Darshan Mohar v. State of NCT of Delhi: POCSO Presumptions, Victim Testimony and Protocols for DNA Preservation of Product of Conception

Darshan Mohar v. State of NCT of Delhi: POCSO Presumptions, Victim Testimony and Protocols for DNA Preservation of Product of Conception

1. Introduction

The judgment of the Delhi High Court in Darshan Mohar v. State of NCT of Delhi & Anr. (CRL.A. 168/2025, decided on 10 December 2025) is a significant addition to Indian criminal jurisprudence, particularly in three interlinked areas:

  • the operation of statutory presumptions under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO) in a rape-cum-pregnancy case;
  • the evidentiary value of a child victim’s testimony, including the recorded demeanour under Section 280 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC); and
  • systemic directions on preservation, storage and transportation of fetal material / product of conception (PoC) for DNA profiling, especially when improper preservation (e.g. in formalin) renders DNA analysis impossible.

The case arose from the conviction of the appellant, Darshan Mohar, for aggravated penetrative sexual assault on a minor (his niece by relation) under Sections 5(n)/6 of the POCSO Act and for criminal intimidation under Section 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC). The victim became pregnant as a result of the assault, and her pregnancy was medically terminated; however, due to improper preservation of the product of conception by the hospital, DNA profiling failed.

On appeal, the High Court (Dr. Justice Swarana Kanta Sharma) not only upheld the conviction but also undertook a detailed examination of:

  • how to evaluate alleged inconsistencies in a traumatised minor’s testimony;
  • how delay in lodging FIR is to be viewed in sexual assault matters;
  • the evidentiary consequences of the loss of potential DNA evidence due to systemic lapses; and
  • the binding nature and implementation of Supreme Court directions on handling DNA evidence (particularly in light of Kattavellai v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1439).

This commentary sets out the background, summarises the judgment, analyses the legal reasoning and precedent, simplifies complex concepts, and discusses the broader impact on criminal procedure and forensic practice in sexual offence cases.


2. Factual Background

2.1 Parties and basic facts

  • Appellant/Accused: Darshan Mohar, maternal uncle (mama) of the victim, a relative from Agra.
  • Victim: A girl aged approximately 17 years (minor under POCSO), living with her father, siblings, grandmother and aunts in Delhi.
  • Offences alleged: Rape and criminal intimidation under Sections 376/506 IPC and aggravated penetrative sexual assault under Sections 5(n)/6 POCSO.

2.2 Incident and later discovery

The incident occurred sometime in January 2020. The accused had come from Agra and stayed at the victim’s house for a day. On the morning in question:

  • All adult family members had left the premises (for work, hospital, school etc.).
  • The accused remained in the room where he had slept.
  • The victim was alone in the house with him.

According to the victim:

  • While she was cleaning the floor, the accused came from behind, held her, bolted the door from inside, pressed her mouth, and caused her to lose consciousness.
  • Upon regaining consciousness, she found herself on the bed with the accused present in the room.
  • On being specifically questioned later, she clarified that he had removed her clothes and his pants and forcibly established physical relations with her.
  • He threatened to kill her and to inform her father if she disclosed the incident.

Due to fear and emotional fragility (her mother had died earlier, and she was mentally disturbed), she did not disclose the incident immediately. After she missed her menstrual periods for about two months and developed abdominal pain, she confided in her younger sister and then in her aunt, who took her to Deep Chand Bandhu Hospital on 04.05.2020.

At the hospital:

  • An ultrasound revealed a single live intrauterine pregnancy of about 15 weeks’ gestation.
  • The victim disclosed that her maternal uncle, Darshan, had sexually assaulted her in January 2020.
  • The doctor informed the police; an NGO counsellor counselled the victim.
  • Her statement was recorded, and FIR No. 362/2020 was registered at PS Bharat Nagar.

