Delayed Death, Septicemia, and Chain of Causation: Supreme Court’s Nine‑Principle Framework for Classifying Murder vs. Attempt to Murder under the IPC

Case: Maniklal Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh | Citation: 2025 INSC 1107 | Court: Supreme Court of India | Bench: J.B. Pardiwala, J.; R. Mahadevan, J. | Date: 12 September 2025

Introduction

This judgment provides a detailed and authoritative exposition on how Indian courts should classify criminal liability when a victim dies after a significant lapse of time due to complications such as septicemia, pneumonia, and bedsores that arise from the original injuries. Confronted with a High Court’s decision that downgraded a murder conviction under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) to attempt to murder under Section 307 IPC because the victim died nine months after the assault (purportedly due to lack of proper treatment), the Supreme Court emphatically corrected the legal approach.

Although the Court ultimately dismissed the convict’s appeal (because the State had not filed an appeal to seek restoration of the Section 302 conviction), it delivered a comprehensive doctrinal clarification on causation, the scope of Explanation 2 to Section 299 IPC, and the proper boundary between Sections 302 and 307 when death ensues after a delay.

The case involves four accused, including the appellant, who allegedly trespassed into the victim’s home, dragged him to the terrace, flung him down, and assaulted him further. The victim, Rekhchand Verma, survived for approximately nine months, eventually succumbing to septic shock with bilateral pneumonia, post‑traumatic spinal cord injury with paraplegia, infected bedsores, and hepatic dysfunction. The trial court convicted under Section 302 IPC; the High Court altered it to Section 307 IPC. The Supreme Court has now articulated a structured framework to assess such situations.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in downgrading the conviction from Section 302 IPC to Section 307 IPC merely because death occurred nine months after the assault and during ongoing medical treatment.
Medical evidence (three doctors) unequivocally established that the cause of death was closely and directly linked to the original injuries: septic shock with bilateral pneumonia and complications flowed from the spinal cord injury, paraplegia, and bedsores resulting from the assault. There was practically no cross‑examination to dislodge this linkage.
The Court reaffirmed the centrality of Explanation 2 to Section 299 IPC: the adequacy of medical treatment is irrelevant if death is caused by the bodily injury; the person who caused the injury is deemed to have caused the death even if proper treatment might have prevented the fatality.
Drawing on Indian and comparative jurisprudence, the Court set out nine clear principles to guide courts in cases of delayed death, focusing on proximate cause, intervening causes, and the nature of the original injury (especially “Clause Thirdly” under Section 300 IPC).
Outcome: The appellant’s challenge failed and the appeal was dismissed. Because the State had not filed an appeal, the Supreme Court did not convert the conviction back to Section 302; however, it expressly recorded that the High Court’s legal reasoning was erroneous.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The Court anchored its reasoning in a mix of Indian Supreme Court and High Court authorities, and influential English decisions and standard treatises:

Prasad Pradhan v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2023) 11 SCC 320: Clarified that a lapse of time between injury and death does not, by itself, diminish liability from murder to culpable homicide. The determinative question is whether the injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The Court relied on this to reject the High Court’s timeline‑based downgrading.
Sudershan Kumar v. State of Delhi, (1975) 3 SCC 831: Death after 12 days from acid burns was held to be murder where the injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Used to reinforce that supervening complications do not necessarily break the chain of causation.
Patel Hiralal Joitaram v. State of Gujarat, (2002) 1 SCC 22: Death due to septicemia weeks after burns was traced to the original injury; mere “academic possibilities” of other causes do not override the broad probabilities established by medical evidence.
State of Haryana v. Pala, (1996) 8 SCC 51: Distinguished primary vs secondary effects of injuries; held that when septicemia is the direct result of head injury, the case falls under Clause Thirdly of Section 300 (injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death).
Jagtar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1999) 2 SCC 174: Even when death occurs after 16 days due to septicemia, if medical evidence shows the head injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, Section 302 applies; Explanation 2 to Section 299 defeats the argument about alleged improper treatment.
Sreedharan v. State Of Kerala, 1969 SCC OnLine Ker 46: Valuable articulation of how intention is inferred (weapon, manner, body part, nature of injuries, persistence). The Supreme Court adopts these metrics to explain intent under Section 307.
English authorities on attempt and causation (e.g., Reg. v. Cassidy, Emperor v. Gogte, R v Whybrow, R v Grimwood, DPP v Smith) were deployed to emphasise that for attempt to murder, intent or knowledge as per Section 300 IPC is crucial, and the act must be inherently capable of causing death. They also inform the causation analysis (proximate cause vs remote consequences).
Older Indian and colonial decisions (e.g., In re Doraswami, In re Periaswami, Nga Moe v The King) and standard texts (Mayne’s Criminal Law of India, Taylor’s Medical Jurisprudence, Russell on Crime, Modi’s Medical Jurisprudence) were invoked to show that death due to septicemia, pneumonia, peritonitis, etc., may be indirect but legally proximate consequences of the original injury if the chain remains unbroken.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds along two axes—(1) the classification of the ultimate offence under Sections 299–302 IPC, and (2) the content of Section 307 IPC when courts consider downgrading to attempt to murder.

