Curative Power as a Constitutional Duty to Resolve Irreconcilable Final Outcomes on Identical Evidence: Commentary on Surendra Koli v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2025 INSC 1308)

Introduction

In a judgment of exceptional constitutional significance, a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court of India (CJI Bhushan Ramkrishna Gavai, J. Surya Kant, and J. Vikram Nath) in Surendra Koli v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 INSC 1308, has deployed the Court’s curative jurisdiction to recall a prior final conviction and to acquit the petitioner. The Court held that where two sets of final outcomes rest on the same evidentiary substratum yet speak with discordant voices, the anomaly threatens adjudicatory integrity and violates Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. In that situation, intervention ex debito justitiae is not discretionary but a constitutional duty.

The case arises from the notorious “Nithari” prosecutions concerning disappearances and killings in and around House D-5, Sector 31, Noida. Surendra Koli, employed as a domestic help by Moninder Singh Pandher, was convicted in 2009 in the case relating to victim Rimpa Haldar, and that conviction and the sentence of death were affirmed by the Supreme Court in 2011. After review failed in 2014, the High Court commuted the death sentence to life in 2015. Meanwhile, in twelve other prosecutions arising from the same confessional and recovery evidence, the High Court acquitted Koli in 2023, and the Supreme Court dismissed the State’s appeals in 2025, affirming those acquittals. Koli’s curative petition directly confronted the incongruity: a standing Supreme Court affirmation of guilt in one case, and subsequent Supreme Court-backed acquittals in twelve companion cases, all resting on the same evidentiary architecture.

The key issues were: (i) whether the curative jurisdiction can be invoked to resolve irreconcilable final outcomes on an identical record; (ii) whether the petitioner’s confession under Section 164 CrPC was voluntary and admissible; (iii) whether the alleged discoveries and recoveries under Section 27 of the Evidence Act were legally sustainable; and (iv) whether the forensic and investigative record could sustain a conviction. The judgment answers each question emphatically in favor of rectifying a manifest miscarriage of justice.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court allowed the curative petition, recalled its earlier orders upholding conviction and dismissing review (15.02.2011 and 28.10.2014), allowed the criminal appeal, set aside the trial court and High Court judgments (13.02.2009 and 11.09.2009), acquitted Surendra Koli of all charges under Sections 302, 364, 376 and 201 of the IPC, and directed his release if not required in any other matter. The Court held:

Curative jurisdiction exists to prevent abuse of process and to cure gross miscarriages of justice. It is narrow, not a second review, and is anchored in Articles 129, 142, 137, and 145 read with Order XLVIII of the Supreme Court Rules, as recognised in Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra (2002) 4 SCC 388.
The controlling test includes whether earlier decisions produce results that offend judicial conscience due to fundamental process defects or grave miscarriages of justice—specifically including “irreconcilably inconsistent outcomes on the same substratum of facts and evidence.”
The very confession under Section 164 CrPC and the Section 27 Evidence Act “discoveries” that underpinned Koli’s conviction had been judicially discredited in twelve companion cases. On identical evidentiary foundations, like cases must be treated alike. To let one conviction stand would violate Articles 14 and 21.
The confession was inadmissible (bar under Section 24 of the Evidence Act) given prolonged custody, absence of meaningful legal aid, the Investigating Officer’s proximity to the recording process, and internal indications of tutoring and coercion; the Magistrate failed to record clear and unqualified satisfaction about voluntariness as Section 164 CrPC requires.
The alleged recoveries were inadmissible/unreliable: no contemporaneous disclosure memo; contradictions between remand papers and seizure narratives; prior public and police knowledge of the recovery sites; and recovery from open, non-exclusive areas reduced the exercise to a seizure from an already known place, failing Section 27’s preconditions.
Forensic results did not bridge the evidentiary gap: no human blood or remains consistent with multiple homicides inside D-5; DNA work established identification of remains but not authorship of homicide by the petitioner; alleged weapons lacked human blood or tissue and were not forensically linked; chain of custody issues persisted.
The investigation was seriously deficient: scene not secured, contradictory paperwork, prolonged custody without robust court-directed medical oversight, perfunctory legal aid, and failure to probe alternative leads including an organ-trade angle noted by a governmental committee.

The Court concluded that allowing the conviction to stand would entrench arbitrary disparity and offend due process. It emphasised that in criminal law, especially in capital cases, suspicion cannot substitute proof. Finality gives way where the Court’s own final orders are irreconcilably inconsistent on an identical record.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The judgment centrally relies on the Constitution Bench decision in Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra, (2002) 4 SCC 388. Rupa Ashok Hurra established that:

The Supreme Court, as a court of record (Article 129), possesses inherent powers to prevent abuse of process and preserve the purity of its proceedings.
Article 137 recognises the power of review; Article 142 empowers the Court to do complete justice; Article 145 authorises the Court to frame procedural rules. Together with Order XLVIII of the Supreme Court Rules (on curative petitions), these provisions sustain a narrow curative jurisdiction after review is exhausted.
The curative petition is not a second review. Relief is reserved for compelling cases displaying fundamental defects (e.g., violation of natural justice, reasonable apprehension of bias) that imperil the legitimacy of adjudication.

