irreformability; psychiatric, jail-conduct and probation reports indicated reformative potential.
• Evidentiary holdings of broader import:
  • CDR tower-location evidence cannot pinpoint a person’s location and, without robust corroboration, is insufficient to place an accused at the precise scene or posting location. Private mapping tool outputs (with disclaimers) carry limited probative value.
  • Handwriting expert opinions were rejected due to internal inconsistency between two reports on the same specimen sets; ransom letters could not be attributed to any accused; Section 364-A thereby failed.
  • Diatom test is insufficient when it merely states “comparable” diatoms without species-level comparison; standing alone, it cannot prove the victim was thrown alive into water.
  • Digital “last seen” evidence: Photographs and video of Yug extracted from a memory card found in Vikrant’s Samsung N7100 phone (identified by IMEI and purchase records) and matching the décor and fixtures of Flat No. 22 established a powerful “last seen alive” circumstance, shifting the Section 106 Evidence Act burden to Chander and Vikrant, which they failed to discharge.
  • Section 27 (Evidence Act) joint disclosures: Acceptable when made one after another, leading to discovery; recovery of bones and a concrete slab from a public utility (water tank) remained admissible because the “fact discovered” is the concealed existence and the accused’s knowledge; public accessibility does not per se vitiate Section 27 recoveries.

Analysis

1) Circumstantial Evidence Framework Applied with Rigor

Reiterating Sharad Birdhichand Sarda and Raj Kumar Singh, the Court demanded: (a) complete establishment of each circumstance, (b) circumstances consistent only with guilt, (c) exclusion of alternative hypotheses, and (d) a chain so complete as to leave no reasonable ground for innocence.

Against that template, each alleged circumstance was tested. The Court excluded unproven or weak links (handwriting attribution, CDR-driven location) but found decisive strength in the joint disclosures, recoveries, DNA identification, and the digital “last seen” evidence from Vikrant’s handset.

2) Section 8 Evidence Act (Conduct) — Relevance Narrowly Construed

Although the Trial Court treated Chander’s self-proclamation as an “advocate” and a “human rights” functionary as relevant conduct, the High Court correctly held that, under Section 8, conduct is relevant only if it is influenced by or influences a “fact in issue” or a relevant fact. Boastful misrepresentations by themselves did not bear upon the facts in issue and were excluded from the guilt analysis.

3) CDR Tower Location Evidence — Substantial Caution Mandated

• Telecom nodal witnesses accepted that tower coverage radii are variable (e.g., 200 meters to 1.5 km) and environment-dependent; hence, CDRs can only place a user within a broad area, not at a specific pinpointed location.
• Mapping via an open-source/private tool (N-Konnect) carried an express accuracy disclaimer, and no validation steps were taken to improve accuracy; the Court refused to rely on such outputs to fix movements or posting of ransom letters.
• Takeaway: CDRs can be corroborative, not determinative, of precise location. Absent corroboration, they cannot prove presence at a specific scene or post-box.

4) Handwriting Expert Opinion — Inconsistencies Are Fatal Without Convincing Reasons

The same expert issued two inconsistent opinions: initially “no opinion possible,” later “same hand” on substantially the same questioned and specimen writings. No adequate explanation for this reversal was tendered. Citing Murari Lal and C. Kamalakkannan (2025), the Court insisted that reasons must be probed and corroboration sought where the science is imperfect. Result: ransom letters were not traced to the accused; Section 364-A could not stand.

5) Digital Forensics — Chain, Extraction and Corroboration

• From FIR 6/15 (a separate theft case), mobile phones were seized, transferred under court orders, and examined at SFSL-Junga. The BlackBerry and two Samsung N7100s were identified by IMEIs; one Samsung N7100 (recovered from Vikrant) contained a microSD (Q-2) with photographs and short videos of a child matching Yug’s photograph (C-1). XRY-generated reports and exported frames were produced.
• The defense’s claim that the memory card was the “audio chip” mentioned in the first ransom note was rejected: no audio was found in Q-2, and there was no rational impetus for police to plant an exhibit years after the fact when earlier in possession of the ransom note.
• A forensic comparison of the décor (ply-board and carpet patterns) in the images/frames with Flat No. 22 during SFSL visits further anchored that Yug was at that flat when photographed/filmed.
• Doctrinal shift: The Court treated such images/videos as robust “last seen alive” evidence sourced to an accused’s device, thereby justifying the Section 106 shift of explanatory burden. The accused offered no plausible account.

