Departmental Exoneration and Jurisdictional Validity of Sanction under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act: Commentary on T. Manjunath v. State of Karnataka, 2025 INSC 1356

1. Introduction

The Supreme Court’s decision in T. Manjunath v. State of Karnataka, 2025 INSC 1356, deals with two recurring and practically important questions in corruption prosecutions:

Whether exoneration in departmental/disciplinary proceedings on the same allegations can justify discharge or quashing of a criminal prosecution under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (PC Act), especially in “trap” cases.
How to understand “competence” and “jurisdiction” of the sanctioning authority under Section 19 PC Act, and at what stage (trial vs appeal/revision) the Explanation to Section 19(4) operates.

The appellant, T. Manjunath, a Senior Inspector of Motor Vehicles at the RTO, K.R. Puram, Bengaluru, was caught in a trap arranged by the Karnataka Lokayukta and prosecuted for offences under Sections 7, 8, 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of the PC Act. The Special Court discharged him, holding that the sanction granted by the Transport Commissioner was invalid because only the State Government, as appointing/removing authority, could sanction his prosecution. The High Court reversed this, upheld the sanction, and directed the trial to proceed.

On appeal, the Supreme Court:

Rejected the argument that departmental exoneration on the same facts bars or renders unjustified the criminal prosecution, particularly in trap cases.
Clarified that the Explanation to Section 19(4) PC Act (which treats “competency of the authority” as an “error”) is primarily relevant at the appellate/revisional stage and does not prevent a Special Judge from treating lack of competence of the sanctioning authority as a jurisdictional defect at the trial stage.
Remitted the matter to the trial court to determine, on evidence and original records, who is in law the appointing/removing authority of the appellant and, consequently, whether the sanction was validly issued by a competent authority.

This judgment thus refines the law on the interplay between departmental findings and criminal prosecution in corruption “trap” cases, and on the scope and timing of judicial scrutiny of sanction under Section 19 PC Act.

2. Factual Background and Procedural History

2.1 The Trap and Criminal Case

At the relevant time, the appellant was a Senior Inspector of Motor Vehicles posted at the RTO, K.R. Puram, Bengaluru (a Group-B post). A complaint was made to the Lokayukta alleging demand of bribe in connection with allowing tippers belonging to a private crusher company to ply without harassment.

Key factual elements:

The Lokayukta Inspector (Sri Sanjeevarayappa) arranged a trap.
Two independent government employees were secured as panch witnesses.
During pre-trap proceedings, Rs. 15,000/- was entrusted to the complainant with phenolphthalein powder applied to the notes.
On 14 June 2012, the accused-appellant (A1) was allegedly caught in a trap where co-accused H.B. Mastigowda, a private person (A2), received Rs. 15,000/- from the complainant “on behalf of” A1.
Crime No. 48/2012 under the PC Act was registered. Sanction for prosecution was issued by the Commissioner of Transport and a chargesheet was filed under Sections 7, 8, 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) PC Act.

2.2 Discharge Application Before the Special Court

The appellant filed an application under Sections 227 and 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC), seeking discharge on two principal grounds:

Invalid Sanction: As a Group-B officer allegedly appointed by the State Government under the authority of the Governor, he argued that only the State Government, not the Transport Commissioner, was competent to grant sanction under Section 19 PC Act.
Departmental Exoneration: He had been exonerated in disciplinary proceedings on the same charges and evidence, so continuing the criminal prosecution would be unjustified.

The Special Court treated the issue of sanction as a preliminary jurisdictional issue and held:

Under Section 19 PC Act, obtaining valid sanction from the competent authority is mandatory.
The service record (part of the chargesheet papers) showed that the competent authority to remove the appellant was the Government of Karnataka.
Since sanction was granted by the Transport Commissioner, it was “invalid and non-est”.
Cognizance “can be taken in respect of the offences alleged against the accused only once and if there are several accused, against some of whom sanction … may be necessary, it is mandatory that sanction be awaited … otherwise, it would lead to a confused state of affairs.”

Accordingly, the Special Court:

Discharged both A1 (public servant) and A2 (private person).
Returned the chargesheet to the investigating agency with liberty to obtain proper sanction and file a fresh chargesheet.

2.3 High Court Revisional Proceedings

Both:

The State (challenging the discharge), and
The accused-appellant (seeking to strengthen his discharge, including on exoneration grounds)

filed separate criminal revision petitions before the Karnataka High Court.