Surendra Koli extends and specifies this framework by explicitly recognising a further class of foundational error warranting curative intervention: where the Court’s final orders produce irreconcilably inconsistent outcomes on the same evidentiary substratum. The Court also grounds this extension in constitutional guarantees—Articles 14 and 21—explicitly linking curative relief to equality and due process when identical records produce divergent results.

The decision also navigates its own prior orders:

The 2011 two-judge bench judgment affirming Koli’s conviction and death sentence (in the Rimpa Haldar case);
The 2014 dismissal of review; and
The 2025 three-judge bench dismissal of State appeals affirming the 2023 High Court acquittals in twelve other Nithari cases resting on the same confession and Section 27 materials.

The friction among these final outcomes supplies the very trigger for curative intervention as articulated in this judgment.

Legal Reasoning

The Court structures its reasoning in two layers: first, a doctrinal clarification of when curative power may be exercised; second, an application of that doctrine to the record.

1) The doctrinal threshold for curative relief

Curative power is narrow, exceptional, and not an appellate re-appraisal. It is invoked to rescue the integrity of adjudication and the rule of law when fundamental defects persist after review.
The “controlling test” is whether the earlier decision produces a result that offends the Court’s conscience because of a fundamental defect in process or a grave miscarriage of justice. The judgment explicitly includes as such a defect: outcomes that are “irreconcilably inconsistent on the same substratum of facts and evidence.”
This standard is anchored to constitutional guarantees—Articles 14 and 21—so that equality (like cases treated alike) and due process (fair, just, and reasonable procedure) function as substantive yardsticks within curative review.
Where those values are compromised by inconsistent final results on an identical record, “intervention ex debito justitiae is not an act of discretion but a constitutional duty.”

2) Application to the evidentiary architecture

The Court then examines the “structural infirmities” in the prosecution’s mode of proof that had already led to twelve acquittals and were present in the Rimpa Haldar case as well.

Section 164 CrPC confession and Section 24 Evidence Act bar: The confession was recorded after approximately sixty days of uninterrupted police custody; the petitioner lacked meaningful, private access to legal aid; the Magistrate failed to record clear and unqualified satisfaction of voluntariness, as the statute requires; and the Investigating Officer’s presence and proximity to the process infected voluntariness. The confession’s text itself reflected tutoring and coercion. These features attracted the Section 24 bar (confessions caused by inducement, threat, or promise are inadmissible) and rendered the confession legally unusable.
Section 27 Evidence Act “discoveries” and recoveries: No contemporaneous disclosure statement was proved; remand papers and seizure narratives conflicted (including references to a “joint disclosure” inconsistent with later claims); recovery sites were already known to police and public and were open, not under the exclusive control of the accused; excavation had begun before the accused arrived. These facts negate the essential causal link required by Section 27—discovery of a fact “in consequence of” information supplied by the accused—reducing the episode to mere seizure from a known place.
Forensic insufficiency: Repeated specialized searches yielded no human blood or remains inside D-5 consistent with multiple homicides and dismemberment. DNA profiling assisted identification of victims’ remains but did not connect the petitioner to the actus reus; alleged weapons bore no human blood or tissue and were not matched to cut marks; chain-of-custody and capability gaps persisted (no proof that a domestic help could perform the alleged precise dismemberment).
Investigative infirmities: The scene was unsecured when excavation commenced; key paperwork carried contradictions; prolonged custody lacked robust independent medical oversight; legal aid at confession was perfunctory; alternative investigative avenues—including an organ-trade angle flagged by a governmental committee—were neglected. These deficiencies directly compromised reliability and fairness.

After isolating these defects, the Court reasons that it cannot permit the same tainted evidentiary pillars to sustain a conviction in one case while being judicially rejected in twelve indistinguishable cases. To do so would be arbitrary (Article 14) and unfair (Article 21). The Court stresses the special rigor required where the death penalty is involved—while the sentence had been commuted, the conviction’s gravity persisted, necessitating curative correction.

Impact

This judgment has several far-reaching implications:

Curative jurisdiction refined and strengthened: The decision crystallizes a new, explicit ground for curative relief: irreconcilably inconsistent final outcomes on an identical evidentiary foundation, grounded in Articles 14 and 21. This is a clear doctrinal development within the Rupa Ashok Hurra framework. It preserves finality generally but ensures that finality does not entrench manifest injustice.
Equality and due process within post-finality review: By locating curative intervention within equality (like cases treated alike) and due process (fair procedure), the Court infuses constitutional discipline into the rare space of post-finality correction. This is likely to guide future curative petitions in clusters of cases arising out of the same incident or record (e.g., mass prosecutions, riot cases, serial-offence clusters) where evidentiary architectures are shared.
Higher bar for voluntariness of Section 164 CrPC confessions: The judgment reiterates strict compliance: genuine voluntariness, meaningful and private access to legal aid, adequate time for reflection, and insulation from police influence. Magistrates must record clear, unqualified satisfaction on voluntariness and ensure the Investigating Officer is not present or proximate in a way that can influence the maker. Non-compliance risks Section 24 inadmissibility.
Clarifying Section 27 Evidence Act practice: The Court emphasizes contemporaneous disclosure memos, consistency across remand and seizure documents, and the necessity of demonstrating that discovery truly flows from the accused’s information and is not from a place already known to police/public. Open-area seizures with prior knowledge will be scrutinized as mere seizures, not discoveries.
Forensic probity and the limits of DNA identification: DNA that establishes identity of remains does not, by itself, establish authorship of the crime. Courts will expect scene-of-crime consistency (blood patterns, transfer evidence, traces within alleged locations), reliable chain-of-custody for exhibits, and activity-level forensic linkage to an accused. The absence of such linkage may be fatal in circumstantial cases.
Investigative standards and institutional learning: The judgment’s candid critique underscores the need for early scene security, contemporaneous documentation, independent medical oversight during custody, robust legal aid, and exploration of alternate hypotheses. Agencies may need to revisit SOPs and training, especially in high-profile, multi-victim cases.
Death penalty jurisprudence and heightened scrutiny: Even where a death sentence is later commuted, the conviction’s endurance can be incompatible with Articles 14 and 21 if its pillars are structurally infirm. The judgment reinforces the “more searching scrutiny” sensibility in capital cases across the life cycle of litigation.
Practical effects on related proceedings: With the acquittal, pending SLPs concerning the mercy commutation became infructuous. This highlights how curative outcomes can render collateral proceedings academic.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Curative jurisdiction: A narrow power the Supreme Court uses, after review is exhausted, to correct fundamental defects that undermine justice and the integrity of its own final judgments. It is not a second review or a re-appeal. Typical triggers include violation of natural justice, undisclosed bias, or—as clarified here—irreconcilably inconsistent outcomes on the same record.
Ex debito justitiae: Latin for “as a debt of justice.” The Court’s intervention is not mere discretion; in certain circumstances, the Court is duty-bound to act to prevent manifest injustice.
Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution: Article 14 guarantees equality before the law: like cases must be treated alike. Article 21 ensures no person is deprived of life or personal liberty except according to a fair, just, and reasonable procedure. Both provisions inform the Court’s curative stance here.
Section 164 CrPC confession: A confession recorded by a Magistrate must be voluntary. The Magistrate must caution the accused, provide time for reflection, ensure freedom from police pressure, allow meaningful access to legal aid, and record clear satisfaction of voluntariness. Failure invites inadmissibility under Section 24 of the Evidence Act.
Section 24 Evidence Act: A confession is inadmissible if it appears to be caused by any inducement, threat, or promise by a person in authority, leading the accused to suppose they would gain advantage or avoid evil in reference to the proceedings.
Section 27 Evidence Act: Only that portion of information given by an accused in police custody which distinctly relates to the discovery of a fact is admissible, provided the discovery is in consequence of that information and was not already known. Prior public or police knowledge, or seizure from an open/known place, undermines admissibility.
“Identical evidentiary substratum”: Cases that rely on the same confession, the same type of recoveries, and the same forensic narrative. If such a shared foundation is judicially discredited in a set of cases, maintaining a conviction in another indistinguishable case is arbitrary.
DNA identification vs authorship: DNA can confirm identity of remains (e.g., that they belong to a particular missing person) but does not inherently prove who committed the crime. Activity-level linkage (e.g., traces connecting the accused to the act) is needed to prove authorship.
Chain of custody: The documented integrity of evidence from collection to courtroom. Breaks or inconsistencies can render forensic results unreliable.

Conclusion

Surendra Koli v. State of Uttar Pradesh is a landmark in the law of curative jurisdiction. It does three things of enduring importance. First, it explicitly recognises that irreconcilably inconsistent final outcomes on an identical evidentiary foundation are a cognizable ground for curative intervention, anchored in Articles 14 and 21. Second, it reframes the inquiry in post-finality correction away from re-appreciation of facts and toward identification of structural infirmities in the mode of proof—voluntariness of confession, legality of “discoveries,” and forensic integrity—especially where those infirmities have already been judicially established in indistinguishable companion cases. Third, it reaffirms that in criminal adjudication, more so where death penalty looms, suspicion cannot substitute proof; only admissible, reliable, and constitutionally obtained evidence can sustain a conviction.

The judgment preserves the value of finality by confining curative relief to narrow grounds, even as it prevents finality from ossifying error into injustice. It offers concrete guidance to Magistrates, investigators, and trial courts: strictly safeguard voluntariness in Section 164 CrPC confessions; contemporaneously record and corroborate Section 27 disclosures; secure scenes, preserve chains of custody, and ground DNA findings in activity-level linkage. For the appellate judiciary, it provides a principled parity mechanism to avoid arbitrary divergence when identical records are in play.

Ultimately, the Court’s message is clear: when this Court’s own final orders speak with discordant voices on the same record, constitutional fidelity requires the Court to cure the dissonance. In doing so here, the Supreme Court has both vindicated the rule of law and fortified public confidence in the administration of justice.