2.3 Medical termination and handling of product of conception

  • The victim was referred to Bhagwan Mahavir Hospital, Pitampura.
  • After the Child Welfare Committee granted permission, her pregnancy was medically terminated on 06.05.2020.
  • The product of conception (PoC) and placental tissue were sealed and handed over to the police for forensic examination.
  • The material was later sent to FSL Rohini and subsequently to CFSL, Lodhi Road, but both laboratories reported that DNA profiling could not be done due to degradation and the presence of inhibitors.

2.4 Trial and conviction

The investigation included:

  • Recording the victim’s statement under Section 164 CrPC before a Magistrate.
  • Collection of school records to establish age (date of birth: 24.01.2003).
  • Preparation of site plan at the victim’s instance.
  • Arrest of the accused on 24.06.2020.

The trial court (ASJ, POCSO Court, North West, Rohini):

  • Framed charges under Sections 5(n)/6 POCSO (with alternative charge under Section 376(2)(f) IPC) and Section 506 IPC.
  • Examined 15 prosecution witnesses and 1 defence witness.
  • Convicted the accused under Sections 5(n)/6 POCSO and 376(2)(f), 506 IPC.
  • Sentenced him to:
    • 20 years’ rigorous imprisonment under Section 6 POCSO (statutory minimum for aggravated penetrative sexual assault);
    • 1 year’s rigorous imprisonment under Section 506 IPC.

Aggrieved, the accused filed the present criminal appeal before the Delhi High Court.


3. Key Issues Before the High Court

The appeal raised, inter alia, the following issues:

  1. Age of the victim: Whether she was a minor at the time of incident (critical for POCSO).
  2. Reliability of the victim’s testimony:
    • Alleged inconsistencies in her account;
    • Her initial statement in court that she lost consciousness and did not know what happened; and
    • Later clarification that the accused removed her clothes and raped her.
  3. Delay in lodging FIR: About four months between alleged incident (January 2020) and FIR (May 2020).
  4. Absence of medical/forensic corroboration:
    • No contemporaneous injuries, no seizure of bedsheets/clothes yielded usable biological evidence;
    • Failure of DNA profiling from the product of conception.
  5. Applicability and rebuttal of POCSO presumptions: Scope and effect of Sections 29 and 30 POCSO once foundational facts are proved.
  6. Credibility of defence: Multiple, shifting defences—affair with one “Amit”, monetary dispute between families, and alleged fabrication of medical records.
  7. Systemic handling of DNA evidence: How and why the fetal tissue was rendered unusable and what protocols must govern such evidence henceforth.

4. Summary of the Judgment

4.1 Findings on facts

The High Court upheld the trial court’s findings that:

  • The victim was a minor (about 16 years and 11 months) at the time of the offence, as proved by school records and unchallenged documentary evidence.
  • The victim’s core narrative—rape by her maternal uncle in January 2020 leading to pregnancy—remained consistent across:
    • her disclosures to the doctors at both hospitals;
    • her statement to the Investigating Officer;
    • her Section 164 CrPC statement before the Magistrate; and
    • her deposition in court.
  • Apparent hesitation or initial omission to narrate graphic details in court was adequately explained by her demeanour—emotional breakdown, crying, apparent youthfulness and trauma—recorded by the trial judge under Section 280 CrPC.
  • The delay in lodging FIR was naturally explained by the victim’s fear, threats by the accused, and the fact that the offence came to light only when the pregnancy was discovered at the hospital.
  • The defence version was inconsistent, unsupported and unreliable (multiple shifting stories, including introduction of a mysterious “Amit” and unsubstantiated claims of monetary disputes).

4.2 Application of POCSO presumptions

Once the prosecution established foundational facts—minor’s age, sexual assault, resultant pregnancy, and consistent disclosures—the statutory presumptions under:

  • Section 29 POCSO: presumption as to commission of the offence, and
  • Section 30 POCSO: presumption of culpable mental state

stood attracted. The Court held that the accused had failed to rebut these presumptions by credible evidence.