The High Court:

Allowed the State’s revision and dismissed the appellant’s revision.
Held that sanction by the Transport Commissioner was valid and competent, referring to a notification dated 11 February 2010 that conferred jurisdiction on the Commissioner to accord sanction.
Set aside the discharge order and directed the trial court to proceed against both accused in accordance with law.

2.4 Appeal Before the Supreme Court

In the Supreme Court, the appellant reiterated:

Exoneration argument: He had been fully exonerated in departmental proceedings on the same facts and evidence; given the lower standard of proof in such proceedings, continuation of the criminal case was unjustified.
Sanction/competence argument: On the basis of an office memorandum dated 3 December 1991 (handed over in Court), he argued that he was appointed “under the authority of the Governor of Karnataka”; hence the State Government, not the Commissioner, was the appointing/removing authority and the only competent sanctioning authority under Section 19 PC Act.

The State, through the learned Additional Advocate General, responded that:

Departmental exoneration, especially when based on witnesses turning hostile, does not bar or undermine PC Act prosecution.
In trap cases, conviction can rest even on the sole testimony of the trap-laying officer if it is trustworthy, despite the complainant and shadow witnesses turning hostile.
The office memorandum produced by the defence was, at best, a posting order, not a formal appointment order, and that the Commissioner was in fact the appointing/removing authority, evidenced by the 11 February 2010 order (also produced to the Court).

3. Issues Before the Supreme Court

The Court had to resolve two central issues:

Effect of departmental exoneration:
Does exoneration in departmental proceedings on the same charges and evidence as the criminal case, particularly when based on certain witnesses turning hostile, justify discharge or quashing of the criminal prosecution under the PC Act?
Competence of sanctioning authority under Section 19 PC Act:
(a) When the accused is a State employee, who is the “authority competent to remove him from office” for purposes of Section 19(1)(b)-(c)?
(b) Does the Explanation to Section 19(4), which defines “error” to include “competency of the authority to grant sanction”, prevent the trial court from treating lack of competence as a fatal jurisdictional defect at the stage of discharge, or is this Explanation confined to appellate/revisional scrutiny under Section 19(3)?

4. Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court, per Mehta J. (with Vikram Nath J. concurring), held as follows:

Departmental exoneration does not bar or automatically undermine criminal prosecution, especially in PC Act trap cases.
- The departmental exoneration was based primarily on the complainant, shadow witness, and colleague turning hostile and not supporting the case.
- The trap-laying officer’s testimony and the trap panchanamas still supported the prosecution version.
- Given well-settled law that conviction under the PC Act can be based solely on the credible testimony of the trap-laying officer even when other witnesses are hostile, the possibility of conviction remains real.
- Witnesses may depose differently in a criminal trial due to the risk of perjury for false testimony.
- Accordingly, departmental exoneration in such a scenario cannot be used to “short-circuit” a criminal trial.
- The reliance on Ashoo Surendranath Tewari v. Dept. Superintendent, (2020) 9 SCC 636, was found to be misplaced on the facts.
Sanction under Section 19 PC Act – competence as a jurisdictional issue at the trial stage.
- Section 19(1) clearly ties the sanctioning authority to the Government or authority competent to remove the public servant from office.
- The Explanation under Section 19(4), treating “competency of the authority to grant sanction” as an “error”, is primarily relevant at the stage of appeal/revision under Section 19(3)—for deciding whether a conviction should be reversed for sanction-related defects and whether there has been a “failure of justice”.
- In the present case, the Special Judge acted in original jurisdiction and held that the sanction was invalid because the authority issuing it allegedly lacked jurisdiction. At this stage, the Explanation does not constrain the Special Judge’s power to treat lack of competence as a fatal defect.
- Hence, precedents like State v. T. Murthy, State of M.P. v. Virender Kumar Tripathi, and State of Bihar v. Rajmangal Ram, which dealt with post-conviction appellate/revisional scrutiny, were distinguished as inapplicable at this stage.
Remand on the disputed question of appointing/removing authority.
- There was a substantive factual dispute: the appellant claimed the State Government was his appointing authority (relying on a 1991 memorandum), whereas the State claimed the Commissioner filled that role (relying on the 2010 order/notification).
- These competing documents, and the fact-specific question of who in law was actually competent to appoint/remove him at the material time, had not been adequately adjudicated below.
- To resolve this properly, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s conclusion upholding sanction and remanded the matter to the trial court to:
  - Summon and examine the original records and contemporaneous documents relating to the appellant’s appointment and service conditions.
  - Determine conclusively who was, at the relevant time, the competent appointing/removing authority.
  - On that basis, decide the validity of the sanction order.
  - If sanction is found to have been issued by a competent authority, proceed with the trial.
  - If not, return the chargesheet to the investigating agency to obtain fresh sanction from the appropriate authority.