1) Classification under Sections 299, 300, and 302 IPC

Explanation 2 to Section 299 IPC is decisive: Where death is caused by bodily injury, the person who caused the injury shall be deemed to have caused the death, although proper treatment might have prevented it. This shields the causation chain from arguments about alleged “lack of proper treatment.”
Clause Thirdly of Section 300 IPC: If the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, it is murder. The medical evidence here showed cardiorespiratory failure from septic shock with bilateral pneumonia due to paraplegia and infected bedsores—each a foreseeable and medically common complication of grave spinal injury and prolonged immobility.
Chain of causation remains intact: Septicemia, pneumonia, and bedsores did not arise as independent, unrelated, or unexpected novelties; rather, they were the “natural or likely” consequences of the injuries. Therefore, the “proximate cause” is the original injury; the complications merely describe the mechanism by which death occurred.
No “year-and-a-day” rule in India: Unlike the historically rigid common law rule, Indian law does not treat lapse of time as a dispositive factor. The question is one of proximate cause, not the calendar.
Evidence alignment: The doctor witnesses (PW-9, PW-24, PW-28) were barely cross‑examined, and their consistent medical causation testimony stood unshaken. The ocular testimonies of family eyewitnesses were found reliable and in sync with medical findings.

2) What Section 307 IPC (Attempt to Murder) requires—and what it does not

Mens rea as per Section 300: To sustain a conviction under Section 307 IPC, the prosecution must establish intention or knowledge of the kind described in Section 300 IPC. The “act” must be done in such circumstances that, if death had resulted, the act would amount to murder.
Act must be inherently capable of causing death: As emphasised through Reg. v Cassidy, an act intrinsically incapable of causing death cannot attract Section 307. The provision distinguishes between the act and its result; even if no harm ensues, the act can attract Section 307 if the required mens rea is present and the act is capable of causing death.
Simplicity of injury is not conclusive: Even simple injuries do not preclude Section 307 if the intent/knowledge is present and the act is capable of causing death.
Intention inference metrics: Nature of weapon, manner of use, body part targeted, injury character, and the opportunity/persistence of assault (as per Sreedharan) guide the inference.

The High Court’s error

The High Court’s central premise—that death nine months later and “due to lack of proper treatment” moves the case from Section 302 to Section 307—was legally erroneous. Adequacy of treatment is irrelevant (Explanation 2 to Section 299); the complications were the medically expected sequelae of the assault.
Once medical evidence established that death was the reasonably probable consequence of the spinal injury (and not an unexpected, independent cause), Clause Thirdly of Section 300 was engaged.
Because the State had not appealed, the Supreme Court refrained from restoring the Section 302 conviction; but it expressly corrected the governing legal principles for future application.

Impact and Implications

This judgment is a significant doctrinal restatement that will shape murder adjudication whenever death occurs after a delay.

For trial and appellate courts: The nine‑principle framework in the judgment’s Conclusion must guide classification between Sections 302 and 307 in delayed‑death scenarios. Courts should anchor their causation analysis in Explanation 2 to Section 299 IPC and a proximate‑cause approach rather than lapse‑of‑time or treatment‑adequacy arguments.
For investigators and prosecutors: Meticulous collection of medical records (bed‑head tickets, discharge summaries, post‑mortems) and expert opinions linking complications (septicemia, pneumonia, bedsores) to the original injury is crucial. Cross‑examination should anticipate and pre‑empt “intervening cause” arguments.
For defence counsel: A viable defence requires demonstrating a genuine break in the chain (e.g., an unexpected, independent supervening cause) or showing that the original injury was not sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Mere treatment‑based arguments will generally fail due to Explanation 2.
For medical experts: Clear articulation of whether complications are a natural/probable consequence of the original injury—and whether the original injury was sufficient in the ordinary course to cause death—carries decisive weight.
Systemic effect: We can expect fewer downgrades from Section 302 to Section 307 solely because death occurred after prolonged treatment. The jurisprudence discourages speculative attributions of causation to “treatment” and demands a principled proximate‑cause analysis.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Explanation 2 to Section 299 IPC: If death is caused by an injury, the law treats the assailant as having caused the death even if proper medical treatment could have saved the victim. Treatment adequacy is irrelevant.
Proximate cause vs remote cause: Proximate cause is the primary, legally relevant cause that leads to death in the ordinary course of events. Remote causes are too far removed or interrupted by independent, unexpected events.
Chain of causation: The unbroken sequence linking the assault to death. Complications like septicemia and pneumonia often sit within the chain if they are common sequelae of the injury.
Clause Thirdly of Section 300 IPC: Murder when the intended injury is, by itself, sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Medical opinion on sufficiency is crucial but courts also draw inferences from the injury’s nature.
Section 307 IPC (Attempt to Murder): Requires the mental element (intention/knowledge) akin to Section 300. The act must be capable of causing death; actual injury is not essential, but the act’s inherent lethality and mens rea are.
Septicemia, pneumonia, bedsores: These are medically well‑known complications of grave injuries and prolonged immobility (e.g., paraplegia after spinal cord injury). Legally, they do not “break” causation if they predictably arise from the assault.