6) Section 27 Evidence Act — Joint Disclosures and Public Place Recoveries

• Joint/simultaneous disclosures: Following Navjot Sandhu and Kishore Bhadke, disclosures made one after the other, each leading to discovery, are admissible. Here, each accused separately volunteered that they could point out the tank where the child was thrown; they then led the police and witnesses to the Keleston tank.
• “Fact discovered” and public places: Jeet Singh and Limbaji clarify that Section 27 turns on discovery of a fact (place and knowledge), not on whether the location is “public.” The tank’s concealment of a concrete slab tied with plastic strip and bones, and their recovery, sufficed. The knowledge uniquely lay with the accused; no prior police knowledge was shown.
• Open place not fatal: The Court stressed that the legal question is visibility and concealment, not theoretical accessibility to all.
• On knives allegedly used for posing in a photograph, since the recovered knives were not forensically matched with images, that recovery remained legally sterile.

7) DNA Profiling — Identity of Remains Established

The femur/metatarsal/phalangeal bones recovered were forensically human; dental age fell in the 4–5 year range; DNA profiling matched the parents’ FTA-card samples, fixing identity as Yug. This, combined with Section 27 discovery and the absence of police prior knowledge, was a formidable incriminating circumstance.

8) Diatom Test — Caution and Insufficiency Without Species Matching

Relying on Taylor, Knight’s Forensic Pathology, Modi, and Supreme Court guidance (e.g., Shantibhai Vaghela), the Court underscored that diatom analysis has inherent pitfalls and requires species-level comparison between bone marrow and the water source. A finding that diatoms were “detectable and comparable” was not enough. Consequently, the prosecution could not prove Yug was thrown alive into the tank; however, this did not dent the 302 conviction because other links were strong.

9) Section 364-A IPC and 347 IPC — Elements Not Proved

• Handwriting attribution to an accused on the ransom letters failed; no reliable trail tied the letters to any accused. The chronology was also discordant: the child was apparently killed by 21–22 June 2014 while the first demand letter arrived on 27 June.
• Without proof of detention “for ransom” by the accused or a demand attributable to them, Section 364-A was not made out. Nor could “wrongful confinement to extort property” be sustained.

10) Section 201 IPC — Destruction of Evidence

Deletion of recordings, missing clothes, and other facts warranted Section 201 IPC. The Court reiterated that Section 201 is an independent charge; conviction thereunder does not depend on a conviction for the principal offence, provided the prosecution proves commission of some offence and that the accused knowingly caused disappearance of evidence to screen the offender.

11) The “Last Seen” Doctrine in a Digital Age

The Court meaningfully extended traditional last-seen logic to digital proof: images/videos of the living child found in an accused’s device, linked to a specific location (Flat 22) which the accused controlled, placed the victim last alive in their company. Under Section 106, the accused were obliged to explain what ensued; their silence or false denial became an additional link completing the chain.

12) Sentencing — Manoj (2023) Implemented; Death Converted to “Life Till Last Breath”

• The Trial Court’s “crime-only” focus was corrected. Applying Bachan Singh and Manoj, the High Court directed its scrutiny to the criminal — reformability, psychiatric/psychological condition, social background, jail conduct — not merely the brutality of the crime.
• Psychiatry, probation officer, jail conduct reports for Chander and Vikrant showed normal social behaviour, no psychological illness, satisfactory conduct, and participation in productive work. The State did not prove “irreformability.”
• Accordingly, death sentences were commuted to imprisonment for the remainder of natural life (per Swamy Shraddananda (2)).

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Sharad Birdhichand Sarda; Raj Kumar Singh; Abdul Nassar: Golden principles for circumstantial evidence; chain must be complete; suspicion cannot replace proof.
• Nahar Singh; Browne v. Dunn; Muddasani Venkata Narsaiah: Unchallenged testimony stands; cross-examination duty reiterated.
• A.N. Venkatesh; Prakash Chand; Vikramjit Singh: Section 8 conduct is relevant only when it influences or is influenced by a fact in issue.
• Murari Lal; C. Kamalakkannan: Handwriting expert evidence is fallible; reasons must be convincing; corroboration may be needed.
• Pulukuri Kottaya; David Rozario; Charandas Swami: Scope of Section 27; only the part “distinctly relating” to discovery is admissible; “fact discovered” includes place and knowledge.
• Navjot Sandhu; Kishore Bhadke: Joint or near-simultaneous disclosures admissible; credibility is for evaluation.
• Jeet Singh; Limbaji; Ibrahim Musa Chauhan; Perumal Raja: Open/public place recoveries not per se inadmissible; if the accused does not explain their knowledge, adverse inference is permissible.
• State of Maharashtra v. Suresh: If only the accused can explain how he knew of a concealment and does not, courts may presume he concealed it.
• Nizam; Surajdeo Mahto; Satish; Trimukh Maroti; Mir Mohammad Omar: “Last seen” doctrine and Section 106 burden when facts are especially within the accused’s knowledge.
• Manoj v. State of M.P. (2023); Swamy Shraddananda (2): Capital sentencing requires an evidence-backed inquiry into reformability; psychiatric/probation/jail reports should inform whether life imprisonment is foreclosed; whole-life terms may be imposed instead of death.