The appeals were thus partly allowed: the departmental-exoneration argument was rejected outright; the High Court’s view on the validity of sanction was set aside; and the sanction issue was remanded to the trial court for fresh determination.

5. Detailed Analysis

5.1 Departmental Exoneration vs Criminal Prosecution

5.1.1 The Enquiry Report and Basis of Exoneration

The Court carefully examined the enquiry report dated 23 September 2021. The key findings of the Inquiry Officer/disciplinary authority were:

Charges were held “not proved”; even the “preponderance of probabilities” did not point to misconduct.
Prosecution witnesses in the departmental inquiry:
- PW-1 – shadow witness (government employee)
- PW-2 – complainant
- PW-3 – colleague of the complainant
- PW-4 – Investigating Officer / trap-laying officer
PW-1 to PW-3 did not support the department’s case. They:
- Denied that the appellant demanded bribe.
- Either professed ignorance or gave evasive answers about the alleged demand and payment.
- Admitted certain procedural aspects (presence in proceedings, signatures on documents) but not the incriminating core of demand/acceptance.
PW-4 (the trap-laying officer) fully supported the department’s version: he proved the complaint, pre-trap and trap panchanamas, phenolphthalein process, recovery of Rs. 15,000/- from co-accused Mastigowda, and the turning of sodium carbonate solution to pink.
The Inquiry Officer nonetheless concluded that the “solitary evidence” of the Investigating Officer, without corroboration from PW-1 to PW-3 on demand and acceptance, was insufficient even for departmental standards.

The Supreme Court found this reasoning problematic on two levels:

It ignored established law that even in a criminal trial, conviction can be based on the sole, credible testimony of the trap-laying officer; the threshold for departmental proceedings (preponderance of probabilities) is lower, not higher.
The exoneration was driven by the hostility or non-cooperation of key witnesses (complainant and associated witnesses), without adequately weighing the trap-laying officer’s testimony and circumstantial evidence.

5.1.2 Trap Cases, Hostile Witnesses and the Possibility of Conviction

The Court drew on its own precedents (notably M. Narsinga Rao v. State Of A.P. and Neeraj Datta v. State (GNCTD)) to reiterate:

In PC Act trap cases, it is not uncommon for complainants and shadow witnesses to turn hostile, often due to pressure, compromise, or fear.
Nonetheless, if the trap-laying officer’s evidence is cogent, trustworthy, and corroborated by objective circumstances (recovery of tainted money, chemical tests, panchanamas), a conviction can legally be based on such evidence alone.
The departmental forum erred in assuming that the absence of support from PW-1 to PW-3 rendered PW-4’s testimony insufficient, even on a probability standard.

The Supreme Court added an important practical observation:

“When a witness deposing on oath in a criminal trial resiles from the original version and does not support the prosecution case, he would be liable to face prosecution for perjury. Under this pressure, the witness may choose to speak the truth.”

In other words, the behaviour of witnesses in departmental proceedings cannot safely predict their behaviour in a criminal trial. The prospect of perjury proceedings in the latter context might induce a more truthful or consistent account.

5.1.3 Distinguishing Ashoo Surendranath Tewari

The appellant relied on Ashoo Surendranath Tewari v. Dept. Superintendent, (2020) 9 SCC 636, where the Supreme Court had quashed criminal proceedings after a departmental exoneration. The principle drawn from that case is often stated as:

When departmental proceedings and criminal proceedings are founded on identical and indistinguishable facts and evidence, and the departmental authority has given a clean chit on merits, continuation of criminal prosecution may be oppressive and an abuse of process—particularly where the standard of proof in departmental proceedings is lower than in criminal trials.

