Denials in Interrogatory Affidavits and the High Threshold for Perjury under BNS/BNSS: Commentary on Koninklijke Philips N.V. & Ors. v. Karma Mindtech & Ors. (Delhi High Court, 24 November 2025)

1. Introduction

The decision of the Delhi High Court in Koninklijke Philips N.V. & Ors. v. Karma Mindtech & Ors. addresses a critical procedural question at the intersection of commercial intellectual property litigation and the new criminal procedural framework under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) and the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS).

While the underlying civil suit concerns alleged piracy of Philips’ “IntelliSpace Portal” (ISP) diagnostic software and misuse of trade secrets by an ex-employee (Defendant No. 2), the judgment at hand deals specifically with an application to initiate criminal proceedings for perjury and related offences. The plaintiffs sought action under Sections 227, 229, 236, 237 and 246 BNS, by invoking the complaint mechanism in Sections 379 read with 215 BNSS, on the basis of allegedly false and evasive answers by Defendant No. 2 in an interrogatory affidavit.

Justice Tejas Karia’s ruling assumes particular importance because it:

• Is an early and detailed articulation of the perjury standard under the BNS/BNSS framework in civil/commercial proceedings; and
• Clarifies how courts should treat denials in affidavits in response to interrogatories, especially in high-stakes commercial IP disputes, vis‑à‑vis the offence of “false evidence”.

The judgment ultimately declines to initiate perjury proceedings, reaffirming a high threshold for criminalisation of allegedly false statements in civil cases and warning against the use of perjury applications as a tactical weapon during trial.

2. Factual and Procedural Background

2.1 The Parties and the Technology

• Plaintiffs: Koninklijke Philips N.V. and its group companies, engaged in developing and selling medical imaging software and systems.
• Disputed Software: “IntelliSpace Portal” (ISP), an advanced visualization and analysis software used with medical imaging devices (e.g., MRI, CT).
• Confidential Assets:
  • Customer Service Intellectual Property (CSIP) – proprietary service tools, documentation, and software.
  • Integrated Security Tool (IST) – a digital rights management solution for controlling access to CSIP via certificates and entitlement verification.
• Defendant No. 2: An ex-employee of Plaintiff No. 3 (Philips India subsidiary) who worked as a Field Service Engineer and thereafter allegedly engaged in piracy/refurbishment business.

2.2 The Civil Suit and Interim Orders

The plaintiffs filed CS(COMM) 914/2023 as a commercial IP suit seeking:

• Permanent injunction against copyright and trademark infringement;
• Injunction against misuse of trade secrets and confidential information;
• Accounts, damages, and delivery up of infringing material.

On 20 December 2023, the Court granted an ex parte ad‑interim injunction restraining the defendants from:

• Using, selling, or offering ISP or connected applications on any hardware or diagnostic devices.

The Court also appointed a Local Commissioner to inspect the defendants’ premises and seize devices/software containing infringing copies of ISP or related applications bearing “INTELLISPACE”.

2.3 Parallel Criminal Proceedings

Separately, Philips had already lodged an FIR (No. 11206020220285, dated 24.02.2022) in Gujarat against Defendant No. 2 under Sections 51, 63 and 64 of the Copyright Act, 1957, leading to a criminal case (State of Gujarat v. Karan Hareshbhai Patel, CC 2532/2022), still pending. A raid had allegedly yielded a tampered trial version of ISP with an “impossible” validity of over 5000 years.

2.4 Discovery through Interrogatories

In the civil suit, Philips moved I.A. 9743/2024 under Order XI Rules 1 and 12 CPC (as amended by the Commercial Courts Act, 2015) seeking discovery by interrogatories and document production. The interrogatories (a–k) sought, inter alia:

• Exact dates and scope of alleged piracy/sale of ISP;
• Identity of all customers and geographical spread (India and abroad);
• Prices charged and profits made from alleged piracy;
• Confidential information accessed by Defendant No. 2 during employment;
• Methods and tools used to circumvent Philips’ technological protection measures (IST, key generators, fake certificates, etc.);
• Names and roles of all individuals/entities involved in unauthorized sale/distribution of ISP.