4.3 Conviction and sentence affirmed

The High Court:

  • Affirmed the conviction under:
    • Sections 5(n)/6 POCSO (aggravated penetrative sexual assault by a relative in a position of trust);
    • Section 376(2)(f) IPC (rape on a minor); and
    • Section 506 IPC (criminal intimidation).
  • Held that the sentence of 20 years’ rigorous imprisonment under Section 6 POCSO was the statutory minimum and required no interference.

4.4 Systemic directions on DNA evidence and product of conception

On the failure of DNA profiling from the product of conception, the Court:

  • Noted that the fetal material had been improperly preserved in formalin by the hospital, contrary to scientific and governmental guidelines.
  • Summoned the concerned CFSL officer at the appellate stage (while clearly acknowledging that it could not take additional evidence to influence conviction) in order to:
    • understand the scientific reasons behind the DNA failure; and
    • ensure that such lapses are not repeated in future cases.
  • Recorded the CFSL explanation that:
    • formalin preservation fragments DNA and introduces amplification inhibitors;
    • fetal tissue kept in formalin beyond seven days has negligible chances of yielding usable DNA; and
    • guidelines categorically prohibit preserving fetal tissue for DNA analysis in formalin.
  • Referred to:
    • the Ministry of Health & Family Welfare’s Guidelines & Protocols: Medico-legal care for survivors/victims of Sexual Violence, and
    • the Directorate of Forensic Science Services (DFSS), MHA guidelines for forensic medical examination in sexual assault cases,
    both of which prescribe:
    • rinsing PoC with normal saline (not soaking) and storing at low temperatures (around 4°C or -20°C), and
    • prohibiting formalin for fetal tissue intended for DNA analysis.
  • Relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Kattavellai v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1439, which laid down pan-India guidelines for:
    • collection, documentation, transport (within 48 hours) and chain of custody of DNA samples; and
    • maintenance of a Chain of Custody Register appended to the trial court record.
  • Directed the Government of NCT of Delhi and forensic and police authorities to evolve a workable policy framework to ensure:
    • implementation of MoHFW and DFSS guidelines; and
    • compliance with the Supreme Court’s directions in Kattavellai, especially given practical hurdles such as lack of cold-chain infrastructure and FSL closure on weekends/public holidays.

5. Detailed Analysis

5.1 Determination of Age of the Victim

The Court’s approach to age determination is straightforward yet important for POCSO jurisprudence.

  • Evidence relied upon:
    • Testimony of PW-2 (school teacher) who proved:
      • admission form;
      • affidavit of father;
      • MCD birth certificate produced at the time of school admission; and
      • school certificate showing date of birth as 24.01.2003.
    • Entries in school admission register—found properly maintained and untampered.
  • Defence conduct:
    • No challenge in cross-examination to the genuineness of school records;
    • No contrary evidence on age produced.

On this basis, the Court affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that the victim was a minor (about 16 years and 11 months) at the time of the occurrence, bringing the case squarely within POCSO’s protective ambit and triggering aggravated assault under Section 5(n) (perpetrator being a “relative” in a position of trust).

5.2 Credibility of the Victim’s Testimony and Section 280 CrPC

5.2.1 Emotional state and demeanour recorded by the trial court

A striking feature of the judgment is the weight the High Court accords to the trial judge’s observations on the victim’s demeanour—mandated by Section 280 CrPC.

Section 280 CrPC requires the presiding judge to record any material remarks about the demeanour of a witness while deposing. Here, the trial court recorded that:

  • The witness appeared of weak stature, looking no more than 13–14 years old (though actually about 17).
  • Her eyes were moist; she became emotional and started crying during testimony.
  • She cried inconsolably when asked to recount the assault and said she did not want to “repeat the incident again and again.”

The High Court recognises that such recorded demeanour is not a mere formality; it is crucial for assessing credibility in sexual offence cases, especially involving children. It emphasises that:

  • testifying victims are real persons, not just “case files”; and
  • court records must capture their emotional reality, particularly where trauma shapes how they narrate events.

5.2.2 Alleged inconsistencies and their treatment

The defence highlighted that in her initial examination-in-chief the victim said she became unconscious and did not know what happened. It argued that the absence of a direct assertion of rape undermined the prosecution’s case.