However, the present Bench found the reliance on Ashoo Tewari misconceived, because:

The departmental exoneration here was not the result of a reasoned evaluation of all evidence leading to a conclusion that no demand or acceptance occurred. Instead, it was primarily driven by three key witnesses turning hostile.
The crucial evidence of the trap-laying officer, and the objective circumstances of recovery and chemical tests, remained intact and, in law, could suffice to prove the charge in a criminal trial.
Given this, there remained a “realistic possibility” of conviction in the criminal case, wholly apart from the departmental outcome.

The Court therefore held that departmental exoneration, particularly when based on hostile witnesses, does not ipso facto justify discharge in PC Act cases, “more particularly in trap cases”.

5.2 Sanction Under Section 19 PC Act: Competence and Jurisdiction

5.2.1 Textual Framework of Section 19

Section 19 PC Act, as reproduced by the Court, has three important components:

Section 19(1): Prior sanction as a condition for cognizance
- Court cannot take cognizance of offences under Sections 7, 11, 13, 15 PC Act against a public servant without prior sanction from:
  - Central Government – if employed in connection with Union affairs and removable only by/with its sanction.
  - State Government – if employed in connection with State affairs and removable only by/with its sanction.
  - “Any other person” – from the authority competent to remove him from office.
Section 19(2): Resolving doubts between authorities
If there is doubt whether the sanction should come from the Central Government, State Government or some other authority, the sanction is to be given by the authority that would have been competent to remove the public servant from office at the time the offence was allegedly committed.
Section 19(3) & (4): Effect of errors or irregularities in sanction at appellate/revisional stage
- No finding, sentence, or order of a Special Judge shall be reversed/altered in appeal, etc., on the ground of absence of, or any error/omission/irregularity in, sanction, unless a “failure of justice” is shown.
- Courts shall not stay proceedings on such grounds unless they result in “failure of justice”.
- In determining “failure of justice”, Courts must consider whether the objection could/should have been raised earlier.
- Explanation: For this section, “error” includes competency of the authority to grant sanction.

5.2.2 Limited Role of the Explanation to Section 19(4)

The State relied on State v. T. Murthy, State of M.P. v. Virender Kumar Tripathi, and State of Bihar v. Rajmangal Ram to argue that:

Even if the sanctioning authority’s competence is in doubt, this is just an “error” covered by Section 19(3)-(4).
Hence, sanction cannot be treated as invalid or fatal at the threshold; courts must proceed with trial and later apply the “failure of justice” test.

The Supreme Court rejected this broad proposition and drew a :

The Explanation to Section 19(4) is primarily designed for appellate or revisional review after a finding, sentence, or order has been passed by a Special Judge.
Section 19(3) explicitly speaks of reversal or alteration of a finding/sentence/order in appeal, confirmation, or revision.
In that context, “error” (including competency) may be overlooked unless it causes “failure of justice.”

By contrast, in the present case:

The Special Judge, acting in original jurisdiction, was called upon to decide, at the stage of discharge, whether cognizance could validly be taken on the basis of the sanction produced.
The Special Judge held that the sanctioning authority (Transport Commissioner) was not the authority competent to remove the appellant and therefore lacked jurisdiction to grant sanction.

The Supreme Court held that in such a scenario, the Explanation to Section 19(4) does not deprive the trial court of its power—and indeed its duty—to examine the competence of the sanctioning authority as a jurisdictional prerequisite to cognizance and trial.

In support, the Court referred to Nanjappa v. State Of Karnataka, (2015) 14 SCC 186, where it was held that:

A trial conducted without valid sanction is void.
A subsequent sanction cannot retrospectively validate a trial held in absence of a valid sanction at the time of cognizance.

Thus:

The Explanation below Section 19(4) becomes relevant when the finding, sentence or order of the Special Judge is under scrutiny before an appellate or revisional court on the grounds specified in Section 19(3). It does not apply to bar the trial court from deciding, in the first instance, whether the sanctioning authority had jurisdiction to grant sanction.

As a result, reliance on T. Murthy, Virender Tripathi, and Rajmangal Ram—all dealing with post-conviction contexts—was held to be misplaced in the present, pre-trial posture.

5.2.3 Competence as “Jurisdiction”, and the Disputed Appointing Authority

The appellant argued that “competence” under Section 19(4) must be read as a matter of “jurisdiction”: if the sanctioning authority is not legally empowered to remove the public servant from office, then it has no jurisdiction to sanction his prosecution.

The trial court had, on the record then available (service particulars in the chargesheet file), concluded that:

The Government of Karnataka was the authority competent to remove the appellant from his post.
The sanction, having been issued by the Commissioner of Transport, was therefore invalid and “non-est”.