On 16 December 2024, the Court allowed the interrogatory application and directed the defendants to answer interrogatories (a)–(k) by affidavit within four weeks.

Defendant No. 2 filed his affidavit in reply on 8 February 2025 (beyond the stipulated deadline), effectively:

• Denying involvement in piracy/sale of ISP;
• Denying having circumvented Philips’ technological measures;
• Denying access to proprietary/confidential trade secret tools beyond basic operational manuals.

2.5 Application for Perjury under BNS/BNSS

Philips then moved the present application under:

• Section 379 BNSS (successor to Section 340 CrPC, dealing with cases where the court may lodge a complaint for certain offences affecting administration of justice),
• read with Section 215 BNSS (successor to Section 195 CrPC type provisions, governing when and how courts can take cognizance of offences relating to proceedings in court),
• invoking offences under Sections 227, 229, 236, 237, and 246 BNS (equivalents of “false evidence,” “false statements,” and other offences against public justice).

The core allegation was that Defendant No. 2’s interrogatory affidavit contained deliberate falsehoods and evasive denials that:

• Contradicted his own Written Statement;
• Contradicted statements attributed to him in the Local Commissioner’s report; and
• Were inconsistent with admitted employment agreements and undertakings acknowledging access to Philips’ confidential information.

3. Issues Before the Court

The Court focused on a single central issue:

Whether the statements made by Defendant No. 2 in his interrogatory affidavit amount to “false evidence” or related offences under the BNS, warranting initiation of criminal proceedings under Sections 379 read with 215 BNSS.

Within this, several sub‑questions arose:

• Can denials in an affidavit in response to interrogatories, by themselves, amount to perjury?
• Do apparent contradictions between:
  • the Written Statement (admitting purchase of software from a Chinese seller),
  • the Local Commissioner’s report (allegedly recording that business with infringing ISP began in August 2021),
  • and the interrogatory affidavit (denials),
  suffice to attract perjury?
• Does an employment agreement containing broad confidentiality clauses conclusively prove actual access to trade secrets so that denial of such access in an affidavit is per se false?
• At what stage and under what conditions should a civil court invoke its perjury jurisdiction under BNSS/BNS?

4. Summary of the Judgment

Justice Karia dismissed Philips’ application to initiate perjury proceedings against Defendant No. 2.

The Court held that:

• The interrogatory affidavit amounted essentially to denials and the defendant’s version of events, which, even if later disproved, do not automatically constitute perjury.
• For perjury under Section 227 BNS (false evidence) and related provisions, there must be:
  • A clear, deliberate falsehood on a matter of substance;
  • Established by unimpeachable evidence (not merely conflicting statements or disputed documents); and
  • An independent judicial conclusion that launching a criminal complaint is expedient in the interests of justice.
• The alleged contradictions with the Written Statement and the Local Commissioner’s report did not meet this threshold, particularly as:
  • The LC report itself recorded that no infringing ISP was found during inspection; and
  • The defendant expressly disputed the manner in which his statements were recorded by the Local Commissioner.
• The employment agreement, though evidencing a contractual duty of confidentiality, did not conclusively prove actual access to trade secret‑level information so as to render any contrary affidavit statement “demonstrably false”.
• Invoking perjury jurisdiction at the interlocutory stage, with trial already underway and issues framed, would risk interfering with and prejudicing the main civil proceedings.

Accordingly, the Court found that the statutory prerequisites for action under Sections 379/215 BNSS were not satisfied and declined to lodge any complaint.

5. Detailed Legal Analysis

5.1 Statutory Framework under BNS and BNSS

The plaintiffs invoked:

• Sections 227, 229, 236, 237, 246 BNS – broadly corresponding to:
  • giving or fabricating false evidence,
  • making false statements in declarations receivable in evidence, and
  • other offences against public justice in relation to court proceedings.
• Section 379 BNSS – functionally analogous to Section 340 CrPC, enabling a court to direct a complaint where offences affecting administration of justice (such as perjury) appear to have been committed in relation to proceedings before it.
• Section 215 BNSS – akin to Section 195 CrPC, placing restrictions on courts taking cognizance of such offences except upon a complaint made by that court, or by a court to which it is subordinate.