The Court rejects this contention, noting:

  • From the very first disclosure to the doctor (MLC at Deep Chand Bandhu Hospital), the victim had explicitly stated that:
    • her mother’s cousin brother (“mama”) forced her to have intercourse when no one else was at home;
    • she named the accused Darshan, aged 28 years, resident of Agra.
  • The same account was repeated in:
    • the MLC at Bhagwan Mahavir Hospital;
    • her statement to police;
    • her Section 164 CrPC statement.
  • In court, when the learned APP put leading questions (permissible when a witness shows fear or hesitation), she detailed that:
    • the accused bolted the door, pressed her mouth;
    • removed her clothes and his pants;
    • forcibly had sexual intercourse with her;
    • threatened to kill her and to inform her father if she disclosed.

Thus, the Court correctly distinguishes between:

  • “minor discrepancies” or hesitation—which often stem from trauma, embarrassment and the difficulty of discussing sexual details in open court; and
  • “material contradictions”—which would go to the root of the allegation or show fundamental changes in the core story.

Here, the core story (rape by maternal uncle leading to pregnancy) remained unchanged; only the detail and comfort level in narrating the assault varied. The High Court therefore holds her testimony cogent, consistent on material points, and fully capable of sustaining conviction even without independent corroboration.

5.3 Delay in FIR in Sexual Offence Cases

The defence pointed to a nearly five-month gap between the incident (January 2020) and FIR (May 2020). The Court finds this delay satisfactorily explained.

Key factors:

  • The victim was threatened by the accused with death and exposure to her father.
  • She was emotionally fragile—having recently lost her mother (and later grandmother and uncle), had dropped out of school, and was mentally disturbed.
  • She did not even understand she was pregnant until she missed menstrual cycles for two months and experienced abdominal pain.
  • The FIR was lodged immediately after the doctor detected pregnancy and informed the police.

In this context, delay was not indicative of falsity; rather, it was a natural consequence of trauma, fear and lack of awareness. The Court aligns with the broader judicial approach that delay in reporting sexual offences, particularly child sexual abuse within the family, cannot be mechanically treated as suspicious; such victims often remain silent until physical symptoms or external intervention force disclosure.

5.4 Absence of Contemporaneous Medical Injuries and Physical Evidence

The Court confronts a frequent defence argument: no medical or forensic evidence directly linking the accused to the act (e.g., injuries on genitalia, DNA on clothes or bedsheets).

Its reasoning is twofold:

  1. Temporal gap:
    • The assault occurred in January 2020; the victim was medically examined and the FIR lodged only in May 2020.
    • After such a lapse, no reasonable expectation exists of:
      • fresh genital injuries;
      • recoverable semen or other biological traces on clothes/bedsheets;
      • undisturbed scene of occurrence.
  2. Settled legal position:
    • Conviction for rape/sexual assault can rest on the sole testimony of the victim if it is credible and trustworthy.
    • Absence of medical corroboration is not fatal, especially where:
      • examination is delayed; and
      • the narrative is internally consistent, corroborated by surrounding circumstances (such as pregnancy), and unimpeached in cross-examination.

The Court thus refuses to let the lack of physical signs or seized material detract from the victim’s testimony and the objective fact of pregnancy.

5.5 Application of Statutory Presumptions under POCSO (Sections 29 and 30)

5.5.1 Foundational facts established

The Court explicitly sets out Sections 29 and 30 POCSO and notes that once certain foundational facts are established by the prosecution, statutory presumptions arise in favour of the prosecution:

  • Victim was a minor—proved beyond dispute by school records and lack of contradictory evidence.
  • Victim consistently alleged penetrative sexual assault by the accused, her maternal uncle.
  • Medical evidence (ultrasound) confirmed a 15-week intrauterine pregnancy compatible with her timeline of assault (January 2020 → May 2020).

5.5.2 Nature and burden of presumptions

Under:

  • Section 29: The Special Court shall presume that the accused committed the offence unless the contrary is proved.
  • Section 30: The Special Court shall presume the existence of the requisite “culpable mental state” (intention, knowledge, etc.), and it is for the accused to prove the absence of such a mental state beyond reasonable doubt.

