Delay attributable to the accused is no ground for bail under UAPA; original interim bail must first be moved before the Special Court — Commentary on Tasleem Ahmed v. State (2025 DHC 7659-DB)

Delay attributable to the accused is no ground for bail under UAPA; original interim bail must first be moved before the Special Court — Commentary on Tasleem Ahmed v. State (2025 DHC 7659-DB)

Introduction

This Division Bench decision of the Delhi High Court in Tasleem Ahmed v. State Govt. of NCT of Delhi (2025 DHC 7659-DB, decided on 2 September 2025) arises from FIR No. 59/2020 relating to the North-East Delhi disturbances of February 2020. The appellant, arrayed as Accused No. 12 and charged under a wide canvas of IPC, UAPA, Arms Act and PDPP Act provisions, sought bail on the sole ground of delay in the progress of trial and long incarceration. He also moved an interim bail application directly before the High Court during the appeal.

Two tightly framed issues dominated the adjudication:

  • Whether an interim bail application in a UAPA case can be moved directly before the High Court, or must first be filed before the Special Court (NIA Act)?
  • Whether prolonged incarceration and trial delay, by themselves and without examining the merits mandated by Section 43D(5) UAPA, can justify grant of bail, especially where delays are largely attributable to the accused side?

On both questions, the Court delivered clear answers that will guide UAPA bail practice going forward: (i) original (including interim) bail applications under UAPA must be filed before the Special Court, with appeals only thereafter to a Division Bench; and (ii) delay alone cannot found bail under Section 43D(5), particularly where the defense has contributed to the delay and has declined to press the merits that Section 43D(5) requires the Court to examine.

Summary of the Judgment

  • Maintainability ruling: The Court dismissed the appellant’s interim bail application filed directly before the High Court as not maintainable. Relying on Section 21 of the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 and the Supreme Court’s ruling in State of A.P. through Inspector General, NIA v. Mohd. Hussain (2014) 1 SCC 258, the Bench held that original bail applications—regular or interim—in UAPA/NIA Act matters must first be presented to the Special Court. Appeals from such orders lie to a Division Bench of the High Court.
  • Delay-based bail plea rejected: Confined by the appellant’s strategic choice to argue only delay (and not the merits), the Court held that Section 43D(5) UAPA does not permit bail solely on delay and long incarceration in the present facts. The Court scrutinized the trial court orders and found that delays in commencing and prosecuting arguments on charge were largely due to the accused (including the appellant, who argued on charge only on 04.04.2025), not the prosecution or the court.
  • Appeal dismissed: Finding no infirmity in the trial court’s refusal to grant bail on the ground of delay, the High Court dismissed the appeal, expressly refraining from any pronouncement on the merits of the accusations.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and How They Shaped the Decision

