Defective Section 313 Examination, Suppressed FIR and Non‑Examination of IO as Grounds for Acquittal

Commentary on Suresh Sahu & Anr v. State of Bihar (Now Jharkhand), 2025 INSC 1382 (Supreme Court of India, 27 November 2025)

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court’s decision in Suresh Sahu & Anr v. State of Bihar (Now Jharkhand) is a significant criminal law ruling on three inter‑linked trial‐fairness issues:

the mandatory and substantive nature of examination of the accused under Section 313 CrPC (now Section 351 BNSS) and when defects in such examination vitiate the entire trial;
the legal treatment of multiple reports of an incident, including a prior “suppressed” FIR and a subsequent embellished report, and the consequences of non‑examination of the investigating officer who recorded them; and
the evidentiary weight of defence witnesses and oral dying declarations in the face of serious contradictions, delay and medical evidence.

The case arises from a 1990 homicide at a village fair in Mandar, near Ranchi. The deceased, Gajendra Prasad Gupta, was assaulted while returning from a “Jatra Mela” where he had been selling sweets. His paternal cousins, the appellants Suresh and Aditya Sahu, were ultimately convicted of murder. The prosecution theory rested largely on:

a written report naming Suresh and Aditya as assailants, allegedly based on what Gajendra shouted during the assault;
a claimed oral dying declaration to his sisters; and
the testimony of the father (informant) as an eye‑witness.

The trial court convicted the appellants under Sections 120-B, 302 and 302/149 IPC and sentenced them to life imprisonment. The High Court, while modifying the conviction to Section 302/34 IPC and imposing a fine, otherwise affirmed the life sentence.

More than 35 years after the incident, the Supreme Court has set aside both the trial court and High Court judgments and acquitted the appellants, emphasising deep infirmities in the prosecution case and serious procedural violations.

II. Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court (Mehta, J., with Nath, J. concurring) allows the appeal and acquits the appellants on the following core grounds:

Defective Section 313 CrPC examination: Only three, extremely generic questions were put to each accused, merely parroting the charge and not putting any specific incriminating circumstances appearing in evidence to them. This was held to be a serious irregularity causing prejudice, especially at such a late stage of the case, rendering remand impracticable and entitling the accused to acquittal.
Two conflicting reports and suppression of the true FIR:
- On 12 May 1990, a detailed Fardbeyan (Exh.1) of the informant (PW‑3) was recorded at R.M.C.H. Ranchi, which formed the basis of an FIR, and did not name any assailants.
- On 13 May 1990, a subsequent written report (Exh.5) introduced, for the first time, names of the appellants and a motive relating to an employment dispute.
- The High Court erroneously treated Exh.5 as the “real” FIR, discarding Exh.1 on a dubious explanation that the informant’s signature had been obtained in ignorance.
- The Supreme Court holds that Exh.1 was the actual FIR, that Exh.5 was at best a statement under Section 161 CrPC, and that the subsequent naming of the appellants was a belated embellishment.
Non‑examination of the Investigating Officer (IO): The same ASI, R. Paswan, recorded both Exh.1 and Exh.5 and investigated the case, yet was not examined. No explanation was offered. The Court drew an adverse inference against the prosecution, particularly as he was the only person who could clarify the circumstances of the two reports.
Unreliable prosecution witnesses and concocted oral dying declaration:
- The informant’s narrative changed materially across Exh.1, Exh.5 and two Section 164 CrPC statements; the Court found a systematic pattern of improvement designed to implicate the appellants.
- The alleged oral dying declaration was disbelieved due to:
  - serious cranial injuries making it medically implausible that the deceased could speak; and
  - the sisters’ Section 161 statements featuring this dying declaration being recorded only after a delay of more than 1½ months, with no mention of such declaration in the earliest reports.
- The Court found strong motive for false implication owing to a pending dispute over employment in lieu of land acquisition.
Defence witnesses establishing reasonable doubt: Two eye‑witnesses named in Exh.5 (Jatan Sahu and Khakhandu Sahu) were not examined by the prosecution but came as defence witnesses (DW‑1, DW‑2), stating that:
- Gajendra was assaulted by unidentified persons in a quarrel with tribal people at the fair; and
- the appellants were not present at the scene.
Their testimony, given equal evidentiary value as prosecution witnesses, further undermined the prosecution’s case.