This reverses the usual evidentiary burden: after the prosecution leads credible evidence of the occurrence, the onus shifts to the accused to produce material that creates reasonable doubt about his guilt or mental element. Importantly, Section 30(2) demands that the accused’s rebuttal must meet the higher standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt, not mere preponderance of probabilities.

The Court concludes that:

  • Foundational facts being established, the presumptions under Sections 29 and 30 were triggered; and
  • The accused failed to rebut them in any meaningful way.

5.6 Rejection of the Defence Case

The Court gives detailed attention to the shifting and inconsistent defences raised by the accused:

  1. First line of cross-examination:
    • Suggested that accused used to recharge the victim’s mobile and stayed at her house—implicitly accepting his presence and interaction.
  2. Second line (after FSL failure): “Amit” theory
    • New story: victim allegedly had an affair with a boy named Amit and falsely implicated the accused to shield him.
    • No details produced: no address, identity proof, independent witness, or any corroboration.
    • Victim denied this suggestion in cross-examination.
  3. Statement under Section 313 CrPC:
    • Yet another new theory: some unspecified monetary dispute between his mother and the victim’s deceased mother, and alleged false implication by the victim’s father over unpaid money.
    • No documents or witnesses produced to support this assertion.
  4. Attack on medical records:
    • Accused baldly alleged that doctors acted in a “routine manner” and that MLCs, age documents, statements, and FIR were fabricated.
    • These claims were unsubstantiated and contradicted by multiple doctors’ testimonies that withstood cross-examination.
  5. Defence witness DW-1 (Pankaj, cousin):
    • Claimed to have seen the victim with a boy on a motorcycle in JJ Colony.
    • Admitted under cross-examination that:
      • He did not know the boy’s name or identity; “Amit” was told to him by the accused.
      • He did not know the boy’s address or the bike’s registration number.
      • He did not inform the victim’s family about this alleged sighting.
      • Gave no clear dates or times, and even contradicted the earlier suggestion by saying the accused had never visited Delhi in January 2020.
    • The Court rightly finds his testimony vague, speculative and unreliable.

Overall, the Court characterises the defence case as “multiple, mutually contradictory” and completely insufficient to dislodge presumptions under POCSO or raise a reasonable doubt.

5.7 Degradation of Product of Conception and DNA Profiling Failure

5.7.1 Factual chain regarding PoC and DNA attempts

The Court sets out the factual chain:

  • PoC and placental tissue were collected after MTP on 06.05.2020 and sealed.
  • The sealed parcels reached FSL Rohini, where:
    • Exhibit 1: “fleshy material” (PoC);
    • Exhibit 3: blood sample of the accused.
  • FSL Rohini reported:
    • DNA could not be generated from Ex.1 due to degradation and inhibitors.
  • Pursuant to trial court orders, the same exhibits were sent to CFSL, Lodhi Road.
  • CFSL, in its report (13.10.2022), also reported no DNA could be obtained from the PoC; hence no comparison was possible.

5.7.2 High Court’s proactive step at appellate stage

Recognising the centrality of DNA evidence in rape-cum-pregnancy cases, the High Court, during the appeal, passed an order (12.03.2025) summoning the CFSL officer who authored the report, stating that:

  • It was aware it could not take further evidence to determine guilt; however,
  • Given the gravity of the offence and the lost opportunity to use scientific evidence (DNA of the fetus), it was essential to understand what happened and to prevent recurrence in future cases.

This is an important jurisprudential move: the appellate court uses its proceedings not to reopen evidence for this case, but as a platform to diagnose systemic failures and drive reform, without compromising procedural fairness in the pending appeal.