However, before the Supreme Court, the parties produced additional, competing documents:

The defence handed over an office memorandum dated 3 December 1991, showing appointment to the post “under the authority of the Governor of Karnataka”, to argue that the State Government was the appointing/removing authority.
The State handed over the order/notification dated 11 February 2010, asserting that:
- The Transport Commissioner was in fact the appointing/removing authority for this category of posts, and
- Therefore, the Commissioner was competent to sanction prosecution.

Given this factual conflict, the Supreme Court did not finally adjudicate who was the appointing/removing authority. Instead, it remitted the question to the trial court with instructions to:

Summon original appointment and service records from the relevant departments.
Ascertain in law and in fact who had the authority to appoint and remove the appellant at the time of the alleged offence.
Determine whether the sanction was granted by that very authority (or one lawfully delegated).

The trial court’s eventual conclusion on this point will determine:

If the sanction is valid – the trial must proceed.
If the sanction is invalid – the chargesheet must be returned to the investigating agency to obtain fresh, competent sanction, consistent with Nanjappa.

5.3 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

5.3.1 Ashoo Surendranath Tewari v. Dept. Superintendent, (2020) 9 SCC 636

In Ashoo Tewari, the Supreme Court had held that where:

Departmental and criminal proceedings are based on the same facts and evidence; and
The departmental authority, after full consideration, exonerates the officer on merits;

continuation of criminal prosecution may be unjust and an abuse of process, as the departmental standard of proof is lower.

In Manjunath, the appellant tried to invoke this principle. The Court, however, distinguished Ashoo Tewari on the facts:

The departmental exoneration here flowed from witnesses turning hostile—not from an affirmative finding, based on all available evidence, that no demand or acceptance occurred.
The trap-laying officer’s testimony remained intact and legally capable of sustaining a conviction in criminal court.
The enquiry officer’s logic (that PW-4’s uncorroborated testimony was insufficient even on a probability standard) was, in fact, contrary to PC Act jurisprudence.

Thus, the ratio of Ashoo Tewari—which presupposes a thorough, reasoned departmental exoneration on the same evidence—was held inapplicable.

5.3.2 Trap Case Precedents: M. Narsinga Rao and Neeraj Datta

The Court invoked two key PC Act precedents:

M. Narsinga Rao v. State Of A.P., (2001) 1 SCC 691
- Held that once the prosecution proves acceptance of money by a public servant, a presumption under Section 20 PC Act arises that it was a gratification other than legal remuneration.
- Conviction can rest on the evidence of official witnesses (like the trap-laying officer and panch witnesses), even if the complainant turns hostile, so long as their testimony is credible.
Neeraj Datta v. State (GNCTD), (2023) 4 SCC 731
- Restated fundamental principles: demand for illegal gratification is a sine qua non for PC Act offences, but it can be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence.
- Confirmed that hostility of the complainant does not automatically defeat the prosecution; the court can rely on other credible evidence and statutory presumptions.

These authorities undergird the Court’s view in Manjunath that:

The departmental authority erred in undervaluing the trap-laying officer’s testimony.
Despite hostile complainant and shadow witness, there remains a realistic prospect of conviction at trial.

5.3.3 Sanction-Related Precedents: T. Murthy, Virender Tripathi, Rajmangal Ram, and Nanjappa

State v. T. Murthy, (2004) 7 SCC 763;
State of M.P. v. Virender Kumar Tripathi, (2009) 15 SCC 533;
State of Bihar v. Rajmangal Ram, (2014) 11 SCC 388
- These cases emphasise that irregularities or errors in sanction—including the competence of the authority—do not automatically vitiate a conviction.
- Under Section 19(3)-(4), appellate/revisional courts must ask whether such errors have caused a “failure of justice” and whether the accused was prejudiced.
- “Error” in this context includes defects in the competence of the sanctioning authority (per the Explanation).
The State invoked these cases to argue that sanction competence is a mere irregularity. The Supreme Court in Manjunath accepted their general principle but limited their application to the post-trial, appellate/revisional stage.
Nanjappa v. State Of Karnataka, (2015) 14 SCC 186
- Held that a trial in the absence of valid sanction is void ab initio.
- A defective or absent sanction at the time of cognizance cannot be cured by a subsequent sanction; a fresh trial can only commence after a proper sanction is obtained.
Nanjappa supports the view that:
- At the trial stage, courts must ensure that the sanction is not only formally present but also issued by a legally competent authority.
- Competence is a jurisdictional matter, not a mere technical irregularity to be brushed aside.

6. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

6.1 Departmental Proceedings vs Criminal Trials

Departmental proceedings:
- Conducted by the employer/department to determine misconduct.
- Purpose: administrative – decide on disciplinary penalties (warning, suspension, dismissal, etc.).
- Standard of proof: preponderance of probabilities (more likely than not).
- Rules of evidence are flexible; strict provisions of the Evidence Act do not necessarily apply.
Criminal trials:
- Conducted by courts to determine criminal guilt and impose penal consequences (imprisonment, fine).
- Standard of proof: beyond reasonable doubt.
- Evidence Act applies strictly; procedural safeguards are stronger.

Because the departmental standard is lower, a departmental exoneration is not mechanically binding on the criminal court. But it may carry persuasive weight in certain circumstances (as in Ashoo Tewari) where the exoneration is thorough and reasoned on identical facts and evidence. Manjunath clarifies that this is not so when exoneration stems largely from witnesses turning hostile.

6.2 Standards of Proof Explained

Beyond reasonable doubt:
The evidence must be so convincing that there is no reasonable doubt in the mind of a prudent person about the accused’s guilt. Possibilities of innocence that are purely speculative or far-fetched do not count as “reasonable” doubts.
Preponderance of probabilities:
The decision-maker asks: is it more likely than not that the misconduct occurred? Even if some doubt remains, if the balance of probabilities favours guilt, the charge can be held proved.

In logic, if a person is not proved guilty even on a preponderance of probabilities, it may sometimes be inferred that proving their guilt beyond reasonable doubt in a criminal case is unlikely. But Manjunath teaches that this inference cannot be drawn when the departmental exoneration itself is flawed in reasoning or driven by witness hostility rather than evidence evaluation.

6.3 Sanction for Prosecution and Competent Authority

Under the PC Act, many public servants cannot be prosecuted for corruption offences unless a prior sanction is obtained from the authority competent to remove them from service. This serves two purposes:

Protection from frivolous prosecution: It ensures that an independent higher authority filters out baseless or malicious cases.
Respect for administrative hierarchy: It reinforces that those who control the service relationship (appointing/removing) also decide whether the officer should face criminal trial.

“Competent authority to remove” is typically:

President/Governor or the Government – for senior civil servants appointed under their authority.
Heads of department or specified officers – for lower categories, as per service rules or notifications.

If a sanction is granted by an authority who, in law, lacks the power to remove the public servant, the sanction is jurisdictionally defective. At the trial stage, such a defect can prevent valid cognizance and trial. Manjunath emphasises that this is for the trial court to scrutinise, not merely for appellate courts.

6.4 Trap Proceedings and Evidence

A “trap” is a controlled operation where:

The complainant, under police supervision, offers a bribe allegedly demanded by a public servant.
Phenolphthalein powder is applied to the notes; the pre-trap panchanama records serial numbers and procedure.
After the demand and acceptance, police intervene; the recipient’s hands are washed in sodium carbonate solution which turns pink if phenolphthalein is present.
These steps are recorded in a trap panchanama, often with audio/video or voice recording.

From an evidentiary viewpoint:

The trap-laying officer is an important witness, describing planning, execution, and recovery.
Independent panch witnesses corroborate key stages.
The complainant’s testimony about the demand is crucial, but if he turns hostile, courts can still rely on other evidence and statutory presumption under Section 20 PC Act if acceptance is proved.

Manjunath reinforces that:

Hostility of complainant and shadow witnesses does not automatically collapse the prosecution case.
Conviction can be sustained on the strength of the trap-laying officer’s credible evidence and corroborating circumstances.

6.5 “Failure of Justice” Under Section 19(3) PC Act

“Failure of justice” is not defined, but broadly means:

The accused has suffered real prejudice in defending himself due to the sanction defect.
The trial outcome might have been different had the sanction been properly obtained from the competent authority.

At the appellate/revisional stage, courts might uphold a conviction despite certain sanction irregularities if no such prejudice is shown. But this does not negate the trial court’s primary duty to verify that the sanction is both present and jurisdictionally valid at the outset.