  • State of A.P. through IG, NIA v. Mohd. Hussain, (2014) 1 SCC 258
    The Supreme Court clarified the procedural architecture under Section 21 NIA Act: original bail applications in UAPA/NIA matters must be made to the Special Court; appeals against orders granting or refusing bail lie to a Bench of two Judges of the High Court. The Delhi High Court faithfully applied this to hold that the appellant’s interim bail application filed directly in the High Court was not maintainable.
  • NIA v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali, (2019) 5 SCC 1
    Watali is the bedrock of UAPA bail jurisprudence. It requires the bail court to examine, on a “prima facie true” standard, the case diary and charge-sheet (Section 173 CrPC) materials to decide if accusations under Chapters IV/VI of UAPA stand. If they do, bail must be refused. The Court reiterated Watali’s core holdings: limited, non-mini-trial scrutiny; presume prosecution materials as they stand; assess the totality, not piece-meal; and bear in mind that, under UAPA, “bail is the exception, jail the rule”.
  • GURWINDER SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB, (2024) 5 SCC 403
    Building on Watali, the Supreme Court set out a two-pronged inquiry for UAPA bail: (1) whether the accusations are prima facie true (based only on case diary and final report); and, only if bail is not barred under that prong, (2) whether the accused satisfies the “tripod test” under Section 439 CrPC (flight risk, tampering, influencing witnesses). The High Court invoked this to underscore that the first stage—prima facie assessment—is indispensable; delay alone cannot bypass it.
  • Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713
    Najeeb recognized that statutory bail restrictions (including Section 43D(5) UAPA) do not oust the constitutional courts’ power to grant bail where continued incarceration turns punitive because trial cannot conclude within a reasonable time. But such relaxation must be harmonized; it is not automatic. The Delhi High Court emphasized that Najeeb does not license bail solely on delay where the defense has itself caused or contributed to the delay.
  • Vernon v. State of Maharashtra, (2023) 15 SCC 56
    Vernon reaffirmed Najeeb’s constitutional—Article 21—dimension, recognizing that bail-restricting clauses do not strip constitutional courts of jurisdiction when continued detention would breach liberty. Yet the Court highlighted the quality of materials and the length of detention in that case; again, not a license for bail on delay alone. The High Court read Vernon consistently: delay must be evaluated alongside the case materials and the party responsible for the delay.
  • MANISH SISODIA v. DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1920
    While a PMLA case, it articulates a general principle: if trial is protracted for reasons not attributable to the accused, courts may be guided to grant bail in deference to Article 21. The Delhi High Court distinguished the present facts: the record showed defense-driven delays, neutralizing a delay-only plea.
  • Harpreet Singh Talwar @ Kabir Talwar v. State of Gujarat through NIA, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1103
    The Supreme Court recently reiterated that the rigour of Section 43D(5) yields only in appropriate cases where trial is inordinately delayed or incarceration becomes punitive; and even then, relief is fact-sensitive, not automatic. The High Court’s approach here is fully aligned.
  • Delhi High Court: Jagtar Singh Johal v. NIA, 2024 SCC OnLine Del 89; Nayeem Ahmad Khan v. NIA, 2025 SCC OnLine Del 2233
    These decisions emphasize that long incarceration alone does not suffice for UAPA bail; gravity, national security concerns, and the prima facie case must be weighed, and constitutional considerations cannot be applied in the abstract.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in two distinct steps.

  1. Maintainability under the NIA Act:
    • Section 21 NIA Act creates a self-contained appellate route for Special Court orders and mandates that appeals against bail orders (grant or refusal) lie to a Division Bench.
    • Following Mohd. Hussain, the Court clarified that this route applies to all bail requests—including “interim bail”. Therefore, an original interim bail application filed directly before the High Court is procedurally incompetent.
    • Result: The appellant’s interim bail application (CRL.M.B 2168/2024) was dismissed as not maintainable.
  2. Delay and Section 43D(5) UAPA:
    • Fact-finding on delay: The Court canvassed trial court orders from August 2023 to July 2025. It found repeated defense requests to defer arguments on charge (including those on bail), despite directions for day-to-day hearing and even after the defense had agreed to a sequencing schedule. The appellant himself commenced arguments only on 04.04.2025, i.e., during pendency of the present appeal.
    • Legal standard: Under the proviso to Section 43D(5), bail is impermissible if the accusations are “prima facie true” on a perusal of the case diary or the Section 173 CrPC report. Per Watali and Gurwinder Singh, this merits screen is mandatory and precedes the conventional “tripod test”.
    • Constitutional overlay: Najeeb/Vernon permit constitutional courts to intervene where incarceration becomes punitive due to institutional delay in completing trial. But this requires that the delay is not of the accused’s making and must still be viewed alongside the strength of the prima facie case.
    • Application: Because the appellant consciously chose not to press the merits, the Court could not undertake the Section 43D(5) “prima facie” assessment. Further, the chronology showed delays largely caused by the defense. Consequently, delay alone—especially self-induced—could not justify bail under UAPA.

The Court also underscored a policy concern: accused persons already on bail were seeking adjournments, thereby delaying arguments on charge to the prejudice of co-accused in custody. Such tactical delay cannot be rewarded by invoking Article 21 to claim bail on “delay”.