5.7.3 Scientific explanation by CFSL and effect of formalin

CFSL Assistant Director, Dr. Kamal Chauhan, explained to the Court that:

  • The PoC was preserved in formalin (evident from pungent smell and recorded in his worksheet).
  • Formalin acts as a strong preservative by forming an unbreakable coating on cells but:
    • causes fragmentation of DNA; and
    • acts as a strong inhibitor of DNA amplification (PCR).
  • As per scientific literature and guidelines:
    • Fetal tissue meant for DNA analysis must never be preserved in formalin.
    • PoC should be rinsed in normal saline, stored at about 4°C (or -20°C per forensic guidelines), and transported under a cold chain.
    • Biological samples preserved in formalin beyond seven days have negligible chances of yielding DNA.

This explanation aligns perfectly with:

  • MoHFW’s medico-legal care guidelines for sexual violence survivors; and
  • DFSS/CFSL forensic guidelines on handling PoC and fetal tissue.

Consequently, the Court categorically notes that the failure of DNA profiling was directly traceable to improper preservation at the hospital stage, not to any inherent limitation of DNA science.

5.8 Integration of National Guidelines and the Supreme Court’s Judgment in Kattavellai

5.8.1 Statutory and policy framework

The Court draws together:

  • MoHFW Guidelines & Protocols: Medico-legal care for survivors/victims of Sexual Violence – specifying how PoC is to be:
    • rinsed with normal saline (not soaked);
    • placed in a wide-mouthed container;
    • preserved at about 4°C; and
    • transported in an ice-box maintaining 2–8°C as far as possible.
  • CFSL/DFSS guidelines – prohibiting use of formalin for fetal tissue meant for DNA analysis and directing storage at -20°C in frozen condition.

5.8.2 The Supreme Court’s directions in Kattavellai v. State of Tamil Nadu

The Court relies heavily on the Supreme Court decision in Kattavellai v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1439, where the Supreme Court, alarmed by repeated instances of unusable DNA evidence, issued detailed, pan-India directions, including:

  • Collection and documentation:
    • Swift and careful collection;
    • Proper packaging (with FIR number, section, I.O. details);
    • Signatures of medical officer, I.O., and, where possible, independent witnesses (their absence being recordable, not fatal).
  • Transport within 48 hours:
    • I.O. responsible for prompt transport to either the police station, hospital, or FSL;
    • DNA samples must reach FSL within 48 hours of collection, barring recorded exceptional circumstances;
    • Throughout, samples must be preserved at appropriate temperatures as per their nature.
  • No tampering without court order:
    • Once stored pending trial, no opening or resealing of packages without express trial court authorisation, and only when:
      • a qualified medical professional states that this will not harm sanctity; and
      • the court is satisfied that the step is necessary to ensure just investigation/trial.
  • Chain of Custody Register:
    • Mandatory maintenance of a detailed register tracking every movement of DNA evidence;
    • Register forms part of the trial court record;
    • Failure to maintain it makes I.O. answerable for the lapse;
    • Directors General of Police to prepare standard forms and circulate them for uniform use.

The Delhi High Court explicitly adopts and reiterates these directions, underlining that:

  • While “police” and “public order” are State subjects, handling of DNA evidence must be governed by uniform national standards; and
  • Differing procedures across states for such sensitive evidence are impermissible because the scientific and evidentiary requirements for DNA are universally the same.

5.9 Systemic Concerns and the Court’s Directions

The Court candidly acknowledges unresolved practical issues:

  • Lack of adequate cold-storage infrastructure with police to store/transport biological samples at 4°C or -20°C.
  • Logistical difficulties in maintaining unbroken cold chains.
  • Forensic laboratories not accepting samples on weekends/public holidays—creating tension with the Supreme Court’s 48-hour rule for DNA sample submission.

It notes that:

  • There is no clear, standard operating procedure detailing what I.Os. must do when FSLs are closed but biological evidence is perishable and requires strict cold-chain storage.
  • Unless authorities address these issues, crucial forensic evidence will continue to be lost, risking miscarriages of justice.