On these cumulative defects—procedural and evidentiary—the Court holds that the prosecution has “miserably failed” to connect the appellants with the crime and that the concurrent findings below rest on misreading and erroneous appreciation of the record.

III. Detailed Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

(a) Section 313 CrPC Jurisprudence – Ashok v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ramji Prasad Jaiswal v. State of Bihar

The Court relies heavily on two recent landmark decisions on Section 313 CrPC, both of which substantially shape the outcome in Suresh Sahu:

Ashok v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 INSC 919 (three‑Judge Bench):
- Reaffirmed that it is the duty of the trial court to put each material circumstance appearing in evidence against the accused “specifically, distinctively and separately”.
- Held that omission to do so is a “serious irregularity” which may vitiate the trial where prejudice is shown.
- Explained that, after significant lapse of time, it could be unjust to remand the case for fresh Section 313 examination; in such cases, the accused may be entitled to acquittal if material circumstances were never put to him.
- In the specific facts, the Court held that failure to confront the accused with the main prosecution evidence warranted acquittal notwithstanding some evidence against him.
Ramji Prasad Jaiswal v. State of Bihar, 2025 INSC 738; (2025) 2 SCC 381:
- Applied the principles crystallised in Raj Kumar (cited within Ashok) to hold that mechanical and generic Section 313 questioning which does not place specific incriminating evidence before the accused is contrary to Section 313 and violates audi alteram partem.
- Stressed that:
  - the failure constitutes a serious irregularity;
  - after a long time lapse, remand for re‑recording statements may itself cause injustice; and
  - in such situations, the accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt and acquittal.

In Suresh Sahu, the Court quotes extensively from Ashok (para 14–17 there, para 20–21 here) and from Ramji Prasad Jaiswal, and then applies that line of reasoning. The factual similarity is striking: in both, the accused were asked only a few broad questions, without any real opportunity to meet the case against them.

(b) Non‑Examination of Material Witnesses – Harvinder Singh @ Bachhu v. State of Himachal Pradesh and Takhaji Hiraji v. Thakore Kubersing Chamansing

On the consequences of not examining material witnesses, especially the IO, the Court relies on:

Harvinder Singh @ Bachhu v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1347; 2023 INSC 907:
- Affirmed that while non‑examination of a material witness does not ipso facto vitiate the trial, where:
  - the witness is available and clearly material; and
  - is likely to give a version at variance with the prosecution case;
  deliberate withholding can justify an adverse inference and undermine the prosecution.
- Quoted and applied Takhaji Hiraji on when withholding an eye‑witness or crucial witness should be treated as fatal to the prosecution’s reliability.
Takhaji Hiraji v. Thakore Kubersing Chamansing, (2001) 6 SCC 145:
- Laid down that the Court must ask:
  - whether it was necessary to examine the witness in the facts; and
  - whether the witness was available yet withheld;
  and if yes, an adverse inference against the prosecution may be drawn.

In Suresh Sahu, the IO (ASI Paswan) was the common link for:

recording both the initial Fardbeyan (Exh.1) and the later report (Exh.5); and
investigating the crucial aspects such as place of occurrence, sequence, and statements under Section 161 CrPC.

His non‑examination was held “fatal” given the central controversy about which report was the true FIR, and whether there was tampering or undue influence in recording Exh.1. The Court, in line with Harvinder Singh and Takhaji Hiraji, treats this as a deliberate withholding, thereby dismantling the prosecution’s credibility.