Impact and Implications

  • Procedural discipline under the NIA Act: The judgment shuts the door on direct “interim bail” motions in the High Court in UAPA/NIA cases. Practitioners must move the Special Court first; appeals thereafter lie to a Division Bench. This promotes uniformity and respects the special statutory architecture.
  • Delay-only bail under UAPA is narrowed: The decision crystallizes an important qualifier to Najeeb: delay must be institutionally driven and not attributable to the accused; even then, courts must engage the mandatory Section 43D(5) merits screen. Defense-driven delay can backfire and defeat a delay-based bail claim.
  • Trial management in multi-accused conspiracies: The Court’s censure of defense-led adjournments and insistence on structured, scheduled hearings will empower trial courts to enforce day-to-day hearings, document accountability for delays, and resist dilatory tactics—especially where some accused are in custody.
  • Strategic recalibration for the defense: A “delay-and-time-served” bail strategy, without addressing the Section 43D(5) merits, is unlikely to succeed. Defense counsel should be prepared to demonstrate why the accusations are not “prima facie true” and also show that any delay is not attributable to the accused.
  • Consistency with national security jurisprudence: By reaffirming Watali and Gurwinder Singh, and by distinguishing Najeeb/Vernon on facts, the judgment reinforces the UAPA’s stringent bail regime while leaving room for constitutional relief in genuinely punitive-incarceration cases caused by systemic delay.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • UAPA Section 43D(5): A special bail bar. If, after looking only at the police case diary and the charge-sheet, the court believes the accusations under Chapters IV or VI are prima facie true (i.e., on the face of it, show the accused’s involvement), bail must not be granted. Courts do not conduct a mini-trial; they take the prosecution’s materials as they are for this prima facie screen.
  • “Prima facie true” vs. “not guilty” standards: UAPA’s “prima facie true” threshold is a lower, screening standard (per Watali and Gurwinder Singh) as compared with stricter “not guilty” presumptions in some other statutes.
  • Two-prong test for UAPA bail (from Gurwinder Singh):
    1. Is bail barred because accusations appear prima facie true? If yes, bail must be refused.
    2. If not barred, does the accused pass the general “tripod test” (no flight risk, no tampering, no influencing witnesses)?
  • Constitutional override (Najeeb principle): Even with statutory bail bars, constitutional courts can grant bail where long, institutionally caused delays make incarceration punitive. This is a fact-sensitive, exceptional jurisdiction—not an automatic entitlement.
  • Special Court route under the NIA Act: All original bail applications (including interim bail) in UAPA/NIA Act cases must be filed before the Special Court. Only after the Special Court’s order can a party approach the High Court in appeal before a Division Bench.
  • Arguments on charge: Before framing charges, both sides argue whether the materials justify putting the accused on trial for specific offences. Delays at this stage can significantly prolong commencement of the actual trial.

Key Takeaways

  • New clarifications crystallized:
    • Original interim bail applications in UAPA/NIA matters are not maintainable directly in the High Court; they must be filed before the Special Court (Section 21 NIA Act; Mohd. Hussain).
    • Under UAPA, delay alone—particularly where attributable to the defense—cannot justify grant of bail. The Section 43D(5) prima facie merits screen remains obligatory, and Najeeb’s constitutional relaxation is not triggered by self-induced delay.
  • Practice guidance: Document responsibility for delay. If relying on Article 21 and Najeeb, demonstrate systemic/institutional delays, not defense-created ones, and address the prima facie merits under Section 43D(5).
  • Policy coherence: The decision balances the stringent statutory policy of UAPA with constitutional safeguards by insisting on responsibility-sensitive, merits-aware adjudication.

Conclusion

The Delhi High Court’s judgment in Tasleem Ahmed strengthens two pillars of UAPA bail jurisprudence. First, it enforces the statutory pathway under the NIA Act: all original bail applications—including interim bail—must begin in the Special Court, with appeals only thereafter to a Division Bench. Second, it clarifies that “delay” is, at best, an ancillary consideration in UAPA bail, never a standalone ground—especially when the defense has contributed to the delay and declines to engage the prima facie merits that Section 43D(5) mandates.

While the constitutional safety valve recognized in Najeeb survives, this decision calibrates its use: it is reserved for genuinely punitive incarcerations caused by institutional delay and must be harmonized with the mandatory Watali/Gurwinder Singh merits screen. For multi-accused conspiracy prosecutions, the ruling sends a clear message: tactical adjournments will not be rewarded with delay-based bail, and trial courts are encouraged to structure proceedings to prevent delays from prejudicing accused persons in custody. In sum, the judgment advances a principled synthesis of statutory rigor and constitutional fairness in UAPA bail adjudication.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Delhi High Court

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