Accordingly, the Court:

  • Calls upon:
    • Secretary, Home Department, GNCTD;
    • Secretary, Law Department, GNCTD;
    • Director, FSL Rohini;
    • Director, CFSL, Delhi; and
    • Commissioner of Police, Delhi,
    to take note of the judgment and:
    • coordinate;
    • formulate a workable policy framework; and
    • ensure uniform compliance with MoHFW, DFSS and Supreme Court guidelines.
  • Expresses an expectation that doctors, I.Os., police staff and FSL personnel will follow these guidelines “diligently and scrupulously.”

6. Simplifying Key Legal and Technical Concepts

6.1 Product of Conception (PoC)

“Product of conception” refers to the fetal tissue (including embryo/fetus and placental tissue) removed during a medical termination of pregnancy. In rape-cum-pregnancy cases, PoC is often critical for:

  • establishing paternity through DNA comparison with accused’s blood sample;
  • corroborating the victim’s account (especially if she alleges a specific assailant and denies sexual contact with others).

If preserved and handled correctly, PoC can yield highly reliable DNA evidence. Conversely, if mishandled (e.g., preserved in formalin), it may become useless for DNA profiling.

6.2 Presumption under Sections 29 and 30 POCSO

  • Section 29: Once the prosecution leads prima facie evidence that:
    • a child has been sexually assaulted; and
    • the accused is the identified perpetrator,
    the court shall presume that the accused committed the offence, unless he proves otherwise.
  • Section 30: The court presumes the accused acted with the requisite mental state (intention, motive, knowledge); the accused must prove beyond reasonable doubt that he lacked such mental state.

In simple terms, the law starts by believing that:

  • if the child’s story is coherent and credible; and
  • if the child identifies the accused,

then the accused is presumed to be guilty and to have had the necessary wrongful intent—unless he produces strong evidence to displace that presumption.

6.3 Section 280 CrPC: Demeanour of Witness

Section 280 CrPC requires judges to record remarks about a witness’s behaviour during testimony if it is material—for example:

  • crying;
  • hesitation;
  • fear;
  • confusion or signs of distress.

In sexual offence trials, demeanour notes:

  • help appellate courts understand why a victim may have hesitated or struggled to speak about certain details; and
  • provide an additional layer of context in assessing credibility.

6.4 Chain of Custody

“Chain of custody” refers to the documented trail of who had possession of a piece of evidence, when, where, and for what purpose, from the moment of collection until its production in court. For DNA and biological evidence, it is critical because:

  • it demonstrates that the sample has not been tampered with, contaminated, or substituted;
  • courts can trust that the tested sample actually came from the relevant victim/scene/accused.

A Chain of Custody Register records every transfer—e.g., from doctor to I.O., I.O. to Malkhana, Malkhana to FSL—and is now required (per Kattavellai) to be part of the trial record.

6.5 Benefit of Doubt vs. POCSO Presumptions

Traditionally, in criminal law:

  • The prosecution bears the burden to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
  • If two views are reasonably possible, the view favourable to the accused must be adopted (“benefit of doubt”).

Under POCSO, this principle operates within the modified framework of Sections 29 and 30:

  • Once foundational facts are proved and presumptions arise, the accused must produce cogent evidence to counter the presumptions.
  • If he fails to do so, there is no “reasonable doubt” to give him the benefit of; the presumption of guilt stands.

7. Impact and Significance

7.1 Strengthening victim-centric adjudication in POCSO cases

The judgment reinforces that:

  • The testimony of a child victim of sexual assault, if consistent and credible, is sufficient to convict.
  • Trauma-induced hesitation, emotional breakdowns, or inability to describe graphic details fully in open court do not undermine credibility where:
    • the core allegation is consistent across fora; and
    • demeanour indicates genuine distress rather than fabrication.
  • Courts must read Section 280 CrPC purposively: demeanour notes are integral to appreciating testimony, especially in sexual offences.

7.2 Clarifying the effect of forensic lapses on criminal trials

By upholding conviction despite the loss of potential DNA evidence due to improper formalin preservation, the Court effectively clarifies:

  • Systemic or third-party lapses (by doctors, forensic labs, or investigators) that destroy or degrade biological evidence cannot, by themselves, exonerate an otherwise guilty accused.
  • Where victim testimony and surrounding circumstances (such as pregnancy) are strong, courts are not compelled to acquit simply because DNA corroboration fails for technical reasons.