Although the judgment does not reproduce these provisions verbatim, it treats them as a continuity framework from the earlier IPC/CrPC provisions governing perjury and false evidence. The Court therefore relies heavily on pre‑BNSS jurisprudence under Sections 191–193, 199 IPC and Sections 195, 340 CrPC to interpret the new provisions.

5.2 Supreme Court and High Court Precedents on Perjury

5.2.1 K.T.M.S. Mohd. v. Union of India and the “Intentional Falsehood” Requirement

The Court recalls the Supreme Court’s ruling in K.T.M.S. Mohd. v. Union of India, (1992) 3 SCC 178, which laid down that:

This case underscores that mens rea (criminal intent) is an essential ingredient; mere inconsistency or error does not suffice.

5.2.2 Chandrapal Singh v. Maharaj Singh and Aarish Asgar Qureshi v. Fareed Ahmed Qureshi

The Court reproduces and relies on Chandrapal Singh v. Maharaj Singh, (1982) 1 SCC 466, where the Supreme Court held:

• Merely because a court rejects one party’s version and accepts another’s, the rejected version does not automatically become “false” for the purposes of criminal prosecution.
• False evidence must be such that “truth stands out glaringly” and the two positions (true and false) cannot logically co‑exist, both being attributed to the same person.
• The Court cautioned against frustrated litigants weaponizing criminal process after losing in civil proceedings.

In Aarish Asgar Qureshi v. Fareed Ahmed Qureshi, (2019) 18 SCC 172, the Supreme Court added that:

This introduces a key test adopted in the present judgment: the impugned statement must be directly contradicted by unimpeachable evidence (e.g., undisputed documentary proof, official records, or admitted facts) before a perjury complaint can even be contemplated.

5.2.3 James Kunjwal v. State of Uttarakhand – Denials and “Deliberate Falsehood”

The Court leans substantially on the Supreme Court decision in James Kunjwal v. State of Uttarakhand, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1943, which clarified:

• A simple denial of allegations in an affidavit does not, by itself, meet the threshold for perjury.
• There must be:
  • “Deliberate falsehood on a matter of substance”;
  • Reasonable foundation for the charge, based on distinct evidence (not merely suspicion); and
  • Expediency in the interests of justice (not every inaccuracy or immaterial misstatement requires prosecution).

Justice Karia quotes the Supreme Court to emphasise that statements in an affidavit may simply:

Such denials are part of the normal adversarial process and are not to be criminalised lightly.

5.2.4 N.S. Nandiesha Reddy v. Kavitha Mahesh and the “Expediency” Test

In N.S. Nandiesha Reddy v. Kavitha Mahesh, (2021) 19 SCC 321, a three‑Judge Bench reaffirmed earlier principles:

• Even when a false statement appears to have been made, the court must still consider whether it is expedient in the interests of justice to initiate prosecution.
• The court must weigh:
  • the overall factual context,
  • probable consequences of prosecution, and
  • whether the alleged falsehood truly impacts administration of justice.

The present judgment integrates this requirement and explicitly notes in paragraph 23 that, before lodging a complaint, the court must find:

• a clear, deliberate falsehood supported by unimpeachable evidence, and
• a positive conclusion that initiating proceedings is expedient in the interests of justice given its effect on administration of justice.

5.2.5 High Court Authorities on Timing and Restraint

The Court also relies on a line of High Court authorities, particularly from Delhi and Karnataka:

• Vishal Kapoor v. Sonal Kapoor, 2014 SCC OnLine Del 4484 – a Division Bench endorsed the view that applications under Section 340 CrPC (now Section 379 BNSS) should normally be decided at the final stage of the main proceedings. It cautioned against allowing such applications to hamper the fair trial of the substantive civil dispute.
• Punjab Tractors Ltd. v. International Tractors Ltd., 167 (2010) DLT 490 – stressed that Section 340 CrPC should not become an instrument of private vendetta or mid‑trial strategy, and that a prima facie opinion on intentional falsehood must be carefully formed.
• Jindal Polyster Ltd. v. Rahul Jaura, 2005 SCC OnLine Del 1088 and Kuldeep Kapoor v. Susanta Sengupta, 2005 SCC OnLine Del 1322 – reiterated that perjury proceedings should ordinarily await completion of evidence in the main case.
• Rajesh K.N. v. K.R. Umesh, 2023 SCC OnLine Kar 63 – emphasised that a court must be satisfied, on consideration of material placed, that the person has intentionally given false evidence before directing a complaint, and cited Bibhuti Basu v. Corporation of Calcutta, 1982 Cri LJ 909, to hold that any doubt as to bona fides militates against invoking Section 340 CrPC.