(c) Evidentiary Value of Defence Witnesses – State of U.P. v. Babu Ram and Munshi Prasad v. State of Bihar

The Supreme Court reiterates a critical but often ignored principle: defence witnesses are entitled to the same respect as prosecution witnesses. For this it cites:

State of U.P. v. Babu Ram, (2000) 4 SCC 515:
- Held that depositions of all witnesses—prosecution, defence or court witnesses—are “oral evidence” and must be scrutinised without bias.
- Courts cannot prescribe different yardsticks merely because a witness appears on the defence side.
Munshi Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2002) 1 SCC 351:
- Clarified that defence evidence is not inherently “tainted”; defence witnesses must be assessed on credibility, not on which side called them.
- Emphasised that lapses of defence witnesses cannot be treated differently from similar lapses by prosecution witnesses.

In Suresh Sahu, these principles are acutely relevant because:

DW‑1 and DW‑2 (Jatan and Khakhandu Sahu) were originally named by the prosecution in Exh.5 as eye‑witnesses, yet not produced by the prosecution.
When examined by the defence, they:
- did not support the prosecution version;
- stated they could not identify the assailants; and
- denied the presence of the appellants at the fair.

The Court criticises the trial court and High Court for failing to give due weight to this evidence, and deploys Babu Ram and Munshi Prasad to emphasise that such defence testimony can itself create reasonable doubt, warranting acquittal.

2. Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. Defective Examination under Section 313 CrPC / Section 351 BNSS

The Court finds that the trial court’s examination of the accused under Section 313 CrPC (now mirrored in Section 351 BNSS) was wholly perfunctory:

Only three questions were put to each accused.
The questions merely alleged in generic terms that:
- they were members of an unlawful party whose object was to kill Gajendra; and
- they (together) killed him.
No specific pieces of evidence were put, such as:
- the alleged exclamations “don’t beat me Aditya, don’t beat me Suresh”;
- the alleged oral dying declaration to the sisters;
- the informant’s different statements, or
- any medical evidence or recovery.

The Court re‑states the purpose and legal standard of Section 313:

The provision is not a formality; it is a statutory embodiment of audi alteram partem in criminal trial procedure.
Each incriminating circumstance which the prosecution intends to rely on:
- must be put to the accused; and
- in a form he can understand and respond to.
The accused’s decision whether to lead defence evidence is informed by what is put to them under Section 313. If relevant circumstances are withheld, their ability to defend is compromised.

Applying Ashok and Ramji Prasad Jaiswal, the Court concludes:

The omission is a serious irregularity causing real prejudice.
Given that the occurrence took place in 1990, the trial concluded in 1994, and more than 35 years have elapsed, a remand for fresh Section 313 examination would itself:
- be practically unworkable; and
- risk fresh injustice to the accused.
Therefore, as in Ashok and Ramji, the appropriate remedy is to acquit rather than remit.

This part of the judgment cements a strong appellate principle: when Section 313 is fundamentally mishandled in an old case, acquittal rather than remand may be the only just outcome.

B. Evaluation of the Two Reports and Non‑Examination of the IO

A critical dispute was whether:

Fardbeyan dated 12 May 1990 (Exh.1) at R.M.C.H., recorded by ASI Paswan, was the real FIR; or
Subsequent written report dated 13 May 1990 (Exh.5) at Mandar PS was the true FIR, as held by the High Court.

The High Court accepted the informant’s trial‑stage assertion that Exh.1 was obtained by taking his signature in ignorance and that only Exh.5 reflected his true statement. The Supreme Court finds this approach “perfunctory and unacceptable” for several reasons:

Nature and content of Exh.1:
- Exh.1 is a detailed, coherent narration containing facts only the informant could have known (time, sequence, taking the injured to Mandar hospital and then referral to R.M.C.H.).
- The informant’s signature on Exh.1 is undisputed.
- Crucially, Exh.1 does not name any assailant, though it records that the informant and two other persons could identify them upon seeing them.
Nature and content of Exh.5:
- Filed the next day, Exh.5:
  - suppresses the earlier quarrel at the sweets stall entirely;
  - introduces specific names—Suresh and Aditya—as assailants;
  - adds a motive (land acquisition employment dispute); and
  - alleges that the deceased shouted “don’t kill me Aditya, don’t kill me Suresh”.
- On any fair reading, these are material additions, not mere clarifications.
Informant’s inconsistent story about Exh.1:
- At trial, he claimed that brothers Laxman and Bigan procured his signature on a blank paper and the Fardbeyan was fabricated.
- The Court notes:
  - this allegation was never mentioned in Exh.5—the immediate subsequent report;
  - it also does not appear in either of his Section 164 statements recorded before the Magistrate;
  - hence, the explanation is a belated afterthought and “wholly unconvincing”.
IO’s central role and non‑examination:
- ASI Paswan:
  - recorded Exh.1 at R.M.C.H.;
  - registered the FIR; and
  - later received Exh.5 and investigated the case.
- He is the only person who could:
  - explain the circumstances of Exh.1;
  - confirm whether the informant freely gave that statement; and
  - clarify why no names appeared initially.
- The prosecution gave no explanation for not examining him.

Applying the adverse inference doctrine from Harvinder Singh and Takhaji Hiraji, the Court holds:

The prosecution is “guilty of superseding the actual FIR (Exh.1) and replacing it” with a subsequent embellished report (Exh.5).
Exh.5, therefore, is legally nothing more than a Section 161 CrPC statement, hit by the limitations of Section 162 CrPC (or Section 180 BNSS).
The omission in Exh.1 to name the appellants becomes highly significant.

Once Exh.1 is accepted as the FIR and Exh.5 downgraded to a 161 statement, a central pillar of the prosecution collapses: the earliest version by the informant did not attribute the crime to the appellants at all. This strongly supports the defence plea of later false implication due to family enmity.

C. Credibility of the Informant and Progressive Embellishment

The Court subjects the informant’s various statements to a comparative, step‑by‑step scrutiny:

Fardbeyan (Exh.1 – 12 May 1990):
- mentions two incidents: quarrel at the sweets stall and later assault near the dam;
- states that assailants were unknown but identifiable; and
- no mention of any names shouted by the deceased.
Written report (Exh.5 – 13 May 1990):
- suppresses the earlier quarrel at the stall;
- introduces explicit naming during assault (“don’t beat me, leave me Aditya, leave me Suresh”); and
- adds motive: dispute over employment in lieu of land acquisition with C.C.L.
First Section 164 CrPC statement (19 May 1990):
- states the incident occurred after dark; informant had a lantern; Suresh broke the lantern;
- mentions only Suresh as being named by the deceased; no mention of Aditya.
Second Section 164 CrPC statement (21 May 1990):
- recorded on an application claiming that full facts could not be disclosed earlier due to panic;
- now introduces the name of Aditya in addition to Suresh.

The Court notes:

the lantern is not mentioned in Exh.5, suggesting the Section 164 narrative is another layer of afterthought; and
this pattern of incremental implication—first no names, then Suresh only, then Suresh plus Aditya—reveals a calculated attempt to fill gaps and strengthen a weak case.

There is also the factor of admitted family enmity: a pending dispute about employment due to land acquisition. This motive to falsely implicate, combined with the progressive embellishment, fatally undermines the informant’s credibility.

Importantly, the Court notes an inherent improbability: the informant claims to be an eye‑witness yet did not identify the assailants in Exh.1, although the alleged assailants (the appellants) were his own nephews and well‑known to him. This seriously weakens the version that he saw them assaulting his son.