7. Impact and Future Implications

7.1 Impact on Accused Persons and Defence Strategy

Limited utility of departmental exoneration in trap cases:
- Accused officers can no longer confidently rely on departmental “clean chits” that are based largely on witness hostility to seek discharge or quashing of PC Act prosecutions.
- Courts will look behind the exoneration to see how it was reached and whether the evidence, particularly the trap-laying officer’s testimony and objective circumstances, still support a realistic chance of conviction.
Greater emphasis on sanction competence challenges at trial:
- Accused will likely focus on raising detailed, fact-specific challenges to the competence of the sanctioning authority at the earliest stage (discharge/charge), as Section 19(4)’s Explanation does not bar such challenges at trial.
- This may require presenting service rules, appointment orders, and government notifications to demonstrate which authority is truly competent to remove them.

7.2 Impact on Prosecution and Sanctioning Authorities

Need for meticulous sanction practice:
- Investigating agencies and prosecutors must take greater care to obtain sanction from the correct, legally competent authority, not simply from a high-ranking official.
- They should maintain clear documentation showing the legal basis (statutes, rules, notifications) that make a particular authority the appointing/removing authority.
Proactive witness management:
- Given the Court’s recognition that witnesses may behave differently under perjury risk, prosecution must thoughtfully plan how to secure consistent, truthful testimony in court.
- Where hostile tendencies are anticipated, corroborative evidence (audio/video, independent panch witnesses, scientific tests) becomes even more critical.

7.3 Impact on Trial Courts and Appellate Courts

Trial Courts:
- Reaffirmed authority to treat sanction competence as a jurisdictional prerequisite.
- Expected to scrutinise the sanctioning authority’s competence at the earliest, particularly when specifically challenged by the accused.
- May summon service and appointment records, as directed in Manjunath, before deciding on discharge or framing of charge.
Appellate/Revision Courts:
- Will continue to apply the “failure of justice” test under Section 19(3)-(4) when sanction defects are raised after conviction.
- But they must be sensitive to whether objections “could and should” have been raised earlier, as per Section 19(4); where they were properly raised at trial and wrongly ignored, appellate intervention may be broader.

7.4 Impact on Departmental Authorities

Quality of departmental adjudication matters:
- Where departmental exonerations are based on robust, reasoned evaluation of the same evidence that underpins a criminal case, they may still influence decisions on whether to continue prosecution (consistent with Ashoo Tewari).
- However, where exonerations arise from procedural laxity or witness hostility without proper analysis, they will carry little weight in criminal courts, particularly in trap cases.

8. Conclusion

The Supreme Court in T. Manjunath v. State of Karnataka, 2025 INSC 1356, lays down two clear and significant principles for PC Act jurisprudence:

Departmental exoneration, particularly in trap cases where key witnesses turn hostile, does not ipso facto bar or even strongly weigh against criminal prosecution.
Where the trap-laying officer’s testimony and objective circumstantial evidence remain credible, the possibility of conviction is real, and criminal proceedings should ordinarily continue. The decision thus cabines the reach of Ashoo Surendranath Tewari and emphasises that courts must examine the quality and basis of departmental exoneration, not merely its occurrence.
The competence of the sanctioning authority under Section 19 PC Act is a jurisdictional question that trial courts are entitled—and bound—to examine at the threshold.
The Explanation to Section 19(4), treating competence as an “error”, primarily governs appellate/revisional scrutiny under Section 19(3) and does not strip the Special Judge of power to treat an incompetent sanction as invalid. Where there is dispute over who is the appointing/removing authority, trial courts must summon the relevant records and resolve the issue before proceeding.

By remitting the sanction question for factual determination while rejecting the departmental-exoneration argument, the judgment strikes a calibrated balance:

It protects honest public servants from being prosecuted without a lawfully obtained sanction, and
It prevents departmental proceedings—often less rigorous and susceptible to witness hostility—from being used as a shield against bona fide criminal prosecution for corruption, especially in carefully planned trap cases.

As such, Manjunath will serve as an important precedent guiding:

how defence counsel frame discharge and quashing arguments in PC Act matters,
how prosecutors and sanctioning authorities structure and document sanction decisions, and
how trial and appellate courts allocate and exercise their respective roles in scrutinising sanction and assessing the effect of departmental outcomes on criminal prosecutions.

Departmental Exoneration and Jurisdictional Validity of Sanction under Section 19 of the PC Act: Commentary on T. Manjunath v. State of Karnataka (2025 INSC 1356)