Justice Karia adopts this consistent judicial caution and directly quotes the above authorities to support the stance that:

• Perjury jurisdiction is exceptional and must not be invoked merely because inconsistent statements exist in the record;
• The preferable course is to assess such contradictions within the main trial, through cross‑examination and evaluation of evidence.

5.3 Application of the Law to the Facts

5.3.1 Alleged Contradiction with Written Statement – Chinese Software Purchase

The plaintiffs argued that Defendant No. 2’s interrogatory denials were inconsistent with his Written Statement, where he stated that:

Philips treated this as an admission that Defendant No. 2 was dealing in pirated ISP.

The Court, however, interpreted this paragraph more carefully:

• It records purchase of software from a Chinese seller, not an admission of replication or further sale/distribution of pirated ISP by Defendant No. 2.
• Defendant No. 2’s case is that he believed the software to be genuine and only later realised it was pirated—this is his defence narrative, not a confession of piracy enterprise.
• Whether this narrative is credible is a matter for the civil trial, not for summary determination in perjury proceedings.

Thus, the Court found no “glaring” falsity or self‑contradiction that could be pronounced a deliberate falsehood at this stage.

5.3.2 Local Commissioner’s Report – Alleged Admission of Infringing Business Since August 2021

Philips relied heavily on paragraph 12 of the Local Commissioner’s report, which recorded that Defendant No. 2 had allegedly stated he “commenced the said business in or around August 2021”.

The Court responded in two key steps:

1. Contextual reading of the LC report:
   • Paragraph 11 of the report records that no infringing ISP was found on any devices at Defendant No. 2’s premises during the inspection.
   • When read holistically, the report does not constitute an unambiguous, undisputed admission that an infringing business had commenced on any specific date.
2. Disputed nature of recorded statements:
   • Defendant No. 2 specifically disputed the inference that he had admitted to using infringing software since August 2021.
   • In light of this dispute, the LC’s recording of statements could not be treated as “unimpeachable evidence” of an admission.

Moreover, while Philips relied on Court on Its Own Motion v. Rajesh Girothiya, 2024 SCC OnLine Del 5529 to say that LC reports form part of the court record, the defendant invoked:

• Deepak Malhotra v. National Sports Club Of India, 2008 SCC OnLine Del 397, and
• M.P. Rajya Tilhan Utpadak Sahakari Sangh Maryadit v. Modi Transport Service, (2022) 14 SCC 345

to argue that a Local Commissioner performs largely ministerial tasks, not adjudicatory functions, and his report is subject to judicial scrutiny and may be confirmed, varied, or set aside.

The Court effectively sides with the latter view on this point: a Local Commissioner’s report, particularly where the recorded statements are expressly disputed, cannot, without more, be treated as the “unimpeachable evidence” needed to support a perjury charge.

5.3.3 Employment Agreement and Access to Confidential Information

Philips also argued that Defendant No. 2’s employment agreement and related undertakings:

• Expressly acknowledged access to “confidential and proprietary information” about Philips’ products and processes;
• Were admitted by Defendant No. 2; and therefore
• His denial of access to confidential information and trade secret tools in the interrogatory affidavit must be perjurious.

The Court rejected this as an over‑reach:

• An employment agreement imposing confidentiality obligations does not prove the exact nature and level of information actually accessed by the employee.
• In his affidavit, Defendant No. 2 did not assert having no access at all; rather, he claimed to have had access only to limited, basic operational manuals and troubleshooting guides, and denied access to “proprietary or trade secret‑level” tools.
• Whether his access in fact crossed the threshold into trade secrets is again a matter of evidence to be tested at trial (through cross‑examination, technical evidence, etc.).