D. Implausibility and Late Introduction of the Oral Dying Declaration

The prosecution’s reliance on an oral dying declaration allegedly made by Gajendra to his sisters (PW‑1 Tapeshwari and PW‑2 Saroj) is closely examined and rejected on multiple grounds:

Medical evidence:
- The post‑mortem by PW‑5 (Dr. Ajit Kumar Chaudhary) revealed:
  - three lacerated wounds on the scalp;
  - diffuse contusion of the entire scalp;
  - crack fractures of the right temporo‑parieto‑occipital bone, extending to left parietal bone; and
  - subdural blood and clots over the temporal lobes.
- From these, the Court concludes that the head injuries were severe, extensive and likely to impair consciousness, making it “impossible to believe” that the victim could have been in a condition to speak in any coherent manner, let alone repeatedly name his assailants.
Procedural anomalies and delay:
- There is no mention in either Exh.1 or Exh.5 that:
  - the victim was taken home before hospital; or
  - any oral dying declaration was made in front of family members.
- The suggestion that Gajendra was first brought home appears only in the informant’s Section 164 statement, and seems tailored to create a platform for the sisters’ alleged dying declaration.
- The sisters’ Section 161 CrPC statements mentioning the dying declaration were recorded after more than 1½ months from the incident — a delay the Court considers fatal and unexplained.
Lack of corroborative hospital records:
- The injured was first treated at Mandar hospital and then sent to R.M.C.H.
- No treatment records from Mandar hospital were produced. Such records could have indicated the victim’s level of consciousness or ability to speak, but the prosecution failed to bring them on record.

In combination, these factors lead the Court to characterise the oral dying declaration as a “sheer piece of concoction”, unworthy of acceptance. Since dying declarations, particularly oral ones, require careful scrutiny and are often the only direct evidence in homicide trials, this finding is decisive.

E. Evidentiary Role of the Defence Witnesses (DW‑1 & DW‑2)

Two persons, Jatan Sahu and Khakhandu Sahu, were:

named in Exh.5 as companions of the informant and the deceased at the time of assault; and
thus originally projected by the prosecution as eye‑witnesses.

The prosecution, however, did not examine them, without any explanation. The defence called them as DW‑1 and DW‑2. Their evidence:

confirms that:
- a fight occurred at the fair between Gajendra and some tribal people over selling sweets;
- Gajendra was beaten and became unconscious; and
- they could not identify the assailants.
specifically states that Suresh and Aditya were not present at the fair or incident.

The Court faults both lower courts for failing to engage with this testimony and reiterates via Babu Ram and Munshi Prasad that:

defence evidence cannot be brushed aside simply because it aids the accused; and
where it directly contradicts the prosecution’s identification of the assailants, it strengthens the reasonable doubt.

On this basis, the defence version—that Gajendra was assaulted by unidentified persons in a fair‑related quarrel, not by the appellants—is found more probable than the prosecution’s late‑developed story.

F. Cumulative Effect and Benefit of Doubt

The Court ultimately stresses that:

the defective Section 313 procedure alone seriously undermined the fairness of the trial;
the suppression of the real FIR (Exh.1) and use of an embellished subsequent statement (Exh.5) as FIR, coupled with IO non‑examination, cast a pall over the entire investigation;
the star witness (the informant) is rendered unreliable by drastic inconsistencies and demonstrable improvements across multiple statements;
the oral dying declaration is medically and procedurally implausible; and
defence witnesses introduce a plausible alternative scenario that fits better with the earliest version and objective probabilities.

Viewed cumulatively, the Court finds a “total lack of credible evidence” connecting the appellants with the offence. Applying the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt and the long‑standing principle that when two views are possible the one favouring the accused must be adopted, the appellants are acquitted.

3. Impact and Significance

(a) Section 313 CrPC / Section 351 BNSS: From Formality to Substantive Guarantee

The judgment strengthens a growing line of Supreme Court authority that:

Section 313 is not a ritualistic exercise but a core guarantee of fairness in criminal trials.
Mechanical questioning—especially lumping all evidence into one broad question—is impermissible.
Failure to put specific incriminating evidence to the accused is not only a statutory breach but also a violation of natural justice.
In older cases, where remand is unworkable and prejudicial, such failure can and will lead to acquittal even in serious cases like murder.

With the advent of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), Section 313 CrPC has its analogue in Section 351 BNSS. The Court explicitly cross‑refers both provisions, signalling that the same constitutional and procedural standards will apply to future prosecutions under BNSS.