Impact

• For investigators:
  • CDR tower data must be treated as broad-area corroboration only. Private mapping tools with disclaimers carry little weight; ensure validation or avoid overreliance.
  • Handwriting opinion work must be methodologically consistent; collect comparable writings with the same instruments/media; avoid “dictation-copying” pitfalls.
  • Section 27 recoveries from public places are tenable provided concealment and accused’s unique knowledge are shown; record disclosures carefully and independently witness them.
  • For diatom testing, ensure species identification and match with the suspected water body; otherwise, the test is of limited probative value.
  • Digital forensics needs rigorous chain-of-custody: tie devices by IMEI, court-ordered transfer, documented extractions (e.g., XRY), and correlate imagery with scene features.
• For prosecutors:
  • When invoking Section 364-A or 347, prove authorship and transmission of ransom demands by the accused; ensure chronological coherence with alleged detention and threats.
  • In capital cases, proactively file psychiatric/psychological assessments, probation reports, and jail conduct to address reformability as mandated by Manoj.
  • Use digital “last seen” evidence judiciously; if images/videos place the victim at an accused-controlled site, press the Section 106 burden to explain.
• For defense counsel:
  • Attack CDR-based pinpointing and private mapping outputs; demand 65B compliance where relevant and validation of mapping tools.
  • Probe handwriting expert methodology and inconsistent opinions; seek exclusion or diminished weight.
  • On Section 27, remember: statements alone cannot convict (Manoj Kumar Soni); insist on independent corroboration linking discovery to the crime.
  • Challenge diatom conclusions lacking species comparators; press literature-based limitations.
• For trial courts:
  • Apply the circumstantial “panchsheel” scrupulously; drop weak links to prevent chain contamination.
  • At sentencing, hold a genuine pre-sentence hearing; call for and consider psychiatric, probation and jail reports; record reasons per Section 354(3) CrPC; treat life as the rule, death as a narrow exception.
  • Where digital media places the victim last alive with the accused at premises under their control, articulate the Section 106 shift and evaluate explanations, if any.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Section 27 Evidence Act (Disclosure and Discovery): Only the portion of an accused’s information that directly leads to discovery of a new fact (e.g., the place where an object is concealed and his knowledge of it) is admissible. The confession part (“I stabbed him with this”) is not.
• “Last Seen” Doctrine: If a victim is last seen alive with the accused and found dead soon thereafter, the accused must explain what happened (Section 106). With digital evidence, images/videos can be “last seen” proof if properly tied to the accused’s device and location.
• CDR Location Evidence: Shows which cell tower handled a call; coverage areas are large and variable; it cannot pinpoint exact location without other evidence.
• Diatom Test: Looks for microscopic algae in organs/bone marrow to infer drowning while alive. Without species-level matching to the suspected water body, it’s weak and controversial.
• DNA Profiling: Compares genetic markers from remains with relatives’ samples (e.g., FTA cards) to establish identity; accepted as reliable when properly conducted and documented.
• “Life till last breath” (Special Category Life): A sentence where the convict’s imprisonment extends to his natural life without statutory remission (constitutional clemency remains), used when death is unwarranted but ordinary life term is inadequate.
• Section 364-A IPC: Requires proof that the accused kidnapped/detained a person, threatened harm or caused death, and did so to compel ransom; authorship of demands and timing are crucial.

Conclusion

This judgment is a careful recalibration of circumstantial and forensic proof in serious crimes. The Himachal Pradesh High Court crystallizes multiple critical propositions:

• CDR tower data and private mapping outputs lack precision and require corroboration; they cannot alone prove location.
• Handwriting expert evidence must be methodologically sound and consistent; unexplained reversals on the same material are unacceptable.
• Diatom testing, without species-level matching, is insufficient to prove drowning while alive.
• Digital “last seen” sourced from an accused’s device — when forensically tied to a location the accused controlled — is a robust incriminating circumstance shifting the Section 106 burden.
• Section 27 joint disclosures are admissible when they lead to discovery; recoveries from public places are valid if concealment and the accused’s knowledge are proved.
• Section 364-A and 347 IPC demand rigorous proof of authorship of ransom demand and confinement for extortion; mere suspicion cannot substitute proof.
• Capital sentencing must adhere to Manoj (2023): the State must affirmatively prove irreformability; absent that, death sentences must yield to appropriately structured life terms.

On the facts, the Court acquitted Tejinder Pal Singh for want of corroborative evidence beyond his disclosure; sustained the 302 and 201 liabilities of Chander Sharma and Vikrant Bakshi grounded in Section 27 discovery, DNA identification, and digital “last seen”; rejected the ransom and confinement charges; and commuted their death sentences to life for the remainder of natural life. The ruling is a significant guidepost for the responsible use of modern forensics and principled capital sentencing, and will inform investigative, prosecutorial, and judicial practice across the region.