Absent additional, incontrovertible proof (e.g., logs, entitlement records, or explicit admissions) showing that Defendant No. 2 indeed possessed specific trade secret tools, the Court held that the denial in the affidavit could not be branded as an intentional falsehood.

5.3.4 Nature of Interrogatory Answers – Denials as part of Defence

The Court repeatedly emphasises that the interrogatory answers:

• Are part of Defendant No. 2’s defensive narrative, responding to probing questions from the plaintiffs;
• Consist largely of denials of the plaintiffs’ allegations; and
• Do not seek any immediate substantive relief from the Court based on those statements (unlike, for example, an injunction obtained on a fabricated document).

Criminalising such denials at the discovery stage would:

• Chill a defendant’s right to put forward a defence and respond to adversarial allegations;
• Convert routine factual disputes into potential criminal liability, contrary to the caution expressed in Chandrapal Singh and James Kunjwal;
• Risk turning perjury applications into a strategic tool to pressure or intimidate the opposing party during trial.

The Court concludes that:

5.3.5 Timing and Expediency

Issues in the main suit had already been framed on 28 April 2025:

• Copyright infringement by use/sale of pirated ISP;
• Trademark infringement; and
• Misuse of confidential information and circumvention of technological measures by Defendant No. 2.

Against this backdrop, the Court considered:

• The ongoing nature of the civil trial;
• The necessity of cross‑examination to test the truthfulness of interrogatory answers; and
• The guidance from Vishal Kapoor, Punjab Tractors, Jindal Polyster, and Kuldeep Kapoor favouring consideration of perjury complaints at the final stage absent exceptional circumstances.

The Court finds no exceptional circumstances here:

• There is no unimpeachable proof of fabrication or forgery (unlike, for example, in KG Marketing India v. Rashi Santosh Soni, 2024 SCC OnLine Del 4553, where fabrication was admitted).
• Nor is there any order of the Court obtained solely on the strength of the allegedly false affidavit.

Therefore, initiating criminal proceedings at this stage would not be “expedient in the interests of justice” and could unduly hamper the civil trial.

5.4 Distinguishing Plaintiffs’ Authorities

Philips cited several decisions where courts strongly condemned perjury and fake documents, including:

• Tata Sia Airlines Ltd. v. Pilot18 Aviation Book Store, 2019 SCC OnLine Del 9535;
• Whatman International Ltd. v. P. Mehta, 2019 SCC OnLine Del 6856;
• Dr. Praveen R. v. Dr. Arpitha, 2021 SCC OnLine Kar 15703;
• Gokaldas Paper Products v. Lilliput Kidswear Ltd., 2023 SCC OnLine Del 2191;
• H.S. Bedi v. NHAI, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 432;
• Nishi Gupta v. Cattle Remedies, 2021 SCC OnLine Del 3032; and
• KG Marketing India v. Rashi Santosh Soni, 2024 SCC OnLine Del 4553.

While acknowledging the seriousness of perjury and fabricated documents and the need for deterrence, Justice Karia notes a crucial distinction:

• In those cases, courts found clear, demonstrable falsehoods or admitted fabrication (such as fake invoices or fabricated newspapers), often used to obtain substantive interim relief.
• In the present matter, however:
  • The statements under challenge are denials or alternative factual narratives, not forged documents;
  • The alleged contradictions are neither unequivocal nor tested against unimpeachable proof; and
  • No interim order was obtained based solely on those statements.

Thus, the ratio in those authorities – that courts must respond firmly to clear perjury and fabrication – does not translate to a mandate to criminalise every contested or arguably evasive affidavit.

6. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

6.1 Perjury and “False Evidence” under BNS

Under the BNS (like under the old IPC):

• “False evidence” involves:
  • Intentionally making a false statement on oath (or formal declaration) in a judicial proceeding; or
  • Fabricating evidence intending it to be used in such a proceeding.
• Perjury is the criminal offence corresponding to the giving of such false evidence.

The core elements are:

• Falsity – the statement must be objectively false;
• Intent – the maker must know it is false and intend to mislead the court; and
• Nexus to judicial proceeding – made in, or in relation to, a court proceeding.