At the same time, the Court:

  • Refuses to be indifferent to such lapses;
  • Uses its appellate jurisdiction to bring in scientific experts;
  • Signals to all stakeholders that mis-handling PoC or other DNA evidence is unacceptable and must be structurally remedied.

7.3 Operationalising the Supreme Court’s DNA directions at the local level

The judgment plays a bridging role between:

  • the Supreme Court’s national directives in Kattavellai on DNA evidence; and
  • on-the-ground realities in Delhi’s hospitals, police stations and forensic labs.

By:

  • explicitly quoting Kattavellai directions;
  • aligning local MoHFW and DFSS guidelines with those directions; and
  • tasking Delhi’s Home, Law, Police and Forensic authorities with evolving a policy framework,

the Court ensures that national standards on DNA handling do not remain on paper, but are woven into local practice.

7.4 Forensic medicine and medico-legal practice

The judgment has immediate implications for:

  • Obstetricians and gynaecologists: They must:
    • avoid formalin for PoC intended for DNA analysis;
    • use saline and low-temperature preservation; and
    • coordinate with police to obtain DNA kits at the time of MTP.
  • Hospital administrators: Need to:
    • train staff on medico-legal protocols;
    • ensure availability of refrigeration/freezer facilities; and
    • establish internal SOPs aligned with MoHFW and DFSS guidelines.
  • Police investigators: Must:
    • understand the medical side of PoC handling;
    • arrange timely transport in cold-chain conditions; and
    • maintain detailed chain-of-custody documentation.

7.5 Normative message on trust and intra-familial abuse

By categorising the offence as aggravated under Section 5(n) POCSO (offender being a relative in a position of trust), the judgment underlines that:

  • Sexual abuse by relatives (e.g., maternal uncles, uncles by marriage, etc.) is aggravated because:
    • such persons are expected to protect, not prey on, children; and
    • the familial setting makes disclosure harder and victimisation more profound.
  • Courts will treat such breaches of trust with particular seriousness and apply the statutory minimum sentences robustly.

8. Conclusion

Darshan Mohar v. State of NCT of Delhi is more than a straightforward affirmation of a POCSO conviction. It stands at the intersection of victim-centric adjudication, evidentiary law under special statutes, and the emerging field of forensic governance.

Key takeaways include:

  • Victim testimony remains central: Courts will not demand impossible levels of consistency or emotional detachment from traumatised minors, especially in intra-familial sexual assault cases. Demeanour observations under Section 280 CrPC are vital to contextualising any hesitations.
  • POCSO presumptions are meaningful: Once foundational facts are proved, Sections 29 and 30 POCSO place a real and heavy burden on the accused to rebut presumptions of guilt and mental state beyond reasonable doubt.
  • Forensic lapses do not automatically benefit the accused: The destruction or degradation of DNA evidence through improper procedures (such as preserving PoC in formalin) does not mandate acquittal where other evidence convincingly establishes guilt.
  • Systemic reform is a judicial concern: The High Court’s proactive engagement with CFSL and its endorsement of MoHFW and DFSS guidelines, together with the Supreme Court’s directions in Kattavellai, signal a clear expectation of institutional reform in handling PoC and DNA evidence.
  • Intra-familial abuse is treated with gravity: Offences by relatives in positions of trust justifiably attract aggravated charges and statutory minimum sentences.

In the broader legal context, the judgment:

  • consolidates the jurisprudence that conviction for child sexual offences can rest firmly on the sole, credible testimony of the victim, even in the absence of DNA or contemporaneous injury evidence; and
  • charts a path forward for better alignment between medical practice, police procedure and forensic science, thereby strengthening the criminal justice system’s ability to respond to sexual violence with both sensitivity and scientific rigour.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Delhi High Court

Judge(s)

Justice Swarana Kanta Sharma

Advocates

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