(b) Handling Multiple Reports and “Improved” FIRs

The ruling sends a clear message on FIR integrity:

The earliest, spontaneous report—here, a Fardbeyan at the hospital—will generally be treated as the true FIR, especially where:
- it is detailed;
- is signed by the informant; and
- contains facts only the informant could know.
A subsequent report adding names, motives or other crucial details will usually be treated as:
- a Section 161 statement; and
- cannot, by itself, cure earlier omissions in the FIR, particularly on identity of assailants.
Attempts to “supersede” or disown the earlier FIR, especially many days or years later, will be viewed with grave suspicion.

This aspect will significantly influence handling of cases where:

initial FIRs are anonymous or against unnamed persons; and
names appear only in later, sometimes tutor‑driven, statements.

Courts and investigators are implicitly cautioned that:

suppression or sidelining of an original FIR undermines the prosecution case; and
investigating agencies must ensure transparent preservation and production of the first information.

(c) Non‑Examination of IO and Other Material Witnesses

Although the principle was already established, Suresh Sahu makes its application more stringent where:

the IO is the scribe of crucial documents (FIR, key statements); and
a controversy exists about possible tampering or mis‑recording.

In such cases, failure to examine the IO will be treated as fatal unless compelling reasons are shown. Prosecutors and trial courts are thus put on notice:

IOs should normally be examined; and
if they are not, the court must record and assess reasons why, failing which adverse inference may be drawn.

(d) Oral Dying Declarations – Heightened Caution

The decision underscores a cautious approach to oral dying declarations, especially where:

there is substantial delay in the first disclosure of such declaration to authorities;
the declarant had severe head injuries compromising consciousness;
close relatives alone testify about the declaration, with no contemporaneous mention in the earliest reports; and
there is potential motive for false implication (e.g., family land or employment disputes).

Trial courts are implicitly directed to:

cross‑check claimed dying declarations with medical evidence on fitness to speak;
insist on prompt recording by neutral authorities, wherever possible; and
treat late‑emerging, uncorroborated oral declarations with great scepticism.

(e) Reinforcement of Equality of Defence and Prosecution Witnesses

By foregrounding the evidence of DW‑1 and DW‑2 and criticising its neglect by lower courts, the Supreme Court reiterates that:

defence witnesses can be pivotal; their testimony can provide the “second possible view” essential for benefit of doubt;
courts must not start with a presumption that prosecution witnesses are truthful and defence witnesses are interested or unreliable;
the same standards of internal consistency, corroboration and reasonableness apply to both sides.

This has an important systemic impact: it strengthens the role of the defence in fact‑finding and counteracts any ingrained institutional bias towards prosecution testimony.

(f) Long‑Pending Cases and Finality Versus Fairness

Finally, the judgment reflects a pragmatic but principled stance on very old cases:

Where serious procedural violations (like defective Section 313 examination) come to light decades later, remanding the case may be unjust and unworkable.
In such circumstances, if the existing record does not safely support conviction, acquittal is the only way to avoid further violation of fair trial rights.

This will likely shape future appellate responses to old cases under Article 136, where the Court confronts entrenched but flawed convictions.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Fardbeyan and FIR

Fardbeyan is a term often used in Bihar/Jharkhand and some other regions for a first, detailed narrative given by the informant, usually at the hospital or the scene, recorded by a police officer.
If it relates to the commission of a cognizable offence and is sent to the police station, it typically becomes the First Information Report (FIR) under Section 154 CrPC.
In this case:
- Exh.1 = Fardbeyan at hospital on 12 May → actual FIR;
- Exh.5 = later written report on 13 May → treated by Supreme Court as only a statement under Section 161 CrPC.

2. Section 313 CrPC / Section 351 BNSS

Section 313 CrPC (and new Section 351 BNSS) gives the accused a right to explain any evidence against them.
The court must:
- put each piece of incriminating evidence to the accused;
- in simple language the accused understands; and
- give opportunity to respond.
If important circumstances are not put:
- the accused cannot properly defend themselves; and
- the trial may be vitiated if prejudice is shown.