6.2 “Unimpeachable Evidence”

The term “unimpeachable evidence” refers to proof that is:

• Reliable and beyond reasonable doubt as to authenticity (e.g., undisputed public records, certified documents, admitted documents, clear contemporaneous records);
• Such that no reasonable person could dispute it without engaging in obvious falsehood.

Per Aarish Asgar Qureshi, a perjury charge should rest on a clear conflict between:

• the impugned statement, and
• such unimpeachable evidence,

not merely on a competing version from the opposing party.

6.3 “Expedient in the Interests of Justice”

Before filing a complaint under Section 379 BNSS, the court must consider:

• Does the alleged falsehood materially impact the decision in the case or undermine the judicial process?
• Will prosecution promote justice (by deterring serious misconduct) or merely add complexity and delay?
• Is there a risk that prosecution will be used as a tactical tool to pressure the other party?

Only if prosecution serves a larger systemic interest in protecting the integrity of justice should the court proceed.

6.4 Interrogatories in Commercial Suits

Interrogatories are written questions one party can serve on another, requiring written, sworn answers. Under Order XI CPC, as modified for commercial disputes:

• They are a tool to obtain specific admissions, clarifications or information on key factual issues.
• Answers are given on affidavit and are therefore given on oath.
• Parties may:
  • Answer fully and frankly,
  • Refuse to answer on specific, legally justifiable grounds (e.g., privilege), or
  • Deny the assertions embedded in the questions.

This judgment makes clear that denials in interrogatory answers, even if later disproved, are not per se perjury.

6.5 Local Commissioner

A Local Commissioner is appointed under Order XXVI CPC to perform certain tasks on behalf of the court, such as:

• Inspecting premises;
• Making inventories or seizing material;
• Recording physical states of affairs.

Key points:

• The Commissioner performs primarily ministerial functions, not judicial adjudication.
• His report is not automatically binding; the court may accept, modify, or reject it.
• Statements recorded by the Commissioner, especially if later disputed, are not automatically unimpeachable proof.

6.6 “Suppressio Veri” and “Suggestio Falsi”

These are Latin expressions often used in equity and fraud contexts:

• Suppressio veri: suppression of the truth – where a party deliberately conceals a material fact they are bound to disclose.
• Suggestio falsi: suggestion of falsehood – where a party affirmatively asserts a false fact.

Philips accused Defendant No. 2 of both. The Court, however, found no sufficient basis to treat his responses as deliberate suppression or falsehood amounting to a criminal wrong at this stage.

7. Implications and Impact

7.1 For Commercial and IP Litigation

Commercial suits, especially under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, now rely heavily on:

• Statements of Truth with pleadings;
• Detailed document disclosure; and
• Discovery through interrogatories.

This decision sends a clear signal:

• Civil courts will not lightly entertain perjury applications based merely on denials or contested factual assertions in such affidavits.
• Parties are still expected to be truthful, but the remedy for allegedly false denials is usually through:
  • Contradiction by evidence at trial,
  • Adverse inferences, costs, or sanctions under civil procedure rules, rather than immediate criminal prosecution.
• Perjury actions remain reserved for clear, conscious falsehoods or fabricated documents that strike at the heart of judicial integrity.

7.2 Continuity under BNS/BNSS

Although the BNS and BNSS are new codes, this case demonstrates a deliberate continuity of principles from the earlier IPC/CrPC perjury jurisprudence:

• The requirement of intentional falsehood and unimpeachable contradiction remains.
• The “expedient in the interests of justice” test, evolved under Section 340 CrPC, is explicitly applied to Section 379 BNSS.
• The caution against letting perjury prosecutions interfere with ongoing civil trials continues unaltered.

In that sense, the judgment is an early guidepost on how courts will interpret BNS/BNSS provisions relating to offences against public justice.

7.3 Avoiding “Weaponisation” of Perjury Applications

The decision clearly discourages the use of perjury complaints as a litigation strategy:

• Parties cannot treat every contradiction, exaggeration, or denial as a criminal act.
• Civil litigants – especially in long, technically complex IP cases – must understand that factual disputes are meant to be thrashed out in trial, not turned into side‑criminal proceedings absent clear evidence of fraud.
• Counsel should be cautious in advising perjury applications; premature or weak applications risk being seen as an abuse of process.