Illustrative Scenarios

Murder (Section 302): A deep abdominal stab causes internal organ damage; after a week the victim dies of peritonitis. Even though peritonitis is the “immediate” cause, the original wound is the proximate cause—murder under Clause Thirdly.
Murder (Section 302) despite delayed death: A spinal injury causes paraplegia; months later, the victim dies from septic shock due to infected bedsores and pneumonia. The complications are the natural sequelae—chain intact—Section 302 still applies.
Not murder (causation breaks): A minor, non‑dangerous injury heals. Much later, an entirely independent, unexpected condition causes death unrelated to the original assault. Here, the causal chain is broken; murder liability may not attach.
Attempt to murder (Section 307): The accused fires at the chest but misses. No injury occurs, yet the act—accompanied by an intention/knowledge as per Section 300 and inherently capable of causing death—makes out Section 307.

Key Principles Articulated by the Supreme Court

The Court distilled nine guiding principles (paraphrased for clarity) that courts must apply when death is delayed due to complications:

If the injury was fatal and intended to cause death, subsequent septicemia or complications do not change the offence—still murder (Section 300 “Firstly”).
If the intended injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course to cause death, delayed death due to complications remains murder (Section 300 “Thirdly”).
If injuries were imminently dangerous and other elements are satisfied, delayed death does not prevent the offence from being murder (Section 300 “Fourthly”).
Whether good medical treatment might have prevented death is irrelevant to classifying the offence.
If supervening causes are attributable to the injuries, the assailant remains liable for causing death even if death was not the immediate result of the injuries.
Courts must distinguish between (a) remote, improbable complications (suggesting the injury may not be sufficient in the ordinary course), and (b) complications that are practically inevitable sequences of the injury (strongly supporting murder under Section 302).
Even if no single injury is independently sufficient to cause death, their cumulative effect may be sufficient in the ordinary course—courts can infer murderous intent from the totality.
The presence of an intervening cause is not determinative; the question is whether death was only a remote possibility or a reasonably contemplated result in due course of nature.
Where death is delayed, courts should evaluate the nature of injury and whether complications are natural/probable. If the chain is intact, liability for murder stands; if broken by unexpected new mischief, the causal link fails.

Conclusion

Maniklal Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh (2025 INSC 1107) is a clarifying precedent on causation and mens rea that will heavily influence homicide jurisprudence in India. The Supreme Court’s decision:

Reaffirms that delayed death due to septicemia, pneumonia, and similar complications commonly associated with severe injuries does not diminish liability from murder (Section 302) to attempt (Section 307) when the chain of causation is intact.
Reasserts the force of Explanation 2 to Section 299 IPC—treatment adequacy is legally irrelevant to liability once death is caused by injury.
Recalibrates analysis under Section 307 IPC by insisting on mens rea of the Section 300 kind and that the act be inherently capable of causing death, even if no injury or fatal result actually ensues.
Equips courts with a nine‑principle framework that focuses on proximate cause, foreseeability, and the ordinary course of nature, instead of lapse‑of‑time or hindsight assessments of medical care.

While the Court ultimately dismissed the convict’s appeal for want of a State challenge to restore Section 302, it unmistakably corrected the legal route for future cases. Henceforth, downgrading murder to attempt solely because death follows a prolonged clinical course will be an error. The jurisprudence prioritizes causation, intention, and the inherent lethality of the inflicted injury—ensuring doctrinal coherence and fairness in homicide adjudication.