3. Section 161 and 164 CrPC / Sections 180 and 183 BNSS

Section 161 CrPC (Section 180 BNSS): power of police to examine witnesses during investigation. Statements recorded are:
- not taken on oath;
- generally not substantive evidence; and
- used mainly for contradiction.
Section 164 CrPC (Section 183 BNSS): statements/confessions recorded by Magistrates, on oath, with specific safeguards. These:
- can have higher evidentiary value; but
- still must be assessed for consistency and credibility.

4. Common Intention (Section 34 IPC) vs Common Object (Section 149 IPC)

Section 34 IPC (common intention):
- requires a pre‑arranged plan and acting in concert;
- each participant is liable as if he alone did the act.
Section 149 IPC (common object of unlawful assembly):
- requires at least five persons;
- if an offence is committed in prosecution of the common object, all members are liable.
Here, the trial court used Section 302/149 IPC; the High Court modified to 302/34 IPC. The Supreme Court’s acquittal makes that distinction academic in outcome.

5. Oral Dying Declaration

A dying declaration is a statement made by a person as to the cause of their death or circumstances of the transaction leading to death.
It can be:
- oral; or
- written/recorded (preferably by a Magistrate).
Courts accept dying declarations in principle, but require:
- that the maker was in a fit condition to speak;
- that the statement is voluntary and coherent; and
- that there is no serious contradiction or delay in presenting it to authorities.
In Suresh Sahu, the oral dying declaration was rejected because:
- medical evidence suggested incapacity to speak; and
- it was disclosed to police only after an inordinate delay.

6. Adverse Inference

Under the Evidence Act, when a party withholds a material witness without good reason, the court may presume that the witness’s evidence would have been unfavourable to that party.
Here, non‑examination of the IO and non‑production of key eye‑witnesses by the prosecution led the Court to draw such adverse inference, strengthening the defence case.

7. Benefit of Doubt

In criminal law, guilt must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
If, after assessing all evidence, a reasonable possibility of innocence remains, the accused is entitled to acquittal.
The presence of two plausible versions (prosecution and defence), combined with major procedural lapses, made benefit of doubt inevitable in this case.

V. Conclusion

Suresh Sahu v. State of Bihar (Now Jharkhand) is a robust reaffirmation of core fair‑trial guarantees in Indian criminal jurisprudence. It crystallises and applies three key doctrinal strands:

Section 313 / 351 BNSS is a substantive right, not a formality; mechanical questioning can, especially in old cases, compel acquittal rather than remand.
Authenticity of the first information is vital: an original FIR cannot be casually discarded in favour of a later, embellished version, particularly where the IO is not examined.
Equality of evidentiary treatment for prosecution and defence witnesses is essential; defence eye‑witnesses, combined with medical and documentary inconsistencies, can decisively undermine the prosecution case.

In setting aside concurrent convictions in a 35‑year‑old murder case, the Supreme Court demonstrates its willingness to intervene under Article 136 where findings are built on:

misreading of evidence;
serious procedural violations; and
suppression or distortion of crucial investigative material.

The judgment will serve as an important precedent guiding trial courts, prosecutors and appellate courts on:

how to conduct and evaluate Section 313 examinations;
how to treat multiple, inconsistent accounts of the same occurrence;
when withholding of the IO and other material witnesses fatally weakens the prosecution; and
the careful scrutiny required for oral dying declarations and late‑emerging incriminatory statements.

Ultimately, the decision reinforces that procedural fairness is integral to substantive justice. Where the trial itself is compromised, even grave charges like murder cannot override the presumption of innocence and the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Defective Section 313 Examination, Suppressed FIR and Non‑Examination of IO as Grounds for Acquittal: Commentary on Suresh Sahu v. State of Bihar (Now Jharkhand), 2025 INSC 1382