7.4 Guidance for Future Perjury Applications

For future litigants contemplating applications under Section 379 read with 215 BNSS, this judgment effectively sets out a checklist:

1. Identify a specific statement (or document) alleged to be false, not just a general suspicion.
2. Demonstrate falsity through unimpeachable evidence:
   • Official/public records,
   • Admitted documents, or
   • Clear, incontrovertible technical or forensic proof.
3. Establish intentionality:
   • Show that the party knew the truth and yet asserted the opposite.
4. Explain why prosecution is expedient in the interests of justice:
   • Does it protect the integrity of judicial process beyond the interests of the immediate parties?
5. Consider timing:
   • Is it more appropriate to await trial completion, or do truly exceptional circumstances justify earlier action?

7.5 Specific Impact on Employee/Trade Secret Litigation

In disputes involving ex‑employees and trade secrets, employers often rely on:

• Broad confidentiality clauses in employment agreements; and
• General assertions of access to internal systems and tools.

This judgment clarifies:

• Such documents, while relevant to civil liability, do not automatically prove actual access to a particular trade secret or confidential tool.
• An ex‑employee’s nuanced or minimizing description of what they accessed cannot be criminalised as perjury unless concrete, irrefutable evidence contradicts it.

This balances employer interests in protecting confidential information with the ex‑employee’s right to contest allegations without immediate fear of criminal exposure for every contested assertion.

8. Critical Assessment

The judgment is doctrinally consistent and carefully grounded in Supreme Court authority. Its key strengths include:

• Doctrinal clarity: It restates and applies the classic tests of perjury – intentional falsehood, unimpeachable contradiction, and expediency – to the new BNS/BNSS framework.
• Procedural prudence: It recognises the danger of derailing complex commercial trials with parallel perjury proceedings based on contested facts.
• Protection of adversarial process: By treating denials as part of legitimate defence unless clearly proved otherwise, the Court preserves the ability of parties to contest allegations robustly.

There is, however, a policy tension:

• On one hand, courts like in Nishi Gupta and H.S. Bedi have expressed concern that leniency in perjury matters encourages false claims and forged documents.
• On the other, overly aggressive use of perjury provisions risks chilling genuine defences and over‑criminalising civil litigation behaviour.

Justice Karia’s approach leans toward caution and restraint, insisting that only clear, deliberate, and provable falsehoods be prosecuted. This is arguably appropriate in a commercial IP suit still at the trial stage, where:

• Highly technical evidence is yet to be led;
• Allegations of piracy, trade secret misuse, and circumvention are heavily fact‑dependent; and
• The local commissioner’s findings and employment documents, while relevant, are not dispositive of criminal intent or falsity.

In sum, the judgment promotes a measured enforcement of perjury laws in civil proceedings, reserving the criminal sanction for truly egregious cases.

9. Conclusion

The Delhi High Court’s ruling in Koninklijke Philips N.V. v. Karma Mindtech reinforces a robust and cautious approach to perjury under the BNS/BNSS regime.

Key takeaways:

• Denials and alternate narratives in interrogatory affidavits, by themselves, do not amount to perjury.
• Perjury demands a clear, deliberate falsehood on a material point, established by unimpeachable evidence.
• Courts must separately assess whether initiating a criminal complaint is expedient in the interests of justice, and should ordinarily defer such consideration until the final stage of the main proceedings unless exceptional circumstances exist.
• A Local Commissioner’s disputed recording of statements and a general employment confidentiality clause cannot, without more, sustain perjury charges.

Within the broader legal landscape, this judgment stands as an important early precedent on:

• How BNS/BNSS provisions on offences against public justice will be applied in commercial and IP litigation; and
• How courts will guard against both perjury and the misuse of perjury provisions as tools of litigation strategy.

It thus contributes significantly to the evolving jurisprudence on honesty in pleadings and affidavits, while preserving the proper role of the civil trial as the primary forum for resolving contested questions of fact.